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2019 DIGILAW 262 (MAD)

Martin Sagayanadin v. Antoinette

2019-01-25

C.T.SELVAM, M.V.MURALIDARAN

body2019
JUDGMENT : M.V. MURALIDARAN, J. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the order dated 14.12.2006 passed in M.O.P.No.132 of 2001 on the file of the Family Court, Puducherry, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Article 237 and 242 of French Code Civil, seeking to dissolve the marriage dated 11.2.1993 solemnized between the appellant and the 1st respondent and also directing the 2nd respondent to cancel the entry from the register of marriage in Etat Civil De, Nellithope, dated 11.2.1993 as No.9 of 1993. 2. The appellant is the husband and the 1st respondent is the wife. 3. The case of the appellant is that the marriage between the appellant and the 1st respondent was held on 11.2.1993 and after the marriage, the 1st respondent lived only for three months in the appellant's house and even during the said three months, she often used to leave the appellant alone and reside with her parents, without his consent and knowledge. The 1st respondent persisted the appellant to set up a separate conjugal home away from his parents even though, they were living in his parents house in a separate room. 4. Further case of the appellant is that in order to save the name of his family, the appellant arranged for a house at Tagore Nagar and during that period of their life at Tagore Nagar, the intolerable activities of the 1st respondent continued. The 1st respondent did not behave like a dutiful wife and she did not give respect to the appellant. In fact, the 1st respondent permanently left the conjugal home on 17.3.1994 on her own accord. The efforts to bring her back through mediators failed and after 17.3.1994, she never returned to his house and desertion started from that date and continued till the date of the petition. In this background, the appellant husband filed petition seeking dissolution of marriage. 5. Per contra, the case of the 1st respondent is that the appellant had ill-treated her by not providing food and he often beat her and also abused her in filthy language. The 1st respondent was driven out from the conjugal home by the appellant and his parents. In this background, the appellant husband filed petition seeking dissolution of marriage. 5. Per contra, the case of the 1st respondent is that the appellant had ill-treated her by not providing food and he often beat her and also abused her in filthy language. The 1st respondent was driven out from the conjugal home by the appellant and his parents. Even though she had an apprehension of danger to her life, through mediators of the family, counsellors and Reddiarpalayam Church Priest, there was reconciliation and in the year 1995, the appellant and the 1st respondent reunited in a home away from her in-laws. On 15.7.1996, a male child was born and the same itself disproves the case of desertion as alleged by the appellant. According to the 1st respondent, in September 1998, the appellant picked up quarrel without any proper reason, beat her and drove her out of the conjugal home. 6. Before the Family Court, the appellant examined himself as P.W.1 and one Susainathan and Jeya were examined as P.Ws.2 and 3 and Exs.P1 to P4 were marked. The 1st respondent examined herself as R.W.1 and no document was marked. 7. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the Court below dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 8. Assailing the order of the Court below, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court below has acted in total contradiction to the provision of law and therefore, the order cannot be sustained. He would submit that the Court below failed to appreciate that the parties are living apart and there is no question of them coming together and living again as husband and wife. He would further submit that the Court below also erred in holding that the appellant did not point out the factum of having child after 1996 and the finding that the petition does not reveal about the child is contrary to facts, as the appellant has clearly stated in his petition about his son and his education expenses. Therefore, there is no question of suppression of facts. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that the 1st respondent had taken away all her items from the appellant's house and to that effect, she had also given a letter. Therefore, there is no question of suppression of facts. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that the 1st respondent had taken away all her items from the appellant's house and to that effect, she had also given a letter. During cohabitation, the 1st respondent has not acted as a dutiful wife and has acted in rude and intolerable manner. The learned counsel next submitted that the Court below erred in holding that there was no desertion. 10. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent, per contra, contends that the Court below, after considering the evidence of both sides, has rightly found that there was no cruelty and/or desertion by the 1st respondent and, therefore, the order of the Court below, dismissing the petition is perfectly correct and the same is to be upheld. 11. We heard Mr. J. Srinivasa Mohan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. B. Chandran, learned counsel for the 1st respondent and perused the documents available on record. No representation on behalf of the 2nd respondent. 