ORDER : U. Durga Prasad Rao, J. 1. The challenge in this C.R.P. at the instance of petitioners/plaintiffs is to the order dated 20.2.2019 in IA No. 212 of 2018 in OS No. 95 of 2010 where under learned Junior Civil Judge, Mummidivaram allowed the petition filed by the defendant under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C., seeking to amend the written statement. 2. The plaintiffs filed OS No. 95 of 2010 seeking declaration of the title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule agricultural land on the pleas that 1st plaintiff purchased the suit land under sale deed dated 28.8.1975; plaintiffs 2 and 3 are her maternal grandsons and she executed a Regd. Gift Settlement Deed dated 16.6.2007 in their favour in respect of plaint schedule property reserving life interest for herself; the defendant is a close relative of 1st plaintiff and as the suit land is nearer to the village of the defendant and father to plaintiffs, 1st plaintiff entrusted the management of suit land in the year 2005 to the defendant to cultivate and render accounts, but from the year 2007 onwards the defendant was not rendering accounts, and there was no proper response from him despite issuance of the notice. Hence, the suit. (a) The defendant filed written statement opposing the plaint averments. He inter alia contends that suit schedule property was sold to him by 1st plaintiff and her husband Nageswara Rao under a possessory agreement of sale dated 8.7.2004 and he has been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit land and they are avoiding the execution of registered sale deed. (b) While so, the trial went on and when the matter was posted for defendant's evidence, he filled IA No. 212 of 2018 under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C., seeking to amend the written statement. His case is that agreement to sell was executed by 1st plaintiff and her husband not in the name of the defendant but in the name of his wife Eswari and the date of agreement to sell was 17.6.2003 but not 8.7.2004. His case is that agreement to sell was executed by 1st plaintiff and her husband not in the name of the defendant but in the name of his wife Eswari and the date of agreement to sell was 17.6.2003 but not 8.7.2004. In his affidavit, he would submit that at the time of filing of written statement, since the possessory agreement to sell dated 17.6.2003 and original sale deed dated 28.8.1975 which was in favour of the first plaintiff were misplaced, he could not furnish the correct date of execution of possessory agreement and the correct name of the purchaser. It was purely a mistake but not intentional. Since the original sale deed and possessory agreement to sell were recovered before filing the amendment petition, the said petition was filed to seek necessary amendments. (c) The plaintiff opposed the said petition by filing counter. (d) The Trial Court, it appears, under the impression that there was no much change in the pleadings since the defendant earlier claimed agreement to sell in his favour with a specific date and now claims the agreement to sell in favour of his wife with a different date and in any event, since the plaintiffs denied execution of agreement to sell, whether or not the 1st plaintiff and her husband executed sale agreement in favour of the wife of defendant can be decided only if such a plea is allowed to be taken and accordingly allowed the amendment petition. Hence, the C.R.P. 3. Heard learned Counsel for petitioners Sri Marri Venkata Ramana and learned Counsel for respondent Sri T.V.S. Prabhakara Rao. 4. Parties in the C.R.P. are referred as they are arrayed before the Trial Court. 5. Severely fulminating the order impugned, the Counsel for petitioner would argue that as per proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C., amendment to the pleadings after commencement of trial is not for mere asking but the seeker of the amendment should convince the Court that inspite of due diligence, he could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. Referring the aforesaid provision he would strenuously argue that in the instant case, the defendant at first came up with a plea as if the 1st plaintiff and her husband had executed a possessory agreement of sell on 8.7.2004 in his favour and the plaintiff staunchly denied the said plea in their evidence. Referring the aforesaid provision he would strenuously argue that in the instant case, the defendant at first came up with a plea as if the 1st plaintiff and her husband had executed a possessory agreement of sell on 8.7.2004 in his favour and the plaintiff staunchly denied the said plea in their evidence. After the plaintiffs evidence is over, he came up with amendment as if the agreement was executed in favour of his wife on 17.6.2003. Learned Counsel would argue that the introduction of new plea, by way of amendment changes altogether the course of defence, originally taken by the defendant. He pointed out that the amendment could not have been allowed for the reasons that the defendant could not show before the Trial Court that inspite of exercising due diligence, he could not take such plea before commencement of the trial and further such amendment altogether changes the original defence and introduces a new cause and thereby pushed the plaintiff in such a position that he has to face a new defence and thereby he has to bring on record defendant's Wife as party and commence the proceedings afresh. He thus, prayed to allow the C.R.P. 6. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondent/defendant Sri T.V.S. Prabhakara Rao would argue that since the suit is one for declaration of plaintiffs' title and for possession, the burden of proof to establish their case rests on the plaintiffs and weakness if any in the case of defendant is of no consequence. In that view, he would argue, a mere amendment of the pleading in the written statement that the purchaser from 1st plaintiff is not the defendant but his wife, would not make any vital difference so far as burden of proof lying on the plaintiffs is concerned. If the plaintiffs established their case, then the evidentiary burden shifts on to the wife of the defendant, which was hitherto on the defendant by virtue of original written statement, to establish that the 1st plaintiff and her husband have executed agreement to sell in her favour. So, the amendment has neither brought any change in the original defence nor it caused any prejudice to the case of plaintiffs. So, the amendment has neither brought any change in the original defence nor it caused any prejudice to the case of plaintiffs. So far as due diligence factor is concerned, learned Counsel would argue that because the original agreement to sell and sale deed dated 28.8.1975 were misplaced at the time of filing the written statement and they were recovered only before filing the amendment petition, such amendment became necessary to bring forth true facts before the Court. He thus, prayed to dismiss the C.R.P. 7. The points for consideration are; (1) Whether the proposed amendment altogether changes cause of action and causes severe prejudice to plaintiffs, if allowed? (2) Whether the defendant could satisfactorily explain the due diligence factor to deserve for amendment of the written statement? Point No. 1: 8. On perusal of the jurisprudential jurimetrics on amendment of pleadings, it would appear, the law slightly titled in favour of allowing amendment of the written statements than plaints. It is because of the accepted principle of law that a defendant is permitted to take inconsistent pleas in his written statement. Thereby, it appears, the Courts have consistently held that by way of amendment to the written statement, he can introduce a plea inconsistent with the original plea already taken in the written statement or introduce a new plea altogether. However, the riders to search liberal permission are that by such amendment, the defendant cannot be permitted to stifle the clear admission already made in favour of the plaintiff and nextly by such amendment, he should not allow to change the cause of action causing prejudice to the claim of the plaintiff. Let us look into the following decisions: (1) In Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung, AIR 1922 PC 249 , the Privy Council observed: All rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but nonetheless no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject-matter of the suit. (2) In Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons, (2009) 10 SCC 84 , while referring several decisions of Supreme Court, the Apex Court observed that the statement of law declared by the Privy Council in Ma Shwe Mya's case (supra), has been consistently accepted by the Courts till date as correct statement of law. (3) In B.K.N. Narayana Pillai v. P. Pillai, AIR 2000 SC 614 , the Apex Court observed thus: The principles applicable to the amendments of the plaint are equally applicable to the amendments of the written statements. The Courts are more generous in allowing the amendment of the written statement as question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that event. The defendant has a right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment other side should not be subjected to injustice and that any admission made in favour of the plaintiff is not withdrawn. All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of the real controversies in the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action on the basis of which the original plea was raised or defence taken. Inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. Proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or relates in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. The delay in filing the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written statement. (4) In L.J. Leach and Co. The delay in filing the petition for amendment of the pleadings should be properly compensated by costs and error or mistake which, if not fraudulent, should not be made a ground for rejecting the application for amendment of plaint or written statement. (4) In L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., 1957 (1) SCR 438, the Apex Court observed that the Courts are to be more generous in allowing amendment of the written statement as the question of prejudice is less likely to operate in that event and that the defendant has right to take alternative plea in defence which, however, is subject to an exception that by the proposed amendment the other side should not be subjected to serious injustice. (5) In Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh, AIR 2006 SC 2832 , it is observed that: That apart, it is now well settled that an amendment of a plaint and amendment of a written statement are not necessarily governed by exactly the same principle. It is true that some general principles are certainly common to both, but the rules that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter materially or substitute his cause of action or the nature of his claim has no counterpart in the law relating to amendment of the written statement. Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not raise the same problem as adding altering or substituting a new cause of action. Accordingly, in the case of amendment of written statement, the Courts are inclined to be more liberal in allowing amendment of the written statement than of plaint and question of prejudice is less likely to operate with same rigour in the former than in the latter case. (Emphasis supplied). (6) In Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Ladha Ram and Co., 1977 (1) SCR 728 , it was observed that once a written statement contained an admission in favour of the plaintiff, by amendment, such an admission of the defendants, cannot be withdrawn and if allowed, it would amount to totally displacing the case of the plaintiff, causing irretrievable prejudice to him. In Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal, MANU/SC/0829/1998 also similar view is expressed. 9. In Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal, MANU/SC/0829/1998 also similar view is expressed. 9. When the present case is tested on the anvil of the above principles, the defendant who admits in his written statement that the suit property belongs to the plaintiff has not withdrawn the same in his proposed amendment. So, to that extent the proposed amendment does not suffer any infirmity. However, change in cause of action is concerned, originally the plaintiffs brought the suit on the cause of action that the defendant who was entrusted with the management of the suit property betrayed them and cast a cloud over their title and thus sought for declaration and recovery of possession. According to them, he was only a Manager of their property and nothing more. Therefore, even though the defendant took the plea that the first plaintiff and her husband sold the suit property under an agreement of sale dated 8.7.2004, the cause of action remained same as their plea that he was only a Manager, subsumed in it the denial of execution of agreement of sale in his favour. So, both parties went for trial with such pleas and cause of action. However, in the middle of trial when defendant sought for amendment to the effect that the agreement to sell was in fact executed not in his favour, but in favour of his wife Eswari and the date of agreement was not 8.7.2004, but 17.6.2003, the said plea, in my considered view, is not merely inconsistent with original one, but altogether changes the original cause of action which was hither to against the defendant. By virtue of the amendment, the defendant tried to create a situation whereby the plaintiffs were made to add her as a party, deny the execution of agreement to sale dated 8.7.2004 in her favour and to give fresh evidence in that regard. Thus they were put in such a prejudice that they have to commence altogether a new suit on new cause of action. Under law wife and husband are two separate legal entities especially in contractual matters. If it is the case of defendant that he is not but his wife is the purchaser, it means he has no legal right in the suit property. If so advised, his wife may file an independent suit for specific performance against plaintiffs subject to law of limitation and other relevant laws. If it is the case of defendant that he is not but his wife is the purchaser, it means he has no legal right in the suit property. If so advised, his wife may file an independent suit for specific performance against plaintiffs subject to law of limitation and other relevant laws. However, the defendant cannot introduce the rights of third party in the instant suit by way of amendment so as to change the cause of action, which as stated supra, prejudice the interest of the plaintiffs. Hence, this point goes against the defendant. Point No. 2: 10. In respect of amendments sought for after commencement of trial, the proviso to Order. VI Rule 17 C.P.C. poses a rider that such an amendment cannot be allowed unless the Court comes to the conclusion that inspite of due diligence the party could not. have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In my view the defendant failed to fulfill this procedural mandate also. 11. The term 'due diligence' has not been defined. Hence, the Hon'ble Apex Court extrapolated the said term. In Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, AIR 2008 SC 2234 , the Apex Court held thus: The words "due diligence" Has not been defined in the Code. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edition 2006), the word "diligence" means careful and persistent application or effort. "Diligent' means careful and steady in application to one's work and duties, showing care and effort. As per Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition), "diligence" means a continual effort to accomplish something, care; caution; the attention and care required from a person in a given situation. "Due diligence" means the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. According to Words and Phrases by Drain-Dyspnea (Permanent Edition 13A) "due diligence", in law, means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. "Due diligence" means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs. It is clear that unless the party takes prompt steps, mere action cannot be accepted and file a petition after the commencement of trial. "Due diligence" means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs. It is clear that unless the party takes prompt steps, mere action cannot be accepted and file a petition after the commencement of trial. So, the term 'due diligence' can be understood to mean an earnest effort which is reasonably expected from and ordinarily exercised by a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. It is an act of doing everything reasonable by a prudent man. Thus, the question is, whether in the instant case the defendant exercised due diligence and inspite of the same failed to seek amendment before commencement of the trial. The facts would sow that due diligence is a casually in this case. As can be seen the reason shown by the defendant for not seeking amendment before commencement of trial was that the agreement to sell and original title deed were misplaced at the time of filing the original written statement and they were recovered only before filing the amendment petition. He would claim that that was the reason why in the original written statement he wrongly mentioned his name as purchaser and date of agreement as 8.7.2004. If that was true, the logical question is, whether he honestly mentioned the factum of misplacement of the alleged agreement to sell and the original sale deed in his written statement. He did never mention the said fact in his written statement. Further, he did not make a prudent effort by giving police report. So, there is no scaffolding for his plea that there was an agreement to sell which was misplaced by the time of filing the written statement and thereby he took a wrong plea which requires amendment. Hence, the defendant cannot be said to have exercised due diligence. 12. For the above reasons, the order impugned is factually and legally unsustainable and accordingly, the order in IA No. 212 of 2018 is set aside by allowing the C.R.P. 13. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.