JUDGMENT : A.J. SHASTRI, J. 1. Rule. Mr. Amar N. Bhatt, learned advocate waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent. 2. The present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking following relief’s: “9.(a) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow present petition; (b) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned Order dated 27.04.2018 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, below Exhibit 1 in Civil Misc. Application No.27 of 2017; (c) Your Lordships be pleased to set aside the ex-parte Judgment and decree dated 19.03.2015 passed by the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad in Summary Civil Suit No.2927 of 2014 in the interest of justice; (d) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant the Petitioner unconditional leave to defend the Summary Civil Suit No.2927 of 2014; (e) Your Lordships be pleased to set aside execution proceedings instituted by the Respondent by filing Execution Application No.449 of 2016 before the Hon’ble City Civil Court at Bombay for execution of the ex-parte Judgment and decree dated 19.03.2015 passed in Summary Civil Suit No.2927 of 2014 by the Hon’ble City Civil Court at Ahmedabad in the interest of justice; (f) Pending admission and final hearing of the present Petition, by way of ad-interim or interim order, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the operation, implementation and execution of impugned Order dated 27.04.2018 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, below Exhibit 1 in Civil Misc. Application No.27 of 2017 (g) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, Your Lordships be pleased to suspend/stay the operation, implementation and execution of the ex-parte decree dated 19.03.2015 passed in Summary Civil Suit No.2927 of 2014 and stay the execution proceedings instituted by the Opponent by filing Execution Application No.449 of 2016 before the Hon’ble City Civil Court at Bombay for execution of the ex-parte Judgment and decree dated 19.03.2015 passed by the Hon’ble City Civil Court at Ahmedabad in Summary Civil Suit No.2927 of 2014; (h) An ex-parte ad-interim relief in terms of para (c) above may be passed in the interest of justice. (i) Any other and further relief that may be deemed fit in the facts of the case may be granted.” 3. The background of facts is that the respondent herein has instituted a Summary Civil Suit No.2927 of 2014 before the learned City Civil Court, Ahmedabad for recovery of Rs.1,32,34,810/- (principal amount) and Rs. 28,16,483/- (interest) from the petitioner. The case of the present petitioner is that the petitioner could not appear before the Court to defend the suit, since the Chief Finance Officer (hereinafter referred as to the “C.F.O.”) of the Company, who had received the summons, did not inform the Company nor took any action and on account of his dereliction of duty, the suit came to be decreed ex-parte on 19.03.2015. Pursuant to the said ex-parte decree, the present respondent instituted Execution Application No.449 of 2016 and came to know about the fact that the petitioner submitted Civil Misc. Application No.27 of 2016 before the learned City Civil Court, Ahmedabad for seeking setting aside ex-parte decree, and to grant unconditional leave to defend the said suit and the said Civil Misc. Application having been rejected vide order dated 27.04.2018, the present petition came to be instituted in the month of August 2018, and as per the say of the petitioner, it is substantially on account of inaction on the part of C.F.O., that the Company faced a huge amount of ex-parte money decree. As a result of this, for recalling the said ex-parte decree, an application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the C.P.C. came to be filed. 4. The Court, time and again, appears to have granted respite to the parties to explore the possibility of settlement, as the petitioner had given a settlement proposal to the learned advocate representing the respondent No.1 but having not materialised the said proposal, ultimately, the petition came up for consideration and was heard on 15.03.2019. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Nandish Chudgar for Nanavati Associates appearing for the petitioner has contended that there was a sufficient cause shown as to why the petitioner is facing ex-parte judgment and decree and cogent reason for recalling the same is also projected, but the learned City Civil Judge has not considered it in its proper perspective. Mr. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Nandish Chudgar for Nanavati Associates appearing for the petitioner has contended that there was a sufficient cause shown as to why the petitioner is facing ex-parte judgment and decree and cogent reason for recalling the same is also projected, but the learned City Civil Judge has not considered it in its proper perspective. Mr. Chudgar, learned advocate has further submitted that there are serious issues of law and fact entangled in the present proceedings, and as such, the learned Judge ought to have granted unconditional leave to defend, since several triable issues are involved, more particularly, an issue related to jurisdiction, and therefore, the order passed by the learned City Civil Judge suffers from material irregularities and hence, deserves to be corrected. 5.1. Mr. Chudgar, learned advocate has further submitted that for the purpose of showing sufficient cause, as required under Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the C.P.C., a specific attention was drawn to the learned Judge about the inaction and dereliction of duty on the part of C.F.O., and ultimately, even the Company has sacked off the said officer who created the problem for Company and that action also having been brought to the notice of learned Judge, still the order is passed which deserves to be quashed and set and aside. 5.2. Mr. Chudgar, learned advocate has further submitted that the very suit which has been submitted cannot form a suit within the preview of Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. particularly when the interest amount has been claimed and that being a triable issue, as held by series of decisions, the learned Judge has committed an error in not appreciating the same. It has been submitted that good and sufficient reason is assigned even on merit that when an ex-parte decree is not sustainable, a fair chance ought to have been given, even on a reasonable condition. Though, the interest is not forming part of an agreement, the same has been claimed which itself is a circumstance, which ousts the suit of the respondent from purview of a Summary Suit and no purchase order is indicating the factum of interest, still it has been claimed at the rate of 14 %. Hence, triable issues with regard to interest as well as jurisdiction are involved, the Court ought not to have discarded request of the petitioner. 5.3. Hence, triable issues with regard to interest as well as jurisdiction are involved, the Court ought not to have discarded request of the petitioner. 