Champabai Rathod Shramik Mahila Prathisthan v. State of Maharashtra, Through its Principal Secretary, Woman & Child Development Department
2019-12-13
ANIL S.KILOR, S.V.GANGAPURWALA
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Anil S. Kilor, J. 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of the parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal. 2. By the present petition, the petitioners Mahila Pratisthan/Mahila Bachat Gats, are challenging condition Nos. 22 and 23 of E-tender notice relating to supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meal’, so also Condition No.3 of letter dated 09.08.2019 issued by respondent No.2. The conditions under challenge read thus: Condition No.22. “xxx” Condition No.23. “xxx” Condition No.3. “xxx” 3. Brief facts leading to this petition are as under: Integrated Child Development Services Scheme aims at improving nutritional and health status of children under six years of age and providing optimum opportunity for their growth and development. The said scheme focuses on six services to be provided to the mothers and children in convergence with health department as under: Supplementary nutrition – (a) Each child between 6 months to 6 years of age to get 600 calories and 12-18 grams of protein; (b) Each malnourished child to get 950 calories and 23-28 grams of protein; (c) Each pregnant woman and each nursing mother to get 700 calories and 21-24 grams of protein; * Immunization, * Health check-up, * Prompt referral, * Pre-school non formal education and Health & nutrition education to adolescents and mothers. 4. In the backdrop of the fact that the contract period of appointed - Mahila Bachat Gat/Self help group/Mahila sanstha for supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meal’ to the age group of 3 to 6 years in Anganwadis had come to an end, respondent No.2 Commissioner, ICDS, issued a letter dated 09.08.3029 to the Collectors and Chairmen of all the District Level Food Supply Committees, inter alia informing that the Government has granted approval for issuance of fresh tenders for supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meal’ under the ICDS. 5. The said letter dated 09.08.2019, stipulates certain conditions relating to award of work of supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meal’. One of the conditions, more particularly Condition No.3 says that in a project area, each qualified applicant be allotted five Anganwadis nearby to its registered address, for supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meals’ and if thereafter some Anganwadis are left to be allotted, such Anganwadis be allotted in equal number to all qualified applicants. 6.
One of the conditions, more particularly Condition No.3 says that in a project area, each qualified applicant be allotted five Anganwadis nearby to its registered address, for supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meals’ and if thereafter some Anganwadis are left to be allotted, such Anganwadis be allotted in equal number to all qualified applicants. 6. In pursuance to the said letter dated 09.8.2019, the Collectors and Chairmen, District Level Nutritional Food Supply Committees of Districts Ahmednagar, Parbhani and Latur, issued E-Tender notice on 18.08.2019, calling applications from interested Mahila Sansthas/Self Help Groups/ Mahila Mandals by way of “Expression of Interest”, for supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meal’ to the Anganwadis in Districts Ahmednagar, Parbhani and Latur on the terms and conditions mentioned in the E-tender notice. 7. The tender conditions were approved and finalized by the High Power Committee under the Chairmanship of Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Maharashtra. The High Power Committee consists of following members: a. Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department, Government of Maharashtra Chairman b. Additional Chief Secretary, Planning Department, Government of Maharashtra Member c. Principal Secretary, Food and Civil Supply, Government of Maharashtra Member d. Secretary, Law and Judiciary Department, Government of Maharashtra Member e. Secretary, Women and Child Development Department, Government of Maharashtra Member f. Commissioner, Integrated Child Development Service Scheme, Maharashtra State, Navi Mumbai Member Secretary 8. The Condition No. 22 stipulates that in urban area the applicant shall have registered address and kitchen within the same project area for which the application is made. 9. The Condition No.23 stipulates that one Mahila Mandal/ Bachat Gat can apply for one project area only. These both the conditions Nos. 22 and 23 of the tender notice are under challenge in this petition. 10. Heard Mr. R.N. Dhorde, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners assisted by Advocate Mr. V.R. Dhorde and Mr. S.B. Narwade, learned A.G.P. for the respondents-State. 11. Learned senior counsel Mr R.N. Dhorde submits that condition No.3 of the letter dated 09.08.2019 and condition Nos. 22 and 23 of the E-Tender Notice dated 19.08.2019 are in violation of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India so also the said conditions are in violation of Articles 21 and 21A of the Constitution. 12. Mr.
