JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri P.K. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Sulabh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1/1 to 1/6 representing as legal heirs of the deceased No.1 and perused the record. 2. By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 24th July, 1998, whereby the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Faizabad Region, Faizabad has allowed the claim of the respondent No.1 for the change of date of birth of the respondent in the records of the employer as 30th January, 1942 instead of 1st November, 1933 which was originally recorded. 3. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the respondent No.1 was Machine Man in the erstwhile M/s R.B. Laxman Das Sugar & General Mills, Pvt. Limited, Narwal Road, Bahraich and had got recorded the date of birth as April, 1933 in the service record. It appears thereafter when the mill was taken over by the petitioner and the petitioner relied upon those very service record and so the date of birth of the respondent was continued recorded as 1st November, 1933. Standing orders governing the service conditions of the employees of the petitioner came to be enforced w.e.f. 27th September, 1988 and as per the order No.- L.L. that govern the field of the retirement of the employees on attaining the age of superannuation, provides vide Clause 6, for the change of date of birth recorded in the service records of an employee. Clause 6 of the order No.- L.L. is reproduced for ready reference:- “6. The workman who are in employment at the time of enforcement of these standing orders shall have the right to get their age record modified as per clause 3 above with one year of enforcement of these standing orders. He shall have the right to represent to the Regional Additional/ Deputy Labour Commissioner of the area concerned within one month of notice of retirement. Such representations shall normally be disposed off within a period of one month of the date of receipt of representation from the workmen, and the orders passed by the Additional/ Deputy Labour Commissioner regarding the age of the concerned workman shall be final and shall not be questioned by any party before any court. Such representations shall normally be disposed off within a period of one month of the date of receipt of representation from the workmen, and the orders passed by the Additional/ Deputy Labour Commissioner regarding the age of the concerned workman shall be final and shall not be questioned by any party before any court. In case the Regional Additional/ Deputy Labour Commissioner allows the representation, the employer shall modify the record of age of the workman immediately on receipt of the said orders.” (emphasis added) 4. From a bare reading of the said clause it is quite explicit that there are two stages when an employee can seek change in date of birth:- (A). Within a year of enforcement of the standing order; and (B). Within one month of the notice of the retirement. 5. Assailing the order impugned in the present writ petition it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as far as the first condition is concerned relating to the change of date of birth recorded in the service record, opportunity having been afforded under the standing order for the petitioner to have got his date of birth changed in the service record within a year of the enforcement of the standing order and standing order having come to be enforced on 27th September, 1988, the petitioner should have moved application for change of date of birth in any event by September, 1989. However, that was not done. Since the application for correction of date of birth has been submitted on 25th March, 1991 quite belatedly and so he argues that it was beyond the prescribed period provided under the standing order. 6. Now coming to the second stage; it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent was given notice of retirement on 4th/13th August, 1993 and therefore, he had the opportunity to move appropriate application by 12th September, 1993, if he was aggrieved against the wrong recording of date of birth in the service record. 6. Now coming to the second stage; it has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent was given notice of retirement on 4th/13th August, 1993 and therefore, he had the opportunity to move appropriate application by 12th September, 1993, if he was aggrieved against the wrong recording of date of birth in the service record. However, no such application was moved and straightaway he filed the claim before the Deputy Labour Commissioner for the purpose of change of date of birth and the consequential benefits in regard thereto, which according to the petitioner, should not have been entertained in the face of the fact that the standing orders are having binding force and standing orders provided for certain limitations to get the benefit. It is imperative for an employee, it is contended, to comply with those conditions but in the present case the employee chose not to move any appropriate application within the time prescribed and moved an application after the time prescribed had lapsed and then even after getting the notice of retirement he did not move any application and, therefore, it is argued that the Deputy Labour Commissioner has wrongly recorded a finding to the effect that the petitioner’s application ought to have been considered and allowed. It is an employer who has the right in case if the standing orders are required to be amended or any relaxation to be provided for but once the limitation is prescribed for under the standing order it was beyond the scope of any authority to provide any relaxation in the terms and conditions that are prescribed for. 7. Per contra, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the answering respondent is that there is finding of fact returned by the Deputy Labour Commissioner to the effect that the petitioner had moved an application on 16th June, 1989 itself, which is thus within the period of one year from the date of enforcement of the standing order and, therefore, according to him, it was wrong to allege that the petitioner was sleeping over the matter and was not vigilent of his rights and did not exercise his rights well within time. 8. 8. It is further sought to be urged by learned counsel for the petitioner with the aid of certain document annexed which shows verification was obtained from the Basic Education Officer qua date of birth recorded in the Junior High School. So he contends that the respondents were quite alive to the pending application of the petitioner. He has sought to urge that the substantial justice would be done in the matter if wrongly recorded date of birth is corrected in the service record maintained by the petitioner as well. 9. He has further argued that answering respondent was given reappointment by the petitioner in the establishment and he has been paid salary for one entire session and thus it goes without saying that the petitioner fully acknowledged correct date of birth of respondent No.1 as 1942 and not 1933. He also submits that in the year 1994 he had moved an application also for correction of date of birth in the service record. 