5.3. Mr.Chudgar, learned advocate has further contended that here is a case in which, admittedly, the petitioner is situated at Mumbai, goods were to be delivered at Kandla and the project work was also at a place outside the Gujarat, and therefore, in any case, simply because the office of the plaintiff i.e. the respondent herein is situated in Ahmedabad, the same would not confer jurisdiction in the Civil Court at Ahmedabad and this being an issue, triable in nature, unconditional leave deserves to be granted and in any case, on account of negligence of an officer of the Company, the petitioner may not be penalized to this extent, since most meritorious case is tried to be defeated on account of technicality. The learned City Civil Judge is sufficiently couched with the powers to recall an ex-parte decree and simultaneously ought to have extended an opportunity of defence by giving even a conditional leave. Having not done so, there appears to be a serious error in exercising jurisdiction which requires intervention of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr.Chudgar, learned advocate has further submitted that the reasons which are assigned are also not sufficiently cogent enough to sustain the conclusion arrived at. The cause of action, which has been narrated, is also clearly ill-founded in so far as place of Ahmedabad is concerned. Whenever an issue of jurisdiction is raised, according to the learned advocate, there should be a definite and positive finding about the jurisdiction. Having not done so, this material irregularity deserves to be corrected. Mr.Chudgar, learned advocate has further submitted that the plaintiff has to assert clearly, as required under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the C.P.C. and that having not been mentioned, merely on the basis of invoice which is not counter signed, cannot be imposed upon the Company. The entire transaction has been finalized pursuant to the purchase order in which there is no reference about jurisdiction. Hence, the order in question is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5.4 To strengthen the submissions, learned advocate Mr.Nandish Chudgar has relied upon following decisions: (i) In the case of Zonal Manager versus Akhilbhai B.Mehta reported in 2001 (0) GLHEL-HC 214015. Hence, the order in question is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5.4 To strengthen the submissions, learned advocate Mr.Nandish Chudgar has relied upon following decisions: (i) In the case of Zonal Manager versus Akhilbhai B.Mehta reported in 2001 (0) GLHEL-HC 214015. (ii) In the case of Chlochem Ltd. versus Lifeline Industries Ltd. passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No.13041 of 2012 decided on 01.08.2014. (iii) In the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited versus Hubtown Limited reported in (2017) 1 SCC 568 . 5.5 Ultimately, a request is made by learned advocate Mr.Chudgar to allow the petition and grant the relief, as prayed for, in the present petition. 6. To meet with the stand taken by learned advocate Mr.Nandish Chudgar, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, learned advocate Mr.Amar N.Bhatt appearing for the respondent-plaintiff has submitted that the learned Judge has after proper application of mind and after closely scrutinizing the defence, found that there is no sufficient circumstance pointed out which requires the Court to exercise jurisdiction under Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the C.P.C. for recalling of an ex-parte decree. Mr.Bhatt, learned advocate has further submitted that in fact there is no plea of whatsoever nature prior to filing of the suit about non-receipt of the goods, or its quality and invoicing which have been time and again given, so much so, the “C” forms have also been issued which fact is not in dispute and as such so far as receipt of the goods are concerned, there is absolutely no grievance raised and as such the defence which has been taken, does not fall within the purview of “special circumstance” which may permit the learned Judge to recall ex-parte decree. So far as jurisdictional aspect is concerned, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt has pointed out that the part payment, pursuant to the transaction, has taken place in Ahmedabad, part of the cause of action has also remained in Ahmedabad and the invoices which are akin to an agreement, the same contains a specific clause with regard to interest as well as with regard to place of jurisdiction and undisputedly, the invoices were received from time to time by the petitioner and as such, the point of jurisdiction is not available to the petitioner. 6.1. 6.1. To sustain these submissions, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt has drawn attention of this Court to a decision in the case of M/s. H.S.Shobasing and Sons versus Saurashtra Iron Foundry and Steel Works Private Ltd. reported in 1968 (9) GLR 932 and by referring to paragraph No.5 has contended that Ahmedabad has got jurisdiction where the suit is submitted. A further decision which is in the case of A.B.C.Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another versus A.P.Agencies, Salem reported in (1989) 2 SCC 163 has also been pressed into service by referring paragraphs No.13, 14, 15 and 16 and thereby contended that issue of jurisdiction is taken just for the sake of taking up, as they were clearly at fault. It has further been submitted that an attempt is made to divert attention on the issue of jurisdiction. Even the purchase orders which are produced has got no exclusion clause about jurisdiction, so this Court has certainly jurisdiction which is to exercise within the powers vested in law. 6.2. So far as triable issue which is tried to be canvased by referring to a few decisions and thereby contention that since the interest is claimed, the suit does not fall within the purview of Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. is concerned, in fact, according to learned advocate Mr.Amar N.Bhatt, it is clearly a misconception and as held by Delhi High Court as well as other Courts e-bills/invoices are to be construed as written contracts. Hence, the invoices are clearly referring to the rate of interest to be payable and also referring to the jurisdictional issue, both the points which have been canvased by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner are ill-founded and hence, the same cannot constitute a sufficient cause, in any case. 6.3 To support these contentions, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt has further relied upon decisions in the case of Lucky Electrical Stores, by partner Mahendra Kumar Shah & Anr. 6.3 To support these contentions, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt has further relied upon decisions in the case of Lucky Electrical Stores, by partner Mahendra Kumar Shah & Anr. Versus Ramesh Steel House, by partner Babulal reported in 1988 SCC OnLine Madras 100, in the case of Jatin Koticha versus VFC Industries Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Bombay 1092, and in the case of Bijender Chauhan @ Bijender Kumar versus Financial Eyes (India) Ltd. reported in ILR (2013) IV Delhi 3234 decided on 23.07.2013 and contended that invoices are to be construed as written contracts and further has also submitted that since the plea of defective goods is not at all raised, there is hardly any substance in the submissions of petitioner. So far as negligence of an officer i.e. C.F.O. is concerned, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt has submitted that on page 195, the terms of appointment letter of this C.F.O. is not reflecting any assignment of legal duty and the duties are well stipulated in a detailed order of appointment, which is acknowledged by the concerned employee and signed by the authority of the petitioner-Company, and therefore, an erroneous reason is tried to be concocted to avoid the decree which has crystalized the liability of the petitioner. So far as termination order is concerned, which is dated 04.04.2016, it does not inspire confidence, looking to the terms of the employment and if the sequence of this termination is to be co-related with ex-parte decree and its execution, it appears that the same is nothing, but a concoction. When that be so, the circumstances which are postulated by the petitioner are not forming sufficient explanation which calls for any interference, particularly when the learned trial Judge has clearly examined the issue. 