JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Anand Mandi Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 2. By means of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27th January, 2003 whereby the petitioner's claim for compassionate appointment has been rejected on the ground of financial background of the family of the deceased. 3. Assailing the order impugned it has been argued that the respondent -Bank has not considered the application of the petitioner in correct prospective otherwise the appointment would have been granted by the Bank. The writ petition was filed in the year 2002 seeking compassionate appointment. The consideration has been made on the petitioner's claim in the year 2003 under the directions of this Court. 4. The findings regarding financial aspect of the matter has come to be returned. These findings of fact cannot be disputed by the petitioner as they are based on factual aspect of the matter regarding family pension and other financial terminal benefits that have been given to the petitioner by the Bank. The compassionate appointment is not an appointment as rule in the banking sector. In the case of Food Corporation of India and others v. Hari Ram a Division Bench of which I was a member, while setting aside the order of a learned Single Judge, has held thus:- “6. We have gone through the O.M. and find, when a candidate is not offered appointment, his name is carried forward for next year since quota is only 5 percent for compassionate appointment out of direct recruitment quota. A fresh review of financial status of family is taken and then again, for next year same exercise is repeated. We find it difficult to convince ourselves with any such analogy that such exercise should continue till appointment is given. There has to have some ceiling at some point of time and we find that two reviews in case of a candidate are genuine, reasonable and if a candidate's financial status is found to be sound or that he has been denied appointment due to non availability of vacancy and has survived, then such candidate cannot be continued in the wait list for unlimited period or for longer than a reasonable period. What should be a reasonable period, it is for the Department or Employer to decide as a matter of policy. What should be a reasonable period, it is for the Department or Employer to decide as a matter of policy. Considering entire policy of compassionate appointment in question we do not find any such thing which may be said to be vesting A, an arbitrary discretions. Court normally does not interfere with a policy decision unless probably it is arbitrary to hold that ceiling limit of three years provided/ prescribed by department concerned is unreasonable or arbitrary is difficult to accept. Whether offer of appointment in the category of compassionate appointment shall be carried forward for three years or more is well within the domain of policy making body of concerned Department /Corporation. Besides, we do not find circular/policy in any manner irrational. 7. Even otherwise, it is well settle law that Court shall not lightly interfere with any rule or law making process. 8. In Purushottam Govindji Halai v. Shre B.M. Desai, Additional Collector of Bombay & Others, AIR 1956 SC 20 Court held that duty of constitutional Courts is not to suggest what law should be. Court's duty is only to interprate law. Court referred to the authority of of U.S. Supreme Court in Middletone v. Texas Power and Light Company, (249 US152,157) " there is strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discrimination are based upon adequate grounds. 9. In Jal Mahal Resorts (P) Ltd. v. K.P. Sharma (2014) 8 SCC 804 , Court observed that two overriding considerations narrow the scope of judicial review. The first is, deference to the views of administration experts and, other courts to desist itself from interference on technical matters, where all the advantages of expertise lie with the agencies concerned. 10. Similarly in P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General (2003) 2 SCC 632, Court discarded judicial review of alteration and amendment in service rules or condition of service as outside scope of judicial review. Vide para 10 it held : "We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. 10. Similarly in P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General (2003) 2 SCC 632, Court discarded judicial review of alteration and amendment in service rules or condition of service as outside scope of judicial review. Vide para 10 it held : "We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. Questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy and within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for the Statutory Tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the competency of the State to change the rules relating to a service and alter or amend and vary by addition/substruction the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of service including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as the administrative exigencies may need or necessitate. Likewise, the State by appropriate rules is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/posts. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a Government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service." 11. While discussing the scope of judicial review, Court in State of U.P. And Another v. Johri Mal 2004 SCC 714 spelled out principles governing the scope of judicial review as under: "28. While discussing the scope of judicial review, Court in State of U.P. And Another v. Johri Mal 2004 SCC 714 spelled out principles governing the scope of judicial review as under: "28. The Scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or done the robes of omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court. The limited scope of judicial review succinctly put are : (i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies; (ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds. (iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal. (iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on a Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice. (v) The Courts cannot be called upon to undertake the Government duties and functions. The Court shall not ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. Social