12. The appellant has filed M.O.P.No.132 of 2001 under Article 242 of the French Code Civil, for dissolution of the marriage between himself and the 1st respondent. Though French Code was applicable initially at the time of Independence, now pursuant to the enactment of the Pondicherry (Extension of Laws) Act, 1968 (No.26 of 1968), specified in Part I of the Schedule and Part II of the Schedule, it has been extended to Pondicherry, subject to the modification, if any, specified in the Schedule. The Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 is also found extended to Pondicherry. Therefore, the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and the subsequent Amendment Act is applicable to the parties. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in Candida Justina v. Sunderbabu, reported in 2016 (5) CTC 474 dealt with the appeal arising out of the petition filed under Article 242 of the Fresh Code Civil for dissolution of marriage and held as under: “10. It is seen from the records that the petition has been filed under Article 242 of the French Code Civil, for dissolution of the marriage. It is seen from the records that the petition has been filed under Article 242 of the French Code Civil, for dissolution of the marriage. Though Fresh Code was applicable initially at the time of Independence, now pursuant to the enactment of the Pondicherry (Extension of Laws) Act 1968 (No.26 of 1968), specified in Part I of the Schedule and Part II of the Schedule has been extended to Pondicherry, subject to the modification, if any specified in the Schedule. The Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 is also found extended to Pondicherry. Therefore, the Divorce Act, 1869 is applicable to the parties. Miquoting the provisions in the petition, does not preclude the parties from getting the relief, as per law applicable to them. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that entertaining the petition itself is illegal cannot be accepted.” 14. It is beyond any cavil that the marriage between the appellant and the 1st respondent was solemnized on 11.2.1993 and the same was registered with the 2nd respondent. After few months, the 1st respondent left the matrimonial home and had been living with her parents. After that, mediation was held and both the appellant and 1st respondent were reunited. After reunion, a male child was born on 15.7.1996. 15. From the averments and the contention of the appellant, it is seen that the dissolution of marriage is sought on the ground of desertion by the 1st respondent. Though the 1st respondent denied the averments and the contention of the appellant, she had stated that only in September, 1998, the 1st respondent was driven out of the conjugal home due to quarrel by the appellant without any reason and was also physically beaten. 16. Section 10 of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 provides: “10. Grounds for dissolution of marriage – (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent - (i) ...... Grounds for dissolution of marriage – (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, may, on a petition presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife, be dissolved on the ground that since the solemnization of the marriage, the respondent - (i) ...... (ix) has deserted the petitioner for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or (x) has treated the petition with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent.” 17. The appellant examined himself as P.W.1. In his evidence, P.W.1 has reiterated the averments in the petition. P.W.2 is the father of the appellant and he had deposed that on the efforts of mediators, the appellant and the 1st respondent were reunited and thereafter they were blessed with a male child. P.W.3 is the appellant's sister's daughter. Admittedly, in her evidence, P.W.3 has not stated anything against the 1st respondent. 18. However, the contention of the 1st respondent is that in the year 1998, she was beaten and driven out of the matrimonial home by the appellant. Believing the version of the 1st respondent, the Court below came to the conclusion that the appellant has not proved the alleged desertion and/or cruelty by the 1st respondent. Further, the Court below observed that any allegation regarding events prior to the year 1995 cannot be taken as a ground for divorce. 19. According to the 1st respondent, in the year 1998, the appellant picked up quarrel without any proper reason, beaten her and driven her out of the conjugal home. To prove the same, admittedly, the 1st respondent has not let in any evidence, nor she had examined any independent witness. 20. The Court below dismissed the petition mainly on the grounds that the appellant has suppressed the factum of reunion of the appellant and the 1st respondent during 1995 and also delivery of a male child thereafter. Further, the Court below, in its order pointed out that in the petition, the appellant pleaded desertion from 1994, but as per admission, they lived till 1999 and there was no pleading that after their separation in the year 1999, there were some problems between them. Further, the Court below, in its order pointed out that in the petition, the appellant pleaded desertion from 1994, but as per admission, they lived till 1999 and there was no pleading that after their separation in the year 1999, there were some problems between them. When the 1st respondent herself stated that the alleged separation for the second time was during 1998, the Court below erred in saying that the separation was in the year 1999. 