JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner and Sri Sharad Kumar Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.1. who has passed away during pendency of petition and is now represented through his legal heirs. Opposite party no.2 being merely a Performa Party is thus represented. 2. Petition has been filed against the award dated 28.12.2002 passed in case No. W.C. 10 of 2001 awarding compensation to the opposite party no.1 in view of fact that he lost use of his right arm during an accident that is said to have occurred during course of his duties. 3. As per averments made in petition, the opposite party no.1 had filed a claim under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 which was registered as Case No. W.C. 10 of 2001 claiming compensation on account of fact that he lost use of his right arm during operating of machine during course of employment with the petitioner. Reading of the impugned award along with the written statement filed by employer makes it apparent that the only grounds raised by the employer were that it was not an Industry within meaning of the term as indicated in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that a claimant did not come within the definition of Workmen as defined in the Act. It had also been stated that the accident occurred due to negligence on the part of claimant himself for which the employer could not be held liable. 4. Learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner has submitted that the prescribed authority has not adverted to the submission raised by employer that it was not an Industry as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and is therefore not liable to make payment of compensation to opposite party no.1. It has been submitted that even the factum of contributory negligence raised in the written statement has been ignored while passing the impugned award which has been passed merely on the basis of averments made by the claimant. 5. It has been submitted that even the factum of contributory negligence raised in the written statement has been ignored while passing the impugned award which has been passed merely on the basis of averments made by the claimant. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.1, however has refuted the assertion made by learned State Counsel with the submission that as per the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the requirement of an employer being an Industry for liability towards the payment of compensation to workman is not sine quo non for maintainability of a claim under the said Act. It has been submitted that even otherwise Section 2(2) of the Act makes it apparent that even Government Departments are deemed to be liable to make payment of compensation in terms of the Act. It has further submitted that there is no provision in the Act whereby compensation can be denied to a claimant on account of contributory negligence. 6. Upon consideration of arguments raised by learned counsel for parties and perusal of record, it is evident that the only grounds raised by petitioner before the prescribed authority were that firstly petitioner/employee is not an Industry within the meaning of Act of 1923; secondly, the employee/claimant does not come within definition of Workmen under the Act; and thirdly, claimant was not entitled to any compensation on account of contributory negligence. With regard to third ground, it can be seen from perusal of the impugned award that the said ground pertaining to contributory negligence was subsequently waived by the employee during course of arguments as has been recorded in the impugned award. The only questions therefore requiring adjudication is as to whether petitioner could be absolved of its liability in case it did not come within definition of Industry, and the claimant did not come within the definition of the term 'Workman'. 7. With regard to first question, a reading of the provisions of Act of 1923 makes it clear that the compensation is to be awarded in terms of Section 3 which provides for employers liability for compensation. 8. The relevant portion of Section 3 is as follows ( as its stood at the time of presentation of claim): "3. 7. With regard to first question, a reading of the provisions of Act of 1923 makes it clear that the compensation is to be awarded in terms of Section 3 which provides for employers liability for compensation. 8. The relevant portion of Section 3 is as follows ( as its stood at the time of presentation of claim): "3. Employer's liability for compensation.-(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable— (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding 1 [three] days; (b) in respect of any 2 [injury, not resulting in death 3 [or permanent total disablement] caused by] an accident which is directly attributable to- (i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, 1[****]." 9. A reading of Section 3(1) indicates that an employer shall be liable to pay compensation in case of personal injury caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The said provision does not indicate that for liability towards payment of compensation, and employer is required to come within definition of 'Industry' as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 10. The term employer however has been defined in Section 2(e) which is as follows:- "(e) "employer" includes any body of persons whether incorporated or not and any managing agent of an employer and the legal representative of a deceased employer, and, when the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person while the workman is working for him;" 11. Even the said provision does not indicate anywhere that for liability towards payment of compensation, the employer is required to be an Industry in terms of definition explained in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the contrary Section 2(2) of the Act of 1923 specifically indicates that the exercise and performance of powers and duties of a local authority or of any department acting on behalf of the Government shall be deemed to be trade or business of such authority or department, unless a contrary intention appears. 12. The relevant provision is as follows: Section 2(2) Workmen' S Compensation Act, 1923 "(2) The exercise and performance of the powers and duties of a local authority or of any department 7 [acting on behalf of the Government] shall, for the purposes of this Act, unless a contrary intention appears, be deemed to be the trade or business of such authority or department." 