JUDGMENT : Rajesh Singh Chauhan, J. 1. Heard Sri I.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Kaushlendra Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Vishal Verma, learned State counsel for the State-respondents. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 22.7.2019 (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition) passed by the Principal Secretary, Public Works Department, U.P. Lucknow directing for re-enquiry against the petitioner appointing enquiry officer. The petitioner has also assailed the charge sheet dated 2.8.2019 (Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition) whereby the petitioner has been directed to file defence reply to the charge-sheet. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has informed that the petitioner has not filed defence reply to the charge sheet nor the departmental enquiry has been conducted as yet. 4. The question for consideration is that as to whether the disciplinary authority may direct for re-enquiry without assigning reasons in writing in view of Section 9 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules 1999’). 5. The next question to be considered is as to whether the contention of disciplinary authority that departmental enquiry has been conducted in a cursory manner would suffice and shall be treated sufficient reason in terms of Rule 9 of the Rules, 1999. 6. The next question to be considered is that if the disciplinary authority keeps the findings of enquiry officer for substantially long period and thereafter directs for re-enquiry saying the disciplinary enquiry has been conducted in a cursory manner may be permissible in the eyes of law. 7. As to whether the departmental enquiry against an employee may be conducted serving the charge sheet pursuant to the order of re-enquiry being issued by the disciplinary authority, if the very order of re-enquiry is quashed by the Court treating the same as nullity in the eyes of law. 8. All the detailed facts are being shorn off and admitted position is being considered for adjudication of the aforesaid facts. 9. The petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer on 23.2.1995 at Construction Division Deoria. On 11.11.2011, a departmental enquiry has been initiated against the petitioner under Rule 7 of the Rules, 1999. On 14.12.2011, charge sheet has been provided to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his defence reply to the charge sheet on 9.4.2012. 9. The petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer on 23.2.1995 at Construction Division Deoria. On 11.11.2011, a departmental enquiry has been initiated against the petitioner under Rule 7 of the Rules, 1999. On 14.12.2011, charge sheet has been provided to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his defence reply to the charge sheet on 9.4.2012. Thereafter, the departmental enquiry against the petitioner was conducted strictly in accordance with law. The enquiry officer has concluded the departmental enquiry examining the charge, considering defence reply of the petitioner, appreciating the comments of presenting officer and making thorough analysis of the evidences. The aforesaid departmental enquiry was concluded and the findings of the enquiry officer have been produced before the disciplinary authority on 26.10.2012. 10. Admittedly, since 26.10.2012, no order has been passed by the disciplinary authority till 22.7.2019 when the direction for re-enquiry has been given by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority took about seven years in taking decision that the matter of the petitioner should be re-enquired as the enquiry officer has conducted the departmental enquiry in a cursory manner. 11. Notably, no other reason has been assigned in the impugned office order dated 22.7.2019 directing for re-enquiry of the issue of the petitioner except that the enquiry in the matter of the petitioner has been conducted in a cursory manner. 12. On 28.11.2019, direction has been issued to the State counsel to seek complete instructions in the matter fixing the date for 5.12.2019. On 5.12.2019, the State counsel has produced a letter dated 4.12.2019 preferred by one Sri Sanjai Kumar Upadhyaya, Special Secretary, Government of U.P. addressing to the Chief Standing Counsel, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The aforesaid letter provides that since the disciplinary authority was not agreeable with the findings of the enquiry report, which was made available on 26.10.2012, therefore, direction for re-enquiry has been issued and the Chief Engineer, Ayodhya Kshetra, Ayodhya has been appointed enquiry officer, who has issued charge-sheet on 2.8.2019 and re-enquiry shall be conducted in the case of the petitioner. 13. Since the issue in question is squarely covered with the judgment and order dated 5.4.2016 passed in Writ Appeal No. 10552 of 2016, Dr. Atul Darbari vs. State of U.P. and Others, whereby the Division Bench has set aside the identical order of re-enquiry and this Court following the decision in Dr. 13. Since the issue in question is squarely covered with the judgment and order dated 5.4.2016 passed in Writ Appeal No. 10552 of 2016, Dr. Atul Darbari vs. State of U.P. and Others, whereby the Division Bench has set aside the identical order of re-enquiry and this Court following the decision in Dr. Atul Darbari (supra) decided one writ petition bearing Service Single No. 32015 of 2019, Rajesh Chaudhary vs. State of U.P. and Another, vide judgment and order dated 2.12.2019 allowing the writ petition quashing the identical impugned order of re-enquiry, therefore, the present writ petition is being decided on the basis of legal submissions so advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 14. Learned counsel for the parties are agreeable that the matter may be decided at the admission stage considering their respective legal arguments and material available on record and made available from the department. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 16. 14. Learned counsel for the parties are agreeable that the matter may be decided at the admission stage considering their respective legal arguments and material available on record and made available from the department. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 16. For the brevity, the impugned office order dated 22.7.2019 is being reproduced herein below:- ^^mRRkj Áns'k 'kklu yksd fuekZ.k vuqHkkx&13 la[;k 1886@23&13&19&12¼8½ bZ,e@11 y[kuÅ% fnukad 22 tqykbZ 2019 dk;kZy; vkns'k 1- Jh lqjs'k jke] RkRdkyhu lgk;d vfHk;Urk] ÁkUrh; [k.M] yksŒfuŒfoŒ] tkSuiqj }kjk mDr [k.M esa rSukr jgrs gq, vuqcU/k la[;k 8@,lŒbZŒ@05&06] fnukad 7-11-2005 ds vUrxZr yqfEcuh&nqn~/kh ekxZ ds pSust 228 ls 236-40 rd ds pkSM+hdj.k ,oa lqn`<+hdj.k ds dk;Z eSa fuEu xzsM dh fcVqfeu gsrq mPp nj ij Hkqxrku djus] foHkkxh; LVksj ls LkLrh nj ij lkexzh fuxZr djds Bsdsnkj dks :i;s 24-90 yk[k dk vuqfpr ykHk fn;s tkus rFkk 'kklu dks vkfFkZd {kfr igaqpk;sa tkus vkfn vfu;ferrkvksa ds n`f"Vxr muds fo:) mŒÁŒ ljdkjh lsod ¼vuq'kklu ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh] 1999 ds fu;e&7 ds vUrXkZr dk;kZy; Kki la[;k 5701@23&13&11&12¼8½ bZ,e@11 fnukad 11-11-2011 }kjk vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh lafLFkr djrs gq, eq[; vfHk;Urk ¼e/; {ks=½] yksŒfuŒfoŒ y[kuÅ dks tkap vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k x;k FkkA 2- tkap vf/kdkjh@eq[; vfHk;Urk ¼e/; {ks=½] yksŒfuŒfoŒ y[kuÅ ds i= fnukad 26-10-2012 }kjk tkap vk[;k miyC/k djk;h x;hA tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk ÁLrqr tkap vk[;k ds ijh{k.kksijkUr ;g ik;k x;k fd tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk vipkjh vf/kdkjh ij yxk;s x;s vkjksi ,oa mlds leFkZu esa yxk;s x;s lk{;ksa@vfHkys[kksa dk xgurkiwoZd ijh{k.k u dj ljljh rkSj ij tkap dk;Zokgh lEiUu dj tkap vk[;k miyC/k djk;h x;h gSA vr% mŒÁŒ ljdkjh lsod ¼vuq'kklu ,oa vihy½ fu;ekoyh] 1999 ds fu;e 9¼1½ ds vUrxZr tkap vf/kdkjh }kjk ÁLrqr tkap vk[;k fnukad 26-10-2012 ,rn~}kjk vLohdkj dh tkrh gSA 3- bl lEcU/k esa lE;d~ fopkjksijkUr Jh lqjs'k jke] rRdkyhu lgk;d vfHk;Urk] ÁkUrh; [k.M] yksŒfuŒfoŒ tkSuiqj ds fo:) Ápfyr mDr vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh esa vkjksi&i= dk mRRkj fn;s tkus ds Lrj ls iqu% tkap djus gsrq eq[; vfHk;Urk] v;ks/;k {ks=] v;ks/;k dks tkap vf/kdkjh ukfer fd;s tkus dk vkns'k Jh jkT;iky ,rn~}kjk Ánku djrs gSaA vf/k'kklh vfHk;Urk] ÁkUrh; [k.M] yksŒfuŒfoŒ tkSuiqj ÁLrqrdrkZ vf/kdkjh gksaxsA Jh jkT;iky dh vkKk ls] fufru jes'k xksd.kZ Áeq[k lfpo la[;k 1886¼1½@23-13-2019 rn~fnukad Áfrfyfi fuEufyf[kr dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrq Ásf"kr %& 1- Áeq[k vfHk;Urk ¼fodkl½ ,oa foHkkxk/;{k] yksŒfuŒfoŒ] mRrj Áns'k y[kuÅA** 17. For the convenience, Rule 9 of the Rules, 1999 is being reproduced herein-below:- “9. Action on Inquiry Report: (1) The disciplinary authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation to the charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry from such stage as directed by the disciplinary authority, according to the provisions of Rule 7. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. (3) In case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated by the disciplinary authority of the charges and inform him accordingly. (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of charges is of the opinion that any penalty specified in Rule-3 should be imposed on the charged Government servant, he shall give a copy of the inquiry report and his findings recorded under sub-rule (2) to the charged Government servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The disciplinary authority shall, having regard to all the relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of the charged Government servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, pass a reasoned order imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and communicate the same to the charged Government servant.” 18. Rule 9 (1) of the Rules, 1999 clearly mandates that the disciplinary authority may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-enquiry to the same or any other enquiry officer, meaning thereby if the disciplinary authority remits the matter for re-enquiry, reasons to that effect must be reduced in writing. The impugned office order dated 22.7.2019 does not reveal any specific reasons for remitting the case for re-enquiry. Therefore, the office order dated 22.7.2019 is apparently in violation of Rule 9 (1) of the Rules, 1999. 19. Since the Division Bench in Dr. Atul Darbari (supra) has considered the identical controversy thoroughly, therefore, paras 8, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28 and 29 of the said judgment are being reproduced herein-below:- “8. Therefore, the office order dated 22.7.2019 is apparently in violation of Rule 9 (1) of the Rules, 1999. 