6.4. Learned advocate Mr.Amar N.Bhatt has further contended that the rate of interest in invoice is not in dispute, the judgment which has been relied upon is a per incuriam judgment and looking to the interpretation of “special circumstance”, the request of the petitioner does not form part of Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the C.P.C.. 6.4. Learned advocate Mr.Amar N.Bhatt has further contended that the rate of interest in invoice is not in dispute, the judgment which has been relied upon is a per incuriam judgment and looking to the interpretation of “special circumstance”, the request of the petitioner does not form part of Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the C.P.C.. When that be so, the object of Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. may not be allowed to be frustrated at the instance of the petitioner who has not come out with any “special circumstance” and for that purpose, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt has relied upon a decision in the case of TVC Skyshop Limited versus Reliance Communication and Infrastructure Limited reported in (2013) 11 SCC 754 and by referring to paragraphs No.10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, a request is made to dismiss the petition. 6.5 Additionally, learned advocate Mr.Bhatt has further relied upon yet another decision, which is in the case of Flcom Organics Ltd. versus Laffans Petrochemicals Ltd. reported in 1998 SCC OnLine Gujarat 380 and has submitted that no case is made out. Mr.Bhatt, learned advocate has further submitted that at least this is not a case in which any extraordinary jurisdiction deserves to be exercised which is purely equitable in nature. So far as interest part is concerned, by virtue of Order II Rule 2 of the C.P.C., there is always a right to abandon part of the claim and as such simply because less interest amount is claimed that would not push the case of the petitioner outside the purview of a Summary Suit. 7. In counter to this, learned advocate Mr.Nandish Chudgar appearing for the petitioner has reiterated that since these aforesaid issues at least are suggesting that triable issues are involved and further a pure question of law of jurisdiction is raised, looking to the criteria which has been propounded in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra), by imposing some reasonable conditions at least the defence be allowed by way of a fair chance. Hence, by referring to paragraphs No.10, 14, 15 and 19, a request is made that the petitioner is ready and willing to abide by any reasonable conditions. No other submissions have been made. 8. Hence, by referring to paragraphs No.10, 14, 15 and 19, a request is made that the petitioner is ready and willing to abide by any reasonable conditions. No other submissions have been made. 8. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the entire record, ex-facie, it appears that two major issues have been raised, one with regard to jurisdiction and another with regard to tenability of a suit, since the interest is claimed and third defence is that negligence of C.F.O. may not be allowed to put to jeopardy the petitioner’s defence. Now, in the light of this, before coming to any conclusion, the record which has been placed before the Court deserves some consideration. It has been specifically noted down in the suit proceedings that outstanding principal amount is required to be recovered with interest @ 14% per annum and so far as jurisdiction issue is concerned, a specific assertion is made in paragraph No.9 at page 53 of the petition compilation, which reads as under: “9. The purchase orders for the manufacturing and supply of the materials were placed by the Defendant and accepted by the Plaintiff at Ahmedabad, the payment of the price of the goods sold by the Plaintiff was to be made and part payments as stated above were in fact made at Ahmedabad and therefore, this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. As per the condition in the invoices also this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.” 9. Now, in the light of aforesaid circumstances, so far as jurisdiction aspect is concerned, it has been specifically asserted that Ahmedabad place, which has a jurisdiction and now for that purpose, the commercial invoices which are issued and received by the petitioner-Company, if to be seen from the list of documents, it would clearly suggests that the invoices are categorically mentioning a clause about jurisdiction. For example, one of the commercial invoices, which is reflecting on page 60 of the petition compilation, if to be looked into clause No. 3 at bottom of the said document has what a specific indication “Subject to Ahmedabad Jurisdiction” and undisputedly, these invoices have been received by the petitioner-Company. For example, one of the commercial invoices, which is reflecting on page 60 of the petition compilation, if to be looked into clause No. 3 at bottom of the said document has what a specific indication “Subject to Ahmedabad Jurisdiction” and undisputedly, these invoices have been received by the petitioner-Company. Further, the correspondence which took place is also appearing from plaintiff’s Ahmedabad office and as such, when a clear indication is suggested about the place of jurisdiction, there is hardly any confusion on that issue, since merely a purchase order might not have reflected it and this issue has been examined by the learned City Civil Judge in the impugned order at length and the Court see no perversity or irregularity in such conclusion on the issue of jurisdiction. 10. On the point of jurisdiction, this Court has an advantage of some of the observations made in paragraph No.5 of a decision in the case of M/s. H.S.Shobasing and Sons (supra), which clearly clinches the issue, and hence, same is reproduced hereinafter: “5. Lastly, on behalf of the applicants and argument was advanced that if this rule of English common law were to be introduced in Indian law for determining questions of jurisdiction, it will be in conflict with another statutory provision namely, sec. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code. The argument ran that sec. 20 only provides three clauses laying down the provisions under which a suit can be filed in a particular Court. And this English rule of common law, if adopted, would amount to adding a fourth clause to sec. 20 because this rule would not otherwise fall within any of the three clauses of sec. 20. I am unable to find any substance in this contention also. This rule of common law very clearly does not raise a fourth clause at all. It only lays down that a cause of action would arise at the place where the creditor resides because there is an obligation on the part of the debtor not only to pay back the money but also an obligation to find him and make the payment to the creditor where he resides. Under these circumstances, a part of the cause of action arise within the jurisdiction of the Court where the creditor resides. Under these circumstances, a part of the cause of action arise within the jurisdiction of the Court where the creditor resides. This aspect also receives support from the decision of the Bombay High Court in A.I.R. 1933 Bombay, 179 where this aspect has been considered. Therefore, this third contentions also must fail.” From the aforesaid reading of the observations, here not only the plaintiff-Company is situated at Ahmedabad, but is also in receipt of part-payment towards the transaction at Ahmedabad, which is not in dispute and as such, to raise an issue of jurisdiction, is nothing but an attempt to thwart the proceedings. 