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2019 DIGILAW 2635 (ALL)

Rameshwar Singh v. State Of U. P.

2019-11-25

DINESH KUMAR SINGH

body2019
JUDGMENT : Dinesh Kumar Singh, J. This criminal revision under Section 397/401 CrPC has been filed against the judgment and order dated 16th December, 2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (E.C. Act), Unnao in Sessions Trial No.156 of 2004 by means of which the learned Sessions Judge has acquitted the accused-respondent nos. 2 to 8 (Rajjan Singh, Guddu Singh, Raj Kumar Singh, Uttam Singh, Udham Singh, Madal Singh and Parashuram Singh) of the charges under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Sections 149 and 201 IPC and the accused-respondent, Bhola Singh of the charge under Section 120-B IPC. 2. An FIR at Case Crime No. 501 of 2003 was registered under Sections 147, 148, 302, 201 and 120-B IPC At Police Station Hasanganj, District Unnao against eight accused on a written complaint of Rameshwar Singh, son of Late Guru Prasad Singh (PW-2). The allegations in the complaint were that the complainant was resident of Village Tala Sarai, District Unnao and when the incident took place, he was living at Village Jawan, Police Station Auras, District Unnao. On 26.10.2003, he along with his brother-in-law Ahibaran Singh came to village Jawan to meet his brothers on the occasion of "Diwali". His brother Girish Singh and his brother-in-law Ahibaran Singh, niece Ranjana Singh, daughter of Girish Singh were sitting on the Courtyard of his house and talking to each other. The lamps were burning on the occasion of "Diwali". At around 7:00 hours, the accused Rajjan Singh and Guddu Singh, sons of Jairam Singh, Raj Kumar Singh, Uttam Singh and Udham Singh sons of Pooran Singh, Madal Singh, son of Mahraj Singh, Parashuram Singh, son of Narpat Singh armed with Axe, Farsa and knife came there. They dragged out Girish Singh, brother of the complainant, and they chopped off his neck on a piece of wood in front of house of Sunder Pasi. Thereafter, the accused captured Hardayal Singh, another brother of the complainant, who was sitting in front of house of Nanhke Pasi, and throttled him. It was said that the informant, his brother-in-law Ahibaran Singh and niece Ranjana Singh raised alarm and cried, but nobody came forward for help in the village. After killing two brothers, the accused took away their dead bodies. Despite making search, the dead bodies could not be recovered. It was said that the informant, his brother-in-law Ahibaran Singh and niece Ranjana Singh raised alarm and cried, but nobody came forward for help in the village. After killing two brothers, the accused took away their dead bodies. Despite making search, the dead bodies could not be recovered. It was further alleged that the accused killed two brothers of the complainant because Badake Singh, son of Jairam Singh was killed 17-18 years back in which the complainant and his brother Girish Singh, and two other persons belonging to Pasi Caste of the village were accused. It was also said that at present there was no enmity among them. It was also said that the accused persons have killed his two brothers by deceiving them. It was also said that accused Bhola Singh, son of Shanker was also involved in the incident. The complainant could reach the police hiding himself from the accused on next day and did not come in the night, fearing danger to his life from the accused. 3. The police, after investigating the offence, filed charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 302, 201 and 120-B IPC. 4. The inquest of dead bodies of Girish Singh and Hardayal Singh was conducted from 15.05 hours to 18.10 hours. Postmortem examination of dead body of Hardayal was conducted on 28.10.203 at 4:00 hours and of dead body of Girish Singh was conducted on the same day at 3.30 hours. The dead-bodies of Girish Singh and Hardayal Singh were buried under the ground by the accused after their murder. 5. On 29.10.2003, the accused Raj Kumar, Udham, Parashuram and Uttam were arrested, and on their pointing out Farsa and Axe were recovered. On 14.11.2003, accused Rajjan Singh, Madal Singh and Guddu Singh were arrested. On pointing out of accused Rajjan Singh one Axe, on pointing out of Guddu Singh one Axe and on pointing out to Madal Singh one Axe were recovered. 6. The case was committed to the Court of Session by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Vide order dated 21st April, 2004, the charges under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Sections 149 and 201 IPC were framed against accused Rajjan Singh, Guddu Singh, Raj Kumar Singh, Uttam Singh, Udham Singh, Madal Singh and Parshuram Singh. Against accused Bhola Singh, charge was framed under Section 120-B IPC. 7. Vide order dated 21st April, 2004, the charges under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Sections 149 and 201 IPC were framed against accused Rajjan Singh, Guddu Singh, Raj Kumar Singh, Uttam Singh, Udham Singh, Madal Singh and Parshuram Singh. Against accused Bhola Singh, charge was framed under Section 120-B IPC. 7. To prove its case, the prosecution examined, Kumari Ranjana Singh, daughter of deceased Girish Singh, as PW-1, Rameshwar Singh, the complainant , brother of the deceased Girish Singh and Hardayal Singh as PW-2, Constable Surendra Pal Misra was a formal witness as PW-3, who proved the Chik FIR (Exhibit Ka-2) and G.D. Entry (Exhibit Ka-3) and sending of special report (Exhibit Ka-4), Dr. Shiv Kumar Singh, who conducted postmortem examination of deceased Girish Singh and Hardayal Singh as PW-4, S.I. Krishna Kumar Yadav, who arrested accused Rajjan Singh, Guddu Singh and Madal Singh and recovered three Axes on their pointing out, and prepared seizure memo etc., as PW-5, S.I. Vijay Kumar Singh, who was the first investigating officer, who recovered the dead bodies, got conducted the inquest and sent the dead-bodies for postmortem examination, as PW-7. He also recovered Farsa and Axe on pointing out of Raj Kumar Singh, Uttam and Parashuram, which were allegedly used in commission of the offence. 8. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 CrPC, denied the allegations against them, and said that there was enmity between them and the deceased, and they had been falsely implicated by the police in the case. The accused did not lead any evidence in their defence. 9. The trial Court determined the following issues for consideration:- (i) whether deceased Girish and Hardayal had died because of the injuries caused to them, as stated by the prosecution; (ii) whether the accused, with a common object, formed an unlawful assembly armed with Axe and Farsa, and pursuant to that common object killed deceased Girish and Hardayal; and (iii) whether on pointing out of accused arms, used in commission of the offence, were recovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 10. The trial Court had concluded that the FIR was registered after delay of 17 hours from the time of alleged incident. The distance from the place of incident to the police station was 12 kilometers. For the delay, no explanation was offered in the complaint by complainant Rameshwar Singh. 10. The trial Court had concluded that the FIR was registered after delay of 17 hours from the time of alleged incident. The distance from the place of incident to the police station was 12 kilometers. For the delay, no explanation was offered in the complaint by complainant Rameshwar Singh. After considering the evidence of Rameshwar Singh, PW-2, the trial Court was of the opinion that the FIR was written at the police station, in consultation and, PW-2 was not present when the incident took place. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the trial Court was of the opinion that the FIR was suspicious. After the incident, the complainant was called from the village Jawankhera, where he was living, and thereafter, he went to the police station to lodge the FIR. 12. The trial Court, on first issue, after considering statements of PW-1 and PW-2 and testimony of PW-4, who conducted the postmortem examination of the dead-bodies of Girish Singh and Hardayal Singh, was of the opinion that there was discrepancy between medical evidence and the testimony of the eye-witnesses. The medical evidence did not support the oral testimony of the eye-witnesses, and from the medical evidence, it was clear that the incident did not take place in the manner described by the eye-witnesses. The trial Court had, therefore, opined that the eye-witnesses did not witness the incident. 13. On second issue, the trial Court was of the opinion that there was wide discrepancy between statements of PW-1 and PW-2. PW-1 stated that the accused dragged the dead-bodies on west-side and the blood was oozing from the bodies, whereas the PW-2 in his statement said that the accused took the dead-bodies in two different sags. Considering this perceived discrepancy, the trial Court was of the opinion that the PW-1 and PW-2 were not the eye-witnesses of the incident. The trial Court also held that the incident did not take place at the time and place when and where it was alleged to have taken place. The eye-witnesses were the interested witness as the PW-1 was the daughter of Girish Singh, and complainant PW-2, was the brother of deceased Girish and Hardayal. In absence of an independent witness, their testimonies became suspicious and their presence was also doubtful. There was discrepancy between statements of the eye-witnesses and the Doctor (PW-4), who conducted the postmortem on dead bodies of the deceased. 14. In absence of an independent witness, their testimonies became suspicious and their presence was also doubtful. There was discrepancy between statements of the eye-witnesses and the Doctor (PW-4), who conducted the postmortem on dead bodies of the deceased. 14. After considering the statement of investigating officer, it was held that the incident, as was projected, became suspicious. In respect of Bhola Singh, it was said that except for the statement of PW-2, where he said that in the incident Bhola Singh was also involved, there was no other evidence against him and, therefore, the case against Bhola Singh was not proved in any manner. 15. In view of the aforesaid, it was held that the presence of PW-2 was doubtful. There was wide discrepancy in the statement of the PW-1 and PW-2. The medical evidence did not support the prosecution case regarding the manner in which the incident was caused and, therefore, the case against the accused was not proved. 