13. It can be seen that provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 clearly operate in different fields and reference to one cannot be deemed to be included while considering provisions of the other Act. Both the Acts operating in their individual spheres would be governed by the definitions and provisions of that particular Act itself. 14. Upon a comparison of Section 3(1), Section 2(e) and Section 2(2) of the Act of 1923 it is quite apparent that liability of an employer for payment of compensation to an employee would not be dependent upon the employer being within the definition of the term 'Industry' as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In fact as per Section 2(2) of the Act of 1923, Government Departments are deemed to be trade or business for grant of benefit under the Act of 1923. As such, the submission of petitioners that they were not liable to pay compensation since they were not come within the definition of 'Industry' cannot be a good ground. 15. In fact as per Section 2(2) of the Act of 1923, Government Departments are deemed to be trade or business for grant of benefit under the Act of 1923. As such, the submission of petitioners that they were not liable to pay compensation since they were not come within the definition of 'Industry' cannot be a good ground. 15. So far as assertion of claimant/petitioner is concerned that the claimant was not a workman under the terms of the Act of 1923, a reading of Section 2(n) would be relevant, which defines term workman is as follows: "Section 2(n) Workmen Compensation Act:- (n) "workman" means any person 9(***) who is— (i) a railway servant as defined in 1[clause (34) of section 2 of the Indian Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)], not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or 2[(ia) (a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship, (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle, (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or;] (ii) employed 3[***] 4[***] in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of 5[the Armed Forces of the Union] 6 [***]; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them." 16. A reading of the aforesaid term clearly indicates that any employee who is not employed in a casual nature or is not otherwise employed for the purposes of employee trade business would be covered by the term workman. 17. In the present case, the petitioner has not indicated as to how the claimant would not be covered by term workman. A reading of the aforesaid term clearly indicates that any employee who is not employed in a casual nature or is not otherwise employed for the purposes of employee trade business would be covered by the term workman. 17. In the present case, the petitioner has not indicated as to how the claimant would not be covered by term workman. The only ground taken by the petitioners to claim that claimant does not come within the term 'workman' is based on the ground that petitioner does not come within term of Industry. Clearly that cannot be a reason for denying the status of workman to claimant since it has already been held hereinabove that the employer cannot escape liability for payment of compensation under the Act of 1923 whether or not it is covered under the definition of Industry. 18. Even otherwise the impugned award clearly indicates that the claimant was covered within the term of workman as indicated in Section 2(1)(n) and as per second Schedule to the Act. 19. No other point has been pressed by learned counsel for parties. 20. In view aforesaid, there is no illegality in the impugned award and as such the petition being devoid of merit is dismissed. 21. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.1 has drawn attention to the fact that vide interim order dated 23.10.2003, operation of impugned award has been stayed subject to deposit by petitioner of the award amount within a period of three months before opposite party no.2 out of which ¾ was to be invested in an interest bearing account of nationalized bank and ¼ amount was permitted to be withdrawn by the claimant. It has been submitted that despite the said directions, the petitioner did not deposit the amount as indicated and for which subsequently another application no.2922 of 2004 was filed seeking extension of time to deposit the amount in compliance of interim order dated 23.10.2003. The application was allowed and two months further time had been granted where after the amount was deposited and ¼ which has already been withdrawn by the claimant. 22. In view of aforesaid fact, claimant/opposite party no.1 is (now deceased) through his legal heirs as already brought on record are permitted to withdraw the amount so deposited before the opposite party no.2. 22. In view of aforesaid fact, claimant/opposite party no.1 is (now deceased) through his legal heirs as already brought on record are permitted to withdraw the amount so deposited before the opposite party no.2. In case such application is preferred, the opposite party no.2 shall permit such withdrawal along with interest as accumulated in the interest bearing account within a period of 15 days from the date a copy of this order is produced before said opposite party. 23. Another relevant aspect which cannot be ignored is that this Court vide its interim order dated 23.10.2003 had directed deposit of the awarded amount within a period of three months but the same was not deposited within the time indicated. Although, an application for extension was filed in the year 2004 but the same was allowed only on 16.07.2014. Apparently no efforts were made by the petitioner to get the application for extension decided for about 11 years. Had the awarded amount being deposited within time frame indicated in the year 2003, the opposite party no.1 would have been entitled to interest for the aforesaid 10 years. Clearly, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong particularly in view of directions issued on 23.10.2003 for the awarded amount to be kept in an interest bearing account. In view of aforesaid facts, this Court deems it proper to award simple interest of 4% per annum on the entire awarded amount with effect from 24.01.2004 till the date of actual deposit before opposite party no.2. The amount of interest so calculated shall be deposited by petitioner with opposite party no.2 within a period of four months from the date a copy of this order is produced before petitioner. Upon deposit of such interest amount, the same shall be permitted to be withdrawn by legal heirs of the claimant within a period of 15 days from the date of such deposit.