11. Yet another decision, which cannot be unnoticed is a decision, which is in the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another(supra), wherein, by interpreting Section 20(c) of the C.P.C., the Apex Court has observed that in a matter of contract, there may arise cause of action at various places and at various kind and has stipulated that when part of the cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract, and here also undisputedly the amount is to be paid at Ahmedabad, where usual residence of plaintiff- Company is situated. Paragraphs No.13, 14, 15 and 16 are since relevant, the same are reproduced hereinafter:- “13. Under section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure subject to the limitation stated theretofore, every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. It may be remembered that earlier section 7 of Act 7 of 1888 added Explanation III as under: "Explanation III--In suits arising out of contract the cause of action arises within the meaning of this section at any of the following places, namely: (1) the place where the contract was made; (2) the place where the contract was to be performed or performance thereof completed; (3) the place where in performance of the contract any money to which the suit relates was expressly or impliedly payable." 14. The above Explanation III has not been omitted but nevertheless it may serve a guide. There must be a connecting factor. 15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. The above Explanation III has not been omitted but nevertheless it may serve a guide. There must be a connecting factor. 15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the Law of Contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have perform ed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits f or agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is plead ed as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to t he Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors. 16. If a contract is plead ed as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to t he Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors. 16. So long as the parties to a contract do not oust t he jurisdiction of all the Courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law it cannot be said that the parties have by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the Courts. If under the law several Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to other or others of them it cannot be said that there is total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where the parties to a contract agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a particular jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law their agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdictions cannot be said to be void as against public policy. If on the other hand the jurisdiction they agreed to submit to would not otherwise be proper jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the contract it must be declared void being against public policy. Would this be t he position in the instant case?” 12. So, from the aforesaid situation, which is prevailing on record and in consideration of proposition of law laid down by aforesaid decisions, this Court is of the considered opinion that no error is committed by the learned trial Judge in holding and concluding the point of jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff. 13. So far as contention with regard to interest having been claimed, it emerges as a triable issue, or is bringing the suit outside the purview of Summary Suit. Now, if this is to be examined under Order II Rule 2 of C.P.C. it clearly permit the plaintiff to relinquish part of the claim it may be in the form of the interest. Order 2 of the C.P.C. which deals with framing of suit, categorically prescribe that whenever plaintiff omits to sue in respect of any portion of claim, he then cannot claim it in future. A reference deserves to be made hence, reproduced hereinafter: “2. Order 2 of the C.P.C. which deals with framing of suit, categorically prescribe that whenever plaintiff omits to sue in respect of any portion of claim, he then cannot claim it in future. A reference deserves to be made hence, reproduced hereinafter: “2. Suit to include the whole claim.- (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several relief’s.- A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such relief’s; but if he omits, except with the leave of this Court, to sue for all such relief’s, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.” 14. This leave of relinquishment must be at the threshold and cannot be at a subsequent stage, as held by the Bombay High Court in its decision, reported in AIR 1993 Bombay 67, and hence, in the context of that if the plaint is to be seen, at the very first instance, what has been claimed is interest of 14% instead of 24%, which has been mentioned in commercial invoice and as such, it is not the case that at a subsequent stage, after filing of Summary Suit, a lesser amount of interest is claimed. Hence, the dispute which is now tried to be raised is appearing to be not sufficient enough to hold it as a sufficient circumstance for recalling of the order, as held by several decisions that invoice or bill, even if not signed but pursuant to which the goods have been delivered and received, the same has to be construed as a written contract and here also, the invoices which are reflecting on the record are having a clause with respect to jurisdiction as well as with respect to claim of interest. Hence, the defence which is tried to be projected to treat the same as a “special circumstance” is not possible to be digested. 15. In a decision delivered by Madras High Court in the case of Lucky Electrical Stores, by partner Mahendra Kumar Shah & Anr. (supra), paragraph No.12 categorically observes that invoices are nothing but akin to written contract. The detailed narration of provisions and the proposition as considered and the relevant observations contained in paragraph No.12 are reproduced hereinafter: “12. On merits, it appears to me that it would be too superficial a view to hold that no written contract exists in the instant case. The contention appears to be that a written contract as contemplated by Order 37, Rule 1, C.P.C. must be a contract which is signed by both parties. Now, the relevant part of Order 37, Rule 1(2) reads as follows: “Subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (1), the Order applies to the following classes of suits, namely:- (a) suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes; (b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising, (i) on a written contract; or (ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; or (iii) on a gurantee, where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only.” Under Clause (b), under Rule 1(2), a summary suit can be filed to recover a liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, arising on a written contract. What is necessary for the purposes of this case is that a liquidated demand in money must arise on a written contract. A written contract or a contract in writing need not always be a contract signed by both parties. The Court of Appeal in T.A. Ruf and Company Ltd. v. Pauwels (1919)1 K.B. 660, was called upon to construe the words "contract in writing". The facts of that case were that by contract dated 28th February, 1918 Pauwels had sold to Ruf & Company a quantity of soap. The terms of the contract were contained in a sold note signed only by Pauwels. At the foot of the sold note were the words "Please confirm the above". The facts of that case were that by contract dated 28th February, 1918 Pauwels had sold to Ruf & Company a quantity of soap. The terms of the contract were contained in a sold note signed only by Pauwels. At the foot of the sold note were the words "Please confirm the above". A dispute arose under the contract as to non-delivery of part of the soap and was referred to arbitration in accordance with the clause contained in the note. In the award made by the arbitrators there was a recital that "by a contract in writing made by Alphonse Pauwela with T.A. Ruf & Co. Ltd., dated the 28th day of February, 1918, Alphonse Pauwels contracted to sell and deliver" a certain quantity of soap to Ruf & Co. at a certain price and that a dispute had arisen which was referred to arbitration. By the award which was against the purchasers the purchasers were directed "to pay the costs of the reference, arbitration and award, including 361.15s. our fees and expenses in regard to the said arbitration, as we consider that their conduct in not confirming in writing the contract was probably the cause of the dispute". This award was sought to be set aside on the ground that "it is bad in law and shows error on its face and shows further that there was no legal contract binding on the parties". The Divisional Court ordered the award to be set aside on the ground that on the face of the award the arbitrators had treated as a contract in writing binding upon both parties that which was signed by one of the parties only and was therefore not a contract in writing. Ruf & Company appealed against this judgment. Warrington, L.J. in his judgment referred to the fact that though written confirmation was not sent by the purchasers, the arbitrators had come to the conclusion that there was a parol acceptance by Ruf & Co. of the terms of the sold note, and observed as follows: “Taken in conjunction with the rest of the award they seem to me to indicate that the arbitrators found that Ruf & Co. had confirmed the contract though not in writing, and if so they may quite properly refer to the contract as a "contract in writing". Although the memorandum of it was signed by one party only”. had confirmed the contract though not in writing, and if so they may quite properly refer to the contract as a "contract in writing". Although the memorandum of it was signed by one party only”. Duke, L.J. in a separate judgment observed at page 670: “As to the suggestion which was made that the words "contract in writing" import a contract made by means of a writing or writings signed by both parties, I do not think the words necessarily have that meaning. A document purporting to be an agreement may be an agreement in writing sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an Act of Parliament though it is only verified by the signature of one of the parties: In Re Jones (1895)2 Ch. 719. Here the question is one of a bargain for the sale of goods. I doubt whether the objection which is here set up to avoid a business transaction would have been sufficient to support a special demurrer before the passing of the Common Law Procedure Acts.” The appeal was allowed and the award was restored. There is, therefore, sufficient authority to indicate that even though the invoice of the bill is not signed by the other party to the contract, as a result of the acceptance of the goods delivered in pursuance of the invoice the demand for the price of goods admittedly received by the purchaser on the basis of the invoice must be held to arise on "written contract". Even according to the defendants, they had received goods in pursuance of their order and the goods were expressly supplied to them. According to them, the amount due was Rs. l0,713.89 out of which they had paid Rs. 9,252.92. Beyond this bare statement there is nothing to show how and when such payments were made. Therefore, the defendant's vague plea with regard to the payment of Rs. 9,252.92 without disclosure of any details cannot be said to make out any triable issue. The defendants having admitted that a sum of Rs. 10,713.89 was due would undoubtedly be entitled to an opportunity to show that there was repayment. At best, they may be entitled to a conditional leave to defend on the deposit of the admitted amount.” 16. 9,252.92 without disclosure of any details cannot be said to make out any triable issue. The defendants having admitted that a sum of Rs. 10,713.89 was due would undoubtedly be entitled to an opportunity to show that there was repayment. At best, they may be entitled to a conditional leave to defend on the deposit of the admitted amount.” 16. Yet another decision which is in the case of Jatin Koticha versus (supra) delivered by the Bombay High Court has also clearly opined in the line, on which, the Madras High Court has held. Hence, paragraph No.6 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinafter: “6. Now it is clear that there is no written contract signed by both the parties relied on by the plaintiff. It is not the requirement of the law that it should be a written contract signed by both the parties. What is necessary is that the suit should be based on a written contract. That, one can find in this case, in the form of invoices which were raised on the defendants along with delivery of the goods in pursuance of each purchase order. The invoices, as stated above, contained the terms and conditions. There is a clear parole acceptance of the invoice on the part of the defendants. The defendants accepted delivery of the goods along with the invoice without any demur or suggestion that they do not accept any of the terms whether pertaining to the rate, price, quantity etc. It makes no difference therefore that the invoices are not signed by both the parties. I am of view that the invoices must be treated as a written contract and the suit based on such invoices is a suit based on the written contract. This view is fortified by the Madras High Court reported in The Madras Law Journal Reports 1988 page 187 (Lucky Electrical Stores, by partner Mahendra Kumar Shah and Anr. v. Ramesh Steel House by Partner Babulal 1988 M.L.J.R. 187, where the Chief Justice M.N. Chandurkar, rejected the contention similar to the one applied by the defendants in this case. The relevant observation reads thus: “...What is necessary for the purposes of this case is that a liquidated demand in money must arise on a written contract. A written contract or a contract in writing need not always be a contract signed by both parties. The relevant observation reads thus: “...What is necessary for the purposes of this case is that a liquidated demand in money must arise on a written contract. A written contract or a contract in writing need not always be a contract signed by both parties. The Court of Appeal in (T.A. Rufand Co. Ltd. v. Pauwels) (1919) 1 K.B. 660, was called upon to construe the words "contract in writing". The facts of that case were that by contract dated 28th February, 1918 Pauwels had sold to Ruf and Company a quantity of soap. The terms of the contract were contained in a sold note signed only by Pauwels. At the foot of the sold note were the words "Please confirm the above". A dispute arose under the contract as to non-delivery of part of the soap and was referred to arbitration in