ORDER : DHIRUBHAI NARANBHAI PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original respondents in W.P.(S) No. 5844 of 2007. The writ petition preferred by the respondent was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 6th July, 2015. whereby, the punishment order inflicted upon the respondent (original petitioner) dated 18th September, 2007 (Annexure 7) was quashed and set aside, only to the extent of withholding of 50% pension. Rest of the two punishments have been confirmed. The learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the first punishment mainly on the ground that the same was not mentioned in the show-cause notice, given to the respondent-delinquent, which is dated 05.08.2006 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition). 2. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the respondent is the original petitioner. The respondent (original petitioner) was working as Incharge Regional Director of Animal Husbandry Department, District Dumka. The respondent-writ petitioner was suspended on 16th January, 2003. because he had not obeyed the order of the superior authority. Approximately, 72 persons were employed unauthorisedly in the aforesaid Department and a direction was given by the high ranking administrative officer to the Incharge Regional Director (respondent-original petitioner-delinquent) to issue show-cause notice to those illegally appointed persons and thereafter terminate their services. The respondent had never issued any show-cause notice to the illegally appointed persons. Thus, all those illegal appointees continued into the services because of this dereliction in duty and insubordination by this respondent. As he had not obeyed the order of the superior officer, he was suspended and charge-sheet was issued on 16th January, 2003 (Annexure 3 to the Letters Patent Appeal read with Annexure 7 to the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5844 of 2007). 3. The enquiry was conducted and on the basis of the evidences on record, the Enquiry Officer gave his report on 29th March. 2006 (Annexure 5) and he has concluded that the charges levelled against the respondent (original petitioner-delinquent) have been proved. 4. On the basis of the enquiry report, as the charges levelled against the respondent were proved, 2nd show-cause notice dated 05.08.2006 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition) was given to the respondent. 5. 2006 (Annexure 5) and he has concluded that the charges levelled against the respondent (original petitioner-delinquent) have been proved. 4. On the basis of the enquiry report, as the charges levelled against the respondent were proved, 2nd show-cause notice dated 05.08.2006 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition) was given to the respondent. 5. After receiving the reply from the respondent, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order of punishment dated 18th September, 2007 (Annexure 7), (i) withholding 50% of the pension, (ii) no benefit of Assured Career Progression Scheme and, (iii) nothing to be paid except subsistence allowance. This order was under challenge in the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5844 of 2007 and the learned Single Judge had allowed the writ petition and hence, the State of Jharkhand has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed and set aside the punishment of withholding of 50% of the pension mainly on the ground that in the 2nd show-cause notice, after the enquiry Officer's report was given, the punishment was not mentioned in the 2nd show-cause notice. 6. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that charges levelled against the respondent have been proved as per enquiry Officer's report dated 29th March, 2006. The charges levelled against the respondent were to the effect that he had not obeyed the direction given by the superior authority. There were approximately 72 persons who were employed illegally and unauthorisedly; the respondent was given instruction to issue show-cause notices to them and to take action against them; the respondent had not obeyed the order of the superior authority; no action was initiated by the respondent against those illegally appointees and; hence, the charge-sheet was issued on 16th January, 2003. The Enquiry Officer was appointed and on the basis of the evidences on record, enquiry report gave his report on 29th March, 2006 (Annexure 5). The charges levelled against the respondent have been proved. 7. Now, a 2nd show-cause notice was given on 05.08.2006 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition) and after receiving the reply filed by the respondent, Disciplinary Authority passed an order on 18th September, 2007 (Annexure 7) and the following punishments were inflicted upon the respondent:- (i) 50% pension was ordered to be withdrawn. 7. Now, a 2nd show-cause notice was given on 05.08.2006 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition) and after receiving the reply filed by the respondent, Disciplinary Authority passed an order on 18th September, 2007 (Annexure 7) and the following punishments were inflicted upon the respondent:- (i) 50% pension was ordered to be withdrawn. (ii) No benefit of Assured Career Progression Scheme was to be given. (iii) Except subsistence allowance, nothing is to be paid to the respondent. 8. This order was under challenge in the writ petition and the learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent in W.P.(S) No. 5844 of 2007 vide judgment and order dated 06.07.2015 by giving a reasoned order, in paragraph 9 the learned Single Judge has observed that penalty of withholding of 50% pension was not mentioned in the show-cause notice and hence, same is quashed and set aside. 9. It ought to be kept in mind that punishment to be inflicted by the Disciplinary Authority is not required to be mentioned at all in the show-cause notice. The quantum of punishment depends upon the nature of the misconduct and the explanation given by the delinquent. There is no requirement under any law for the time being in force, to mention the punishment in the 2nd show-cause notice. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while quashing and setting aside part of the punishment inflicted by the Disciplinary Authority. 