JUDGMENT : 1. Appellant faced trial in FIR No.271 dated 15.8.2011, registered at Police Station Bheemganj Mandi, District Kota City under Section 307 IPC. FIR was registered on the basis of statement (Exhibit-P.2) of injured Nafisa. 2. In her statement Exhibit-P.2 injured Nafisa stated that her husband Amin was resident of Agra and was a liquor addict. Her husband used to beat her under the influence of liquor and used to throw her out of the matrimonial home. On 14.8.2011 her husband came home under the influence of liquor and gave beatings to her and poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire. The incident had occurred at about 8-9 PM. At that time her children were sleeping. She raised an alarm. Appellant fled away from the spot. She was removed to the hospital by her neighbours. 3. Statement of injured was also recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The said statement is Exhibit-P.3. Injured had stated that she had been set on fire by her husband after pouring kerosene oil on her. She further stated that her husband used to take liquor and used to beat her. Her father was a poor person and the appellant used to say that her father had not given her anything. On a question put to the injured as to who had saved her, she had replied that she was saved by her neighbours. She stated that the occurrence had occurred at about 8-9 PM and at that time her children were sleeping. 4. After the death of injured Nafisa on 15.8.2011 at about 3.30 AM, offence under Section 302 IPC was added in the FIR. 5. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the appellant. Charge was framed against the appellant under Section 302 IPC by the trial court. 6. Appellant did not plead guilty to the charge framed against him and claimed trial. 7. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined sixteen witnesses. 8. Appellant when examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. after the close of prosecution evidence, prayed that he was innocent and had been falsely involved in the case. His wife had prepared meals and had served the same to the children. He did not know how his wife had caught fire. He had tried to extinguish the fire and had suffered injuries on his face and hands. 9. His wife had prepared meals and had served the same to the children. He did not know how his wife had caught fire. He had tried to extinguish the fire and had suffered injuries on his face and hands. 9. Appellant examined parents of the deceased as in his defence as D.W.1 and D.W.2. 10. Trial court vide judgment/order dated 22.12.2014 ordered conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. Hence, the present appeal by the appellant. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that all the material witnesses including children of the deceased have not supported the prosecution case during trial. Rather, the witnesses had stated that the appellant had tried to extinguish the fire and as a result he had suffered burn injuries. As per Exhibit-P.23, medico-legal examination report of the appellant, appellant had also suffered burn injuries on his hands and forearm. 12. Learned State counsel has opposed the appeal. 13. Present case relates to murder of Nafisa. Deceased is wife of the appellant. FIR was lodged on the basis of statement of Nafisa. Statement of Nafisa was also recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 14. In the present case, all the material witnesses including children of the deceased who have been examined as P.W.3 (Sohil) and P.W.15 (Shaheen) have not supported the prosecution case during trial. P.W.3 and P.W.15 have deposed that their mother had caught fire and their father had tried to extinguish the fire. 15. Parents of the deceased while appearing in the witness box as D.W.1 and D.W.2 have deposed that their daughter had never complained to them that the appellant used to give beatings to her under the influence of liquor. When they had reached the hospital, their daughter was unconscious and could not speak and had died during treatment. Children of Nafisa had told them that their mother had caught fire while preparing meals and she had not been set on fire by anyone. Appellant had tried to extinguish the fire and had suffered burn injuries. Nafisa had been removed to the hospital with the help of neighbours. Thus, the present case, now rests on dying declarations of the deceased suffered before the police as well as the Magistrate. 16. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthu Kutty And Another Vs. Nafisa had been removed to the hospital with the help of neighbours. Thus, the present case, now rests on dying declarations of the deceased suffered before the police as well as the Magistrate. 16. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthu Kutty And Another Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases 113, as under:- "Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1992) SC 1817: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1976] 2 SCR 764) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164) (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors., AIR (1985) SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR (1983) SC 164) (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) SC 1994]. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 SCC 264). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v. State of M.P., AIR (1982) SC 1021]. (vi) A dying declaration with suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P., [1981] 2 SCC 654) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR (1981) SC 617]. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR (1979) SC 1505]. (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1988) SC 912]. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Medan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519]. (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See State of U.P. v. Medan Mohan and Ors., AIR (1989) SC 1519]. (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1982) SC 839]." 17. Let us examine the dying declarations suffered by the deceased to come to a conclusion as to whether the same inspire confidence. 18. A perusal of statement Exhibit-P.2 reveals that the deceased in her dying declaration before the police had stated that her husband used to beat her under the influence of liquor. On the day of incident her husband had beaten her under the influence of liquor and had poured kerosene oil on her and had set her on fire. The appellant then ran away from the spot and she was taken to the hospital by the neighbours. To the similar effect is the statement Exhibit-P.3 of the deceased recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 19. P.W.1 Dr. Tej Pratap Singh deposed that on 14.8.2011 he was on duty in Burns Ward. On that day on a request made by the SHO, Police Station Bheemganj Mandi, he had declared the injured fit to make the statement and thereafter her statement had been recorded by the police official. The said statement was also signed by him. He further stated that on 15.8.2011 at about 12.30 AM, the Magistrate had enquired from him about the condition of the injured and he had stated that the injured was fit to make a statement. Statement of Nafisa Exhibit-P.3 was also signed by him. 20. P.W.13 Swati Sharma deposed that on 14.8.2011 she was on remand duty and had gone to record the statement of Nafisa on an application moved by ASI Udham Singh. Statement of injured has been recorded as stated by her and it was signed by the injured. This witness proved the statement Exhibit-P.3. 21. Thus, from the dying declarations suffered by the deceased it is evident that she had been set on fire by the appellant after pouring kerosene oil on her. Statement of injured has been recorded as stated by her and it was signed by the injured. This witness proved the statement Exhibit-P.3. 21. Thus, from the dying declarations suffered by the deceased it is evident that she had been set on fire by the appellant after pouring kerosene oil on her. The deceased had no reason to falsely involve the appellant in this case if he had actually not set her on fire especially when she was on death bed. The dying declarations of the deceased were recorded after obtaining her fitness certificate from the Doctor. Dying declarations suffered by the deceased inspire confidence. Statements of D.W.1 and D.W.2 fail to rebut the dying declarations suffered by the deceased. From the dying declarations suffered by the deceased it is evident that they had been made voluntarily by the deceased and there is no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the same. 22. The plea taken by the appellant that his wife had caught fire and he tried to extinguish the same appears to be an afterthought. A perusal of Exhibit-P.23 reveals that the appellant was got medically examined on 28.9.2011 at about 10.40 AM whereas the incident had occurred on 14.8.2011 at about 8-9 P.M. A perusal of Exhibit-P.23 further reveals that the appellant had suffered burn injuries on both hands and forearm. Duration of injuries has been given as one to two months. In case appellant had actually tried to save his wife, then in normal circumstances, he would have also got himself admitted in the hospital alongwith his wife and got treatment. However, in the present case, appellant was medico-legally examined on 28.9.2011 whereas, the incident had occurred on 14.8.2011. It is possible that appellant might have suffered injuries while he had set his wife on fire and after committing the crime, he had fled away from the spot instead of taking his wife to the hospital for treatment. Deceased had categorically stated in her dying declaration that she had been taken to the hospital by her neighbours and the appellant after setting her on fire, fled away from the spot. Hence, the trial court while relying on dying declarations suffered by the deceased has rightly ordered for conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. 23. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The impugned judgment/order dated 22.12.2014 passed by the trial court are upheld.