and economic belief of a Judge should not be invoked as a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies. (See Ira Munn Vs. State of Ellinois, 1876 (94) US (Supreme Reports) 113) In Wade's Administrative Law, 8th edition at pages 33-35, it is stated: 29. Review, Legality and discretion The system of judicial review is radically different from the system of appeals. (See Ira Munn Vs. State of Ellinois, 1876 (94) US (Supreme Reports) 113) In Wade's Administrative Law, 8th edition at pages 33-35, it is stated: 29. Review, Legality and discretion The system of judicial review is radically different from the system of appeals. When hearing an appeal the court is concerned with the merits of a decision: is it correct? When subjecting some administrative act or order to judicial review, the court is concerned with its legality: is it within the limits of the powers granted? On an appeal the question is 'right or wrong?' On review the question is 'lawful or unlawful?' Rights of appeal are always statutory. Judicial review, on the other hand, is the exercise of the court's inherent power to determine whether action is lawful or not and to award suitable relief. For this no statutory authority is necessary: the court is simply performing its ordinary functions in order to enforce the law. The basis of judicial review, therefore, is common law. This is none the less true because nearly all cases in administrative law arise under some Act of Parliament. Where the Court quashes an order made by a minister under some Act, it typically uses its common law power to declare that the Act did not entitle the minister to do what he did and that he was in some way exceeding or abusing his powers. Judicial review thus is a fundamental mechanism for keeping public authorities within due bounds and for upholding the rule of law. Instead of substituting its own decision for that of some other body, as happens when on appeal, the court on review is concerned only with the question whether the act or order under attack should be allowed to stand or not. If the Home Secretary revokes a television licence unlawfully, the court may simply declare that the revocation is null and void. Should the case be one involving breach of duty rather than excess of power, the question will be whether the public authority should be ordered to make good a default. Refusal to issue a television licence to someone entitled to have one would be remedied by an order of the court requiring the issue of the licence. Should the case be one involving breach of duty rather than excess of power, the question will be whether the public authority should be ordered to make good a default. Refusal to issue a television licence to someone entitled to have one would be remedied by an order of the court requiring the issue of the licence. If administrative action is in excess of power (ultra vires), the court has only to quash it or declare it unlawful (these are in effect the same thing) and then no one need pay any attention to it. The minister or tribunal or other authority has in law done nothing, and must make a fresh decision." 12. We may point out that in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Others (1994) 4 SCC 138 , while considering object of compassionate appointment to enable family to come out of certain crisis occurred on account of death of bread-earner in harness, Court held that principle behind compassionate appointment is bad conditions of deceased family only. Since, it is an appointment against general rule of direct recruitment, caution and care has to be taken that only in genuine cases appointment should be offered, more especially in the circumstances when quota is only 5 percent to the vacancies available under direct recruitment category. 13. Again in State of Haryana, Electricity Board and Other v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 , Court has held that compassionate appointment is a category of employment only to grant relief to the family from financial distress but such relief cannot be claimed as a right to appointment creating a quota by itself. 14. Again in Director of Education (Secondary) and Another v. Pushpendra Kumar and Others, Court held that compassionate appointment rule is exception to the main provision, therefore, due care has to be taken that in the matters of grant of compassionate appointment it should not result in undue and unnecessary interference with right of other persons who are otherwise, eligible for a public employment. Considering object of compassionate appointment one of us (Sudhir Agarwal, J.) in Mohan Lal v. General Manager (Zone) FCI and, (2010) 1 UPLBEC 218 while considering similar scheme held that a claim of compassionate appointment continued for consideration, is older of three years. The court cannot allow the person claim compassionate appointment to be considered particular terms of scheme.” 5. Considering object of compassionate appointment one of us (Sudhir Agarwal, J.) in Mohan Lal v. General Manager (Zone) FCI and, (2010) 1 UPLBEC 218 while considering similar scheme held that a claim of compassionate appointment continued for consideration, is older of three years. The court cannot allow the person claim compassionate appointment to be considered particular terms of scheme.” 5. The compassionate appointment is governed by the scheme of compassionate appointment circulated by the bank vide circular applicable to the bank employees. It provides for various factors to be considered for providing compassionate appointment unlike other service rules that govern the field of compassionate appointment by necessarily offering appointments to dependants who apply. It could not be argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that decision taken by the bank suffers from any vice of perversity or bad for mala fides. The exercise though administrative in nature in passing the order dated 27th January, 2003 but exercise thereof cannot be taken to be arbitrary absolutely warranting any interference by this Court. 6. In such view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. It is, however, open for the petitioner to get the terminal benefits cleared by the bank by moving appropriate application if it has remained unpaid till date. 8. Subject to above, this writ petition is dismissed and consigned to records.