JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Udayan Nandan for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 and Sri Manu Saxena, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3. 2. This writ petition is directed against orders passed by the Principal Secretary, Nagar Vikas U.P. Lucknow dated 18.8.2019, contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The other prayer in the petition is to command the respondents to permit petitioner to work on the post of Clerk, Nagar Palika Parishad, Nawabganj, Bareilly and not to create any interference in discharge of his duties on the aforesaid post in pursuance to the order of State dated 18.8.2019. 3. Nagar Palika Parishad, Nawabganj, District Bareilly is a municipality and is governed by the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1916’). It has passed two separate resolutions, which are the basis of petitioner’s claim for appointment. The first resolution is dated 1.12.2012 and reads as under:- ^^ ÁLrko la0 56@35 ’kghn Jh tkosn ds HkkbZ dh fu;qfDr ds lEcU/k esa& lEekfur lnu ds lkeus ÁLrko j[kk x;k fd ej.kksijkUr ’kghn Jh tkosn us vius Ák.k R;kx dj 20 vÁSy 2006 dks esjB ds foDVksfj;k ikdZ esa Hkh"k.k vfXudkaM esa 18 o"khZ; ukStoku us 30&35 yksxksa dh tku cpk;h vLirky esa HkrhZ Jh tkosn dks ns[kus lekt oknh v/;{k ds usrk th Hkh igaqps Fks vc lektoknh ikVhZ dh ljdkj gS vkSj uxj ik0 uokoxat dh ifj"kn v/;{k Hkh lektoknh ikVhZ dh gS ikVhZ gkbZdeku ds ok;ns dks ifj"kn ’kghn Jh tkosn ds HkkbZ dks Jh eks0 vj’kn iq= Jh fetkt vgen dks ifj"kn esa fdlh Hkh in ij lfoZl esa ysus gsrq v/;{k egksn; uxj ikfydk ifj"kn uokoxat dks mifLFkr lnL; vf/kd`r djrs gSA^^ 4. The second resolution is dated 21.7.2016, which is also reproduced hereinafter:- ^^ÁLrko la0 14@22 & vLFkk;h :i ls fyfid dEI;wVj vkijsVj iEi pkyd ykbueSu VSDl dysDVj ds in ds drZO;ksa ds fuoZgu ds fy, u0ik0ifj0uokoxat esa 4 o"kksZ ls Bsys ij dk;Zjr deZpkjh rFkk fu;fer pijklh Lo;a lQkbZ deZpkjh lkS ¼Bsdk ij½ dks rSukr djus ds laca/k esa ÁLrko cksMZ dh cSBd esa Jherh ’kkghu lnL; u0ik0 ifj0 us ÁLrko j[kk fd u0ik0 ifj0 dk;kZy; ds ;g egRoiw.kZ dk;Z fuokZpu xzgdj tydj lQkbZ fyfid Hkou o jksM fuekZ.k fyfid@ÁHkkjh ek0 U;k;ky;ksa ds iSjkdkj ys[kk fyfid dEI;wVj vkijsVj ykbueSu iEi pkyd VSDl dysDVj vkfn ds in fjDr gSA ikfydk us dk;Z dh vf/kdrk dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, ikfydk fgr esa ,oa tufgr esa ’kklu ls mDr inksa dh Lohd`r dh ÁR;k’kk esa ikfydk deZpkjh Jh vej flag dSyk’k ;kno /khjsUnz dqekj flag rFkk f’kf{kr ,oa vuqHkoh ifj"kn dk pkj o"kZ iwoZ ls dk;Z dj jgk Jh eks0 vj’kn iq= fetkt vgen dks fjDr mDr fyfid inksa ij fu;qDr djus ds fy, ÁLrko j[kk x;k lnu esa j[ks x;s mDr egRoiw.kZ ÁLrko ij xgurk ls fopkj foe’kZ gqvk ppkZ gqbZA la;qDr fopkj mijkUr ifj"kn esa dk;Z dh vf/kdrk dks n`f"V j[krs gq, mDr deZpkfj;ksa dks vLFkkbZ :i ls fyfid ds in ij j[kus ds fy, lnL;k egksn;k ds }kjk j[ks x;s ÁLrko dk loZ lEefr ls mifLFkr lHkh lnL;ksa us leFkZu fd;k rFkk rhu iEi pkyd pkj ykbeSu nks VSDl dysDVj Bsds la0Ø0 lkS nkS dIEiqVj vkijsVj dh vLFkk;h :i ls ’kklu ds in Lohd`fr dh ÁR;k’kk esa rSukr@fu;qDr j[kus ds ÁLrko dk Hkh loZlEefr ls leFkZu fd;k x;k fyfid ds in tks fjDr gSA og ’kklu }kjk Lohd`r gSA rFkk tks in fjDr ugha gSA in fjDrksa dh Lohd`fr djkus ds fy, rFkk ÁLrko esa fy[ks x;s lHkh deZpkfj;ksa dks fu;qfDr djus ds fy, v/;{k egksn;k dks loZ lEefr ls vf/kd`r djrs gSA ÁLrko loZ lEefr ls ikfjr gqvkA^^ 5. Pursuant to the above referred resolutions, an appointment letter has been issued by the Chairman, Nagar Palika Parishad, Nawabganj, Bareilly on 4.8.2016, temporarily appointing the petitioner as Clerk. A subsequent order has been passed by the Chairman on 12.4.2017 appointing the petitioner as Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika Parishad on officiating basis, and he has been permitted to exercise all powers as are vested in the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika Parishad. A subsequent order has been passed by the Chairman on 12.4.2017 appointing the petitioner as Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika Parishad on officiating basis, and he has been permitted to exercise all powers as are vested in the Executive Officer of the Nagar Palika Parishad. It appears that District Magistrate, Bareilly, gave charge of the office of Executive Officer to another Executive Officer, posted in a different local authority. This order of the District Magistrate dated 13.4.2017 has been challenged by filing Writ Petition No.20584 of 2017, wherein following interim protection has been granted on 11.5.2017 :- “It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the District