16. On third issue, the trial Court held that there was no immediate cause/motive for causing the incident by the accused. The alleged motive was that 18 years before the date of incident, Badake Singh was murdered. He was brother of Raj Kumar Singh and Guddu Singh. In the aforesaid incident, deceased Girish Singh, complainant, PW-2 and two other villagers belonging to Pasi Community were accused. It was said that the motive was not established for commission of the offence. The trial Court was of the opinion that the defence version that two deceased were killed somewhere else and, after the dead-bodies were recovered, the police had falsely implicated the accused appeared to be correct. 17. The grounds, on which a revisional Court can set-aside a judgment and order of acquittal, are well settled by catena of judgments. The powers under sections 397 to 401 of Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly. The High Court, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal, should not act as Court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence. However, it is the duty of Court to correct manifest illegality, resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. 18. The Supreme Court in D. Stephens vs Mosibolla, (1951) AIR SC 196 held that revisional jurisdiction invoked against the order of acquittal should be exercised only in exceptional cases to correct a manifest illegality or to prevent gross miscarriage of justice. However, it is the duty of Court to correct manifest illegality, resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. 18. The Supreme Court in D. Stephens vs Mosibolla, (1951) AIR SC 196 held that revisional jurisdiction invoked against the order of acquittal should be exercised only in exceptional cases to correct a manifest illegality or to prevent gross miscarriage of justice. Para-10 of the aforesaid judgment is extracted hereunder:- "10. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under Section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. As already pointed out, there has been no such error in the present case; on the other hand, it seems to us that on both the previous occasions, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was right in holding that the accused was not guilty of any offence under Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act." Similar view has been reiterated in several judgments, including in Ram Briksh Singh and others Vs. Ambika Yadav and another, (2004) 7 SCC 665 . 19. The questions, which arise for consideration in the present revision, is whether the trial Court has been correct in discarding the testimony of PW-1, who was an eye-witness to the incident in which her father and uncle were killed mercilessly, even it if it is believed that the PW-2 was not an eye-witness. The second question, which needs to be considered, is whether discrepancy in the testimony of PW-1 and PW-4 were so wide that the prosecution case was to be rejected and the accused were to be acquitted. The third question is whether the trial Court had overlooked the material evidence and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, resulting in manifest illegality and gross miscarriage of justice. 20. The third question is whether the trial Court had overlooked the material evidence and passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, resulting in manifest illegality and gross miscarriage of justice. 20. Keeping in mind the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against an order of acquittal the facts of the present case are analysed. PW-1 was 13-14 years child. In her cross-examination-in-chief, she stated that it was the "Diwali Day" and the lamps were burning. At around 7.00 p.m. accused Rajjan, Guddu, Raj Kumar, Uttam, Udham, Madal and Parashuram armed with Farsa and Axe came and dragged her father Girish to the house of Sundar Pasi. They put him on a piece of wood and chopped off his neck. It was further said that at that time his uncle Hardayal was sitting in front of house of Nanhke Pasi. The accused dragged him also by putting rope on his neck, and took him towards west. She said that she witnessed the incident from window of her home. She also said that she knew and recognized the accused. This witness was subjected to quite lengthy cross-examination, but nothing came out, on the basis of which, her testimony could be said to be shaken or unbelievable. She remained firm in her deposition. The minor discrepancy in her statement and the deposition of PW-4 would not make her testimony unbelievable. The trial Court did not keep in its mind that she was a child 12-13 years old when the incident took place and her father was mercilessly murdered by the accused by chopping off his neck from the body, and her uncle was also murdered. The inference regarding manner of assault, drawn on the basis of the medical evidence, should not have been enough to discard her testimony. 