21. It is seen from the records that on 26.9.1998 before the All Women Police Station, Puducherry, the 1st respondent had executed a letter saying that the marriage between her and the appellant was solemnized in the presence of elders five years back and during the five years living with the appellant, there was difference of opinion between themselves and they decided to live separately. Therefore, she was taking back all articles listed out in the annexure from her husband in the presence of witnesses. The recital in the letter dated 26.9.1998 reads as under: xxx From the above recital, it is clear that spouses are living separately from 1998 onwards. The above said letter is not disputed by the first respondent. 22. It is also clear from the records that during 1999, the 1st respondent and her minor child had filed M.C.No.6 of 1999 before the Family Court, Puducherry seeking maintenance of Rs.500/- each per month. By an order 5.7.1999, by recording the endorsement of the appellant that he is willing to pay Rs.800/- per month as maintenance, M.C.No.6 of 1999 came to be partly allowed. The 1st respondent and her minor son had also filed Crl.M.P.No.186 of 2003 in M.C.No.6 of 1999 seeking enhancement of maintenance from Rs.800/- to Rs.2,500/-. By an order dated 14.12.2006, the Court had modified the order and directed the appellant to pay Rs.800/- each to the 1st respondent and the minor child from the date of petition i.e., 11.12.2003 until further orders. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant had preferred Crl.R.C.No.866 of 2007 before this Court. By an order dated 14.12.2006, the Court had modified the order and directed the appellant to pay Rs.800/- each to the 1st respondent and the minor child from the date of petition i.e., 11.12.2003 until further orders. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant had preferred Crl.R.C.No.866 of 2007 before this Court. By an order dated 26.3.2010, this Court while recording the submission of the appellant that the minor child was in the custody of the appellant and the appellant alone maintaining the minor child, set aside the order directing the appellant to pay maintenance to the second respondent and the order directing the appellant to pay Rs.800/- per month towards the 1st respondent was confirmed. 23. Thereafter, the 1st respondent filed Crl.M.P.No.32 of 2013 in M.C.No.6 of 1999 seeking enhancement of maintenance from Rs.800/- to Rs.5,000/-. By an order dated 5.10.2016, the Court below, taking into account the day-to-day needs of the 1st respondent towards food, shelter and medical, directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.2,500/- towards monthly maintenance of the 1st respondent alone until further orders. 24. The aspect to be looked into in the present case is that after leaving the matrimonial home in 1998, the 1st respondent had not returned back. In fact, she had not taken any steps for reunion. In her cross examination, the 1st respondent has stated as under: xxx 25. From the above evidence of R.W.1, it is clear that she had not shown any interest in living with the appellant. Though she had spoken about the incident during 1994, after reunion at the intervention of mediators, she again left the matrimonial home in 1998 and the same was admitted by the 1st respondent in her evidence. Thus, the conduct of the 1st respondent would clearly show that she is not interested in living with the appellant. Moreover, the Court cannot compel and/or force spouses to live together when there is difference of opinion between them. 26. It is apposite to note that, equally, the appellant has also not shown any interest in living with the 1st respondent. In fact, in his cross examination, the appellant has deposed that “xxx” The said evidence was given by the appellant on 22.1.2004 and at the time of giving said evidence, he was aged 40 years and now he is aged about 54 years. 27. In fact, in his cross examination, the appellant has deposed that “xxx” The said evidence was given by the appellant on 22.1.2004 and at the time of giving said evidence, he was aged 40 years and now he is aged about 54 years. 27. Therefore, the conclusion is that there was never any attempt on the part of the 1st respondent to go to her husband's house i.e., matrimonial home of the parties after she left in September, 1998. From this fact alone animus deserendi on the part of the 1st respondent is clearly established. She has chosen to adopt a course of conduct which proves desertion on her part. 28. Desertion and/or cruelty may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values. We, the judges, should not import our own notions of life. Desertion means intentional permanent abandonment of one spouse by other without the others consent and without reasonable cause and in the case on hand, such desertion is explicitly clear and the Court below has not considered this point in the right perspective. 29. Cruelty has not been defined in the Act, but various pronouncements of the Apex Court and other High Courts have outlined the scope of the term 'cruelty'. Cruelty is evident where one spouse treats the other and manifests such feelings towards him or her as to cause reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other spouse. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Whether a spouse is inflicted with physical cruelty or not, it can be judged on the basis of direct evidence whereas mental cruelty is to be inferred on analyzing the factual matrix of each case and drawing conclusion thereon. 