ORDER Yadav, J. --1. Single Bench presided over by Hon’ble Shri Justice Sheel Nagu in Criminal Revision No. 5630/2018 having expressed difference of opinion with the opinion expressed by Hon’ble Shri Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia in Criminal Revision No. 1257/2018 (Rajesh Dubey v. Smt. Rachna Tiwari and another) decided on 21.3.2018 [Published in 2018(I) MPWN 126 ] on the issue of sentencing under sub-section (3) of section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973(hereinafter referred as to “CrPC”), the matter has been referred to the Division Bench. 2. We place on record our appreciation for able assistance of Shri R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel with Shri V.K. Agrawal, who readily agreed to assist the Court as an amicus curie, and of Shri Amit Lahoti, learned counsel for the Applicant. 3. In the case at hand, the relevant fact is not in dispute that the husband having failed to abide by the order passed by the Court to pay an amount of Rs.1,000/- per month to each of three children as ordered on 15.6.2016 under sub-section (1) of section 125 of CrPC, led the Court direct the husband to suffer civil jail for a period of 11 months in exercise of its jurisdiction under sub-section (3) of section 125 of CrPC. 4. Similar fact situation has arisen in Rajesh Dubey (supra), wherein relying on the decision by the Supreme Court in Poongodi & Another v. Thangavel: [ (2013)10 SCC 618 ], the order of sentencing for more than one month has been upheld. Whereas, in the case at hand, learned Single Judge has expressed his reservation for the said view on the basis of another decision by the Supreme Court in Shahada Khatoon and others v. Amjad Ali & others: [(1999)5 SCC (Cri) 1029]. 5. Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. which comprises of four sections, viz, 125, 126, 127 and 128 makes provisions regarding maintenance of wives, children and parents. section 125 envisages order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. Section 126 provides for the procedure. section 127 makes provision regarding alteration in allowance; and section 128 lays down provision regarding enforcement of order of maintenance. 6. section 125 envisages order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. Section 126 provides for the procedure. section 127 makes provision regarding alteration in allowance; and section 128 lays down provision regarding enforcement of order of maintenance. 6. Pertinent it is to note that the provisions contained in section 128 of CrPC only lays down the mode of enforcing recovery of maintenance allowance, stipulating therein that the order of maintenance may be enforced by any Magistrate in any place where the person against whom it is made may be. In case if the order of maintenance put to enforcement is not complied with, section 128 CrPC has no answer as to how the order be actually effected. The answer lays in sub-section (3) of section 125 of CrPC which stipulates : “(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month’s allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may made : Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due.’’ 7. Sub-section (3) of section 125 CrPC thus provides for a mechanism to effect actual recovery of maintenance amount. 8. Dwelling on said aspect, it is held in Smt. Kuldip Kaur v. Surinder Singh & others : [ AIR 1989 SC 232 ]: “6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing recovery on the one hand and effecting actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears on the other. Sentencing a person to jail is a ‘mode of enforcement’. It is not a ‘mode of satisfaction’ of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. Sentencing a person to jail is a ‘mode of enforcement’. It is not a ‘mode of satisfaction’ of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. The whole purpose of sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the payment. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a person ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance ‘without sufficient cause’ to comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a person who ‘without reasonable cause’ refuses to comply with the order of the Court to maintain his neglected wife or child would be absolved of his liability merely because he prefers to go to jail. A sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears. Monthly allowance is paid in order to enable the wife and child to live by providing with the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the neglected wife nor the neglected child can live without funds for purchasing food and the essential articles to enable them to live. Instead of providing them with the funds, no useful purpose would be served by sending the husband to jail. Sentencing to jail is the means for achieving the end of enforcing the order by recovering the amount of arrears. It is not a mode of discharging liability. The section does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom has not said so. Commonsense does not support such a construction. From where does the Court draw inspiration for persuading itself that the liability arising under the order for maintenance would stand discharged upon an effort being made to recover it? The order for monthly allowance can be discharged only upon the monthly allowance being recovered. The liability cannot be taken to have been discharged by sending the person liable to pay the monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other view is possible. The liability cannot be taken to have been discharged by sending the person liable to pay the monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other