21. The prosecution case should not have been rejected by the trial Court merely on the ground that the FIR was lodged with delay of 17 hours. It is important to note here that because of fear and terror being spread on account of daredevil murder of two real brothers on the day of the "Diwali", no witness from the village came forward to depose against the accused. The incident is said to have been taken place at 7:30 p.m. on the day of "Diwali". It is important to note here that because of fear and terror being spread on account of daredevil murder of two real brothers on the day of the "Diwali", no witness from the village came forward to depose against the accused. The incident is said to have been taken place at 7:30 p.m. on the day of "Diwali". The FIR was registered on 12:30 hours on the next day at the police station which was 12 kilometers away from the place of incident. Mere delay in lodging the FIR would not be enough for discarding the prosecution case, if it was otherwise proved by the testimony of an eye-witness and other evidence brought on record. Even if it is believed that there was a delay in lodging the FIR, and the same was lodged after summoning PW-2, but if the prosecution case could get proved by the testimony of one eye-witness, it would be suffice to convict the accused if the testimony of that witness is firmed, believable, cogent and credible. 22. The Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2003) 11 SCC 367 has held that testimony of sole eye-witness can be enough for conviction provided his evidence is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of Sunil Kumar Vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi (supra), which are relevant for the purpose of the present case, are extracted herein below:- "8. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (1957) AIR SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000] this Court had gone into this controversy and divided the nature of witnesses in three categories, namely, wholly reliable, wholly unreliable and lastly, neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the case of the first two categories this Court said that they pose little difficulty but in the case of the third category of witnesses, corroboration would be required. The relevant portion is quoted as under: (AIR p. 619, paras 11-12) "Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way -- it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses." 9. Vadivelu Thevar case, (1957) AIR SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000] was referred to with approval in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P., (1995) SCC(Cri) 160 : AIR 1994 SC 1251 ] This Court held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act"). But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. It is for the court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise. 10. Evidence of PW 5 has been analysed with great care and caution by the trial court as well as the High Court. The so-called improvements do not, in any way, introduce a new facet of the case. Every omission is not a contradiction. 10. Evidence of PW 5 has been analysed with great care and caution by the trial court as well as the High Court. The so-called improvements do not, in any way, introduce a new facet of the case. Every omission is not a contradiction. Minor details which are not indicated in the first information report are later on elaborated in court, do not justify a criticism that the case originally presented has been abandoned to be substituted by another one. PW 5's evidence appears to be clear, cogent and trustworthy. Nothing substantial has been brought on record to disregard the testimony of this witness. Though PW 3 changed his version, yet his evidence does not get totally wiped out. A part of it which is reliable can be taken note of by the court and has, in fact, been taken note of. The evidence of this witness notwithstanding his making a different version provides some corroboration, though as noted above, the evidence of PW 5 alone was sufficient to fix the guilt on the accused persons. Merely because of the fact that there were some minor omissions, which are but natural, considering the fact that the examination in court took place years after the occurrence, the evidence does not become suspect. Necessarily, there cannot be exact and precise reproduction in any mathematical manner. What needs to be seen is whether the version presented in the court was substantially similar to what was stated during investigation. It is only when exaggerations fundamentally change the nature of the case, the court has to consider whether the witness was telling the truth or not. As has been held by the trial court as well as the High Court, the evidence of PW 5 was truthful evidence. He has graphically described the assaults on the deceased. Accused Dharamvir gave several blows on the person of the deceased while accused Sunil caught hold of him to facilitate the assaults. Section 34 of the Act is clearly attracted. This is not a case where anything substantial has been brought on record to disregard the evidence of PW 5." 23. It is the settled law that minor contradiction or inconsistency cannot unnecessarily demolish the entire prosecution story, if it is otherwise found to be credit worthy. Section 34 of the Act is clearly attracted. This is not a case where anything substantial has been brought on record to disregard the evidence of PW 5." 