30. The essence of marriage is sharing of a common life, a sharing of all the happiness which life has to offer and all the misery that has to be faced in life. Since this is missing in the present case, it is a fit case for divorce. It is also a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage which only aggravates the desertion and/or cruelty being faced by the spouses. 31. In the present case, parties in the entire marriage life of more than 25 years have lived separately for more than 19 years. It is also a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage which only aggravates the desertion and/or cruelty being faced by the spouses. 31. In the present case, parties in the entire marriage life of more than 25 years have lived separately for more than 19 years. Even this long period of separation has not resulted in any re-thinking or remorsefulness on the part of either of the parties and their bitterness towards each other continues till date. 32. One spouse in matrimonial relations must not be expected to remain endlessly tolerant and silent sufferer of desertion and cruelty by other spouse. Living separately and not being able to to live together is and continues to form basis of breakdown of marriage. 33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions had given illustration that 'living separately' connotes not living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The parties may live under the same roof by force of circumstances, and yet they may not be living as husband and wife. What seems to be necessary is that they have no desire to perform marital obligations and with that mental attitude they have been living separately. 'Have not been able to live together' which indicates the concept of broken down marriage and it would not be possible to reconcile themselves. 34. In the present case, as stated supra, before the Court below, the 1st respondent has given her categorical evidence that she was not able to live with the appellant. Likewise, the appellant also deposed in his evidence that since half of his life has ended, he does not wish to live with the 1st respondent. When such being the categorical evidence of spouses, it is limpid that both the appellant and 1st respondent do not want to continue their matrimonial life any further. Both the parties, by their conduct and evidence, which has been reproduced supra, made themselves clear on this aspect. 35. In fact, during the course of hearing of the appeal, the appellant has filed an affidavit stating that the 1st respondent has subjected him to cruelty in all forms. First she left the matrimonial house, then re-united, and then she left and are living apart for almost 19 years and there was no possibility whatsoever of living together. 35. In fact, during the course of hearing of the appeal, the appellant has filed an affidavit stating that the 1st respondent has subjected him to cruelty in all forms. First she left the matrimonial house, then re-united, and then she left and are living apart for almost 19 years and there was no possibility whatsoever of living together. It would be necessary to extract certain portion of the affidavit of the appellant affirmed on 27.3.2017: “3. The 1st respondent is my wife. She left the matrimonial home in the year 1994. At the intervention of Father of Church, we started living together after a year. A son was born. Again in the year 1998 the 1st respondent left the matrimonial home and never returned. We are living separately from the year 1998 till date. Even during trial before the lower court, the 1st respondent had expressed her unwillingness to live together. 4. The 1st respondent had taken out an application for maintenance. In the course of the hearing for enhancement, the 1st respondent had refused to take care of our son and left him in the Court premises itself on 18.9.2008. He was around 11 years old at that point of time. Thereafter, I have been taking care of my son.” 36. It is to be noted that earlier the matter was referred to the Tamil Nadu Mediation and Conciliation Centre, High Court, Madras. Though both the appellant and the 1st respondent appeared before the Mediation Centre along with their counsel, they have not arrived at amicable settlement and the matter was sent back to this Court. The report dated 09.10.2017 of the Tamil Nadu Mediation and Conciliation Centre, reads thus: “Both parties appeared before the centre along with their counsels. Parties are unable to arrive at an amicable settlement. Hence the matter is sent back to the Hon'ble Court.” 37. Thus, it is clear that despite efforts taken by mediation, spouses have not arrived at amicable settlement to live together and the parties are living separately from 1998 onwards. It is also clear that the appellant alone is taking care of his son. From the conduct of parties, it is clear that this is a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 38. In Geeta Jagdish Mangtani v. Jagdish Mangtani, reported in II (2005) DMC 492 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “5. ..... It is also clear that the appellant alone is taking care of his son. From the conduct of parties, it is clear that this is a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 38. In Geeta Jagdish Mangtani v. Jagdish Mangtani, reported in II (2005) DMC 492 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “5. ..... The marriage survived only for a brief period of about seven months. After 2nd June, 1993 till the exchange of notices and replies during September to December, 1996 and filing of the divorce petition ultimately by the husband on 31st December, 1996, there has been no attempt on the part of the wife to stay with the husband. She is a school teacher and it is common knowledge that in schools there are long vacations during summon months, more so, in Government schools where the wife teaches. At least during those holidays she could have visited the husband at Ulhasnagar along with her son and stayed with him. There is nothing on record to show that any such attempt was ever made by her to visit the husband during this entire period. She has stated in her evidence that the husband used to come and stay with her during her vacations. This has been denied by the husband. Therefore, the conclusion in inevitable, that there was never any attempt on the part of the wife to go to husband's house i.e., matrimonial home of the parties after she left on 2nd June, 1993. From this fact alone animus deserendi on the part of the wife is clearly established. She has chosen to adopt a course of conduct which proves desertion on her part. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that this desertion on the part of the wife was with a reasonable cause. Such a course of conduct over a long period indicates total abandonment of marriage and cannot be justified on ground of monetary consideration alone as a reasonable cause to desert. It also amounts to wilful neglect of the husband by the wife. .....” 39. As stated supra, in the case on hand, spouses were living separately for the past 19 years. The 1st respondent had not filed any petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Had she been really interested in joining with the appellant, she could have filed the same. It also amounts to wilful neglect of the husband by the wife. .....” 39. As stated supra, in the case on hand, spouses were living separately for the past 19 years. The 1st respondent had not filed any petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Had she been really interested in joining with the appellant, she could have filed the same. Therefore, the conduct of the 1st respondent over a long period would show that she is not interested in the matrimonial life and she deserted the appellant. The same is the conduct of the appellant husband. He also had not put in any efforts to unite with the first respondent wife. It only shows that there is no love lost between the parties. 40. Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by Statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of individuals as well as in broader perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. 41. In Sukhendu Das v. Rita Mukherjee, reported in (2017) 9 SCC 632 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “This Court, in a series of judgments, has exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution for dissolution of a marriage where the Court finds that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down irretrievably, even if the facts of the case do not provide a ground in law on which the divorce could be granted (Manish Goel v. Rahini Goel, (2010) 4 SCC 393 ). Admittedly, the appellant and the respondent have been living separately for more than 17 years and it will not be possible for the parties to live together and there is no purpose in compelling the parties to live together in matrimony (Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj Sharma, (2007) 2 SCC 263 ). The daughter of the appellant and the respondent is aged about 24 years and her custody is not in issue before us. The daughter of the appellant and the respondent is aged about 24 years and her custody is not in issue before us. In the peculiar facts of this case and in order to do complete justice between the parties, we allow the appeal in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution.” 42. In K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, reported in 2013 (2) SCALE 735 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “We are also satisfied that this marriage has irretrievably broken down. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. But where marriage is beyond repair on account of bitterness created by the acts of the husband or the wife or of both, the courts have always taken irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a very weighty circumstance amongst others necessitating severance of marital tie. A marriage which is dead for all purposes cannot be revived by the court's verdict, if the parties are not willing. This is because marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and if they are dried-up there is hardly any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial reunion created by the court's decree.” 43. In Sandhya Rani v. Kalyanram Narayanan, reported in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 588, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “ ...... since the parties are living separately for the last more than three years, we have no doubt in our minds that the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down. There is no chance whatsoever of their coming together. Therefore, the Court granted the decree of divorce.” 44. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 558 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: “85. Undoubtedly, it is the obligation of the court and all concerned that the marriage status should, as far as possible, as long as possible and whenever possible, be maintained, but when the marriage is totally dead, in that event, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage which in fact has ceased to exist. In the instant case, there has been total disappearance of emotional substratum in the marriage. The course which has been adopted by the High Court would encourage continuous bickering, perpetual bitterness and may lead to immorality. 