accordance with the Clause contained in the note. In the award made by the arbitrators there was a recital that "by a contract in writing made by Alphonse Pauwela with T.A. Rufand Co. Ltd., dated the 28th day of February, 1918, Alphonse Pauwels contracted to sell and deliver" a certain quantity of soap to Ruf and Co. at a certain price and that a dispute had arisen which was referred to arbitration. By the award which was against the purchasers the purchasers were directed "to pay the costs of the reference, arbitration and award, including 361.15s. our fees and expenses in regard to the said arbitration, as we consider that their conduct in not confirming in writing the contract was probably the cause of the dispute". This award was sought to be set aside on the ground that "it is bad in law and shows error on its face and shows further that there was no legal contract binding on the parties". The Divisional Court ordered the award to be set aside on the ground that on the face of the award the arbitrators had treated as a contract in writing binding upon both parties that which was signed by one of the parties only and was therefore not a contract in writing. Ruf and Company appealed against this judgment. Warrington, L.J., in his judgment referred to the fact that though written confirmation was not sent by the purchasers, the arbitrators had come to the conclusion that there was a parol acceptance by Ruf & Co. Ruf and Company appealed against this judgment. Warrington, L.J., in his judgment referred to the fact that though written confirmation was not sent by the purchasers, the arbitrators had come to the conclusion that there was a parol acceptance by Ruf & Co. of the terms of the sold note, and observed as follows: "Taken in conjunction with the rest of the award they seem to me to indicate that the arbitrators found that Ruf and Co." had confirmed the contract though not in writing, and if so they may quite properly refer to the contract as a "contract in writing". Although the memorandum of it was signed by one party only.” 17. Same is the case with a decision delivered by the Delhi High Court, which is in the case of Bijender Chauhan @ Bijender Kumar(supra) wherein same principle is reiterated and as such without unnecessary burdening the present order, this Court is of the opinion that whatever interest amount is claimed is part of the written contract, as reflecting in the invoices. Further, it appears that here in the case on hand that pursuant to the invoices and the purchase orders, the present petitioner i.e. defendant continued to retain goods without intimating the seller i.e. the plaintiff that he has rejected the same and can have then picked-up this defence of defendant is completely sham and absolutely without any merit, the said defence cannot be said to be a genuine defence to be treated as a triable issue. 18. Even the further judgments which have been relied upon by learned advocate Mr.Amar N.Bhatt appearing for the respondent one of is a judgment delivered by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Flcom Organics Ltd. (supra) which has analysed the issue of interest vis-a-vis agreement related to it and even if the interest is not claimed, then also, such liquidated demand of money arising out of the contract is forming the proceedings as Summary Suit and the effect of amending provision is also considered while observing and since the conclusion is considered by the Court, the same are reproduced hereinafter: “29. One contention of Mr. Vakil is required to be considered at this stage. Mr. One contention of Mr. Vakil is required to be considered at this stage. Mr. Vakil has relied on the two decisions of this court in 1992 GLH(UJ) 7 and 1985 GLH(UJ) 2 for contending that if there is no agreement for interest and interest is claimed on the basis of custom or trade, the defendant would be granted unconditional leave to defend a summary suit as a suit for a claim inclusive of interest without any contract for such interest or without any such legal liability would not be maintainable as a summary suit. 30. The aforesaid decisions are based on the decision of Chief Justice Chagla in Civil Revision Application No. 259 of 1954 which was rendered on t e basis of provisions of order 37, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 before its amendment. However, after amendment, order 37, rule 1, specifically provides that the summary suit is maintainable, inter alia, where "the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or a liquidity demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising on a written contract.” 19. Lastly, the basic controversy in the present proceeding is about the fact whether for the purpose of recalling an ex-parte decree, whether any sufficient circumstance is projected or not is the center of controversy. Hence, on this issue, the Court has an advantage of one of the decision of the Apex Court which is in the case of TVC Skyshop Limited (supra), clearly postulating as to the interpretation of sufficient cause. The expression sufficient cause in the context of Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the C.P.C., time and again, it has been the subject of interpretation. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinafter, since in that case also, the official of the appellant-Company has resigned which was not accepted as a “special circumstance”, whereas, here in the case on hand, the employee is sacked off. Hence, following paragraphs are of assistance to the Court, and therefore, the same deserve to be quoted hereinafter: “10. The expression “special circumstances” appearing in Order XXXVII Rule 4 was considered by this Court in Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra (2003) 5 SCC 315 and it was observed: “9. Hence, following paragraphs are of assistance to the Court, and therefore, the same deserve to be quoted hereinafter: “10. The expression “special circumstances” appearing in Order XXXVII Rule 4 was considered by this Court in Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra (2003) 5 SCC 315 and it was observed: “9. The expression “special circumstances” is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code nor is it capable of any precise definition by the court because problems of human beings are so varied and complex. In its ordinary dictionary meaning it connotes something exceptional in character, extraordinary, significant, uncommon. It is an antonym of common, ordinary and general. It is neither practicable nor advisable to enumerate such circumstances. Non-service of summons will undoubtedly be a special circumstance. In an application under Order 37 Rule 4, the court has to determine the question, on the facts of each case, as to whether circumstances pleaded are so unusual or extraordinary as to justify putting the clock back by setting aside the decree; to grant further relief in regard to post-decree matters, namely, staying or setting aside the execution and also in regard to pre-decree matters viz. to give leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit.” 11. In the same judgment, the Court considered the scope of order XXXVII Rule 4 and observed: “11. It is important to note here that the power under Rule 4 of Order 37 is not confined to setting aside the ex parte decree, it extends to staying or setting aside the execution and giving leave to appear to the summons and to defend the suit. We may point out that as the very purpose of Order 37 is to ensure an expeditious hearing and disposal of the suit filed there under, Rule 4 empowers the court to grant leave to the defendant to appear to summons