JUDGMENT : Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J. Heard Sri Kuldip Shanker Amist, learned counsel for the appellant. 2. This First Appeal From Order has been filed under section 173 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to 'Act, 1988') by appellant-Oriental Insurance Company Limited, being aggrieved by award dated 21.2.1998 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/VIth Additional District Judge, Jhansi in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.130 of 1995 for a sum of Rs. 86,200/- in favour of claimants. 3. All the issues raised in the memo of appeal requires to be decided in view of the judgment UPSRTC Vs. Km. Mamta and others reported in, (2016) AIR SC 948. 4. It is contended by the counsel for the insurance company that the driver who had licence to drive heavy vehicle but did not have licence to drive kind of vehicle which he was driving at the time of accident as there was no endorsement to drive such a vehicle. It is submitted that the driver had driving licence to drive heavy vehicle but there was no endorsement to drive heavy vehicle. It is contended that this is breach of policy condition. 5. When the matter is taken up, none present for respondents. The appeal can be disposed off without any adverse order against the respondents. 6. It is submitted by learned Advocate for Insurance Company that Insurance Company should be absolved from its liability because the driver did not possess a valid driving licence for driving a transport vehicle. It is an admitted position of fact that the driver did possess a valid licence for driving the heavy vehicle and, therefore, there was licence to drive the type of vehicle he was driving. Once it is held that the said term did not specify the type of licence i.e. the licence to drive heavy goods vehicle or transport vehicle. The transport vehicle is defined in Clause 33 of Section 2 of the Act, 1988 to mean, a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle. Public Service Vehicle is defined in clause 25 of Section 2 of the Act to mean, any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage. Public Service Vehicle is defined in clause 25 of Section 2 of the Act to mean, any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage. Goods vehicle is defined in Clause 8 of the said Section 2 to mean, any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers. Heavy goods vehicle has been defined in clause 9 of Section 2 of the Act to mean, any goods vehicle the registered laden weight of which or a tractor the unladen weight of which, exceeds 11,000 kilo grams. Considering the aforesaid definitions, any goods vehicle, heavy goods vehicle or public service vehicle can be commonly called as transport vehicle. In other words the term heavy goods vehicle is not different from a transport vehicle. Any person possessing a driving licence to drive a transport vehicle can be said to hold a valid licence to drive either a goods vehicle or a public service vehicle. The offending truck was necessarily a heavy goods vehicle within the meaning of clause 9 of Section 2 of the Act. The driver of the offending truck thus possessed a valid licence to drive the heavy motor vehicle. The Tribunal has no erred in distinguishing the transport vehicle from a heavy goods vehicle without considering the above referred statutory definitions appearing in the Act. The Tribunal has not thus erred in Insurance Company in respect of the compensation awarded to the claimant, therefore, the Tribunal cannot be said to have erred in holding the Insurance Company liable. 7. The submission is that the vehicle in question was a passenger vehicle whereas the driver was having a driving licence of HMV to drive goods carrier. The principles enunciated in Mukund Dewangan Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2017) AIR SC 3668 can be inversely made applicable to the facts of this case. In Mukund Dewangan (supra) the principles enunciated was that a person having licence to drive LMV vehicle could drive the LMV passenger vehicle in the same way the person having licence to drive HMV can drive both the kinds of vehicle. The said ground in the appeal fails and is rejected. In Mukund Dewangan (supra) the principles enunciated was that a person having licence to drive LMV vehicle could drive the LMV passenger vehicle in the same way the person having licence to drive HMV can drive both the kinds of vehicle. The said ground in the appeal fails and is rejected. I am even supported by the latest judgment of Supreme Court in Jadish Kumar Sood Versus United India Insurance Company Limited and others, (2018) AIR SC 2906. 8. I am supported in my view of the judgment of Apex Court reported in Kulwant Singh Versus Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2015) 2 SCC 186 . A further fact is also proved before the Tribunal that the driver of the said vehicle was having driving licence to drive the vehicle. The photostat copy of the licence was produced and proved. The driving licence to drive the having vehicle was there but there was no endorsement. It cannot be said that endorsement is of non having is the fundamental breach of policy condition, hence the said fact having been proved. The provisions of Sections 147 and 19 of Act, 1988 will not aid the insurance company. The Insurance Company not having proved the accident occurred because of non endorsement on the licence and they have not proved the same before the Tribunal, they would be liable to indemnify the insured who in turn would be liable for the tortuous act of his driver. Having not proved this fact, the insurance company would be liable. 9. The grounds urged in the memo of appeal shows that the Insurance Company has challenged the involvement and even taken a stand that the vehicle was not insured with them and that if the vehicle was involved it was the deceased who was going on feet had contributed to the accident having taken place and has submitted that evidence of the driver has been brushed aside. 10. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. 10. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply. 11. The contributory negligence has been discussed time and again a person who either contributes or author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place. The Apex Court in Pawan Kumar & Anr vs M/S Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal & Ors decided on 29 January, 2014 has held as follows: 7. Where the plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be a party to the negligence the question of joint and several liability cannot arise and the plaintiff's claim to the extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have to be severed. In such a situation the plaintiff can only be held entitled to such part of damages/compensation that is not attributable to his own negligence. The above principle has been explained in T.O. Anthony (supra) followed in K. Hemlatha & Ors. (supra). Paras 6 and 7 of T.O. Anthony (supra) which are relevant may be extracted here-in-below: "6. "Composite negligence" refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is, his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of "composite negligence" will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error." 12. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 which has held as under : "16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher,1868 3 HL(LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, (2005) ACJ 1840 (SC)). 22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side." 13. It is an admitted position of fact that deceased was walking and was hit from behind by the truck, the driver of the truck before the Tribunal deposed that he did not know that he had dashed with a person. This shows the magnitude of negligence. He came to know when passengers told him and, therefore, the submission that the deceased was trying to cross the road was never even pleaded before the Tribunal. The deceased met with the accident. As per the say of PW-2 the vehicle came in a rash and negligent manner and, therefore, the entire negligence is that of the driver of the vehicle and his deposition proved his negligence. The submission is that the vehicle was not involved in the accident is also negatived by the evidence led before the Tribunal. 14. As far as compensation is concerned, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 86,200/- considering the income of the deceased as he was a labourer aged about 50 years and his income has been considered to Rs. 900/- per month and Rs. 14. As far as compensation is concerned, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 86,200/- considering the income of the deceased as he was a labourer aged about 50 years and his income has been considered to Rs. 900/- per month and Rs. 10,800/- per year and 1/3rd has been deducted. In the year 1997-98, the principal enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176 and the Tribunal did not aware any amount under the head of future prospect. The rate of interest was 10% and, therefore, it cannot be said that the compensation awarded was not just compensation. However, on the remaining amount the rate of interest shall be 9% from the date of filing of claim petition till the deposit, the same be deposited within 12 weeks from today. 15. In this case it is not proved by the Insurance Company that there was fundamental breach of policy conditions. In this case the driver had the licence to drive the heavy motor vehicle. The Insurance Company also did not prove before the Tribunal that the driver was not having valid driving licence to drive the vehicle in question. In case it is not proved that the driver did not have valid and effective driving licence. 16. Appeal fails and is dismissed. The Insurance Company must have deposited Rs. 50,000/- as per the order of this Court passed in the year 1998. The remaining amount be calculated with rate of interest as ordered by the Tribunal and the same may be deposited with 9% interest as modified by this Court.