19. Since the Division Bench in Dr. Atul Darbari (supra) has considered the identical controversy thoroughly, therefore, paras 8, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28 and 29 of the said judgment are being reproduced herein-below:- “8. Be that as it may, the question is whether the disciplinary authority could have resorted to such a practice of abandoning the Inquiry already undertaken and resort to appointment of a fresh enquiring officer. 13. The controversy in hand has been subjected to detailed scrutiny by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K.R. Deb vs. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has proceeded to examine the question in the context of Rule 15 (1) Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. It was a case where an enquiry was ordered against a sub-Inspector, Central Excise. The inquiry officer held that the charge was not proved. Thereafter the disciplinary authority appointed another inquiry officer "to conduct a supplementary open inquiry." Such supplementary inquiry was conducted and a report that there was "no conclusive proof" to "establish the charge" was made. Not satisfied, the disciplinary authority thought it fit that "another inquiry officer should be appointed to inquire afresh into the charge." In K.K. Deb's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that an Enquiry Officer may be asked by the Disciplinary Authority to record further evidence if there had been no proper enquiry because of some serious defect or because some important witnesses were not examined. The Court categorically held therein that the previous enquiry could not be set aside on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer did not appeal to the disciplinary Authority. Relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment are reproduced hereinafter:- “12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant.” 16. It appears that the respondent no. 1 dissatisfied with such earlier enquiry reports, ordered a de novo enquiry under the impugned order dated 4.2.2016 and appointed Shri Rudra Kumar Gupta, Special Secretary, Labour Department, Government of U.P. as Enquiry Officer. This practice of the respondent no. 1 in carelessly and callously discarding enquiry reports, which are not to its liking and ordering for denovo enquiry without even disclosing the reasons, which weighed with it for rejecting the findings of the previous enquiry Officer, is a clear transgression of the law and requires to be deprecated in the strongest terms. 17. In Union of India vs. M.L. Capoor and Others, AIR 1974 SC 87 , the Supreme Court observed: “28.......Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable........” 19. "Reasons" are the milestones which chart the journey of the decision-maker in reaching his destination. Absence of reasons thus leaves the decision-making process without a rudder and open to arbitrariness. Viewed in this light, the approach of respondent no. 1 in instituting denovo enquiry by appointing Enquiry Officer afresh without even setting aside the findings recorded by the earlier Enquiry Officer, giving due reasons therefore, is clearly unsustainable in law. 20. In the present matter, it has been urged that the impugned order is in teeth of Rules 8 and 9 of Rules 1999. 1 in instituting denovo enquiry by appointing Enquiry Officer afresh without even setting aside the findings recorded by the earlier Enquiry Officer, giving due reasons therefore, is clearly unsustainable in law. 20. In the present matter, it has been urged that the impugned order is in teeth of Rules 8 and 9 of Rules 1999. For ready reference, Rules 8 and 9 of Rules 1999 are extracted:- “8. Procedure for imposing major penalties - (1) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in Rule 6 shall be made except after an inquiry is held as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rule and Rule 10, or provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850) where such inquiry is held under that Act. (2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a member of the Service, it may appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. (3) Where a Board is appointed as the inquiring authority it shall consist of not less than two senior officers provided that at least one member of such a Board shall be an officer of the service to which the member of the service belongs. 9. Action on Inquiry Report: (1) The Disciplinary Authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation tot he charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry from such stage as directed by the Disciplinary Authority, according to the provisions of Rule 7. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. (3) In case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated the Disciplinary Authority of the charges and informed him accordingly. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. (3) In case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated the Disciplinary Authority of the charges and informed him accordingly. (4) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of charges is of the opinion that any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the charged Government servant, he shall give a copy of the inquiry report and his findings recorded under sub-rule (2) to the charged Government servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The Disciplinary Authority shall, having regard to all the relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of the charged Government servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, pass a reasoned speaking order imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and communicate the same to the charged Government servant.” 