and defend the suit if the court considers it reasonable so to do, on such terms as the court thinks fit in addition to setting aside the decree. Where on an application, more than one among the specified relief’s may be granted by the court, all such relief’s must be claimed in one application. It is not permissible to claim such relief’s in successive petitions as it would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the provision. Where on an application, more than one among the specified relief’s may be granted by the court, all such relief’s must be claimed in one application. It is not permissible to claim such relief’s in successive petitions as it would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the provision. That is why where an application under Rule 4 of Order 37 is filed to set aside a decree either because the defendant did not appear in response to summons and limitation expired, or having appeared, did not apply for leave to defend the suit in the prescribed period, the court is empowered to grant leave to the defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit in the same application. It is, therefore, not enough for the defendant to show special circumstances which prevented him from appearing or applying for leave to defend, he has also to show by affidavit or otherwise, facts which would entitle him leave to defend the suit. In this respect, Rule 4 of Order 37 is different from Rule 13 of Order 9.” 12. In the present case, we find that the application filed by the appellant for setting aside decree dated 7.11.2006 did not disclose any special circumstance which could justify an order under Order XXXVII Rule 4. In his affidavit, Shri Mahesh Katudia had merely stated that sum of Rs.11,00,000/- had been paid in terms of order dated 13.4.2006 passed by the learned Company Judge and proper instructions could not be given to the Advocate engaged for defending the suit. Therefore, it is not possible to find any fault with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court on the tenability of the appellant’s prayer for setting aside decree dated 7.11.2006. 13. Therefore, it is not possible to find any fault with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court on the tenability of the appellant’s prayer for setting aside decree dated 7.11.2006. 13. The argument of Shri Rohan Thawani, learned counsel for the appellant that even though the appellant had not applied for leave to defend, the learned Single Judge was duty bound to scrutinise the claim of the respondent and the suit could have been decreed only if the Court felt satisfied that the claim was bonafide and not vexatious which finds some support from the judgment in Neebha Kapoor v. Jayantilal Khandwala (2008) 3 SCC 770 sounds attractive in the first flash but we do not find any valid ground to overturn the impugned judgment because, as mentioned above, the affidavit filed by Shri Mahesh Katudia did not disclose any special circumstances which could warrant exercise of power under Order XXXVII Rule 4. He did not even contest the liability of the appellant to pay the amount claimed in the plaint. The mere fact that one of the officials of the appellant had resigned would not constitute a valid ground for negating the policy underlying Order XXXVII in general and Rule 3(5) in particular. 14. Equally merit less is the argument of Shri Thawani that the rate at which the respondent claimed interest is highly excessive. According to Shri Jaideep Gupta with whom we agree, the interest was charged as per the terms of the agreement and the appellant had always paid the bills in which interest was claimed at the rate of 30% per annum.” 20. Now, in the aforesaid discussion about relevant proposition of law, if this issue of Company stands on the negligence of the C.F.O. is to be considered, a few documents are also noted down by the learned trial Judge and on that basis, the Court see no reason to interfere. So far as the appointment order is concerned, reflecting on page 195 of the petition compilation, in which specific duties and responsibilities are spelt out in clause 6 which does not cover the legal duties and apart from this, even sequence of the termination order is to be seen, the ground which has been raised does not inspire any confidence. So far as the appointment order is concerned, reflecting on page 195 of the petition compilation, in which specific duties and responsibilities are spelt out in clause 6 which does not cover the legal duties and apart from this, even sequence of the termination order is to be seen, the ground which has been raised does not inspire any confidence. This is in view of the fact that judgment and decree is passed in Summary Suit on 19.03.2015, whereas, Execution Application No.449 of 2016, reflecting on page 158 of the petition compilation, is dated 29.02.2016, which can be seen on page 160 of the petition compilation, warrant of attachment reflecting on that is dated 29.02.2016 and date of sale is stipulated as on 11.03.2016. Now, pursuant to the judgment to pass a decree in terms of it an application, as required under Order XXXVII Rule 2(3) of the C.P.C., is filed at Exh.40 which is on page 162 is dated 19.01.2015/27.01.2015. Now in that, it has been clearly asserted that defendant i.e. present petitioner has been duly served by direct service on 31.12.2014 and affidavit of service to that effect is also placed on record. Such affidavit is also submitted which is again reiterated on page 225 of the petition compilation. Hence, the factum of service to the present petitioner on 31.12.2014 at 10.45 AM is not in dispute and the same was accepted by one Mr. Sachin of the defendant who signed each of the copies of notice which is clearly mentioned in affidavit of service i.e. on page 225. Now with regard to the contention, which has been raised that it is on account of dereliction of duty of C.F.O., the Company has faced such a situation but C.F.O. Mr.Manoj Mainkar is a person other than Mr.Sachin who acknowledged the summons and apart from that if the terms of appointment of C.F.O. Is to be looked into, the same contain no work related to legal issues of the Company and his terms of appointment are deduced in writing and signed by C.F.O. which is part of the record at page 157. Apart from that, if the chronology of dates is to be linked till the termination of said C.F.O., the story put up by the petitioner is not possible to be accepted. Apart from that, if the chronology of dates is to be linked till the termination of said C.F.O., the story put up by the petitioner is not possible to be accepted. Learned Judge has rightly appreciated sequence to analyze whether the said defence is amenable to the petitioner or not, reference be made to page Nos. 154, 157 and 195. The Court while appreciating the contention of the respondent herein found that such circumstance rightly has been held to be not falling within the meaning of “special circumstance”. Hence, in view of these circumstances which are prevailing on record, the learned City Civil Judge has rightly not believed story of negligence of an officer. Apart from this, undisputedly here, there is no dispute with regard to the supply of goods or quality thereof and undisputedly, pursuant to the invoices which have been raised, the goods have been received and accepted. So, from all the surrounding circumstances also, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Judge has not committed any irregularity nor the conclusion is perverse in any form. Hence, this Court is unable to accept the contentions raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner. 21. Now in the aforesaid context, the judgments which have been relied upon by learned advocate for the petitioner, first about a decision in the case of Zonal Manager (supra) wherein if the facts are to be minutely examined, there was a claim about liquidation amount of 240 days of Earned Leave and in that context, since the suit was not for recovery of liquidated amount but for an amount of interest at the rate of 24% in that context, the learned Judge has taken a decision, whereas here in the instant case, there is receipt of goods, undisputedly by the petitioner, invoices have also been received in which there are clear clauses about jurisdiction as well as interest. Hence, this judgment is of no avail to the petitioner. 