JUDGMENT : KRISHNA S. DIXIT, J. 1. Petitioner, a law graduate having got himself enrolled as an advocate in the Karnataka State Bar Council on 08.08.2003, vide registration No.1897/2003 and roll number KAR/1886/2003 has invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court calling in question the vires of the amendment dated 26.04.2016 to Rule 4 of the Karnataka Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules 2004 at Annexure-H1 to the extent it does not include in its word, the candidates like the petitioner who before completion of seven years of practice have joined as law officers in the local bodies like BBMP keeping their enrollment in suspension. 2. The petitioner has also sought for a writ of mandamus to the respondents 1 and 3 to modify the Recruitment Notification dated 12.12.2018 at Annexure-G to the effect that the Assistant Law Officers-Junior Law Officers of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike can also be in the fray as eligible candidates. 3. After service of notice, Sri Dildar Shiralli, learned HCGP has appeared for respondent Nos.1 & 2 and Sri Vivek Holla, learned counsel has appeared for respondent Nos.3 & 4 resisting the writ petition by filing the statement of objections. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned amendment permits Public Prosecutors- Assistant Public Prosecutors/Government Counsel in the full time employment of the state having not less than seven years of continuous practice immediately preceding the last date for applying for appointment alone can be in the fray of recruitment; petitioner and such other similar candidates who having put in long practice though little short of seven years at the Bar are not permitted to be in the fray although after their public employment as Law Officers they have been discharging the functions which government counsel ordinarily do in the course of their employment; therefore, the impugned Rule and the Recruitment Notification issued in terms thereof fall foul of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submits that the service conditions and job profile of the Junior Law Officers in the BBMP prima-facie match with that of the Public Prosecutors, Assistant Public Prosecutors and the Government Counsel, who too have got their enrollment suspended like the petitioner herein; these Government Advocates in the full time employment of the State when posted on the administrative side as Assistant Directors, Deputy Directors and Joint Directors of Prosecution do not appear and plead before the Court at all and even then by virtue of the amendment they can be in the recruitment fray whereas, the petitioner who is similarly circumstanced on all the fours cannot be; this is absolutely unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory, apart from being contrary to the law declared by the Apex Court and this Court in the following decisions: i. Mallaraddi H.Itagi and others vs. High Court of Karnataka and another, (2002) ILR(Kar) 2093 ii. Rajashekar M Tilanganji and others vs. High Court of Karnataka and others, (2014) ILR(Kar) 502 iii. Deepak Aggarwal vs. Keshav Koushik and others, (2013) 5 SCC 277 6. The learned panel counsel for the 3rd respondent Registrar General submits that the impugned 2016 Amendment to the Rules is brought about by the State Government on the recommendation of an expert committee constituted by this Court on the administrative side and that, the said report was approved by the full Court and therefore the wisdom and legality of the Rule cannot be doubted. He further submits that the observations of the Apex Court in Deepak Aggarwal's case and in Mallaraddi's case, are supportive of the stand of this respondent; admittedly the petitioner has practiced for a period of about six years three months and thereafter, he has joined as a Junior Law Officer in the employ of BBMP and got his enrollment suspended from 23.11.2009 and therefore his service as a lawyer he neither pleads nor appears before any Court as an Advocate; that being so, petitioner is not entitled to any relief at the hands of this Court. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned panel counsel for the third respondent Registrar General of this Court. I have perused the Writ Petition, the Statement of Objections and the rulings cited at the bar. 8. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned panel counsel for the third respondent Registrar General of this Court. I have perused the Writ Petition, the Statement of Objections and the rulings cited at the bar. 8. The admitted fact-matrix of the case is that, the petitioner a Law Graduate got himself enrolled in the State Bar Council on 08.08.2003; he had practiced as an Advocate till 22.11.2009 on which date he joined as a Law Officer in the BBMP employment; he got his enrolment suspended with effect from 23.11.2009; thus he does not have seven years of law practice, immediately preceding the last date for applying under the Recruitment Notification dated 12.12.2018; the shortage of qualifying period of practice is about nine months. Thus, as the amended Rule now stands, petitioner is not eligible to be in the recruitment fray. 9. The recruitment to the post of District Judge is to be accomplished in terms of Article 233 of the Constitution of India, Clause(2) whereof prescribes a practice of seven years as an Advocate/Pleader, immediately preceding the last date fixed for receipt of the application for recruitment. The impugned amendment to Rule 4 is substantially in terms of this Article. The said amendment makes the Public Prosecutors, Assistant Public Prosecutors and the Government Counsel eligible for being in the recruitment fray if they too have put in not less than seven years of continuous practice immediately preceding the last date fixed for receipt of the applications for appointment. It is so even when these candidates being in the State Employment have got their enrolment suspended in as much as they appear and plead as Advocates before the Courts and Tribunals. 