Magistrate, Bareilly giving additional charge of Executive Officer of Nagar Palika Parishad, Nawabganj to respondent no. 4 who is posted as Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Faridpur is illegal and without jurisdiction inasmuch as the post of Executive Officer falls under the Centralised Service and it is only the State Government which is empowered to make such appointment. Prima-facie, the matter requires scrutiny. Learned Standing Counsel representing the State respondents may file counter affidavit within six weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within two weeks thereafter. List after expiry of the aforesaid period. Considering the facts and circumstances, until further orders of this Court, effect and operation of the impugned order dated 13.04.2017 (annexure no. 2 to the writ petition) passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Administration), Bareilly giving additional charge of Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Nawabganj to respondent no. 4 and the consequential order dated 28.4.2017 directing the banks not to allow operation of the account of Nagar Palika Parishad, Nawabganj shall remain stayed. However, this order shall not stand in the way of the State Government in making appointment on the said post.” 6. It appears that in terms of the liberty granted by this Court on 11.5.2017 a regular Executive Officer has been posted in the Nagar Palika Parishad, Nawabganj and the work of Executive Officer, assigned to petitioner earlier, stands withdrawn. It is apparently for this reason that petitioner has claimed continuance on the post of Clerk only in the Nagar Palika Parishad. 7. The State Government has now issued a direction to the District Magistrate, Bareilly dated 18th August, 2019, which is impugned in this petition. It is apparently for this reason that petitioner has claimed continuance on the post of Clerk only in the Nagar Palika Parishad. 7. The State Government has now issued a direction to the District Magistrate, Bareilly dated 18th August, 2019, which is impugned in this petition. This order contains following directions :- ^^egksn;] mi;qZDr fo"k;d vius i= la[;k&53@rsbZl¼;w0vkbZ0½&u0ik0lgk0 fnukad 17&8&2019 dk d`i;k lanHkZ xzg.k djus dk d"V djsa] ftlds }kjk vU; rF;ksa ds vfrfDr ;g Hkh voxr djk;k x;k gS fd v/;{k uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] uokcxat] tuin cjsyh }kjk eks0 vj’kn dh fu;qfDr ij 'kklu }kjk jksd ds ckotwn fcuk fdlh ÁfØ;k dk ikyu fd;s vfu;fer rjhds ls uxj ikfydk ifj"kn esa fyfid in ij fu;qfDr dj nh xbZ gSA 2& mDr ds laca/k esa eq>s ;g dgus dk funsZ’k gqvk gS fd lE;d fopkjksijkUr vfu;fer :i ls fyfid in ij fu;qDr eks0 vj’kn dh lsok lekIr fd;s tkus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gSA d`i;k rnuqlkj Ádj.k esa vxszrj vko’;d dk;Zokgh djrs gq, 'kklu dks voxr djkus dk d"V djsA^^ 8. A separate order of the same date has been issued by State, which is also extracted hereinafter:- ^^egksn;] mi;qZDr fo"k;d vius i= la[;k&53@rsbZl¼;w0vkbZ0½&u0ik0lgk0 fnukad 17&8&2019 dk d`i;k lanHkZ xzg.k djus dk d"V djsa] ftlds }kjk voxr djk;k x;k gS fd v/;{k uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] uokcxat] tuin cjsyh }kjk eks0 vj’kn dks vfu;fer rjhds ls fyfid in ij fu;qDr dj ys[kk laca/kh leLr vko’;d ,oa egRoiw.kZ dk;Z ,oa vfHkys[k mUgsa lkSis x;s gS] tks vf/k’kklh vf/kdkjh ds ekaxs tkus ds mijkUr Hkh mUgsa ugha miyC/k djk;s tk jgs gSaA Jh eks0 vj’kn dh vfHkj{kk esa uxj ikfydk ifj"kn] uokcaxt cjsyh ds egRoiw.kZ ,oa vko’;d vfHkys[k gksus ds dkj.k ikfydk ds’kkldh; dk;ksZ esa ck/kk mRiUu gks jgh gSA 2& vr% bl laca/k esa eq>s ;g dgus dk funsZ’k gqvk gS fd d`i;k mDr xEHkhj vid`R; ds fy;s nks"kh Jh eks0 vj’kn ds fo:) lacaf/kr Fkkus esa ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 ntZ djkrs gq;s fof/kd dk;Zokgh djkdj ’kklu dks voxr djkus d"V djsaA^^ 9. The aforesaid two orders are assailed primarily on the ground that the enabling provision for State, to issue such a direction, is Section 34(1-A) of the Act of 1916, which would not be available to the State in the facts of the present case. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1971 SC 2147 . Reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1971 SC 2147 . Reliance is also placed upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Harpal Singh Vs. State of U.P. (Ministry of Local Self Government) Lucknow and another, 1977 ALJ 260 as also in Rishi Kumar Gupta and others Vs. Nanoomal Yadav and others, AIR 1976 Allahabad 365. A recent decision of this Court in Subodh Kumar Gupta and others Vs. State of U.P. & Another, in Writ Petition No.63834 of 2013, is also relied for similar purposes. 10. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that State Government has no jurisdiction to direct the District Magistrate to terminate the services of petitioner. By the second order a direction has been issued to lodge a First Information Report against the petitioner, which is also challenged. 11. Sri Manu Saxena, appearing on behalf of Nagar Palika Parishad, as also learned Standing Counsel, points out that appointment on the post of Clerk is an appointment to a public office, and therefore, procedure required for appointment to the post of Clerk in Nagar Palika Parishad must remain transparent and after due publication of vacancy etc. It is submitted that the resolution of local authority to appoint petitioner is absolutely inconsistent with the scheme of appointment applicable in the institution. Submission is that petitioner’s appointment since is dehors the law, as such it is not liable to be protected by this Court. 12. Before considering the challenge laid to orders of State Government, it would be necessary to examine the nature of petitioner’s appointment and his right to continue in the employment of Nagar Nigam itself. The employment in Nagar Nigam is an employment to the public office and would require observance of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. For such appointment to remain valid it must be shown that post was duly advertised and that equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment is not denied. 13. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner fairly admits that neither any vacancy was advertised nor any procedure was followed before petitioner got appointed in the Nagar Nigam. The basis of petitioner’s claim to appointment is a resolution, dated 1.12.2012, which has already been extracted above. 13. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner fairly admits that neither any vacancy was advertised nor any procedure was followed before petitioner got appointed in the Nagar Nigam. The basis of petitioner’s claim to appointment is a resolution, dated 1.12.2012, which has already been extracted above. This resolution dated 1.12.2012 records that one Javed played a crucial role in saving lives of many on 20th April, 2006 at Victoria Park in Meerut. It further records that the President of the then ruling party had also gone to see the deceased Sri Javed and, therefore, as a mark of recognition for the outstanding services rendered the Nagar Nigam authorised the President to appoint the petitioner. It is not clear as to under which provision of law such a resolution could be passed by the Nagar Nigam. The act of bravery was performed at Meerut. What exactly is the connection due to which appointment is offered at Nawabganj in Bareilly is also not known. There is no provision in the Act of 1916, which authorises the Nagar Palika Parishad to offer appointment to a relative of a person who has shown outstanding bravery in saving lives of persons. It is also not known as to why only one act of bravery was identified and made the basis for grant of appointment to petitioner while other similar instances or acts of bravery was not made the basis for consideration of claim for appointment to others. Such considerations would remain absolutely extraneous so far as the grant of appointment to a public office is concerned, particularly when no enabling provision exists in the applicable statute. Every appointment to public office has to be made by following the procedure known to law. In the absence of vacancy being advertised and a fair procedure for recruitment followed, consistent with Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the appointment itself would be rendered void. 14. The manner in which appointment has been offered to the petitioner does not have any sanctity in the eyes of law. The subsequent resolution giving charge of Executive Officer to petitioner makes it more explicit. 14. The manner in which appointment has been offered to the petitioner does not have any sanctity in the eyes of law. The subsequent resolution giving charge of Executive Officer to petitioner makes it more explicit. The initial appointment as also the subsequent handing over of charge of Executive Officer to a temporary Clerk clearly appears to be an instance of showing undue favours to the petitioner, inasmuch as, large number of Clerks and Head Clerks, who were substantively appointed and available, were by-passed. This aspect may not be relevant now as regular Executive Officer appears to have joined, but such acts of favouritism would be a relevant input for the Court to form an opinion that offering of employment to petitioner was not just an act of showing respect to somebody’s bravery but was a ploy to extend undue favours. Such appointment would, therefore, not be a valid appointment as it is inconsistent with Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and is otherwise dehors the Act of 1916. 