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Karnataka High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 263 (KAR)

H. S. Appaji Gowda v. Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike, N. R. Square

2019-01-25

KRISHNA S.DIXIT

body2019
ORDER : Petitioner claiming to be the owner of the land comprised in the acquisition Notification dated 24.06.1986 issued under Section 6(1) of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is knocking at the doors of the Writ Court, in substance seeking the benefit of ‘deemed lapse of acquisition’ in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 contending that neither the possession of the said land is taken by the respondents nor payment of compensation is paid to him, nor there is any justification whatsoever for not doing either of them. 2. After service of notice, the respondent No.1- BBMP having entered appearance through its panel counsel Sri H. Devendrappa; the respondent No.2-State of Karnataka has entered appearance through its HCGP Sri Dildar Shiralli. Both these counsel resist the prayer of the petitioner inter alia contending that the Government is considering the resolution of the respondent-BBMP for dropping of these lands from the acquisition process. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that regardless of the resolution of the first respondent-BBMP for dropping of these lands from the acquisition process as stated in its Statement of Objections, the petitioner is entitled to the statutory benefits that arise under the deeming provision of Section 24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and that the said deeming provision cannot be made subject to the likely decision of the 2nd respondent-Government on the said BBMP resolution. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that an argument to the contrary would put the land owner agriculturist initially at the mercy of the respondent- BBMP/Local Body and thereafter, of the respondent-State, and that would militantly defeat the very purpose of the said deeming provision, enacted by the Parliament in its wisdom accumulated over a period of century and above when the erstwhile L.A. Act, 1894 was holding the field. There is a lot of force in this submission. 5. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act which reads as under is as plain as can be: “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases – (1) ….. There is a lot of force in this submission. 5. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act which reads as under is as plain as can be: “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases – (1) ….. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( Act 1 of 1894), where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisitions afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: …” (The proviso being not relevant, is not reproduced) The text of the aforesaid provision does not admit an argument contrary to that of the petitioner, despite the making of award inasmuch as, its making or not making has no significance to the text, content and intent of Sec.24(2) of the Act. 6. The contention of the respondent-BBMP that it has already passed a resolution vide Subject No.23/2014-15 on 18.03.2015 for dropping of the acquisition in question and that the same is already submitted for the consideration of the State Government and therefore no relief can be granted to the petitioner, cannot be countenanced without manhandling the provisions of Sec. 24 of the Act. The counsel appearing on either side are in agreement that the questions that are being debated before the Apex Court following POONA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Case [ (2014) 3 SCC 183 ] and INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Case [ (2018) 3 SCC 412 ] do not have bearing on the fact matrix of these petitions, when there is no dispute as to possession of the land still continuing with the petitioner and the compensation amount not having been paid to him or to anyone else vide BBMP Commissioner’s letter L-1/PR/75/1976-1977 dated 21.07.2017 addressed to the 2nd respondent-Government. 7. In my considered view, there cannot be a classic case more perfect than this for invocation of the principal part of Sec. 24(2) of the Act. 7. In my considered view, there cannot be a classic case more perfect than this for invocation of the principal part of Sec. 24(2) of the Act. Relief cannot be denied to the petitioner, without offending the intent of the Parliament, as expressed in this provision. 8. In the above circumstances, these writ petitions succeed; a Writ of Declaratio issues declaring that the acquisition of the petition Schedule property has lapsed by statutory deeming and that, title of the petitioner to these properties is otherwise intact; a Writ of Certiorari also issues incidentally quashing the impugned acquisition notification bearing No.RD 88 AQB 86 dated 24.06.1986 issued by the 2nd respondent at Annexure-C; a Writ of Mandamus issues to the respondent-BBMP to restore entries in the Property Records as they were immediately before the acquisition process had commenced, unless there are intervening circumstances that come in the way of such restoration. No costs.