Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 2585 (BOM)

Ashok v. Sunita Sanjay Pawade

2019-11-25

V.M.DESHPANDE

body2019
JUDGMENT : V.M. Deshpande, J. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. Heard Mr. G.C. Khond, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Mir Nagman Ali, the learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The challenge that is set up in the present writ petition is to the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, (Court No.3), Wani, below Exh.24 on 05.7.2019 in Summary Criminal Case No. 1818/2018. By the impugned order, the learned Magistrate has allowed the application (Exh.24) filed on behalf of the respondent and directed the petitioner to deposit 20% amount of the cheques as compensation in the Court. 3. Following few facts giving rise to this writ petition will be necessary to decide the controversy : The respondent herein is the complainant who filed a complaint before the Court below alleging therein that the petitioner has committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as "the N.I. Act" for short). According to the complaint, the respondent/ complainant is a Commission Agent and through her, during the period from 16.4.2018 to 31.5.2018, the petitioner has purchased various commodities. Therefore, as per the rules of the Agricultural Produce and Marketing Committee, the petitioner was required to give 1% as commission to the complainant. It is also stated in the complaint that in order to discharge his legal liability, the petitioner issued nine cheques of different dates ranging from 27.4.2018 to 12.6.2018 for various amounts. Those cheques were deposited by the respondent/complainant with her banker. However, on 06.7.2018 all those cheques were returned by the banker of the petitioner with an endorsement "Exceed Arrangement". It is further stated in the complaint that thereafter on 26.07.2018, a statutory notice was given by the respondent, which was received by the petitioner on 27.7.2018. the said was replied by the petitioner by reply dated 06.8.2018 raising various disputes. By notice dated 26.7.2018, the petitioner was asked to pay the amount by 11.8.2018. Since, till that date the amount was not paid, the offence was completed and therefore, on 01.9.2018 the complaint was lodged. 4. the said was replied by the petitioner by reply dated 06.8.2018 raising various disputes. By notice dated 26.7.2018, the petitioner was asked to pay the amount by 11.8.2018. Since, till that date the amount was not paid, the offence was completed and therefore, on 01.9.2018 the complaint was lodged. 4. During pendency of the complaint, initially on 17.01.2019, an application (Exh.18) under Section 143A of the N.I. Act was moved by the respondent seeking direction against the petitioner that the petitioner shall deposit 20% of the total cheque amount. The said application was disposed of by the learned Magistrate on 19.3.2019 by rejecting it on the ground that plea of the petitioner was not recorded. At the same time, liberty was granted to the respondent/complainant to move the application afresh. 5. After the plea was recorded, the respondent moved application (Exh.24) under Section 143A of the N.I. Act seeking direction against the petitioner to deposit 20% of the cheque amount in view of the amendment to the N.I.Act. The said application was contested, however, by the impugned order dated 05.7.2019 the application (Exh.24) is allowed. Hence, the present writ petition. 6. Mr. Khond, the learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of G. J. Raja .vs. Tejraj Surana, (2019) 10 Scale 168 to buttress his submission that Section 143A of the N.I. Act is prospective in nature and therefore, the respondent/complainant cannot file application under Section 143-A in view of the fact that the offence is committed prior to introduction of the amendment. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in G.J.Raja's case (supra) in paragraph 14 has observed as under : "14. In the present case, the complaint was lodged in the year 2016 that is to say, the act constituting an offence had occurred by 2016 whereas, the concerned provision viz. Section 143A of the Act was inserted in the statute book with effect from 01.9.2018. The question that arises therefore is whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section 143A. Section 143A of the Act was inserted in the statute book with effect from 01.9.2018. The question that arises therefore is whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section 143A. We are concerned in the present case only with the issue regarding applicability of said Section 143A to offences under Section 138 of the Act, committed before the insertion of said Section 143A." 8. Similarly, in paragraph 24 of G.J. Raja's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court hold that Section 143A of the N.I. Act is prospective in operation. Paragraph 24 is reproduced herein below : "24. In the ultimate analysis, we hold Section 143A to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book. Consequently, the orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court are required to be set aside. The money deposited by the Appellant, pursuant to the interim direction passed by this Court, shall be returned to the Appellant along with interest accrued thereon within two weeks from the date of this order." 9. Section 143A of the N.I. Act came in the statute book on 01.9.2018. Admittedly, the cheques in question were issued on different dates ranging from 27.4.2018 to 12.6.2018 i.e. prior to amendment. Even the return memo given by the banker of the petitioner intimating that the cheques issued by the petitioner cannot be honoured, is dated 06.7.2018. The statutory notice is given by the respondent on 26.7.2018 and it was received by the petitioner on 27.7.2018. The petitioner was to pay the amount as per the notice on or before 11.8.2018. Till 11.8.2018 it cannot be said that the offence is completed. The offence will be completed only after 11.8.2018. Thus, the offence is committed on 11.8.2018. The amendment is brought in the Statute book on 01.9.2019 i.e. subsequent to commitment of the offence. In view of this factual position, the learned Magistrate has committed a mistake in law in allowing the application (Exh.24). Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. Hence, the following order : ORDER 1. Thus, the offence is committed on 11.8.2018. The amendment is brought in the Statute book on 01.9.2019 i.e. subsequent to commitment of the offence. In view of this factual position, the learned Magistrate has committed a mistake in law in allowing the application (Exh.24). Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. Hence, the following order : ORDER 1. The criminal writ petition is allowed. 2. The order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, (Court No.3), Wani, below Exh.24 on 05.7.2019 in Summary Criminal Case No. 1818/2018, is hereby quashed and set aside. 3. The application (Exh.24) is rejected. 4. It is expected from the learned Judge of the Court below to expedite the trial. 5. Rule is made absolute. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.