22. Rule 9 prescribes action on the enquiry report. Rule 9 (1) provides that the Disciplinary Authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation to the charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry from such stage as directed by the Disciplinary Authority, according to the provisions of Rule 7. Rule 9 (2) provides that the Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the enquiry Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. Rule 9 (3) provides that in case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated the Disciplinary Authority of the charges and informed him accordingly. Rule 9 (4) provides that If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its finding on all or any of charges is of the opinion that any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the charged Government Servant, he shall give a copy of the inquiry report and his finding recorded under sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 to the charged Government Servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The Disciplinary Authority shall having regard to all the relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of the charged Government Servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, passes a reasoned order imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these and communicate the same to the charged Government Servant. 23. It can be seen from the above that the normal rule is that there can be only one enquiry. Hon'ble Apex Court has also recognized the possibility of a further enquiry in certain circumstances enumerated therein. The decision, however, makes it clear that the fact, that the report submitted by the enquiring authority is not acceptable to the disciplinary authority, is not a ground for completely setting aside the enquiry report and ordering a fresh denovo enquiry. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the principle laid down in K.R. Deb's case, would squarely apply to the case in hand. 25. In our opinion, on general principles, there can be only one enquiry in respect of charges for a particular misconduct and that is also what the Rules usually provide. If, for some technical or other good ground, procedural or otherwise the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, there is no principle that a second enquiry cannot be initiated. Therefore, when a completed enquiry proceedings is set aside by a competent forum on a technical or on the ground of procedural infirmity, fresh proceedings on the same charges is permissible. 27. A bare perusal of the order impugned and the record in question this much is accepted position that at no point of time the disciplinary authority had proceeded to give any reason for disagreeing with the earlier enquiry reports in question. Therefore, in these circumstances there is no justification for conducting a second enquiry on the very same charges. Law is clear on the subject, and permits only disciplinary proceedings and same cannot be approved as harassment and allowing such practice is not in the interest of public service. Same view has also been approved by Hon'ble Apex Court in Nand Kumar Verma vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2012) 3 SCC 580 and Vijay Shankar Pandey vs. Union of India and Another, (2014) 10 SCC 589 . 28. Same view has also been approved by Hon'ble Apex Court in Nand Kumar Verma vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2012) 3 SCC 580 and Vijay Shankar Pandey vs. Union of India and Another, (2014) 10 SCC 589 . 28. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order dated 4.2.2016 for denovo/a fresh enquiry against the petitioner on the same charges, which were subject matter of the enquiry reports dated 29.9.2014 and 14.10.2014, is illegal and arbitrary; and hence, is liable to be set aside. The impugned order dated 4.2.2016 is consequently set aside. 29. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the respondent no. 1 is directed to take appropriate decision in the light of the enquiry reports dated 29.9.2014 and 14.10.2014 within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him. There shall be no order as to costs.” 20. So far as the term being used by the disciplinary authority while directing for re-enquiry that the enquiry officer has conducted enquiry in a cursory manner, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Shankar Pandey vs. Union of India and Another, (2014) 10 SCC 589 has interpreted the word cursory in para-32. Para 32 of the aforesaid judgment is being reproduced herein-below:- “32. Coming to the first reason-that the report is a cursory report - A copy of the report is not made available to the appellant. The content of the said report is not known. The only admitted fact about the report is that the appellant was exonerated of all the charges made against him. If such a conclusion is otherwise justified, whether the report is cursory or elaborate, should make no difference to the legality of the report. What matters is the correctness of the conclusions recorded, not the length or the elegance of the language of the report which determines the legality of the conclusions recorded in it. Therefore, this ground is equally untenable.” 