10. In the light of decision of the Apex Court in Deepak Aggarwal's case (supra), Public Prosecutors, Assistant Public Prosecutors and the Government Counsel constitute an exception to Rule 49 of Bar Council of India Rules, which prohibits a salaried person from being an Advocate. Para's 98 and 99 of the said Judgment read as under: "98. Admittedly, by the above resolution of the Bar Council of India, the second and third para of Rule 49 have been deleted but we have to see the effect of such deletion. Para's 98 and 99 of the said Judgment read as under: "98. Admittedly, by the above resolution of the Bar Council of India, the second and third para of Rule 49 have been deleted but we have to see the effect of such deletion. What Rule 49 of the BCI Rules provides is that an advocate shall not be a full time salaried employee of any person, government, firm, corporation or concern so long as he continues to practice. The 'employment' spoken of in Rule 49 does not cover the employment of an advocate who has been solely or, in any case, predominantly employed to act and/or plead on behalf of his client in courts of law. If a person has been engaged to act and/or plead in court of law as an advocate although by way of employment on terms of salary and other service conditions, such employment is not what is covered by Rule 49 as he continues to practice law but, on the other hand, if he is employed not mainly to act and/or plead in a court of law, but to do other kinds of legal work, the prohibition in Rule 49 immediately comes into play and then he becomes a mere employee and ceases to be an advocate. The bar contained in Rule 49 applies to an employment for work other than conduct of cases in courts as an advocate. In this view of the matter, the deletion of second and third para by the Resolution dated 22.6.2001 has not materially altered the position insofar as advocates who have been employed by the State Government or the Central Government to conduct civil and criminal cases on their behalf in the courts are concerned. 99. What we have said above gets fortified by Rule 43 of the BCI Rules. Rule 43 provides that an advocate, who has taken a full-time service or part-time service inconsistent with his practicing as an advocate, shall send a declaration to that effect to the respective State Bar Council within time specified therein and any default in that regard may entail suspension of the right to practice. In other words, if full-time service or part-time service taken by an advocate is consistent with his practicing as an advocate, no such declaration is necessary. In other words, if full-time service or part-time service taken by an advocate is consistent with his practicing as an advocate, no such declaration is necessary. The factum of employment is not material but the key aspect is whether such employment is consistent with his practicing as an advocate or, in other words, whether pursuant to such employment, he continues to act and/or plead in the courts. If the answer is yes, then despite employment he continues to be an advocate. On the other hand, if the answer is in negative, he ceases to be an advocate." The inner voice of these two paragraphs of the Apex Court Judgment militate against the contention of the petitioner that he is similarly circumstanced qua the Public Prosecutors, Assistant Public Prosecutors and the Government Counsel, especially when in the absence of revocation of suspension of his enrolment, he is not entitled to appear and plead before the Court as an Advocate. Therefore, the impugned Rule cannot be faltered. 11. The impugned 2016 amendment to the recruitment rules was prompted by the recommendations made by a special committee constituted by this Court on the administrative side and that the said recommendations were approved by the Full Court unanimously. This amendment is a well thought out evolution of law relating to recruitment of District Judges. The Special Committee and the Full Court in their wisdom gained from past experience had recommended for the amendment in question. The government being the delegate too presumed to have considered the matter in its own wisdom before promulgating the amendment. A host of factors and the lessons drawn from experience to enter Rule Making process. Life of law, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of US Supreme Court said, is not logic but experience. Therefore, the impugned rule cannot be struck down on the unsubstantiated ground of discrimination and arbitrariness/unreasonableness. 12. The contention of the petitioner that the ratio decidendi in the aforesaid Mallaraddi's case (supra) and Rajashekar M Tilanganji case (supra) support the case of the petitioner is bit difficult to accept. In the later, the operative portion of the Judgment reads as under: "30. In our considered opinion, the Apex Court in Deepak Aggarwal, though was considering the appointment to the posts of District Judges under Article 233 of the Constitution, the principle laid down in the said judgment fully answers the question involved in these matters. In the later, the operative portion of the Judgment reads as under: "30. In our considered opinion, the Apex Court in Deepak Aggarwal, though was considering the appointment to the posts of District Judges under Article 233 of the Constitution, the principle laid down in the said judgment fully answers the question involved in these matters. In view of the above, the order passed in Writ Petition No.18428/2012 c/w W.P. Nos.6380/2012, 11611- 11621/2012 AND 38597-38600/2011 (SRES) dated 6th December 2012, impugned in these writ appeals is liable to be set aside and accordingly the same stands set aside. We hold that the Assistant Public Prosecutors-cum- Additional Government Pleaders are eligible for being considered for appointment to the posts of Civil Judges. We also make it clear that the selections/appointments already made pursuant to the notification dated 6.8.2011 are not disturbed. However Assistant Public Prosecutors-cum- Assistant Government Pleaders shall be considered for appointment to the posts of Civil Judges in future." As rightly pointed out by the panel counsel for the respondent No.3 Registrar General, the ratio emerging from this judgment is supportive of the case of the respondents and detrimental to that of the petitioner. Same is the position so far as the case of Mallaraddi also. 13. In the above circumstances, this writ petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs.