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2019 DIGILAW 2626 (ALL)

Jai Prakash Tiwari v. State Of U. P. Thru Prin. Secy. Basic Edu. Lucknow

2019-11-22

RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Rajesh Singh Chauhan, J. 1. Heard Sri Manish Kumar, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ajay Pratap Singh, Advocate for the petitioner, Dr. Uday Veer Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents and Sri J.B.S. Rathour, learned counsel for the opposite party No.4. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed the supplementary affidavit, today in the Court, the same is taken on record. 3. In compliance of order dated 19.11.2019, Sri J.B.S. Rathour has produced the copy of letter dated 21.11.2019 preferred by the District Basic Education Officer, Sultanpur addressing to his counsel wherein the authority has indicated that at the time of suspension of the petitioner he was serving on the post of Personal Assistant Grade-II. The letter dated 21.11.2019 is taken on record. 4. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the impugned suspension order dated 14.08.2019 passed by the Additional Director of Education (Basic), U.P., Prayagraj. 5. The main ground to assail the suspension order is that the impugned suspension order has not been passed by the Competent Authority inasmuch as per the learned counsel for the petitioner the petitioner was serving on the post of Steno-cum-Clerk when the suspension order was passed and placing any Clerk under suspension is an authority vested with the Joint Director of Education (Basic). 6. Sri Manish Kumar, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner has strongly objected the contents of the instructions letter dated 21.11.2019 produced by Sri Rathour wherein it has been indicated that the petitioner was serving on the post of Personal Assistant Grade-II at the time of suspension by submitting that the petitioner was promoted on the post of Personal Assistant Grade-II vide order dated 16.10.2017 (Annexure No.8 to the writ petition), whereby as many as 103 Stenos have been promoted on the post of Personal Assistant. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards Annexure No.9 of the writ petition, whereby the petitioner has preferred a representation to the District Basic Education Officer, Sultanpur forgoing his promotion order so made on 16.10.2017. 8. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards Annexure No.9 of the writ petition, whereby the petitioner has preferred a representation to the District Basic Education Officer, Sultanpur forgoing his promotion order so made on 16.10.2017. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further drawn attention of this Court towards Annexure No.10 of the writ petition, which are salary certificates of the petitioner issued on 02.01.2019, which indicate that the petitioner is serving on the post of Steno and has been getting salary as admissible for the post of Steno. 9. Further, Sri Manish Kumar, learned Senior Advocate has demonstrated the letter dated 25.06.2019 (Annexure No.2 to the writ petition) preferred by the Joint Secretary, Government of U.P., to the Director of Education (Basic), U.P., Lucknow apprising about the suspension of the petitioner wherein the designation of the petitioner has been indicated as Clerk. Not only the above, Annexure No.6 which is a preliminary inquiry report relating to one Sri Kaustubh Kumar Singh, the then District Basic Education Officer, Sultanpur the designation of the petitioner in the finding has been indicated as Clerk, therefore, Sri Kumar has submitted that the aforesaid letter of the department and the government order clearly indicate that the petitioner was serving on the post of Clerk. 10. Sri Manish Kumar has further drawn attention of this Court towards Annexure No.SA-1 of the supplementary affidavit, which is Uttar Pradesh Shiksha Lipik Varga Sewa Niymawali, 1985 and Appendix-Ka thereof clearly indicates that the Appointing Authority for the post of Steno is Regional Joint Director of Education. By means of Annexure No.SA-2 of the supplementary affidavit, the Government Order dated 12.12.1995 has been enclosed whereby the division of works amongst the Superior Authorities of the Education Department has been indicated. The appendix of the aforesaid Government Order clearly provides that the Joint Director of Education shall have various powers and Item No.5 of the aforesaid Appendix clearly reveals that for making appointment, promotion and imposing any sort punishment the authority competent would be the Joint Director of Education. 11. Therefore, in view of the above, it is clear that the petitioner was serving on the post of Clerk when the suspension order has been issued by the Additional Director of Education (Basic), who is not the Competent Authority to pass such order being a Superior Authority to the Competent Authority. 12. 11. Therefore, in view of the above, it is clear that the petitioner was serving on the post of Clerk when the suspension order has been issued by the Additional Director of Education (Basic), who is not the Competent Authority to pass such order being a Superior Authority to the Competent Authority. 12. Sri Manish Kumar, learned Senior Advocate has also drawn attention of this Court towards the Division Bench judgment of this Court in re: Ashok Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P. & others reported in [(2006) 3 UPLBEC 2247] referring paras-13 and 14 thereof whereby the Division Bench of this Court has categorically held that the order of suspension can be passed only by the Disciplinary Authority. However, the order to initiate the disciplinary proceedings may be passed by the Superior Authority. The relevant paras-13 and 14 of the judgment are being quoted below:- "13. In the case of Ram Narain Tiwari (supra) this Court held that an authority higher in rank than the appointing authority cannot pass the order of suspension and if such order of suspension is passed, the same would be incompetent and void. In the case of Bharat Lal (supra) another Division Bench of this Court held that it is only the appointing authority which can pass an order of suspension. So far as the law laid down in the case of Director General ESI v. T. Abdul Razak (supra) is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "the legal position is well settled that it is not necessary that the authority competent to impose the penalty must initiate the disciplinary proceedings and that the proceedings can be initiated by any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority who may be an officer subordinate to the appointing authority. (See State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh (1993) 1 SCC 419 , P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller (1993) 1 SCC 419 and Auditor General and Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan) ( (1996) 2 SCC 145 :" 14. The initiation of disciplinary inquiry and passing of an order of suspension are two things. (See State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh (1993) 1 SCC 419 , P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller (1993) 1 SCC 419 and Auditor General and Inspector General of Police v. Thavasiappan) ( (1996) 2 SCC 145 :" 14. The initiation of disciplinary inquiry and passing of an order of suspension are two things. Disciplinary inquiry against a public servant can be initiated even by an authority higher to the appointing authority but so far as the order of suspension is concerned, that will have to be passed by the appointing authority or by the authority lower in rank which has been delegated with such power but not by any other authority." 13. In the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in re: Ashok Kumar Singh (supra), the reference of some judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court has been given and therefore, there may not be any dispute to the effect that the suspension order can only be passed by the Appointing Authority. In the present case, the suspension order has not been passed by the Appointing Authority but the Superior Authority to the Appointing Authority, therefore, the suspension order vitiates. 14. On the other hand, Dr. Uday Veer Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has tried to defend the suspension order dated 14.08.2019 but in view of the material available on record and also in the light of the decision of Division Bench of this Court in re: Ashok Kumar Singh (supra), he could not defend the said order. 15. Considering the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material available on records as well as the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in re: Ashok Kumar Singh (supra), I am of the considered opinion that since the suspension order dated 14.08.2019 has not been passed by the Competent Authority, therefore, it is liable to be quashed and accordingly the impugned suspension order dated 14.08.2019, which is contained as Annexure No.1 to the writ petition, is hereby quashed. 16. However, the liberty is given to the Competent Authority to pass appropriate orders, if it is so warranted, considering the seriousness of the allegations but that order should be passed strictly in accordance with law. 17. 16. However, the liberty is given to the Competent Authority to pass appropriate orders, if it is so warranted, considering the seriousness of the allegations but that order should be passed strictly in accordance with law. 17. The writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties reinstate the petitioner and post him at any place where the Competent Authority deems fit and proper but such order shall be passed with expedition preferably within a period of two weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this order and the petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits ignoring the suspension order dated 14.08.2019. 18. The writ petition is allowed. 19. No order as to cost.