JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri P.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 01.06.2000 whereby petitioner has been dismissed from service while working as an accountant with respondent on certain charges of serious lapses in discharge of official duty and resultant misconduct. 3. It appears that charge-sheet was submitted to the petitioner to which he submitted reply but beyond that enquiry officer did not put any date for oral hearing in the matter and merely proceeded on the basis of reply of the delinquent employee, namely, the petitioner and the material placed before the enquiry officer by the respondent and on such evaluation conducted by the enquiry officer, he has found the petitioner guilty of all the charges except two charges. 4. The petitioner was issued with the show cause notice and he submitted reply thereof to the respondent questioning the findings returned by the enquiry officer. Considering the reply of the petitioner, the disciplinary authority has proceeded to impose maximum punishment of dismissal from service under the order impugned. 5. Assailing the order impugned, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that entire enquiry was conducted in an ex parte manner and except submission of reply, petitioner had not been given any notice by the enquiry officer or by the respondents fixing any date in the matter of enquiry to give him opportunity to put up his defence before the enquiry officer. 6. In a nutshell, the argument is that no oral enquiry was held in the matter which according to him is a sine qua non in matter of disciplinary proceedings. He submits that petitioner should have been afforded sufficient opportunity to cross examine the witnesses if there were any produced before the enquiry officer by side of the management. All these opportunities have been denied to the petitioner and, therefore, enquiry could not have been sustained in law. It has been further sought to be urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that charges no. 1 and 5 were not proved during enquiry and yet respondents have proceeded to impose penalty on the basis of those very charges. All these opportunities have been denied to the petitioner and, therefore, enquiry could not have been sustained in law. It has been further sought to be urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that charges no. 1 and 5 were not proved during enquiry and yet respondents have proceeded to impose penalty on the basis of those very charges. He further contends that reply was duly submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice but same has not been properly appreciated by the respondents and in just 5 lines in the order impugned, he has held that reply was perused and after consideration it was not found to be satisfactory. He submits therefore, that such finding cannot amount to true appreciation of the reply submitted in the form of explanation to the show cause notice and even while exercising administrative power in the administrative decision making the respondent disciplinary authority was required to look into material placed before it even in the form of explanation. He should have addressed to the points raised therein before recording finding to the effect that reply was not satisfactory. 7. Per contra, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent is that in the matter of enquiry, the petitioner had been found guilt in as many as five charges and merely because he has not been found guilty of two charges, the entire enquiry of the petitioner cannot be brushed aside and finding recorded therein cannot be ignored. He further submits that the material available before the enquiry officer was considered and these considerations cannot be judicially reviewed. He further submits that explanation that was sought from the petitioner to the show cause notice of the proposed action was not supported by any material as such which may require consideration independently by the disciplinary authority and, therefore, disciplinary authority cannot be faulted with in its ultimate action of imposing major punishment upon petitioner. 8. Having heard, learned counsel for the parties and their arguments across the bar and having perused the record, I find that not only in the disciplinary proceeding, oral enquiry has not been held but even disciplinary authority has not duly considered the explanation submitted by the petitioner. 8. Having heard, learned counsel for the parties and their arguments across the bar and having perused the record, I find that not only in the disciplinary proceeding, oral enquiry has not been held but even disciplinary authority has not duly considered the explanation submitted by the petitioner. Conducting a disciplinary proceeding by appointing enquiry officer entales a long drawn exercise not only seeking reply of the delinquent employee but also giving opportunity of oral examination of both the management/ departmental witnesses as well as witnesses that may be produced by delinquent employee. 9. In the case in hand, I find that in the first paragraph of the enquiry report, the enquiry officer has referred to the letters as to how he was appointed as enquiry officer and thereafter, he has started enquiry on various charges. I do not find anywhere anything so recorded from which it may reflect that at any point of time any date was fixed in the matter to hold oral enquiry and petitioner was put notice to appear before the enquiry officer. 10. In such above view of the mater, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no oral enquiry in the matter by the enquiry officer, holds merit. In the matter of disciplinary proceeding, it is settled legal position that the delinquent employee shall always be provided with adequate opportunity to present his case besides explanation/reply that he submits to the chargesheet, and on that count, therefore, enquiry report cannot be sustained and findings returned by the enquiry officer are also not tenable. 