JUDGMENT : SUDIP AHLUWALIA, J. 1. These two revisions have been preferred by the petitioners against the impugned judgments passed by the Ld. Appellate Authority, Amritsar on 9th January, 2017 in Rent Appeal Nos.52 and 53 of 2016 of his Court, vide which the Ld. Trial Court/Rent Controller, Amritsar’s Judgments dated 8th April, 2016 in Rent Application Nos. 13 and 37 dated 18th September, 2013 was upheld. 2. The petitioners in these two revisions happen to be tenants under the same landlord/respondent-Iqbal Singh Narang, who had filed the aforesaid Rent Applications praying for eviction of the petitioners from their individual demised shops which form part of property bearing No.112-116/1 situated on Ravi Dass Road near Police Station Ram Bagh, Amritsar. 3. Vide the impugned judgments, the Ld. Rent Controller had directed eviction of the petitioners from their demised shops, which decisions were in turn upheld by the Appellate Authority, since both the Courts were of the view that the premises were required by the landlord-respondent for his own use and occupation, as also for use by his own son, and in any case, the same were also liable to be got vacated being in a very dilapidated condition and unfit for human habitation. 4. The specific grievance of the petitioners before this Court was that the landlord-respondent was not entitled to any decree for eviction since there was no averment in the original eviction petition to the effect that his son was not in possession of any other premises, nor had parted with the possession of any such premises within the Municipal Area of Amritsar before filing of the revision petition. As such according to the petitioners, the necessary requirements in terms of Section 13(3)(ii) (a) (b) & (c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent restriction Act, were not fulfilled. 5. It is the further contention of the petitioners that even otherwise there is a wrong finding of both the Ld. Courts below regarding the alleged dilapidated condition of the demised premises, on account of which the impugned judgments are not sustainable. 6. To support the first contention, the petitioners have relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Ajit Singh and another vs. Jit Ram and another, 2008 (4) RCR(Civil) 390’, wherein it was held - “11. Courts below regarding the alleged dilapidated condition of the demised premises, on account of which the impugned judgments are not sustainable. 6. To support the first contention, the petitioners have relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Ajit Singh and another vs. Jit Ram and another, 2008 (4) RCR(Civil) 390’, wherein it was held - “11. From the aforesaid decision of this Court, it is therefore, clear that this Court has laid down authoritatively that a non-residential premises, if required by a son for user by him would cover the requirement of words used in the Section, i.e. “for his own use” in reference to a landlord. Therefore, if “his own use” has been interpreted by this Court in the above-said manner, then the requirements as laid down in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(b) and (c) of the Act has to be interpreted in the same manner to hold that (a) the son of the landlord has to plead in the eviction petition that, (b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land as the case may be; and (c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Rent Act, in the urban area concerned.” 7. Relying on the aforesaid decision, Co-ordinate Benches of this Court had set aside the judgments of eviction of the respective tenants in the cases of ‘Manmohan Lal vs. Shanti Parkash Jain, 2014 (5) R.C.R.(Civil) 667 and ‘Rajiv Gupta vs. Jiwan Ram 2015 (1) R.C.R.(Civil)762’, which have also been cited on behalf of the petitioners. 8. On the other hand, the respondent-landlord has basically relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in ‘Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 (1) R.C.R.(Rent) 582’, in which the appeal of the tenant against the judgments for his eviction was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the following observations :- 19. Similar provision is contained in Section 21(1) (h) of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. In Dr. Syed Sibgathullah vs. C.M. Abdul Aziz, 1983 (1) RCJ 516, the Division Bench consisting of M.N. Venkatachaliah and M. Rama Jois, JJ. Similar provision is contained in Section 21(1) (h) of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. In Dr. Syed Sibgathullah vs. C.M. Abdul Aziz, 1983 (1) RCJ 516, the Division Bench consisting of M.N. Venkatachaliah and M. Rama Jois, JJ. (as their Lordships were then) cited with approval the decision of Court of Appeal of England in Riches vs. Wilson, 1963 (2) All England Reports 336, in which Willmer, L.J. interpreting the expression ‘himself’ used in paragraph (h) of Schedule-I to the English Rent and Mortgage Interest restrictions (Amendment Act 1933) had held, “quite plainly the expression “himself” must include all the normal ‘emanations’ of himself”, and concluded to say, - “So, the test by the application of which I should decide this case is whether it could be said that when the sister lives in the premises, the landlord himself lives there through his sister. If he does the sisters occupation is the occupation of the landlord ‘by himself’ and the household would then be a common household. If that be the true position, the landlord should get an order for possession.” The Division Bench followed the Bombay and Mysore view (which we have already referred to) and held that the submission that ‘himself’ refers to landlord in person or his dependent who resides with him and not separated is too technical and artificial a construction which if accepted would rob the provision of its real intention and purpose and it does not merit acceptance. The Court proceeded to note a variety of circumstances by reference to which the actual occupation of the premises by another has to be regarded constructively as the occupation by the ‘emanation’ of the landlord himself. “It is not possible to state exhaustively all the circumstances in which the physical occupation of a person other than the landlord would have to be registered as occupation by the landlord himself. A few illustrations, however, would bring home the point. For instance, the occupation of the premises by a person who is economically dependent on the landlord, the occupation of the premises by a major son or daughter including a married daughter whose residence in the premises is genuinely desired by the landlord, the occupation of the premises out of necessity by those who are kith and kin of the landlord for the purpose of the Dr. (sic) education or medical treatment as the case may be as genuinely desired by the landlord, would have to be regarded as occupation by the landlord himself.” The Division Bench however sounded a note of caution and clarified - “the Court should be circumspect in finding out as to whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence adduced such occupation could be regarded as occupation by the landlord himself or was only a ruse to get an order of eviction.” The Court further observed that all the relevant factors and attendant circumstances shall have to be taken into consideration besides (i) the degree of relationship or dependence, (ii) the circumstances under which the landlord’s claim for the premises arises and put forward; (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim having regard to the realities of life and the social mores and the like and shall have all to be put into the scales and go into the judicial verdict. 