10. It has been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 at paragraphs 68, 69 and 70 as under:- "68. The question which then arises is, "Whether the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. which further amended the substituted clause (2) of Article 311 with effect from January 1, 1977. has made any change in the law?" The amendments made by this Act are that in clause (2) that portion which required a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty to be given to a government servant was deleted and in its place the first proviso was inserted, which expressly provides that it is not necessary to give to a delinquent government servant any opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty. Does this affect the operation of the original proviso which, by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, became the second proviso? Such obviously was not and could not have been the intention of Parliament. The opening words of the second proviso remain the same except that the word "further" was inserted after the word "provided", because the original proviso by reason of the insertion of another proviso before it became the second proviso. It should be borne in mind that the show-cause notice at the punishment stage was originally there as a result of the interpretation placed by the Judicial Committee in Lall case and by this Court in Khem Chand case upon the phrase "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him". Clause (2) as substituted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act merely reproduced the substance of what was held in Khem Chand case. The words which originally found a place in clause (2), "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him", do not any more feature in clause (2), All that clause (2) now provides is an inquiry in which the government servant is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges-Clause (2) taken by itself even without the first proviso does not provide, expressly or impliedly, for any opportunity to make a representation against the proposed penalty. After the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act this second opportunity formed a separate part of clause (2), which part was deleted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. Thus, when the second proviso states in its opening words that "Provided further that this clause shall not apply", it means that whatever safeguards are to be found in clause (2) are wholly taken away in a case where any of the three clauses of the second proviso is attracted. In this connection, the following observations of this Court in the case of Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala (at pp. In this connection, the following observations of this Court in the case of Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala (at pp. 326-27) are pertinent: "There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by the provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law may or may not prescribe such a course." In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. T.C. Shrivastava this Court held that "neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary". Since a right to such opportunity does not exist in law, it follows that the only right which the government servant had to make a representation on the proposed penalty was to be found in clause (2) of Article 311 prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. This right having been taken away by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, there is no provision of law under which a government servant can claim this right. 69. As for the argument that in a case under clause (a) of the second proviso a government servant could be wrongly dismissed, removed or reduced in rank mistaking him for another with the same name unless he is given an opportunity of bringing to the notice of the disciplinary authority that he is not the individual who has been convicted, it can only be described as being too fanciful and far-fetched for though such a case of mistaken identity may be hypothetically possible, it is highly improbable. As in all other organizations, there is in government service an extremely active grapevine, both departmental and inter-departmental, which is constantly active, humming and buzzing with service news and office gossip, and it would indeed be strange if the news that a member of a department was facing prosecution or had been convicted were to remain a secret for long. Assuming such a case occurs, the government servant is not without any remedy. He can prove in a departmental appeal which service rules provide for, save in exceptional cases, that he has been wrongly mistaken for another. Assuming such a case occurs, the government servant is not without any remedy. He can prove in a departmental appeal which service rules provide for, save in exceptional cases, that he has been wrongly mistaken for another. Similarly, it is not possible to accept the argument that unless a written explanation with respect to the charges is asked for from a government servant and his side of the case known, the penalty which would be imposed upon him, could be grossly out of proportion to his actual misconduct. The disciplinary authorities are expected to act justly and fairly after taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case and if they act arbitrarily and impose a penalty which is unduly excessive, capricious or vindictive, it can be set aside in a departmental appeal. In any event, the remedy by way of judicial review is always open to a government servant. 70. The position which emerges from the above discussion is that the keywords of the second proviso govern each and every clause of that proviso and leave no scope for any kind of opportunity to be given to a government servant. The phrase "this clause shall not apply" is mandatory and not directory. It is in the nature of a constitutional prohibitory injunction restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an inquiry under Article 311(2) or from giving any kind of opportunity to the concerned government servant. There is thus no scope for introducing into the second proviso some kind of inquiry or opportunity by a process of inference or implication. The maxim "expressum facit cessare taciturn" ("when there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded") applies to the case. As pointed out by this Court in B. Shankara Rao Badami v. State of Mysore this well-known maxim is a principle of logic and common sense and not merely a technical rule of construction. The second proviso expressly mentions that clause (2) shall not apply where one of the clauses of that proviso becomes applicable. This express mention excludes everything that clause (2) contains and there can be no scope for once again introducing the opportunities provided by clause (2) or any one of them into the second proviso. The second proviso expressly mentions that clause (2) shall not apply where one of the clauses of that proviso becomes applicable. This express mention excludes everything that clause (2) contains and there can be no scope for once again introducing the opportunities provided by clause (2) or any one of them into the second proviso. In Atkinson v. United States of America Government Lord Reid said (at p. 232): "It is now well recognised that the court has power to expand procedure laid down by statute if that is necessary to prevent infringement of natural justice and is not plainly contrary to the intention of Parliament." Here, however, the attempt is not merely to do something contrary to the intention of 'Parliament', that is, in our case, the Constituent Assembly, but to do something contrary to an express prohibition contained in the Constitution. The conclusion which flows from the express language of the second proviso is inevitable and there is no escape from it. It may appear harsh but as mentioned earlier, the second proviso has been inserted in the Constitution as a matter of public policy and in public interest and for public good just as the pleasure doctrine and the safeguards for a government servant provided in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 have been. It is in public interest and for public good that a government servant who has been convicted of a grave and serious offence or one rendering him unfit to continue in office should be summarily dismissed or removed from service instead of being allowed to continue in it at public expense and to public detriment. It is equally in public interest and for public good that where his offence is such that he should not be permitted to continue to hold the same rank, that he should be reduced in rank. It is equally in public interest and for public good that where his offence is such that he should not be permitted to continue to hold the same rank, that he should be reduced in rank. Equally, where a public servant by himself or in concert with others has brought about a situation in which it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry and his conduct is such as to justify his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, both public interest and public good demand that such penalty should forthwith and summarily be imposed upon him; and similarly, where in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry, it is in the public interest and for public good that where one of the three punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is called for, it should be summarily imposed upon the concerned government servant. It was argued that in a case falling under clause (b) or (c), a government servant ought to be placed under suspension until the situation improves or the danger to the security of the State has passed, as the case may be, and it becomes possible to hold an inquiry. This argument overlooks the fact that suspension involves the payment at least of subsistence allowance and such allowance is paid at public expense, and that neither public interest would be benefited nor public good served by placing such government servant under suspension because it may take a considerable time for the situation to improve or the danger to be over. Much as this may seem harsh and oppressive to a government servant, this Court must not forget that the object underlying the second proviso is public policy, public interest and public good and the Court must, therefore, repel the temptation to be carried away by feelings of commiseration and sympathy for those government servants who have been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by applying the second proviso. Sympathy and commiseration cannot be allowed to outweigh considerations of public policy, concern for public interest, regard for public good and the peremptory dictate of a constitutional prohibition. The Court must bear in mind that the second proviso has been in the Constitution since it was originally enacted. It was not blindly or slavishly copied from Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Court must bear in mind that the second proviso has been in the Constitution since it was originally enacted. It was not blindly or slavishly copied from Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Article 311 was Article 282-B of the draft Constitution of India and the draft Article 282-B was discussed and a considerable debate took place on it in the Constituent Assembly (see the Official Report of the Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, pp. 1099 to 1116). The greater part of this debate centred upon the proviso to clause (2) of the draft Article 282-B, which is now the second proviso to Article 311. Further, the Court should also bear in mind that clause (c) of the second proviso and clause (3) of Article 311 did not feature in Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, but were new provisions consciously introduced by the Constituent Assembly in Article 311. Those who formed the Constituent Assembly were not the advocates of a despotic or dictatorial form of government. They were the persons who enacted into our Constitution the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. The majority of them had fought for freedom and had suffered imprisonment in the cause of liberty and they, therefore, were not likely to introduce into our Constitution any provision from the earlier Government of India Acts which had been intended purely for the benefit of a foreign imperialistic power. After all, it is not as if a government servant is without any remedy when the second proviso has been applied to him. There are two remedies open to him, namely, departmental appeal and judicial review. The scope and extent of these remedies will be considered later in the course of this judgment. Article 14 and the Second Proviso" (Emphasis supplied) 11. It has also been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of ECIL v. B. Karunakar reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 at paragraphs 25 to 28 as under:- "25. The scope and extent of these remedies will be considered later in the course of this judgment. Article 14 and the Second Proviso" (Emphasis supplied) 11. It has also been held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of ECIL v. B. Karunakar reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 at paragraphs 25 to 28 as under:- "25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. 