11. Besides above, I also find that the disciplinary authority while considering the reply of the petitioner has only referred in three lines that perusal of the explanation has been done and from perusal the explanation has not been found to be satisfactory. The relevant portion of the findings returned by the disciplinary authority is reproduced hereunder: ^^;r% Jh flag ls izkIr izfrokn ij cSad izcU/k }kjk xEHkhjrkiwoZd fopkj fd;k x;k A fopkjksijkUr ;g ik;k x;k fd Jh flag us dkj.k crkvks uksfVl ds izfrokn esa dksbZ ,slk u;k lk{; & rF; izLrqr ugha fd;k tks izLrkfor n.M dks de djus esa lgk;d gks A vr,o cSad izca/k }kjk Jh flag dks izLrkfor n.M esa deh djus dk dksbZ vkSfpR; ugha ik;k x;k vkSj lsokP;qr djus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;kA** 12. The settled legal position in a catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court and in Mulan's natural justice, it has been reiterated time and again that while dealing in such matters, disciplinary authority is robed with adjudicatory authority and therefore, issues that are referred to it even by way of explanation to the show cause notice have to be examined and to be dealt with by him independent of the enquiry report. I find that these aspects are quite lacking in the order impugned and therefore both the enquiry and order of disciplinary authority is not sustainable in law. 13. Mullan in "Natural Justice and Fairness" writes: ".......This did not go far enough; the old law relating to natural justice was too rigidly entrenched. More importantly, the issues were now somewhat more sophisticated, and it was recognized that it was not a case of all or nothing. Some decision making functions, while not requiring full adjudicative hearings, might nevertheless have usefully had certain participatory obligations or perhaps simply an obligation of "proper" consideration attached to them. Out of this predicament emerged the new vocabulary of the duty to act fairly. This was not in any sense the result of a growing feeling on the part of the courts that the time had come to assert a general review power over the wisdom of administrative decision-making, even though the subsequent conduct of one of the principal proponents of procedural "fairness" review, Lord Denning M.R., might suggest that this was indeed the case. It can best be viewed as a reaction to a particular problem in a particular area of judicial review. Hence it is ironic, though not perhaps surprising, to now see the emergence of fairness in the substantive law of judicial review as a standard for judging the merits of administrative decision-making........ . (1982) 27 McGill L.J. 273. 14. Besides above, the order to be passed by disciplinary authority while awarding major penalty, has to record cogent and convincing reasons or in other words the order passed by the disciplinary authority imposing major penalty, should be a speaking order. It has been held in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Atul Krishna Shaw and another 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 414 by the Apex Court that: "Giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice. It has been held in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Atul Krishna Shaw and another 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 414 by the Apex Court that: "Giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice. A right to reason is, therefore, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review. Reasoned decision is not only for the purpose of showing that the citizen is receiving justice, but also a valid discipline for the Tribunal itself. Therefore, statement of reasons is one of the essentials of justice." 15. In the case of Devendra Bhai Shankar Mehta Vs. Rameshchandra Vithal Das Sheth (1992) 3 SCC 473 , the Apex Court has held that the decision of disciplinary authority must appear to reflect that such authority was alive to various aspects of charge and defence pleaded. In such proceedings while an ultimate decision is taken of imposing penalty by the authority, the requirement of proof must be fulfilled in such proceedings and while an ultimate decision is taken by the authority, it should appear that the requirement of proof was fulfilled substantially. In a nut shell, the disciplinary authority should view that inquiry officer has taken due care in meticulously scrutinizing and analyzing the evidence on record and materials. Therefore, there must be an independent application of mind by the disciplinary authority to the findings of the inquiry officer. There should be no cut and paste of the finding of the inquiry officer by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority otherwise, such an order is liable to be rendered illegal and such a decision is unsustainable. In the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 , the Apex Court has held that where findings are based on no evidence or there is an absence of any findings, such an order is liable to go. 16. In the case of Managing Director, Ecil, Hyderabad Vs. In the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 , the Apex Court has held that where findings are based on no evidence or there is an absence of any findings, such an order is liable to go. 16. In the case of Managing Director, Ecil, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 the court observed thus: "The reason why the right to receive the report of the Inquiry Officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity it the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is the negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the Inquiry Officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the Inquiry Officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the Inquiry Officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. If the Inquiry Officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the Inquiry Officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary, authority while arriving at its conclusion. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary, authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the Inquiry Officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the Inquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against it." 17. At this stage learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner has already got superannuated on 07th July, 2001. Learned counsel for the respondent does not dispute the same and therefore, there is no question of remitting the matter to the authority for revisiting the issue. 18. Since I find disciplinary enquiry already unsustainable in law as well as the order impugned dismissing the petitioner from service, both the enquiry report and order impugned dated 18th September, 1999 and 4th October, 1999 (Annexures 11 and 12) respectively are hereby quashed. Consequences to follow. 19. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions with no order as to costs.