11. Learned senior counsel Mr R.N. Dhorde submits that condition No.3 of the letter dated 09.08.2019 and condition Nos. 22 and 23 of the E-Tender Notice dated 19.08.2019 are in violation of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India so also the said conditions are in violation of Articles 21 and 21A of the Constitution. 12. Mr. Dhorde, submits that earlier more than 10 Anganwadis had been allotted to each of the petitioners for supply of ‘Hot Cooked Meals’, however, bringing down the number of Anganwadis to 5, is not economically feasible. He tried to demonstrate on the basis of arithmetical calculations, how the present scheme is not economically feasible for any of the applicants. According to him, as per the terms and conditions of the contract, a contractor needs to have separate godown for storage and separate kitchen for cooking. Because supply is restricted to five Anganwadis, the contractors would not be able to recover the huge expenses towards the godown and kitchen. He therefore alleges that administration is bent upon for destroying the scheme. 13. Mr. Dhorde, learned Senior Advocate further argues that administration seems to be more interested in allotting the work to the contractors/ corporation/ cooperatives controlled by certain families and therefor, conditions under challenge are modified to suit them. 14. He further submits that the members of the applicant society reside in different areas and therefore putting a condition that members of the applicant society shall be resident of the project area and also to have kitchen in the project area for which the application is made, is arbitrary and unreasonable. 15. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Dhorde has relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dated 26.02.2019 in Civil Appeal No.2336/2019 in the case of Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat Vs. State of Maharashtra to urge that present policy framed by the State Government particularly, conditions under challenge are contrary to the findings given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 16. He also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Reliance Energy Limited Vs. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation reported in 2007 (8) SCC 1 , to submit that the terms and conditions must indicate with legal certainty, norms and benchmarks. This “legal certainty” is an important aspect of the rule of law.
16. He also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Reliance Energy Limited Vs. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation reported in 2007 (8) SCC 1 , to submit that the terms and conditions must indicate with legal certainty, norms and benchmarks. This “legal certainty” is an important aspect of the rule of law. If there is vagueness or subjectivity in the said norms, it may result in unequal and discriminatory treatment. It may violate doctrine of “level placing field”. He further submits that the basic requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, is fairness in action by the State Government and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. For the same, a basic and obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness. 17. Per contra, Mr. Narwade, learned A.G.P. points out that ICDS is a specialized department of Women and Children Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, which has been tirelessly working since 1975 for development of infant and children by implementing schemes for nutritional improvement in their diets. 18. Learned A.G.P. has relied upon Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (supra) more particularly para 52 of the said judgment to submit that the level of decentralization intended by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is clearly of Panchayat level and hence determination of number of Anganwadis was required and to achieve maximum decentralization and uniformity in allotment, it was decided to allot five Anganwadis to each qualified/eligible Mahila Mandals/Self Help Groups in urban areas in all the districts of the State. 19. The learned A.G.P. has submitted that with an object to supply fresh and hot food while servings to the beneficiaries and at the same time, to give importance to participation of local women, Condition no.22 was formulated. 20. The learned A.G.P. further points out that with an object to restrict monopolization of supplies as well as to increase the participation of more local resident women, Condition No.23 was framed. 21. He urges that the Government Resolutions dated 29.05.1999, 28.10.2005, 24.08.2009 and 05.11.2011 on which the petitioners are relying upon are not applicable as those were issued prior to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (Supra). 22.
21. He urges that the Government Resolutions dated 29.05.1999, 28.10.2005, 24.08.2009 and 05.11.2011 on which the petitioners are relying upon are not applicable as those were issued prior to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (Supra). 22. The learned AGP opposed the present petition by pointing out the limited scope of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for judicial review, in the contractual matters. 23. To appreciate and consider the rival contentions of the parties, we have gone through the record and also the various judgments cited by the respective parties. 24. In the case of Municipal Corporation of India and Anr. Vs. BVG India Limited and Ors. Reported in 2018 (5) SCC 462 the Apex Court has observed thus: “10. The judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness. The purpose of judicial review of administrative action is to check whether the choice or decision is made lawfully and not to check whether the choice or decision is sound. If the process adopted or decision made by the authority is not mala fide and not intended to favour someone; if the process adopted or decision made is neither so arbitrary nor irrational that under the facts of the case it can be concluded that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached such a decision; and if the public interest is not affected, there should be no interference under Article 226. 13. In U.P. Financial Corporation Vs. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 299 , it was observed that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the corporation and seek to correct them, and that the doctrine of fairness, evolved in administrative law, was not supposed to convert the writ Courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities.” 25. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 , the Apex Court discussed the limitations relating to the scope of judicial review which reads thus: “(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(2) The Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom to contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.” 26. In the case of Directorate of Education & others Vs. Education Datamatics Ltd. & others, 2004 AIR (SC) 1962 the Apex Court has held thus: “It has clearly been held in these decisions that the terms of the invitation of tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm of contract. That the government must have a free hand in setting terms of the tender. It must have reasonable play in its joints as a necessary concomitant for an administrative body in an administrative sphere. The courts would interfere with the administrative policy decision only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory mala fide or actuated by bias. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by the particular circumstances. The courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. The courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide.” 27. In the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Vs.
The courts cannot strike down the terms of the tender prescribed by the government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. The courts can interfere only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide.” 27. In the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Vs. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the principles which read thus: “(a) the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities; (b) fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by Courts is very limited; (c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by Courts is not warranted; (d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work; and (e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by Court is very restrictive since no person can claim fundamental right to carry on business with the Government.” 28. Thus from the judgments supra, it is clear that the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot sit as an appellate authority over administrative authorities. The doctrine of fairness evolved in administrative law, was not supposed to convert the writ Courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities.
Thus from the judgments supra, it is clear that the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot sit as an appellate authority over administrative authorities. The doctrine of fairness evolved in administrative law, was not supposed to convert the writ Courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. Non-arbitrariness and fairness is the basic requirement of Article 14 and in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. The judicial review is intended to prevent arbitrariness and to check whether the choice or decision is made lawfully and not to check whether the choice or decision is sound. If the process adopted or decision made by the authority is not mala fide and not intended to favour someone or is neither so arbitrary nor irrational, no interference under Article 226 is warranted. 29. The legal position which also emerged from the judgments supra is that the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive. In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities. The Court does not have the expertise to substitute its own decision or to correct the administrative decision but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest and if the decision is free from arbitrariness, not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides, interference by Court is not warranted. 30. In the case of Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (supra), the tender notice for multilevel contract and for supply of ready to cook food to Anganwadis was under challenge. The question which was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was referred in paragraph 4 of the judgment which reads thus: “4. The principal issue raised is whether contracts for the supply of such food for Anganwadis should be given to local Mahila Mandals run along democratic lines with local women participating or whether such contracts ought to be given by the State to large corporates/contractors under the guise of the conditions of the tender. In PUCL V. Union of India & Ors.