21. As per the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Shankar Pandey (supra) indicating the word that enquiry officer has made enquiry in a cursory manner would not suffice but as to how the findings of the enquiry officer are cursory should be explained. In view of the aforesaid reason, the Hon'ble Apex Court has disapproved using the word cursory without indicating the reason as to how it was cursory. In view of the aforesaid reason, the Hon'ble Apex Court has disapproved using the word cursory without indicating the reason as to how it was cursory. 22. Therefore, the impugned office order dated 22.7.2019 is not in conformity with Rule 9 (1) of the Rules, 1999 as no reasons have been assigned and assigning the reason that the enquiry in question has been conducted in a cursory manner has not been approved by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Shankar Pandey (supra), so I am of the considered opinion that the office order dated 22.7.2019 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 23. I have also noted that the disciplinary authority has not taken final decision for about seven years after receiving the findings of the enquiry officer on 26.10.2012 without any cogent reasons to that effect, therefore, such an inordinate delay in taking final decision after receiving the findings of enquiry officer vitiates the entire purpose of conducting re-enquiry. 24. Since I am of the considered view that the impugned office order dated 22.7.2019 is non est in the eyes of law being violative of Rule 9 (1) of the Rules, 1999, therefore, I also hold that the charge sheet, which has been issued pursuant to the office order dated 22.7.2019, is non est in the eyes of law and no departmental enquiry can be conducted against the petitioner on the basis of the aforesaid charge sheet in view of legal maxim SUBLATO FUNDAMENTO CADIT OPUS. 25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in re; State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others connected with Sumedh Singh Saini vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Others, (2011) 14 SCC 770 has considered the aforesaid maxim in paras-107 to 111, which are being reproduced herein-below:- “107. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential proceedings would fall through for the reason that illegality strikes at the root of the order. In such a fact-situation, the legal maxim SUBLATO FUNDAMENTO CADIT OPUS meaning thereby that foundation being removed, structure/work falls, comes into play and applies on all scores in the present case. 108. In such a fact-situation, the legal maxim SUBLATO FUNDAMENTO CADIT OPUS meaning thereby that foundation being removed, structure/work falls, comes into play and applies on all scores in the present case. 108. In Badrinath vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, AIR 2000 SC 3243 and State of Kerala vs. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam and Another, (2001) 10 SCC 191 , this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle is applicable to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings equally. 109. Similarly in Mangal Prasad Tamoli (dead) by LRs. vs. Narvadeshwar Mishra (dead) by LRs. (2005) 3 SCC 422 , this Court held that if an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings, consequent thereto, will be non est and have to be necessarily set aside. 110. In C. Albert Morris vs. K. Chandrasekaran and Others, (2006) 1 SCC 228 , this Court held that a right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. Upen Chandra Gogoi vs. State of Assam and Others, (1998) 3 SCC 381 , Satchidananda Misra vs. State of Orissa and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 599 , Regional Manager, SBI vs. Rakesh Kumar Tewari, (2006) 1 SCC 530 and Ritesh Tewari and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 2010 SC 3823 . 111. Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the orders impugned being a nullity, cannot be sustained. As a consequence, subsequent proceedings/orders/ FIR/investigation stand automatically vitiated and are liable to be declared non-est.” 26. In view of the aforesaid dictums of the Hon'ble Apex Court considered in Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (supra), I am of the considered opinion that since the impugned office order dated 22.7.2019 is nullity in the eyes of law, therefore, it cannot be sustained, so its consequential proceedings i.e. charge sheet dated 2.8.2019 stand automatically vitiated and is liable to be declared non-est in view of the legal maxim SUBLATO FUNDAMENTO CADIT OPUS. 27. Accordingly, all the questions have been answered in favour of the petitioner. 28. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the office order dated 22.7.2019 passed by opposite party no. 27. Accordingly, all the questions have been answered in favour of the petitioner. 28. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the office order dated 22.7.2019 passed by opposite party no. 1, which is contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition and charge sheet dated 2.8.2019, which is contained in Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition. 29. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to provide all consequential service benefits, promotion, benefit of ACP etc. with expedition, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 30. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.