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Upendra Narayn Singh & others reported in (2009) 5 SCC 65 had the occasion to deal with appointments offered without any advertisement issued and without following any procedure for such appointment. The Apex Court proceeded to examine the law on the subject and made following observations in paragraph 24:- “24. Notwithstanding the critical observations made in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union vs. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others (supra) and State of U.P. and others v. U.P. State Law Officers Association and others (supra), illegal employment market continued to grow in the country and those entrusted with the power of making appointment and those who could pull strings in the corridors of power manipulated the system to ensure that their favourites get employment in complete and contemptuous disregard of the equality clause enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution and Section 4 of the 1959 Act. However, the Courts gradually realized that unwarranted sympathy shown to the progenies of spoil system has eaten into the vitals of service structure of the State and public bodies and this is the reason why relief of reinstatement and/or regularization of service has been denied to illegal appointees/backdoor entrants in large number of cases -Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava [ (1992) 4 SCC 33 ], Dr. M.A. Haque and others v. Union of India and others [ (1993) 2 SCC 213 ], J & K Public Service Commission and others v. Dr. Narinder Mohan and others [ (1994) 2 SCC 630 ], Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharashtra and others [1994 Suppl. (3) SCC 380], Union of India and others v. Kishan Gopal Vyas [ (1996) 7 SCC 134 ], Union of India v. Moti Lal [ (1996) 7 SCC 481 ], Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. and others v. Dr. P. Sambasiva Rao and others [ (1996) 7 SCC 499 ], State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma and another [ (1996) 7 SCC 562 ], Dr. Surinder Singh Jamwal and another v. State of J&K and others [ (1996) 9 SCC 619 ], E. Ramakrishnan and others v. State of Kerala and others [ (1996) 10 SCC 565 ], Union of India and others vs. Bishambar Dutt [ 1996 (11) SCC 341 ], Union of India and others v. Mahender Singh and others [ 1997 (1) SCC 245 ], P. Ravindran and others v. Union Territory of Pondicherry and others [ 1997 (1) SCC 350 ], Ashwani Kumar and others v. State of Bihar and others [ 1997 (2) SCC 1 ], Santosh Kumar Verma and others v. State of Bihar and others [ (1997) 2 SCC 713 ], State of U.P. and others vs. Ajay Kumar [ (1997) 4 SCC 88 ], Patna University and another v. Dr. Amita Tiwari [ (1997) 7 SCC 198 ] and Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra and others [(2005) 5 SCC 122].” 16. In the same judgment the Apex Court went on to observe as under in paragraphs 31 & 33 :- “31. In our opinion, there is no merit in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel. If the initial appointments of the respondents are found to be illegal per se, the direction given by the High Court for their reinstatement with consequential benefits cannot be approved by relying upon the so-called regularisation of their services. Had the respondents been appointed by the competent authority after issuing an advertisement or sending requisition to the employment exchange so as to enable the latter to sponsor the names of eligible persons then they would have certainly produced the relevant documents before the High Court or at least before this Court. Had the respondents been appointed by the competent authority after issuing an advertisement or sending requisition to the employment exchange so as to enable the latter to sponsor the names of eligible persons then they would have certainly produced the relevant documents before the High Court or at least before this Court. However, the fact of the matter is that none of the documents which could give a semblance of legitimacy to the appointments of the respondents was produced before the High Court and none has been produced before this Court. 33. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the initial appointments of the respondents were made in gross violation of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 and the provisions of the 1959 Act and the learned Single Judge gravely erred by directing their reinstatement with consequential benefits.” 17. In the facts of the present case and for the reasons recorded above, this Court is of the considered opinion that petitioner’s entry in the employment of Nagar Nigam is an act of undue favour extended upon him which is in teeth of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and has to be treated as void. This Court, therefore, is not inclined to examine the legality of the government order on the grounds as have been urged by Sri Shashi Nandan, inasmuch as, the nature of appointment possessed by the petitioner does not create any right in him to continue in the employment of Nagar Nigam. This Court, therefore, would not be inclined to examine the legality of the government order under challenge at the instance of present petitioner, as it is not a fit case for invocation of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Law is well settled that this Court would be justified in refusing to interfere in this writ petition if the effect of interference would amount to restoring an illegality. [See: (1999) 6 SCC 237 , M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India; (1994)2 SCC 481 , State of Maharashtra vs. Prashu]. 18. A Division Bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar Vs. [See: (1999) 6 SCC 237 , M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India; (1994)2 SCC 481 , State of Maharashtra vs. Prashu]. 18. A Division Bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, 2015(4) ALJ 58 has been pleased to hold that the right of this Court not to interfere in a petition would be available for justifiable reasons, if it is not a writ of habeas corpus and none of the fundamental rights of a person is infringed. Paragraph 13 of the division bench judgment is reproduced hereinafter:- “13. However, even if the version of the petitioner is accepted on its face value, in view of the facts of the present case and considering the seriousness of the criminal offence for which the petitioner has been convicted, in our view, it is not a case where the disciplinary authority could have taken any other view of the matter even if an opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Thus, it would have been an empty formality, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to him. Principle of natural justice is not like an unruly horse. Its application depends upon the facts of a case and not in a factual vacuum. Moreover, it is also trite that even if there has been violation of the principles of natural justice this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not bound to interfere in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction because by doing so it would be restoring an illegality. A person convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code should not be reinstated in service till he is absolved in appeal. Therefore, doing so on the plea of violation of proviso to Rule 14 (iii) of the Rules would amount to bringing to life another illegality, and would do more harm than good. Reference may be made in this regard to the judgments of Supreme Court reported in the case of M. C. Mehta Vs. Union of India, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 237 , and State of Maharashtra Vs. Prashu, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 481 . Except for the writ of habeas corpus and cases involving violation of fundamental rights invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not as a matter of right but discretionary.” 19. Union of India, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 237 , and State of Maharashtra Vs. Prashu, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 481 . Except for the writ of habeas corpus and cases involving violation of fundamental rights invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not as a matter of right but discretionary.” 19. In the present case neither any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner are infringed nor is it a writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, this Court would be justified in refusing to interfere in the writ or examining the questions raised at the instance of the present petitioner by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Any interference in this writ would otherwise result in revival of an illegal and void act. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.