JUDGMENT : Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J. 1. Heard Sri S.K. Mehrotra, learned Standing Counsel for the State. None appeared for the respondents even in the revised call. 2. This appeal, at the behest of the State, has been filed against the judgment and order dated 22.11.1988 passed by Civil Judge, Bijnor in original Suit No. 222 of 1986. The appeal challenges the arbitral award as well as confirmation of the same by the Court below. 3. The parties are referred to as State/Appellant and Contractor/Respondent. 4. The facts for the purpose of our decision as they are culled out from the record that parties entered into the contract but there were certain disputes regarding certain items and the matter was referred to the Arbitrator who passed the award in favour of the present respondents. Objections were raised by the appellant herein with several contentions that were dealt with by the first Court and rejected the objections and made the award Rule of the Court vide order dated 22.11.1988 which is challenged before this Court. The record was missed and the appellant was directed to reconstruct the same which has been reconstructed. Rest of the documents are filed along with the memo of appeal. 5. It is submitted that the contracted rate for work was Rs. 8.49 per cubic metre and not Rs. 18 per cubic meter as awarded by the Arbitrator. 6. It is submitted that the diesel was supplied by the Department despite that the Arbitrator has awarded the amount for diesel and though the work was performed at Roorkee and payment was made at Haridwar, the Court below had no jurisdiction to pass orders. The District Bijnor where the Collectorate is situated had no jurisdiction to decide this matter as the contract was entered into at Rorkee. The award was made at Aligarh. 7. The Apex Court in FCI Versus Joginderpal Mohinderpal, (1989) 2 SCC 347 has held that the objection against an arbitral award can be raised only if it falls within the parameters fixed by the provisions of Section 14, and 33 of the Act, 1940. If the award satisfies that it is based on equity, fair play, principles of natural justice and established practice and procedure then the award should not be interfered. In proceedings of arbitration there must be adherence to justice, equity, law and fair play in action. If the award satisfies that it is based on equity, fair play, principles of natural justice and established practice and procedure then the award should not be interfered. In proceedings of arbitration there must be adherence to justice, equity, law and fair play in action. The proceedings must adhere to the principles of natural justice and must be in consonance with such practice and procedure which will lead to a proper resolution of the dispute and create confidence of the people for whose benefit these processes are resorted to FCI Versus Joginderpal Mohinderpal (supra). 8. Sections 30 and 33 of the Act, 1940 read as follows : “Section 30. Grounds for setting aside award.- An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely:- (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is other-wise invalid.” “33. Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application.-Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.” 9. The judicial review of an award has been circumscribed by Apex Court in FCI Versus Joginderpal Mohinderpal (supra) wherein it has been held that arbitration as a mode for settlement of disputes between the parties, has a tradition in India. It has a social purpose to be fulfilled today,. It has a great urgency today when there has been an explosion of litigation in the courts of law established by the sovereign power. It is, therefore, the function of Courts of Law to oversee that the arbitrators act within the norms of justice. It has a social purpose to be fulfilled today,. It has a great urgency today when there has been an explosion of litigation in the courts of law established by the sovereign power. It is, therefore, the function of Courts of Law to oversee that the arbitrators act within the norms of justice. Once they do so and the award is clear, just and fair, the Courts should, as far as possible, give effect to the award of the parties and make the parties compel to adhere to and obey the decision of their chosen adjudicator. It is in this perspective that one should view the scope and limit of correction by the court of an award made by the arbitrator. 10. In backdrop of this it will have to be decided as to whether can it be said that the decision of arbitrator upheld by the Court below is bad and was wrongly made the Rule of Court as per Arbitration Act, 1940. 11. While perusing the award, it is found that the arbitrator considered each item threadbare and has given his findings. Can it be said that arbitral award does not fulfill the contours of principles which are required to be followed by an arbitrator under the Act, 1940. 