10. Rival submissions fall for consideration. 11. The basic question around which the controversy revolves about is the right of the applicant to get the date of birth changed in the service record or in other words the accurate time to exercise option. It is admitted to the petitioner that his services are fully governed by the standing orders that came into force on 27th September, 1988 and Clause 6 as provided in the order No.-L.L. of the standing order speaks of two stages only to exercise option. The question, therefore, is whether those stages were available to the petitioner at the time when the petitioner had moved an application and the petitioner’s application could be said to be justified within four corners of the provisions. 12. As far as the finding that has come to be recorded in the order of Deputy Labour Commissioner that the petitioner had moved an application in the year 1989 and a document to that effect has also been brought on record by answering respondent to the counter affidavit is concerned, I find in the written statement that was submitted before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, the said application and service thereof was denied. Even in paragraph 12 to the writ petition it has been categorically stated that no such application was available on record of the employer nor, any such application was ever moved. Even in paragraph 12 to the writ petition it has been categorically stated that no such application was available on record of the employer nor, any such application was ever moved. The only application that was filed was dated 25th March, 1991 for the correction of date of birth. Paragraph 12 as have been averred in the writ petition is reproduced hereunder:- “12. That the claim of the Opposite Party No.1 was contested by filing written reply by the petitioners, wherein in para 5 it has been specifically indicated that the Opposite Party No.1 has not given any application on 16.6.1989 for correction of his date of birth. It was admitted in para 5 of the said reply that the Opposite Party No.1 for the first time has given application on 25.3.1991 for correction of his date of birth but under the provisions of the Standing Orders the time for correction of date of birth had expired and the entries in the Service record became final for all times to come. A copy of the written reply dated 13.1.1995 as submitted by the petitioners is being annexed herewith as Annexure-6 to this writ petition.” 13. Reply to the aforesaid paragraph has been given in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit which is reproduced hereunder:- “8. That contents of para 11, 12 & 13 of the writ petition need no reply.” 14. The averment that has come to be made in paragraph 12 to the writ petition in quite unequivocal terms clarifies that there was no such application available on record nor, was filed by the respondent. There is no denial in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit. Non denial means a fair admission and the admission is the best piece of evidence as law is so established. The finding that has come to be returned in by Deputy Labour Commissioner that such an application was filed in 1989, if tested on the averments so made in the writ petition and counter affidavit, turns out to be a perverse finding. No material has been discussed by Deputy Labour Commissioner in recording such a finding and, therefore, as far as the first condition is concerned provided under Clause 6 of the standing order, it is proved that the petitioner did not move any application for correction of date of birth well within time prescribed for. 15. No material has been discussed by Deputy Labour Commissioner in recording such a finding and, therefore, as far as the first condition is concerned provided under Clause 6 of the standing order, it is proved that the petitioner did not move any application for correction of date of birth well within time prescribed for. 15. Coming to the second aspect of the matter as to whether the application of the respondent could have been allowed in the face of the fact that he did not move any application for correction of date of birth within a period of one month of the date of notice of the retirement, I find it to be admitted to the petitioner that no such application was ever moved, instead, he admits that the application was moved only in 1994. So, this is again a fair admission on the part of the petitioner that no such application was made well within time as prescribed for. 16. In P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General (2003) 2 SCC 632, the Court held that there is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a Government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service. 17. The legal position is very sound to this effect that no relaxation in the Rules can be provided by an authority unless such delegation of power permits. Even the Courts are not in a position to provide any such relaxation in the conditions provided for under the standing order. Rules as prescribed are absolute and are mandatory in their binding effect. In Purushottam Govindji Halai v. Shre B.M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay & Others, AIR 1956 SC 20 Court held that duty of constitutional Courts is not to suggest what law should be. Court's duty is only to interprate law. Rules as prescribed are absolute and are mandatory in their binding effect. In Purushottam Govindji Halai v. Shre B.M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay & Others, AIR 1956 SC 20 Court held that duty of constitutional Courts is not to suggest what law should be. Court's duty is only to interprate law. Court referred to the authority of of U.S. Supreme Court in Middletone v. Texas Power and Light Company, (249 US 152, 157)" there is strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discrimination are based upon adequate grounds. 18. The golden rule of interpretation is to go by the plain and literal meaning of the language in which the provision is couched. 19. In such view of the matter, therefore, I am of the opinion that the Deputy Labour Commissioner seriously erred in law by allowing the claim of the petitioner for the change of date of birth recorded in the service record of the petitioner and the order, therefore, cannot be sustained. 20. In view of the above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 24th July, 1998 is hereby quashed with no order as to costs.