ORDER : 1. This is a petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 46/2019 dated 25.03.2019, registered with Police Station, Kishtwar for offences under Section 420 of the RPC. 2. Briefly stated the material facts are as under. 3. A written complaint was lodged by the complainant-respondent No. 2 here in before the Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch, Jammu alleging therein that the accused- petitioner approached the complainant and offered to sell his land measuring 4 marlas falling under khasra No. 112 situate at Lach Khazana, Kishtwar for an amount of Rs. 5.10 lacs. 4. It was alleged that the entire payment was made to the petitioner through bank transfers and that despite the assurance of the petitioner that land would be registered in his name within one month, the needful was not done. 5. It was further alleged that upon enquiry, the complainant came to know that the petitioner was not the exclusive owner of the property in question but a share holder along with others and was not competent to sell the same individually. This fact, it is alleged, was withheld from the complainant, as a result, for the last three years, neither the land had been transferred in his favour nor was the amount refunded. 6. Based upon the complaint so made, an FIR bearing No. 46/2019 was registered with the police station at Kishtwar against the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the FIR ought not to have been registered as the matter was purely civil in nature and that the investigation and subsequent trial of the petitioner would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. 8. It was also urged that the averments made in the complaint, even if taken at their face value did not constitute the offence of cheating. 9. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. It is no longer res-integra that this court does have the jurisdiction to quash a complaint or an FIR on the ground that it would amount to an abuse of the process of the court in a case where the court records its satisfaction that the averments contained in the complaint, assuming to be correct, did not reflect commission of an offence for which the case stands registered. 11. 11. With a view to determine as to whether offence punishable under Section 420 RPC, is made out on a plain reading of the complaint based upon which the FIR was registered, it would be necessary to determine the main ingredients of the relevant Section. 12. Section 415 of the RPC envisages as under: “Cheating: Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, any which act of omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat.” Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” 13. Therefore, the ingredients required to be established for punishment of an offence under Section 420 RPC are (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission; (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of any person any by deceiving him; (iii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived and (iv) in cases covered by (iii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 14. In G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 693 , while dealing with the definition of “cheating” as contained in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code held as under: “........While the first part of the definition relates to property, the second part need not necessarily relate to property. 14. In G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 693 , while dealing with the definition of “cheating” as contained in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code held as under: “........While the first part of the definition relates to property, the second part need not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below: “....intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, any which act of omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat.” This part speaks of intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such act or omission should have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or property. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional.....” 15. Reliance in the aforementioned case was placed on an earlier judgment of the Apex Court reported as Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575 , wherein the Apex Court held as under: “...a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating “mens rea” on the part of that person, must be established....” 16. The Apex Court in G.V. Rao's case (supra), also relied upon its earlier judgment reported as Mahadeo Prasad vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724 , wherein it was held that: “...in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered....” 17. The Apex Court in G.V. Rao's case (supra), also relied upon its earlier judgment reported as Mahadeo Prasad vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724 , wherein it was held that: “...in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered....” 17. In similar circumstances, in Murari Lal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 699 , wherein a criminal complaint was instituted under Section 406 and 420 IPC, the Apex Court held as under: “....The complaint is an abuse of the process of the court and the proceedings are, therefore, liable to be quashed. Even if all the averments made in the complaint are taken to be correct, yet the case for prosecution under Section 420 or Section 406 of the Penal Code is not made out. The complaint does not make any averment so as to infer any fraudulent or dishonest inducement having been made by the petitioner pursuant to which the respondent parted with the money. It is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner does not have the property or that the petitioner was not competent to enter into an agreement to sell or could not have transferred title in the property to the respondent. Merely because an agreement to sell was entered into which agreement the petitioner failed to honour, it cannot be said that the petitioner has cheated the respondent. No case for prosecution under Section 420 or Section 406 Indian Penal Code is made out even prima facie. The complaint filed by the respondent and that too at Madhepura against the petitioner, who is a resident of Delhi, seems to be an attempt to pressurize the petitioner for coming to terms with the respondent.....” 18. For determining as to whether the petitioner herein had the intention to cheat at the time inducement was offered, it would be necessary to fall back upon the complaint, which was filed before the Crime Branch. 19. On a perusal of the complaint filed before the Crime Branch, it becomes clear that the complainant/respondent No. 2 had specifically urged that the land in question could not have at all been sold to him inasmuch as the petitioner herein was only a shareholder in regard to the said property and was not competent to sell the same individually. On a perusal of the complaint filed before the Crime Branch, it becomes clear that the complainant/respondent No. 2 had specifically urged that the land in question could not have at all been sold to him inasmuch as the petitioner herein was only a shareholder in regard to the said property and was not competent to sell the same individually. It is stated that this fact had been concealed from the complainant-respondent No. 2 herein with a view to cheat him. 20. The Apex court in M/s. Indian Oil Corporation vs. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. 2006 (6) Supreme 66 crystallized the principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 (analogous to section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure) to quash complaints and criminal proceedings based upon the ratio of various judgments rendered by the Apex Court from time to time with special references to: (a) State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (b) Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, 1988 (1) SCC 692 (c) Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, 1995 (6) SCC 194 (d) Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. 1996 (5) SCC 591 (e) State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla, 1996 (8) SCC 1641 (f) Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi, 1999 (3) SCC 259 (g) Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. 2000 (3) SCC 269 (h) Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar, 2000 (4) SCC 168 (i) M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Kumar, 2001 (8) SCC 645 (j) Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, 2005 (1) SCC 122 The principles deduced in M/s. Indian Oil Corporation's case (supra) are as follows: “(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala-fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.” 21. The Apex Court in paragraph 10 of the M/s. Indian Oil Corporation's case was aware of the growing tendency of litigants and their effort to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases, given the impression that civil law remedies were time consuming and did not adequately protect the interests of the complainants. It was held that entangling a person in criminal prosecution was most likely to result in an imminent settlement. It was held that entangling a person in criminal prosecution was most likely to result in an imminent settlement. This practice was deprecated. Reliance was also placed on G. Sagar Suri vs. State of U.P. 2000 (2) SCC 636 where the Apex Court observed thus: “It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 22. In Rajesh Bajaj vs. State NCT of Delhi, 1999 (3) SCC 259 , the Apex Court held that it was not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce, in the body of his complaint, all the ingredients of the offence he was alleging, nor was it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. It was also held that the crux of the principle was the intention of the person, who induced the victim of his representation and not the nature of the transaction, which would become decisive in discerning whether there was commission of offence or not. 23. Testing the facts of the present case on the touchstone of the law discussed above, it can be seen that the complainant did say in so many words in his complaint that the petitioner was induced to part with his money on the assurance that the land measuring 4 marlas would be sold and transferred in his name. It has also been averred that the petitioner did not have the exclusive rights to the land in question, which was the part of the ancestral property. The averments, therefore, are not such, which cannot be said to be not constituting an offence of cheating and therefore, do require investigation. 24. For the reasons mentioned above, the petition is found to be without any merit and is accordingly dismissed along with connected applications.