JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. The application (CLMA 11204/2018), seeking condonation of delay of 134 days in preferring the appeal, is not opposed by Sri T.A. Khan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, and the delay is, therefore, condoned. 2. Heard Sri Rajendra Dobhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, and Sri T.A. Khan, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioner and, with their consent, the appeal is disposed of at the stage of admission. 3. This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPSS No. 2412 of 2016 dated 19.3.2018. The respondent herein had filed the said writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 24.9.2015 passed by the third respondent, and the order dated 5.6.2015 passed by the first respondent; a writ of mandamus commanding the second and third respondents to pass appropriate orders, in terms of Chapter XIII para 1(d) of the Statute of the respondent-University, for granting compassionate appointment to the petitioner’s daughter in his place; and for a writ of mandamus commanding the second and third respondents to grant all monetary benefits to the petitioner with interest. 4. Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that the respondent-writ petitioner was working as a Carpenter in the respondent-University since 1981. Because of a rare disease, he became permanently disabled while working with the respondent-University, and the permanent disability, which he suffered, was assessed as 85 per cent. The respondent-writ petitioner made an application, in terms of Chapter XIII para 1(d) of the Statute, seeking compassionate appointment, for his daughter, in his place. This was rejected by the orders, impugned in the writ petition, dated 24.9.2015 and 05.06.2015 passed by the third and second respondents respectively. The petitioner had earlier filed WPSS No. 1871 of 2015 seeking a direction to the respondent-University to take a decision on the petitioner’s request. This Writ Petition was disposed of, by order dated 7.9.2015, directing the respondents to take a decision. Pursuant thereto, the impugned orders. 5. The petitioner had earlier filed WPSS No. 1871 of 2015 seeking a direction to the respondent-University to take a decision on the petitioner’s request. This Writ Petition was disposed of, by order dated 7.9.2015, directing the respondents to take a decision. Pursuant thereto, the impugned orders. 5. Both the orders were passed by the appellants on the ground that Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (Act 1 of 1996) disabled the University from terminating the services of the respondent-writ petitioner and, consequently, the appellant-University could not terminate his services and consider his daughter’s claim for compassionate appointment. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. 6. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner’s representation dated 25.3.2013 was rejected by order dated 25.9.2015 referring to Act 1 of 1996; the amendment, carried out in the statutes on 20.2.2017, would only have prospective application, and could not be applied to the petitioner; and Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996 had no application to cases where an employee voluntarily quits his job. The impugned order dated 25.9.2015 was quashed and set aside, and the appellants herein were directed to consider the case of the respondent-writ petitioner, in terms of the un-amended statute 1(d), within a period of ten weeks from the date of the order. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 7. Sri Rajendra Dobhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, would submit that Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996 disabled the University from terminating the services of the respondent-writ petitioner; it is only if the services of the respondent-writ petitioner can be terminated, would the question of considering his daughter’s candidature, for compassionate appointment, arise; in any event, in terms of the proviso to Clause 1(d), the respondent-writ petitioner’s daughter is not entitled to be appointed on compassionate grounds since there are other members of the respondent-writ petitioner’s family who are employed. 8. 8. Section 6 (8) (13), of Chapter XIII of the statute of the respondent-University, relates to appointment, and Clause 1(d) and the provisos thereto read as under: “A dependent (wife or husband, son, unmarried daughter and widowed daughter) of an employee of the University who meets with untimely death or gets permanent disability during the service period may be appointed on any non-teaching post for which he/she is suitable and fulfills the minimum qualifications, without selection procedure. WITH THE PROVISO THAT: (i) The above facility will be given to only the dependents of employees who have put in at least 3 years continuous service in the University and only if there is no other earning member in the family of the deceased. (ii) If there are more than one member in the family of deceased, desirous to get employment then the appointing authority shall select one of such persons on the basis of suitability particularly considering the interest of his widow and minor members of the family of the deceased. (iii) Such appointment shall be made only against an existing vacancy.” 9. A bare reading of Clause 1(d), of Section 6 (8) (13) of the Statute, makes it clear that a dependant (which would include an unmarried daughter) of an employee of the University, who gets permanent disability during his service, can be appointed to any non-teaching post for which he/she is suitable and fulfills the minimum qualification, without the selection procedure. It is not in dispute that the respondent-writ petitioner was assessed to have a permanent disability of 85 per cent. It is also not in dispute that he submitted an application on 25.3.2013 seeking appointment for his unmarried daughter on compassionate grounds in terms of Clause 1(d) of the aforesaid Statute. The only ground on which the impugned order of rejection was passed is the bar under Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996, which reads as under: “47. It is also not in dispute that he submitted an application on 25.3.2013 seeking appointment for his unmarried daughter on compassionate grounds in terms of Clause 1(d) of the aforesaid Statute. The only ground on which the impugned order of rejection was passed is the bar under Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996, which reads as under: “47. Non-discrimination in Government employments.—(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section. 10. All that Section 47(1) stipulates is that the appellant University cannot dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service; even if he is not suitable for the post he was holding, he can only be shifted to another post with the same pay scale and service benefits; and, even if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he should be kept in a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or till he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. Section 47(2) also disables the University from denying promotion to such a person. The embargo under Section 47 is on the employer, who is disabled thereby from terminating the services of an employee who suffers from a physical disability. Section 47(2) also disables the University from denying promotion to such a person. The embargo under Section 47 is on the employer, who is disabled thereby from terminating the services of an employee who suffers from a physical disability. Section 47 has no application to cases where an employee, on his own volition, seeks to voluntarily retire from service, or to cases where such an employee himself seeks termination of his services, to enable the University to consider his daughter’s claim for the compassionate appointment in terms of Clause 1(d) of the Statute of the University. The learned Single Judge was, in our view, justified in holding that Section 47 of Act 1 of 1996 would not apply to a case where an employee voluntarily quits his job because of his disability. 11. Sri Rajendra Dobhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner, would, however, contend that it is only in terms of provisos (i) and (ii) to Clause 1(d) of the Statute that compassionate appointment can be granted; there are other members of the family of the respondent-writ petitioner who are in employment; and the respondent-writ petitioner’s daughter is, therefore, not entitled for compassionate appointment. It would be wholly inappropriate for us, in the present appellate proceedings, to consider such a contention, in as much as neither the impugned orders of rejection, of the respondent-writ petitioner’s claim for compassionate appointment for his daughter, are based on this ground nor was any such plea taken in the counter affidavit filed, by the appellants in the writ petition. 12. In any event, all that the learned Single Judge has directed the appellants herein is to consider the case of the respondent-writ petitioner’s daughter for compassionate appointment in accordance with the Statute. As Section 47 of the Act 1 of 1996 has no application, rejection of the respondent-writ petitioner’s claim on this ground is illegal. The appellant University shall, as directed by the learned Single Judge, consider the claim of the respondent-writ petitioner’s daughter for compassionate appointment strictly in accordance with Clause 1(d) and its provisos. 13. We see no reason to interfere with the order under appeal. The appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.