22. Hence, this judgment is of no avail to the petitioner. 22. Additionally, yet another decision which has been relied upon which is in the case of Chlochem Ltd. versus Lifeline Industries Ltd. delivered on 01.08.2014 in Special Civil Application No.13041 of 2012, wherein, the suit was filed for the purpose of recovery of amount along with interest in which leave to defend was granted but a close reading of the said decision would ex-facie indicate a different fact situation which cannot be compared to the facts of case on hand. A close reading is also indicating that there was no material on record in that case that there was any agreement between the parties regarding claim of interest and still claim of interest was made. Whereas here, in the instant case, the commercial invoices are clearly indicating the factum of interest. Hence, one slight change or additional change would make a world of difference in applying the precedent. Hence, this additional circumstance, which is available on the case on hand about the claim of interest which is supported by an agreement in the form of invoice, this Court is not inclined to accept the said proposition, as a straightjacket formula and unable to apply this judgment on the peculiar background of facts on hand. 23. Now yet another decision, lastly which has been pressed into service is a decision in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited (supra), wherein, post -1976 amendment, certain principles have been laid down about grant or refusal of leave to defend. General principles have been broadly laid down by the Apex Court, but going through the judgment pressed into service at length, the Court found that, here in the case on hand, there appears to be no substantial defence visible from the stand of the petitioner neither any triable issues are involved as not made out succinctly, nor the record indicates that the dereliction of C.F.O. is mainly a ground to canvas for seeking relief in the application, the case on hand stands on a different footing. On the contrary, there is no doubt either with regard to jurisdiction or with regard to the claim of interest and so far as genuineness of circumstance of C.F.O.’s negligence is concerned, the said defence is finding it not digestable and this Court is unable to accept the stand of petitioner. On the contrary, there is no doubt either with regard to jurisdiction or with regard to the claim of interest and so far as genuineness of circumstance of C.F.O.’s negligence is concerned, the said defence is finding it not digestable and this Court is unable to accept the stand of petitioner. On the contrary, this decision delivered by the Apex Court has clearly observed that “care must be taken to see that the object of the provisions to assist expeditious disposal of commercial causes is not defeated and corresponding care must be taken to see that triable issues may not be shut out”. Keeping this object in mind, since there appears to be no substantial defence or the circumstance, the learned Judge appears to have not committed any error in exercising jurisdiction. 24. At this stage, while parting with, the Court has an advantage of one of the decision delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Rajni Kumar versus Suresh Kumar Malhotra and another reported in AIR 2003 SCC 1322 wherein a fine distinction is made out in the provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 4 vis-a-vis Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C.. As compared to Order IX Rule 13 of the C.P.C.. Some more stringent circumstance special in nature deserves to be made out for availing the benefits of provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the C.P.C.. Here, it is completely missing, looking at the stand of the petitioner. Hence, the Court has no hesitation in reproducing this relevant observations of the Apex Court hereinafter contained in paragraph No.10, which reads as under: “10. It is important to note here that the power under Rule 4 of Order 37 is not confined to setting aside the ex parte decree, it extends to staying or setting aside the execution and giving leave to appear to the summons and to defend the suit. We may point out that as the very purpose of Order 37 is to ensure an expeditious hearing and disposal of the suit filed there under, Rule 4 empowers the court to grant leave to the defendant to appear to summons and defend the suit if the Court considers it reasonable so to do, on such terms as court thinks fit in addition to setting aside the decree. Where on an application, more than one among the specified relief’s may be granted by the Court all such relief’s must be claimed in one application. It is not permissible to claim such relief’s in successive petitions as it would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the provision. That is why where an application under Rule 4 of Order 37 is filed to set aside a decree either because the defendant did not appear in response to summons and limitation expired, or having appeared, did not apply for leave to defend the suit in the prescribed period, the court is empowered to grant leave to defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit in the same application. It is, therefore, not enough for the defendant to show special circumstances which prevented him from appearing or applying for leave to defend, he has also to show by affidavit or otherwise, facts which would entitle him leave to defend the suit. In this respect, Rule 4 of Order 37 is different from Rule 13 of Order 9.” 25. From the aforesaid overall circumstances, which are prevailing on record and in view of the fact that there are series of correspondence, reflecting about demand of money out of commercial transaction, which has undisputedly took place and the said futile correspondence has led the petitioner to institute Summary Suit which has rightly been examined by the learned trial Judge, this Court is of the opinion to preserve the object of statutory provisions of Order XXXVII of the C.P.C. rather than to defeat by allowing the petitioner’s stand. Hence, no case is made out by the petitioner, which calls for any interference. 26. The Court while coming to this conclusion, is also conscious about the limitation of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, which is clearly observed in one of the decisions delivered by the Apex Court in case of Sameer Suresh Gupta versus Rahul Kumar Agarwal reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 , the relevant observations contained in paragraphs No.6 and 7 are relevant, hence, considered by this Court, while deciding the present case on hand. 27. From the aforesaid overall circumstances, the Court is not inclined to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction, equitable in nature. Hence, petition being devoid of merit, stands dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.