ORDER : Tashi Rabstan, J. 1. Petitioner's case is that a civil suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure for recovery of an amount of Rs. 12.00 Lacs has been filed by the plaintiff (respondent herein) before the court of learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar (for short "TRIAL COURT") against him. 2. The petitioner-defendant states that he moved an application seeking leave to defend the suit on the basis of the averments made in the application. Learned Trial Court vide order dated 25.02.2019 disposed of aforesaid application, granting petitioner liberty to defend the suit subject to depositing an amount of Rs. 6.00 lacs in the Court or in alternative pay or deposit cash security of Rs. 6.00 lacs in the shape of bank guarantee within a period of 30 days, failing which, the court said, that it would be deemed that the defendant (petitioner herein) has no defence to defend the suit. It is this order, of which petitioner is aggrieved and seeks quashment thereof on the grounds tailored in the petition in hand. 3. Application, moved by the petitioner seeking liberty to defend the suit, has been filed on the ground that the repayment of the money had been effected partly in cash and partly by remitting the money through transfer in the account of the plaintiff (respondent herein), as such, petitioner had prayed for grant of liberty without any condition. It is stated that the suit filed before learned Trial Court is based on four cheques, being bill of exchange; the initial presumption is taken about the genuineness of the claim, unless the Court grants leave to defend the suit after deriving satisfaction about the genuineness of the defence. It is further submitted that neither is initial presumption available to genuineness of the claim nor is the power available to the court below to put the defendant-petitioner herein to the condition while granting liberty to defend the suit. Therefore, the learned Trial Judge failed to sustain the objections that the jurisdiction in terms of Order XXXVII CPC is not available to the plaintiff-respondent herein. Learned counsel for petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in State Bank of Hyderabad v. RABO Bank reported in (2015) 10 SCC 521 . 4. Therefore, the learned Trial Judge failed to sustain the objections that the jurisdiction in terms of Order XXXVII CPC is not available to the plaintiff-respondent herein. Learned counsel for petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in State Bank of Hyderabad v. RABO Bank reported in (2015) 10 SCC 521 . 4. Learned counsel for the respondent has resisted the contention raised by the petitioner and defended the order impugned by saying that the learned Trial Court has rightly put the condition in the order impugned. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the matter. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed on record a certified copy of application filed by the petitioner before the learned Trial court with a prayer to grant extension of time for submitting bank guarantee of cash security to the tune of Rs. 6.00 lac in order to avail defense in the case and the trial court accordingly vide order dated 23.03.2019 granted 15 days' time to do the needful. Petitioner again approached learned Trial Court by filing another application seeking grant of further time in raising the security as the time granted earlier, according to him, was not sufficient. The Trial court vide order dated 11.4.2019 put the same on 29.04.2019. 7. Perusal of the application and certified copies of the Trial court orders passed on different dates on the applications moved by the petitioner, reveals that the petitioner was willing to comply the impugned order, therefore, he approached the learned Trial court for extension of time. However, filing of present petition shows that the petitioner has taken U-turn only to delay the proceedings before the Trial court. 8. Before deciding the controversy emanating from present petition, the question which arises for consideration is whether the petition filed under Section 104 of the Constitution of State of J&K is maintainable. The fact that the High Courts have powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is undisputed, but care is to be taken when the same is warranted to be exercised because powers under such Articles have to be utilized very cautiously, carefully, sparingly and in rarest of rare cases. The fact that the High Courts have powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is undisputed, but care is to be taken when the same is warranted to be exercised because powers under such Articles have to be utilized very cautiously, carefully, sparingly and in rarest of rare cases. There should not be tendency in High Courts to entertain petitions under Article 226 or for that matter under Section 104 of Constitution of State of J&K, against the orders, against which revision is barred in terms of amended Act of CPC. 9. The Supreme Court in this regard in case titled Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010 AIR SCW 6387) has observed that there is tendency in High Courts to entertain petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against the orders against which revision is barred in terms of amended Act of CPC. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 80, 81 and 82 of the judgment supra herein: "80. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petition. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev (supra) and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 81. As a result of frequent interference by Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. 82. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. 82. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly." 10. This Court also in the case of Abdul Rehman Dar and others V. Showkat Ali Bhat and others reported in 2011 (IV) JKJ 334 (HC) and in the case of Kuldip Singh and others v. Krishna Devi and others passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in LPAOW No. 30/2013 dated 16.04.2013, while following the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, has laid down the same principle that if a party, which loses the case before Trial Court or before Appellate Court, is allowed to file a writ petition and thereafter if such writ petition is entertained without any check and balance that will amount to beating litigation and in breach of the purpose, aim and object of the legislation which was made basis for amendment of the CPC. 11. In Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra), the Supreme Court has surveyed judicial pronouncements as to the nature of the power of superintendence and control conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution (Section 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir). The Supreme Court in this case has started with the Constitutional Bench's judgment in Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath, AIR 1954 SC 215 , where the Court, while relying upon a Special Bench judgment delivered by HARRIES, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airway Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , had held that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The Supreme Court also referred to another Constitution Bench judgment in State of Gujarat v. Vakhat Singh Ji Vajesingh Ji Vaggekam, AIR 1968 SC 1481 , in which it was opined that supervisory power under Article 227 is meant to keep the subordinate Tribunal within the limits of their authority and to ensure that they obey law. 12. The Supreme Court also referred to another Constitution Bench judgment in State of Gujarat v. Vakhat Singh Ji Vajesingh Ji Vaggekam, AIR 1968 SC 1481 , in which it was opined that supervisory power under Article 227 is meant to keep the subordinate Tribunal within the limits of their authority and to ensure that they obey law. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others (2015 AIR SCW 1849), has taken a different view from one that was taken in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others concerning jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the judicial order of Civil Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the question referred to in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), held that judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contrary view taken in Surya Dev's case has, thus, been overruled. However, the position qua jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, elaborately dealt with in Surya Dev Rai's case, has not been changed. 13. This Court in the case titled Mohd. Yousuf Shah and others v. Akber Ganai and others, reported in 2017 (3) JKJ (HC)542 has elaborately discussed the legal position and the parameters governing exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. What was held by this Court in paragraphs No. 14 and 15 of the said judgment is reproduced here as under: "14. In view of the settled legal position, it is abundantly clear that the powers of this Court under Article 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir are extra ordinary power of superintendence and are, therefore, required to be exercised in the rarest of rare cases. 15. Viewed from the settled position of law, the case in hand does not fall in any of aforesaid parameters laid down by the Supreme Court and as such, does not call for any interference. It is reiterated that the powers vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K is not a substitute for the revisional powers vested in the Civil Court under Section 115 of CPC. It is reiterated that the powers vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K is not a substitute for the revisional powers vested in the Civil Court under Section 115 of CPC. Once the revision petition against the order passed by the Civil Court is barred, this Court would be loath to exercise jurisdiction under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir unless it is demonstrated that the order impugned is perverse and has occasioned serious miscarriage of justice." 14. In the present case, impugned order dated 25.02.2019, on its glimpse, reveals that the learned Trial Court has passed it in presence of both parties. The learned Trial Court has, while relying on various judgments passed by the Apex Court as also the High Courts, observed that it has discretion under Order XXXVII CPC to grant leave unconditionally or subject to the conditions. The learned Trial Court although observed the defence urged by defendant illusory and sham, yet it granted leave to petitioner subject to depositing Rs. 6.00 Lacs or in alternative depositing security of Rs. 6.00 Lacs in the shape of Bank Guarantee/Demand Draft in the name of the Court, within a period of 30 days. Learned Trial Court has rightly placed reliance on the judgment rendered by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. Mechalec Engineers & Manufacturers v. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation reported in AIR 1977 SC 577 , in which it was taken note of that could the High Court interfere with the discretion of Trial Court in granting unconditional leave to defend upon the grounds which even on perusal of the order of the High Court shows to be reasonable. The Supreme Court also discussed the law laid down by it in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh, 1958 SC 321 as also Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Co. (1901) 85 LT 262, that whenever a defence raised a really triable issue, leave must be given. The Supreme Court quoted the principles applicable to the cases covered by Order XXXVII CPC in various propositions, laid down by it in Sm. Kiranmoyee Dassi v. Dr. J. Chatterjee (1945) 49 Cal WN 246. (1901) 85 LT 262, that whenever a defence raised a really triable issue, leave must be given. The Supreme Court quoted the principles applicable to the cases covered by Order XXXVII CPC in various propositions, laid down by it in Sm. Kiranmoyee Dassi v. Dr. J. Chatterjee (1945) 49 Cal WN 246. Some of the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court are that if defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good defence to claim on its merits the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment and defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend; if defendant raises triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable good defence, plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment and defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend; and if the defendant has no defence or the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then although ordinarily plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment, the Court may protect plaintiff by only allowing the defence to proceed if the amount claimed is paid into Court or otherwise secured and give leave to defendant on such condition, and thereby show mercy to defendant by enabling him to try to prove a defence. Verily, in the present case, the learned Trial Court has taken into account all facets of the matter including the principles applicable to the cases covered by Order XXXVII and the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Mechalec Engineers (supra). In that view of matter, the judgment cited by learned counsel for petitioner is not applicable to the case in hand. Instant petition has been filed under Section 104 of the Constitution of State of J&K, but it does not demonstrate the order impugned perverse and occasions any serious miscarriage of justice, inasmuch as petitioner has failed to show that the learned Trial Court, while passing the impugned order, has either acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction. Having said that, the impugned order does not call for interference. 15. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.