view is possible. That is the reason why we set aside the order under appeal and passed an order in the following terms : “Heard both the sides. The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned Magistrate as confirmed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to the effect that the amount of monthly allowance payable under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wiped out and is not recoverable any more by reason of the fact that respondent No.1, Surinder Singh, was sent to jail in exercise of the powers under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is set aside. In our opinion, respondent No.1, husband of appellant, is not absolved from his liability to pay the monthly allowance by reason of his undergoing a sentence of jail and the amount is still recoverable notwithstanding the fact that the respondent No.1 husband who is liable to pay the monthly allowance has undergone a sentence of jail for failure to pay the same. Our reasons for reaching this conclusion will follow. So far as the amount of monthly allowance awarded in this particular case is concerned, by consent of parties, we pass the following order in regard to future payments with effect from 15th August, 1986. We direct that Respondent No. 1, Surinder Singh shall pay Rs.275 (Rs. 200 for the wife and Rs 75 for the child) as and by way of maintenance to the appellant Smt. Kuldip Kaur commencing from August 15, 1986. The amount of Rs. 275 shall be paid by the 15th of every succeeding month. On failure to pay any monthly allowance for any month hereafter on the part of respondent No.1, Surinder Singh, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall issue a warrant for his arrest, cause him to be arrested and put in jail for his failure to comply with this Court’s order and he shall not be released till he makes the payment. On failure to pay any monthly allowance for any month hereafter on the part of respondent No.1, Surinder Singh, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall issue a warrant for his arrest, cause him to be arrested and put in jail for his failure to comply with this Court’s order and he shall not be released till he makes the payment. With regard to the arrears which have become due till August 15, 1986, learned counsel for the appellant states that having regard to the fact that respondent No.1, has agreed to the aforesaid consent order, the appellant will not apply for the respondent being sent to jail under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but will reserve the liberty to realize the said amount (Rs. 5090 plus the difference between the amount that became due and the amount actually paid under the interim order) under the law except by seeking an order for sending respondent No.1 to jail. The appeal will stand disposed of accordingly.” 9. In Shahada Khatoon & others v. Amjad Ali & otherss: [1999 SCC(Cri.) 1029], a bench of equal strength interpreting Subsection 3 of section 125 ot the CrPC observed : “The short question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court correctly interpreted sub-section (3) of section 125 of the CrPC by directing that the Magistrate can only sentence for a period of one month or until payment, if sooner made. The learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the liability of the husband arising out of an order passed under section 125 to make payment of maintenance is a continuing one and on account of nonpayment there has been a breach of the order and therefore the Magistrate would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person continuing him in custody until payment is made. We are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. The language of sub-section (3) of section 125 is quite clear and it circumscribes the power of the Magistrate to impose imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until the payment, if sooner made. This power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of one month. The language of sub-section (3) of section 125 is quite clear and it circumscribes the power of the Magistrate to impose imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until the payment, if sooner made. This power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of one month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. By no stretch of imagination can the the Magistrate be permitted to impose sentence for more than one month. In that view of the matter the High Court was fully justified in passing the impugned order and we see no infirmity in the said order to be interfered with by this Court. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed ” 10. Evidently, the observation in Smt. Kuldip Kaur (supra), was not taken note. 11. Later, in Shantha alias Ushadevi & another v. B.G. Shivananjappa :[2005 SCC (Cri.) 1089], another bench of equal strength expressed the following view : “8. We are, therefore, of the view that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the bar under section 125(3) cannot be applied and the High Court has erred in reversing the order of Sessions Judge. It must be borne in mind that section 125 CrPC is a measure of social legislation and it has to be construed liberally for the welfare and benefit of the wife and daughter. It is unreasonable to insist on filing successive applications when the liability to pay the maintenance as per the order passed under section 125(1) is a continuing liability.” 