12. While going through the award, it is clear that while considering all the claim, the Arbitrator has given cogent reasons. The cement was not given in time. The demand of the claimant has been considered on the economical as well as that which can be granted as the State has objected to the grant of any amount under the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940. The objection taken by the State were only general and no specific objection item wise was taken and nor was proved by evidence that contractor was not entitled to the damages and interest. They had filed their objection vide Application No. 654 of 1998. Judgments on Arbitration Act, 1940 13. (I) Steel Authority of India Ltd Vs. Gupta Brothers Steel Tubes Ltd. (2009) 10 SCC 63 . “...... They had filed their objection vide Application No. 654 of 1998. Judgments on Arbitration Act, 1940 13. (I) Steel Authority of India Ltd Vs. Gupta Brothers Steel Tubes Ltd. (2009) 10 SCC 63 . “...... The courts below have currently held that the arbitrator has gone into the issues of facts thoroughly, applied his mind to the pleadings, evidence before him and the terms of the contract and then passed duly considered award and no ground for setting aside the award within the four corners of Section 30 has been made out......... In what we have already discussed above, the view of the arbitrator in this regard is a possible view. Consequently, appeal has no merit and costs.” (ii) Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd Vs. Oil & Natural Gas Commission of India (2010) 11 SCC 296 “.... award was not only a plausible one but a well reasoned award. In the circumstance the interference by the High Court was not called for. In that view of the matter we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, as well as that of the Division Bench....” (ii) Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. Vs. M/s Dewan Chand Ram Saran reported as 2012 (5) SCC 306 “.... There was no reason for the High Court to interfere in the view taken by the arbitrator which was based, in any case on a possible interpretation of clause 9.3. The learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench clearly erred in interfering with the award rendered by the arbitrator. Both those judgments will, therefore, have to be set-aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as of the Division Bench, are hereby set aside....” (iii) Reported as 2011 (5) SCC 758 , in the case of J.G. Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr. (iv) First Appeal No.137 of 1992, in the case of State of Gujarat & Anr. Vs. Nitin Construction Company, judgment dated 22.03.2013 of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat. (v) First Appeal No.3688 of 2012, in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Vijay Mistri Construction & Anr., judgment dated 22.03.2013 of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat. (vi) Reported as 2000 (4) GLR 3652 in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited Vs. Essar Steel Limited, (Paragraph-8). (v) First Appeal No.3688 of 2012, in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Vijay Mistri Construction & Anr., judgment dated 22.03.2013 of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat. (vi) Reported as 2000 (4) GLR 3652 in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited Vs. Essar Steel Limited, (Paragraph-8). (vii) Reported in 1999 (9) SCC 449 , Arosan Enterprises Limited V/s. Union of India & Anr. (viii) Reported in 2003 (8) SCC 4 , Continental Construction Limited Vs. State of U.P., Assam State Electricity Board V. Buildworth (P) Ltd., AIR 2017 (SC) 3336 ,Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board V. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., 1989 (1) SCC 532 : Irrigation Department, State Of Orissa V. G.C. Roy, 1992 1 SCC 508 : Jugal Kishore Prabhatilal Sharma V. Vijayendra Prabhatilal Sharma, AIR 1993 SC 864 and Smt. Aruna Kumari V. Government Of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 873 . (ix) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Indag Rubber Ltd, 2006 (7) SCC 700 wherein it has been held that the award can be set aside on the ground of misconduct if relevant documents are not considered by the Arbitrator. 14. Therefore in light of decisions of the Apex Court and the discussion herein above, the scope of interference with the findings of Arbitrator and confirmed by the District Judge, on the basis of principles would not permit to interfere with the findings, as settled in view of decision in case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd Vs. Annapurna Construction reported in 2003 (8) SCC 154 . 15. As far as ground of jurisdiction is concerned, the learned Judge has given elaborate reasons. I do not think that there is any perversity in the same. Hence, the said submission cannot be granted to upturn the arbitral award. 16. As far as the rate is concerned, for that also reasons are assigned by the learned Judge. Hence, in absence of the parameter fixed for interference by this Court in appeal, I do not find any reason to interfere. 17. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that in the alternative, if the award is not set aside, the interest awarded by the Tribunal should be interfered with as has been done by this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 714 of 2005 (State of U.P. and others Vs. J.M. Construction Company) decided on 11.4.2019. 18. 17. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that in the alternative, if the award is not set aside, the interest awarded by the Tribunal should be interfered with as has been done by this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 714 of 2005 (State of U.P. and others Vs. J.M. Construction Company) decided on 11.4.2019. 