33. Our conclusions are crystalised as under: (i) the words ‘for his own use’ as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. (ii) The expression-landlord requires for ‘his own use’, is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal ‘emanations’ of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as inter-relationship and interdependence-economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong. (iii) The tests to be applied are: (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord’s own requirement? and, (ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as ‘his own’ occupation or user? (iii) The tests to be applied are: (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord’s own requirement? and, (ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as ‘his own’ occupation or user? The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as ‘his own’ and the person who would actually use the premises, (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward, and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The Court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord’s claim. (iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. (v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii). 9. In addition, the decisions of Co-ordinate Benches of this Court in ‘Gurbaj Singh vs. Parshotam Singh and others, 2011 (4) R.C.R.(Civil) 518, Daljit Singh vs. Kulwant Rai & Sons and another, 2017 (4) R.C.R.(Civil) 589’ and ‘Arun Kumar vs. Des Raj Tandon (since deceased) through his LR - CR No.7149 of 2017’, in which reliance had been placed upon the aforesaid decision were cited on behalf of the respondent, as also there is a reference to a Full Bench decision of this Court in case of ‘Banke Ram vs. Sarasti Devi, AIR 1977 P&H 158 . The thrust in Gurbaj Singh’s case (supra) as also in Arun Kumar’s case (supra) was on the assertion that where no objection had been taken regarding the alleged deficiency in pleadings covering the landlord’s own son for whom the demised premises was required, dismissal of his prayer for eviction when he could have not had the scope to cure such procedural omission would not be justified. 10. Ld. 10. Ld. Counsel for the petitioners however in reply cited an additional decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in ‘Babli and others vs. Kumari Ruchi Bansal and another, 2017 (1) R.C.R.(Civil) 152’, wherein it was held that in the event of nondisclosure of the fact that the concerned landlord was not in possession of shops which were suitable and sufficient for his purpose, his eviction petition was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. 11. This Court however finds virtually no applicability of the ratio in this citation to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It needs to be remembered that admittedly in the original petition the respondent-landlord had specifically taken the plea that the demised premises were required by him for personal use and occupation by himself as also by his son. Incidentally, both the landlord and his son happen to be Advocates by profession. The only omission even according to the petitioners’ side is the lack of averments to the effect that respondent’s son was not in possession of, nor had vacated any other premises within the Municipal area of Amritsar. But as already noted earlier, such omission in such situation where no objection to the same had been taken on behalf of the tenants in their own pleadings would not vitiate the landlord’s right to seek the eviction on the ground of his personal necessity or that of his own son. In other words, omission to take this procedural plea can by no means by equated with any willful suppression of the existence of any other suitable premises in the actual possession of the landlord or his son, which was the situation in the Babli’s case (supra), while there is no material whatsoever on record to indicate that respondent or his son were actually in possession of any other such suitable accommodation, or had willfully suppressed about such existence and occupation. 12. The other contention regarding the alleged perverse finding concerning the dilapidated condition of the premises as claimed on behalf of the respondent is also not convincing. Suffice it to say, both the Ld. Courts below have come to a concurrent finding in this regard to the effect that the demised premises are actually in a very dilapidated condition and unfit for human habitation as claimed in the original eviction petitions. Suffice it to say, both the Ld. Courts below have come to a concurrent finding in this regard to the effect that the demised premises are actually in a very dilapidated condition and unfit for human habitation as claimed in the original eviction petitions. Evidence to support this contention had been led on behalf of the respondent-landlord by way of Inspection in this regard, conducted by a Competent Civil Engineer, which is on record as Exhibit A-2. 13. Admittedly, no contrary report disputing the correctness of the aforesaid report was led into evidence from the side of the petitioners. 14. In the given facts and circumstances therefore, this Court in its revisional jurisdiction is not required to interfere with the concurrent finding of facts arrived at by both the Ld. Courts below particularly since the Expert’s report led from the side of the landlord was not countered by any similar evidence from the petitioners’ side. 15. For the aforesaid reasons this Court finds no substantive merit in the present revisions which are accordingly dismissed. 16. In the interest of justice, however, considering that the petitioners have remained in occupation of the demised premises for a long time which is almost three decades by now, they are granted time for three months to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the same to the landlord from today. During such period any execution application, if already filed against them shall remain stayed. 17. This order shall thereafter stand automatically vacated on 30th April, 2019.