26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it. 27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings. 28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle-Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a "reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him". The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it. could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that "where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed", it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges." (Emphasis supplied) 12. It has been further held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in the case of SBI v. B.R. Saini reported in (2018) 11 SCC 83 at paragraphs 7 to 10 as under:- "7. As stated above, the disciplinary authority after supplying the report of the inquiring authority had given an opportunity to the respondent to submit his explanation, which he did. In view of the disability of the disciplinary authority in passing an "order of removal" under Rule 68(2), the entire record was sent to the appointing authority who examined the matter and passed an "order of removal". 8. In SBI v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty which is the basis of the judgment of the High Court, it was held that the appointing authority could not pass an order imposing a major penalty. In that case, the disciplinary authority sent the records to the appointing authority who passed order of "dismissal from service". It is not clear from the judgment as to whether the delinquent officer in that case was given a notice by the disciplinary authority before the records were sent to the appointing authority. This Court held that even in the absence of any rule requiring a notice to be given, the principles of natural justice would require an opportunity to the delinquent employee. This Court held that even in the absence of any rule requiring a notice to be given, the principles of natural justice would require an opportunity to the delinquent employee. It was not held in the said judgment that even if the inquiry report was furnished and an opportunity was given to the delinquent there is a further requirement of another opportunity before imposing the penalty. This Court found that before imposition of a major penalty the delinquent was entitled for an opportunity of being heard. The High Court was wrong in holding that the delinquent employee is entitled for a notice before the penalty is imposed. 9. Though Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is not applicable to the officers of the appellant Bank, in ECIL v. B. Karunakar this Court held that government servants as well as others are governed by their service rules and that whenever an inquiry is conducted and a punishment is awarded, a delinquent employee is entitled to a copy of report of the inquiring authority and an opportunity to submit his explanation. The absence of any rule providing for an opportunity to be given to a delinquent employee before imposition of a penalty cannot be taken advantage of by the employer. However, there is no requirement of a second show-cause notice before imposition of a penalty. 10. In this case, the respondent had sufficient opportunity to respond to the report of the inquiring authority and to the findings of the disciplinary authority disagreeing with the inquiring authority regarding Charges 6 and 8. He is not entitled to any further notice before imposition of a penalty. Apart from the requirement of a second show-cause notice before imposition of penalty no other point was raised in this appeal." (Emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the punishment to be inflicted upon the delinquent by the Disciplinary Authority is not required to be mentioned in the 2nd show-cause notice. There is no such requirement under any law for the time being in force. There is no procedural lacuna in holding the enquiry and looking to the nature of misconduct committed by the respondent, the punishment inflicted upon the respondent by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 18th September, 2007 (Annexure 7 to this Letters Patent Appeal) cannot be labelled as shockingly disproportionate, nor can be labelled as unreasonably excessive punishment. There is no procedural lacuna in holding the enquiry and looking to the nature of misconduct committed by the respondent, the punishment inflicted upon the respondent by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 18th September, 2007 (Annexure 7 to this Letters Patent Appeal) cannot be labelled as shockingly disproportionate, nor can be labelled as unreasonably excessive punishment. The respondent was Incharge Regional Director of Animal Husbandry Department. There were as many as 72 illegal appointees and their services were to be brought to an end after following the procedures. This direction was not obeyed. It is a serious lacuna on the part of the respondent. It is a gross misconduct. It is a deliberate dereliction in the duty. Such act on the civil side is known as 'connivance', whereas, on the criminal side, it is known as 'conspiracy'. There is a gross violation of "minimum rules of discipline" by the respondent and hence, looking to the nature of misconducts committed by the respondent, the punishment inflicted upon him vide order dated 18th September, 2007 is absolutely just, proper and fair. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be unreasonably excessive, nor it can be labelled as shockingly disproportionate. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent. We, therefore, quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 5844 of 2007 dated 6th July, 2015. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of with a cost of Rs. 15.000/-. which will be deposited by the respondent before the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development & Social Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, towards Juvenile Justice Fund. This amount will be deposited in Bank A/c No. 3734498462-5, Jharkhand Juvenile Justice Fund, State Bank of India, Project Bhawan, Hatia, Ranchi, either by cheque or bank draft, within a period of six weeks from today towards Juvenile Justice Fund. The aforesaid amount shall be utilized for the welfare of the juveniles as per the duties assigned to the State in the Juvenile Justice Act. 14. Copy of this order will be sent to, (a) the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development & Social welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi; and, (b) the Member Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Nyay Sadan, Doranda, Ranchi.