86. In the instant case, there has been total disappearance of emotional substratum in the marriage. The course which has been adopted by the High Court would encourage continuous bickering, perpetual bitterness and may lead to immorality. 86. In view of the fact that the parties have been living separately for more than 10 years and a very large number of aforementioned criminal and civil proceedings have been initiated by the appellant against the respondent, the matrimonial bond between the parties is beyond repair. A marriage between the parties is only in the name. The marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is already defunct de facto. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially more prejudicial to the public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.” 45. The aforesaid decision would squarely be applicable to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, not to grant a decree of divorce would be disastrous for the parties. Thus, the Court below erred in dismissing the petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the appellant, as the appellant and the 1st respondent were living separately for long number of years. 46. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, reported in I (2007) DMC 597 (SC), wherein qua long separation, it has been emphatically held as under: “95. Once the parties have separated and the separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and one of them has presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties; yet, if it is found that the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequences of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties.” (emphasis supplied) In the case on hand, as held above, the marriage is irretrievably broken and there has been a long separation of nearly 19 years. 47. A marriage which is dead for all purposes cannot be revived by the court's verdict, if the parties are not willing. 47. A marriage which is dead for all purposes cannot be revived by the court's verdict, if the parties are not willing. This is because marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and if they are dried-up there is hardly any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial reunion created by the court's decree. 48. The long separation between them had rendered the matrimonial life slip to a stage beyond retrieval. The matrimonial life between the appellant and the 1st respondent has irretrievably broken leaving little, in our view, no scope for re-union, at this stage. Thus, no useful purpose could be achieved by keeping the matrimonial tie alive when practically there is no possibility or chance for the couple to re-unite. Therefore, in the best interest of the appellant and the 1st respondent, it is desirable that the matrimonial relationship between them has to be snapped leaving the parties to decide their future course of living in the manner they wish. 49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in number of cases, with a view to do complete justice and shorten the agony of parties engaged in long drawn legal battle, directed dissolution of marriage. The present case is one, where similar yardstick needs application. In the aforesaid legal and factual background the inevitable conclusion is that the appellant is entitled to a decree of dissolution, as the appellant and the 1st respondent have been living separately for more than 19 years and it will not be possible for the parties to live together and there is no purpose in compelling them to live together in matrimony. The child born to the couple is now aged about 21 years and his custody is not in issue before us and it is the specific plea of the appellant that the child is in his custody and he is bearing all the expenses pertaining to the child's education and maintenance. Therefore, the best course in our opinion is to dissolve the marriage so that the parties who are litigating since 2001 and have lost valuable part of life can live peacefully in the remaining part of their life. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and in order to do complete justice between the parties, we allow the appeal by setting aside the order of the Court below. 50. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and in order to do complete justice between the parties, we allow the appeal by setting aside the order of the Court below. 50. In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, supra, while granting divorce to the appellant therein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered granting of permanent alimony to the wife, even without filing of an application. In the case on hand, considering avocation of the appellant; the fact that the parties stayed together only for a few years; and also the fact that a male child was born from the wedlock and he is in the custody of the appellant, it would be appropriate to order permanent alimony to the 1st respondent. Thus, a lump sum amount of Rs.5,00,000/- is directed to be given by the appellant to the 1st respondent towards permanent alimony. 51. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed and the order dated 14.12.2006 passed in M.O.P.No.132 of 2001 on the file of the Family Court, Puducherry is set aside. The marriage between the appellant and the 1st respondent solemnized on 11.2.1993 stands dissolved. The appellant is directed to pay a lump sum amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to the 1st respondent as permanent alimony. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition, if any, is closed.