23. It is the settled law that minor contradiction or inconsistency cannot unnecessarily demolish the entire prosecution story, if it is otherwise found to be credit worthy. If the contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses do not destroy the core of the prosecution case, the prosecution case should not be rejected. In a murder trial, trivial discrepancy should not be the ground for rejecting the prosecution case, if it is otherwise found to be credit worthy. The Supreme Court in the case of Bakhshish Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 12 SCC 187 , in paragraphs 31 to 33 has held as under:- "31. This Court in several cases observed that minor inconsistent versions/discrepancies do not necessarily demolish the entire prosecution story, if it is otherwise found to be creditworthy. In Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police [Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 42] this Court after scrutinising several earlier judgments relied upon the observations in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546] to the following effect: (Sampath Kumar case [Sampath Kumar v.Inspector of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 42], SCC p. 130, para 21) "21. ... "42. Only such omissions which amount to contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false and the sense of observation differ from person to person." (Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary case, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546] , SCC p. 483, para 42)" 32. In Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375] this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 671, para 30) "30. In Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375] this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 671, para 30) "30. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 580] .)" 33. The embellishments in the statements of Narinder Banwait (PW 19) referred to above, in our view do not constitute such contradictions which destroy the core of the prosecution case as this Court in Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722 ] has observed as under: (SCC p. 740, para 43) "43. ... It is a settled legal proposition that, while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not affect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not prompt the court to reject the evidence thus provided, in its entirety. The irrelevant details which do not in any way corrode the credibility of a witness, cannot be labelled as omissions or contradictions. Therefore, the courts must be cautious and very particular in their exercise of appreciating evidence. The approach to be adopted is, if the evidence of a witness is read in its entirety, and the same appears to have in it, a ring of truth, then it may become necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in mind the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the said evidence as a whole, and evaluate them separately, to determine whether the same are completely against the nature of the evidence provided by the witnesses, and whether the validity of such evidence is shaken by virtue of such evaluation, rendering it unworthy of belief." 24. Similar view has been taken in (2009) 14 SCC 748 , (2018) 5 SCC 435 and (2017) 11 SCC 85 and several other cases. 25. In the present case, the contradictions in the manner of assault by Axe on deceased Girish Singh, as stated by PW-1, and evidence of PW-4 would not make the prosecution story improbable or false. The trial Court has been incorrect in discarding the testimony of PW-1. Even if it is believed that she did not witness the murder of his uncle, her testimony could not have been discarded, regarding the murder of her father. PW-1 was the natural witness. The assailants/accused belonged to the same village and were known to her. Her presence at the house and witnessing the incident had been discarded by the trial Court, considering the medical evidence. The approach of the trial Court does not appear to be correct. 26. The trial Court finding that there was no motive for commission of the offence does not appear to be correct. The accused, in their statements, have specifically stated that they have been falsely implicated because there was enmity between them and complainant due to murder of Badake Singh in which Guddu Singh, complainant and two others belonging to "Pasi Community" were the accused. The motive becomes irrelevant when there is ocular testimony of the incident. 27. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned judgment and order is set-aside, and the matter is remitted back to the trial Court for decision afresh. So far as acquittal of Bhola Singh (respondent no. 9) is concerned, the trial Court was correct in holding that except for bald statement of PW-2 that he was involved in commission of the offence, there is no evidence regarding his involvement in commission of the offence. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order, so far as it relates to Bhola Singh (respondent no. 9) is concerned, it is affirmed. The trial Court is directed to decide the case afresh in accordance with law within a period of four months from today. 28. Bail bonds of the respondents 2 to 8 (Rajjan Singh, Guddu Singh, Raj Kumar Singh, Uttam Singh, Udham Singh, Madal Singh and Parashuram Singh) are cancelled. They are required to surrender before the trial Court and apply for fresh bail. 29. The revision is allowed partly. 28. Bail bonds of the respondents 2 to 8 (Rajjan Singh, Guddu Singh, Raj Kumar Singh, Uttam Singh, Udham Singh, Madal Singh and Parashuram Singh) are cancelled. They are required to surrender before the trial Court and apply for fresh bail. 29. The revision is allowed partly. Let a copy of this order, along with L.C.R., be transmitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith for compliance.