In PUCL V. Union of India & Ors. (W.P. (C) No.196 of 2001), this Court has passed the order, on 07.10.2004, inter alia to the following effect:- "The contractors shall not be used for the supply of nutrition in Anganwadis and preferably ICDS funds shall be spent by making use of village communities, self-help groups and Mahila Mandals for buying of grains and preparation of meals." While giving answer to the said principal issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in para 52, has observed thus: 52. It has also been found that fixing of unit area as a district several players have been effectively ousted from the field, it would be appropriate to form groups of the smaller area such as at panchayat or group of panchayats etc., within the District so that the real intention behind the policy is fulfilled in its real sense and supply should be decentralized as much as possible as it is not for the big players/industrialists in the field to cater to the needs of the Scheme as they have usurped in past. It is open to the State Government to make alternative arrangement and they are restrained from continuing the existing system of supply in the interregnum period. This decision as to alternative arrangement should be taken within ten days. 31. In the present matter, Integrated Child Development Services Scheme as referred above aims at improving nutritional and health status of children under six years of age and providing optimum opportunity for their growth and development. Under the scheme each child between 6 months to 6 years of age to get 600 calories and 12-18 grams of protein. ICDS has been working since 1975 for development of infant and children by implementing schemes for nutritional improvement in their diet. 32. Women and Child Development Department, Government of Maharashtra is a specialized department and having expertise knowledge about the Scheme. Secretary of the said department and the Commissioner, Integrated Child Development Services Scheme, were the members of the High Power Committee, who had formulated and finalized the conditions of the tender. The report of the High Power Committee was accepted by the State Government. 33.
Secretary of the said department and the Commissioner, Integrated Child Development Services Scheme, were the members of the High Power Committee, who had formulated and finalized the conditions of the tender. The report of the High Power Committee was accepted by the State Government. 33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (supra), has observed that it would be appropriate to form groups of the smaller area such as at panchayat or group of panchayats etc., within the District so that the real intention behind the policy is fulfilled in its real sense and supply should be decentralized as much as possible as it is not for the big players/industrialists in the field to cater to the needs of the Scheme as they have usurped in past. 34. In the said backdrop, with an object to get fresh and hot food to the beneficiaries, the condition of having kitchen within the project area and to give importance to the participation of more local women, it is made mandatory to have registered address of the applicant within the project area, by way of condition No.22. Thus, we find that condition No.22 fulfills the real object of the scheme and the same is in consonance with the judgment in Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (supra). 35. Similarly, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (supra), that supply should be decentralized as much as possible as it is not for the big players/industrialists in the field to cater to the needs of the Scheme, the State Government in the present matter, with an object to remove monopolization of supplies and to increase the participation of more local resident women, specific condition was put in the tender notice by way of Condition No.23 that a Mahila Sanstha/ Bachat Gat can apply only for one project area. Thus, according to us, this condition is also in accordance with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vaishnorani Mahila Bachat Gat (supra). 36. As far as the condition No.3 of the letter dated 09.08.2019, is concerned, the only argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the said condition is not financially feasible for any Mahila Mandal/Bachat Gat.
36. As far as the condition No.3 of the letter dated 09.08.2019, is concerned, the only argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the said condition is not financially feasible for any Mahila Mandal/Bachat Gat. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners tried to convince us on the basis of some calculation made by the petitioners that in previous contract they had been allotted 10 to 15 Anganwadis and now because of reduction in number of Anganwadis to 5, it is difficult for any Mahila Mandal/Bachat Gat to meet the expenses which will be borne towards having separate godown and separate kitchen. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners therefore submits that such allotment of Anganwadies ought to have been at least 10 to 15 and not 5 Anganwadis. 37. As we discussed herein above that in the matter of formulating conditions of tender documents and awarding contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities. This Court does not have the expertise to substitute its own decision or to correct the administrative decision but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. Moreover, we have already observed that in the present matter, the High Power Committee has formulated the tender conditions including the impugned conditions. The members of the Committee are experts in the said field. In view of the said fact, we cannot accept the argument made by the petitioners about the financial feasibility and hence the same is rejected. 38. In the light of settled law position as discussed above, that if the process adopted or the decision made by the authority is not mala fide and not intended to favour someone or is neither so arbitrary nor irrational, no interference under Article 226 is warranted. Since in the present matter nothing is brought on record to show or to establish that there is any mala fide or there is any intention of the authorities to favour someone or the impugned conditions are violative of Article 14, 19, 21 and 21A of the Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that in the present matter interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is not warranted. 39. In view of observations made above, we have no hesitation to hold that the present petition is merit-less and deserves to be dismissed.
39. In view of observations made above, we have no hesitation to hold that the present petition is merit-less and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. 40. Rule discharged.