JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned A.G.A. representing the State. Perused the records. 2. The applicants Kishan Lal @ Singh Bhadauria and Mukesh Kumar Gupta, by means of this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court with prayer to quash entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 1663 of 2017, Padam Chand Jain Vs. Kishan Singh Bhadauriya and others, under Sections 406, 420, 120B, 504, 506 I.P.C., P.S. Naie Kee Mandi, district Agra, pending in court of Special C.J.M., Agra, including summoning order dated 20.3.2018 passed by Court of Special C.J.M., Agra. 3. The contention of learned counsel for the applicants is that there has been four years delay in filing above complaint. This was a concocted one and in registered sale deed, payment of sale consideration, was admitted by complainant. Subsequently, in utter connivance, this complaint was filed. Whereas there is variance in the statements recorded during enquiry made u/s 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. Even then the impugned order of summoning has been passed. Hence this application with above prayer. 4. Learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed above argument. 5. Having heard learned counsel for parties and gone through material placed on record, it is apparent that complaint was filed by complainant with contention that opposite parties, who are applicants in this application, are property dealers. They entered into sale of a plot having an area 74.33 Sq. Mtr. owned by complainant on 18.11.2013 and it was by way of registered sale deed. Consideration was not paid, though it was shown in the deed to be paid and was assured to be paid in instalment. Under above assurance, the deed was executed with affirmation of payment before Registrar. Subsequently money was not paid. When hue and cry was made then a cheque for value of Rs. 10.50 lacs was given, but it was post dated cheque and when again hue and cry was raised then threat of dire consequences was extended for which report was tried to be lodged at police station as well as with Superintendent of Police, but of no avail. Hence, this complaint was filed, wherein above mentioned statement was there. Statements recorded u/s 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. of complainant and his witness Smt. Nirja Jain, are with full tune and in corroboration to each other.
Hence, this complaint was filed, wherein above mentioned statement was there. Statements recorded u/s 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. of complainant and his witness Smt. Nirja Jain, are with full tune and in corroboration to each other. Hence there was evidence recorded by Magistrate in its enquiry made u/s 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. for offences for which accused persons have been summoned. 6. In exercise of inherent jurisdiction granted u/s 482 Cr.P.C. factual evidence is not to be analysed minutely. 7. Saving of inherent power of High Court, as given under Section 482 Cr.P.C, provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Meaning thereby this inherent power is with High Court (I) to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any other order under this Code (II) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court (III) or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gaurishetty Mahesh, JT 2010 (6) SC 588: (2010) 6 SCALE 767 : 2010 Cr. LJ 3844 has propounded that "While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court". In another subsequent Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474 , hon'ble Apex Court propounded that "Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which after filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, or to delay the trial which enable to win over the witness or may disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of Justice".
In again another subsequent Monica Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781 , the Apex Court has propounded "Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself." While interpreting this jurisdiction of High Court Apex Court in Popular Muthiah v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296 has propounded "High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings". 8. Regarding prevention of abuse of process of Court, Apex Court in Dhanlakshmi v. R.Prasana Kumar, (1990) Cr LJ 320 (DB): AIR 1990 SC 494 has propounded "To prevent abuse of the process of the Court, High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 could quash the proceedings but there would be justification for interference only when the complaint did not disclose any offence or was frivolous vexatious or oppressive" as well as in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1989) Cr LJ 1005: AIR 1989 SC 1 , Apex Court propounded "In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not". 9. Meaning thereby, exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is within the limits, propounded as above. 10. Hence, the application merits dismissal. 11. Dismissed, accordingly. 12. However, in the interest of justice, it is provided that if the applicants appear and surrender before the court below within four weeks from today and apply for bail, then the bail application of the applicants be considered and decided in view of the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 13.
State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. 13. For a period of four weeks from today or till the disposal of the application for grant of bail whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants. 14. However, in case, the applicants do not appear before the Court below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against them.