12. Evidently, the decision in Smt. Kuldip Kaur (supra), and Shahada Khatoon & others (supra), was not noticed. These two decisions were, however, taken note of in Poongodi & another v. Thangavel :[ (2013)10 SCC 618 ] wherein dwelling on the aspect as to entitlement of wife to claim arrears maintenance, it has been held : “4. A reading of the order dated 21.4.2004 passed by the High Court would go to show that the proviso to section 125(3) CrPC has been construed by the High Court to be a fetter on the entitlement of the claimants to receive arrears of maintenance beyond a period of one year preceding the date of filing of the application under section 125(3) CrPC. Having considered the said provision of the Code we do not find that the same creates a bar or in any way affects the entitlement of a claimant to arrears of maintenance. What the proviso contemplates is that the procedure for recovery of maintenance under section 125(3) CrPC, namely, by construing the same to be a levy of a fine and the detention of the defaulter in custody would not be available to a claimant who had slept over his/her rights and has not approached the Court within a period of one year commencing from the date on which the entitlement to receive maintenance has accrued. However, in such a situation the ordinary remedy to recover the amount of maintenance, namely, a civil action would still be available. 5. The decision of this Court in Kuldip Kaur v. Surinder Singh and another [ AIR 1989 SC 232 ], may be usefully recalled wherein this Court has held the provision of sentencing under section 125(3) to be a “mode of enforcement” as distinguished from the “mode of satisfaction” of the liability which can only be by means of actual payment. Para 6 of the Report to the above effect, namely, that the mode of enforcement i.e. sentencing to custody does not extinguish the liability may be extracted below: (SCC p.409, para 6) “6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing recovery on the one hand and effecting actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears on the other. Sentencing a person to jail is a ‘mode of enforcement’. It is not a ‘mode of satisfaction’ of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. The whole purpose of sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the payment. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a person ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance ‘without sufficient cause’ to comply with the order. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a person ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance ‘without sufficient cause’ to comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a person who ‘without reasonable cause’ refuses to comply with the order of the Court to maintain his neglected wife or child would be absolved of his liability merely because he prefers to go to jail. A sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears. Monthly allowance is paid in order to enable the wife and child to live by providing with the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the neglected wife nor the neglected child can live without funds for purchasing food and the essential articles to enable them to live. Instead of providing them with the funds, no useful purpose would be served by sending the husband to jail. Sentencing to jail is the means for achieving the end of enforcing the order by recovering the amount of arrears. It is not a mode of discharging liability. The section does not say so. The Parliament in its wisdom has not said so. Commonsense does not support such a construction. From where does the Court draw inspiration for persuading itself that the liability arising under the order for maintenance would stand discharged upon an effort being made to recover it? The order for monthly allowance can be discharged only upon the monthly allowance being recovered. The liability cannot be taken to have been discharged by sending the person liable to pay the monthly allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that it is only a mode or method of recovery and not a substitute for recovery. No other view is possible. That is the reason why we set aside the order under appeal and passed an order in the following terms…...” 6. In another decision of this Court in Shantha alias Ushadevi and Another v. B.G. Shivananjappa: [2005 SCC (Cri.) 1089] it has been held that the liability to pay maintenance under section 125 CrPC is in the nature of a continuing liability. In another decision of this Court in Shantha alias Ushadevi and Another v. B.G. Shivananjappa: [2005 SCC (Cri.) 1089] it has been held that the liability to pay maintenance under section 125 CrPC is in the nature of a continuing liability. The nature of the right to receive maintenance and the concomitant liability to pay was also noticed in a decision of this Court in Shahada Khatoon & others v. Amjad Ali & others :[1999 SC(Cri.) 1029]. Though in a slightly different context, the remedy to approach the Court by means of successive applications under section 125(3) CrPC highlighting the subsequent defaults in payment of maintenance was acknowledged by this Court in Shahada Khatoon (supra).” 7. The ratio of the decisions in the aforesaid cases squarely apply to the present case. The application dated 5.2.2002 filed by the appellants under section 125(3) was in continuation of the earlier applications and for subsequent periods of default on the part of the respondent. The first proviso to section 125(3), therefore did not extinguish or limit the entitlement of the appellants to the maintenance granted by the learned trial Court, as has been held by the High Court.” 