18. Recently, the Apex Court in K.Marappan (Dead) Versus Superintending Engineer T.B.P.H.L.C. Circle Anantapur, 2019 JX(SC) 391 and in Raveechee and Company Versus Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 3109 has interpreted the role of the Courts while hearing matters under the arbitration Act .The judgments go to show that pendente lite interest will depend upon several factors such as ; phraseology used in the agreement clauses conferring power relating to arbitration, nature of claim and dispute referred to arbitrator, and on what items power to award interest has been taken away and for which period. The Court observed: "34. Thus our answer to the reference is that if contract expressly bars award of interest pendente lite, the same cannot be awarded by the Arbitrator. And that the bar to award interest on delayed payment by itself will not be readily inferred as express bar to award interest pendente lite by the Arbitral Tribunal, as ouster of power of the arbitrator has to be considered on various relevant aspects referred to in the decisions of this Court, it would be for the Division Bench to consider the case on merits." 19. Further, this Court considered an identical clause in the contract in the case of Ambica Constructions v. Union of India, (2017) 14 SCC 323 , wherein it observed that the Clause of the GCC did not bar the arbitrator from awarding interest pendente lite and affirmed the award passed by the arbitrator. The three Judge Bench of this Court held that the contention raised by the Union of India based on the Clause of the GCC that the arbitrator could not award interest pendente lite was not a valid contention and the arbitrator was completely justified in granting interest pendente lite. Relying on the three Judge Bench judgment in Union of India v. Ambica Construction (supra) and in Irrigation Deptt., State of Orissa (supra), this Court held that the bar to award interest on the amounts payable under the contract would not be sufficient to deny the payment of interest pendente lite. 20. Relying on the three Judge Bench judgment in Union of India v. Ambica Construction (supra) and in Irrigation Deptt., State of Orissa (supra), this Court held that the bar to award interest on the amounts payable under the contract would not be sufficient to deny the payment of interest pendente lite. 20. The interest aspect is looked into by the undersigned in First Appeal No. 3256 of 2001 (OIL and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Versus Birla Techneftegas Exploration Limited decided on 7.4.2016 by the High Court of Gujarat wherein the following observations are relevant and are extracted herein below:- “........28. Therefore in light of decisions of the Apex Court and the discussion hereinabove, the scope of interference with the findings of Arbitrators and confirmed by the District Judge, on the basis of principles, we are not inclined to interfere with the findings, as settled in view of decision in case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd Vs. Annapurna Construction reported in 2003 (8) SCC 154 . 29. The award so far as interest is concerned, reads as follows: “With regard to contention (a) above, it is contended by the respondent that increase in HSD is not by operation of law but on account of the administrative orders and, therefore, the claim is not maintainable under Article 23.1 which deals only with variation in operating costs on account of change in or enactment of law in India or interpretation of existing law in India after the date of opening of price bid. To examine this contention it is essential to refer to the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Section 2 of this Act in subsection (a) defines “Essential Commodity”. In sub clause (viii) of clause (a) of section 2, petroleum and petroleum products have also been included as “Essential Commodities Act, Central Government has power to regulate and control the prices at which an essential commodity may be bought or sold. Therefore, increase in prices of HSD being a petroleum product is pursuant to the exercise of powers given to the Central Government under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act and is therefore, on account of a change in law.” The Tribunal has relied on the decisions of the Privy Counsel and Apex Court and also relied upon the affidavit of appellant filed before the Tribunal before the Award passed. The awarding of interest cannot be said to be in any manner, warranting any interference, however, the factum of interest, in our view may be considered, which in our view is on higher side looking to prevalent practice at the relevant time. The quantum of interest, if reduced to 9% from 15%, the same would meet with ends of justice. As a result thereof, we modified the same and factum of interest is ordered to be reduced from 15% to 9%. The rest of the award is not interfered in any manner.” 21. Hence, the interest shall be payable at the rate of 9% and not at 12% as that was not the rate fixed. The appeal is partly allowed. The arbitral award and the order of the Court below shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. 22. Interim relief granted by this Court on 8.12.1989 shall stand vacated forthwith. The amounts if yet not deposited, the same be deposited by recalculating the appellants as expeditiously as possible with the interest accrued not later than 12 weeks from today and, if the amount has already been deposited, the respondent shall refund the amount to the State namely 3% of the award made within three months from today failing which the State shall be at liberty to take action as per the provisions of law as they have failed to appear when the matter is being taken up. 23. This Court is thankful to Sri S.K. Mehrotra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State for restructuring the matter and ably assisting the Court. However, no earlier orders has been placed on record of this Court.