13. In Poongodi (supra), Their Lordships were pleased to take note of slightly different context in which Shahada Khatoon (supra), was decided which may be noticed from the argument advanced by learned counsel in the said case [i.e. Shahada Khatoon (supra)]. The contentions advanced in Shahada Khatoon (supra), was the “liability of husband arising out of an order passed under section 125 to make payment of maintenance is a continuing one and on account of nonpayment, there would be entitled to impose sentence on such a person continuing him in custody until payment is made.” The submissions thus suggested that, Magistrate can keep or sentence the person until said person makes up the payment. These submissions glossed over the language of sub-section (3) of section 125 which contemplates a punishment of imprisonment which may extend to one month or until payment, if, sooner made. Therefore, the contentions raised were negatived holding that the “power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of one month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. Therefore, the contentions raised were negatived holding that the “power of the Magistrate cannot be enlarged and therefore the only remedy would be after expiry of one month. For breach or non-compliance with the order of the Magistrate the wife can approach the Magistrate again for similar relief. By no stretch of imagination can the the Magistrate be permitted to impose sentence for more than one month. 14. Thus, the issue was not as in the present case where the arrears of maintenance has been claimed and despite issuance of warrant, there is non-compliance. Thus, on facts the decision in Shahada Khatoon (supra), is distinguishable. 15. In the context which we are dwelling, decision under section 488 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 which is pari materia section 125(3) of 1973 Act can be taken note of. Sections 488 of CrPC 1882 stipulates : “The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person for the whole or any part of each month’s allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month.” 16. In Emperor v. Beni : [AIR 1938 Allahabad 386], a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court while deciding on the sentence by the Magistrate for a period of six months by issuing one warrant for recovery of the maintenance of the amount of 21 months observed : “......... We are satisfied after a consideration of the terms of the section that the intention of the Legislature was to empower the Magistrate after execution of one warrant only to sentence a person, who has defaulted in the payment of maintenance ordered under section 488, Criminal P.C., to imprisonment for a period of one month in respect of each month’s default and that the section does not enjoin that there should be a separate warrant in respect of each term of imprisonment for one month. In other words, where arrears have been allowed to accumulate, the Court can issue one warrant and impose a cumulative sentence of imprisonment. We would observe that the decision in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi [(1897)20 Mad. 3] has been followed in a number of other cases in Bhiku Khan v. Zahuran :[(1898) 25 Cal. 291], Emperor v. Sardar Muhammad :[(1935) 22 AIR. We would observe that the decision in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi [(1897)20 Mad. 3] has been followed in a number of other cases in Bhiku Khan v. Zahuran :[(1898) 25 Cal. 291], Emperor v. Sardar Muhammad :[(1935) 22 AIR. Lah. 758] and Emperor v. Budhu Ram :[(1919)6 AIR Lah. 50]. We would remark further that the warrant of imprisonment under section 488, Criminal P.C., the form of which is to be found in schedule 5, No. XL, contemplates a sentence of more than one month’s rigorous imprisonment in the case of a person who has defaulted in payment for more than one month. The warrant runs: …...and whereas it has been further proved that the said (name) in wilful disregard of the said order has failed to pay rupees being the amount of the allowance for the month (or months) of.... And thereupon an order was made adjudging him to undergo simple (or rigorous) imprisonment in the said jail for the period of....” We therefore hold that in the case of a default in payment directed by an order under section 488, Criminal P.C., the Magistrate seised with the case may issue one warrant and thereafter pass a sentence of imprisonment of one month in respect of each month or part of a month for which there has been default in payment. In the result we reject the reference and direct that the record be returned.” 17. In Karson Ramji Chawda v. State of Bombay : AIR 1958 Bom. 99 ], a Full Bench of Bombay High Court observed : “2. This sentence has been challenged on the ground that in passing the sentence for two months, the Magistrate exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him under section 488 (3). The matter came up before Mr. Justice Bavde-kar and Mr. Justice Desai and they referred it to a Full Bench, as they felt that they were bound by an unveported decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Queen Empress v. Pandu Mahadu, 1885 Rat Un. Cr. C. 801 (A). The contention urged by Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the applicant is that in respect of one warrant issued, the sentence which can be inflicted by the Magistrate can only be one month and not exceeding one month. Now turning to the sub-section. Cr. C. 801 (A). The contention urged by Mr. Kotwal on behalf of the applicant is that in respect of one warrant issued, the sentence which can be inflicted by the Magistrate can only be one month and not exceeding one month. Now turning to the sub-section. “if any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month’s allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made.” Therefore, this sub-section confers upon the Magistrate two independent powers; one to issue a warrant which has to be executed in the manner laid down in the sub-section and the other to sentence the person also in the manner laid down in the sub-section. The fallacy underlying Mr. Kotwal’s argument is that the sentence follows upon the issue of a warrant. That is not the section. The power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant is not dependent upon the issue of the warrant, or in other words the issue of the warrant is not a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant. Therefore, if we read the provision with regard to the power of the Magistrate to sentence the applicant independently of the power to issue the warrant, it is clear that the power to sentence is for the whole or any part of each month’s allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made. Now these words clearly lay down the power of the Magistrate. The power of the Magistrate is in respect of whole or any part of each month’s allowance remaining unpaid to sentence the applicant for a term not exceeding one month. Now, the view taken in this unreported judgment was based, with respect, on the assumption with which we have just dealt that a separate warrant should issue for each separate monthly default and when that is done, the maximum punishment can be one month’s imprisonment. Now, the view taken in this unreported judgment was based, with respect, on the assumption with which we have just dealt that a separate warrant should issue for each separate monthly default and when that is done, the maximum punishment can be one month’s imprisonment. This view proceeds on the basis that whenever there is a default, a warrant has to be issued and the Magistrate must proceed to sentence the applicant alter the warrant has been issued. With respect, there is no warrant for this view and this decision was based on a judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Queen Empress v. Narain, ILR 9 All 240 (B). The Allahabad High Court since then in a Full Bench has come to a contrary conclusion: see Emperor v. Beni, ILR (1938) All 750:( AIR 1938 All 386 ) (C). Mr. Chandrachud has also drawn our attention to the judgments in Allapichai Ravuthar v. Mohidin Bibi, ILR 20 Mad 3 (D), and in King Emperor v. Budhoo Mandal, which have also taken the same view and, according to the Allahabad High Court, presumably the decision in Bhiku Khan v. Zahu-ran, ILR 25 Cal 291 (F), is also to the same effect. It may also be pointed out that the history of this section also supports the view that we have taken. In the Code of 1861, the section ran in the following terms : “The Magistrate may, for every breach of the order by warrant, direct the amount due to be levied in the manner provided for levying fines; or may order such person to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding one month.” 18. In Gorakshnath Khandu Bagal v. State of Maharashtra & others : [2005 CriLJ 3158], a Division Bench of Bombay High Court had the occasion to dwell upon the issue as presently involved in the case at hand, held : “9. …... In Gorakshnath Khandu Bagal v. State of Maharashtra & others : [2005 CriLJ 3158], a Division Bench of Bombay High Court had the occasion to dwell upon the issue as presently involved in the case at hand, held : “9. …... taking into consideration facts of the present case and also by making reference to the language of section 125(3) and the proviso referred thereto and also from form of warrant provided under Schedule-II in Form No.18, we record our finding that the Magistrate can impose a punishment for default of each month or a part of each month’s default in payment of maintenance, by awarding imprisonment for a period of one month or till the payment is made, which ever is sooner. If there are arrears for more than one month then the imprisonment exceeding for a period of one month can be imposed. However, what we find that the proviso contemplates application within 12 months and thereby at the most, in one application 12 defaults can be clubbed together and after every 12 defaults, a separate application will have to be filed. However, in that eventuality in each application, as there are maximum 12 defaults, the Magistrate may impose imprisonment extending upto a period of 12 months, but that is outer limit. The lesser imprisonment can be imposed and such imprisonment will be followed until the payment is made, that means, if the amount is paid during the period of imprisonment, the person will have to be released immediately. In short, we find that there is no substance in this revision petition and the revision petition is accordingly rejected.” 19. In view whereof, the order making reference i.e. order dated 13.12.2018 passed in Criminal Revision No. 5630/2018 when tested on the anvil of above analysis cannot be upheld. The view taken by learned Single Judge in Rajesh Dubey (supra) that the Magistrate can impose a sentence for default of each month or a part of each months default in payment of maintenance, by awarding punishment for a period of one month till payment is made, whichever is sooner. If there are arrears for more than one month then the imprisonment exceeding for a period of one month can be imposed is uphold. 20. The reference is answered accordingly. 21. If there are arrears for more than one month then the imprisonment exceeding for a period of one month can be imposed is uphold. 20. The reference is answered accordingly. 21. The matter is referred back to learned Single Judge for consideration of Criminal Revision No. 5630/2018 on merit in terms of above decision. 22. Office is directed to place the order passed today on the record of Criminal Revision No. 1257/2018 and Criminal Revision No. 5630/2018.