JUDGMENT : VINIT KUMAR MATHUR, J. The present jail appeal was admitted by this Court on 02/01/2018 and an Amicus Curiae was appointed to assist the Court on behalf of the accused appellant. 2. The jail appeal aforesaid has been preferred by the appellant Lochandas against the judgment dated 03/11/2017 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Merta in Sessions Case No. 48/2016, whereby the accused-appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced for life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine further to undergo six months imprisonment. 3. Brief facts necessary to be noted are that on 13/03/2016, a complaint XEx.P.13) was filed by PW.3 Surajdev to the SHO, Police Station Gotan stating therein that he was permanent resident of Orissa but was performing the job of labour Contractor in J.K. Industries, Gotan. The appellant and his elder brother Devraj were also employed with him for last two months. For last one month, both of them were staying with him and doing the job of labour. On 12/03/2016, both the brothers left the place together from dwelling tent (where they were staying) and yesterday at around 2 p.m., the appellant Lochandas came to his dwelling tent (Dera) and on being asked about Devraj, he informed that Devraj had gone back to his village. On 13/03/2016 at around 11.30 a.m. dead body of Devraj was recovered from a pit situated behind the J.K. Factory. The dead body of Devraj had lacerated wounds on his head. He suspected that Devraj had been murdered by Lochandas as he hid himself on the last night in the dwelling tent (Dera) and slept there. Even in the early morning, he left the dwelling tent (Dera). 4. On the aforesaid complaint, a formal FIR No. 52/2016 was registered against the accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC at the Police Station Gotan, District Nagaur. 5. After completion of investigation, police filed a charge-sheet against the accused-appellant for the offence under Sections 302 IPC. 6. Learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C to the accused appellant who denied the charge and sought trial. 7. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and 32 documents were exhibited. Article-1 to Article-8 were also produced on record. 8. 6. Learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C to the accused appellant who denied the charge and sought trial. 7. During the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and 32 documents were exhibited. Article-1 to Article-8 were also produced on record. 8. The accused-appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and he was confronted with the evidence adduced against him during the course of trial to which he denied and stated that he was innocent and falsely implicated in this case. 9. Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant as above vide judgment dated 03/11/2017. Hence this appeal. We have heard learned Amicus Curiae and the learned Public Prosecutor. 11. Shri Anil Upadhyay, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant has vehemently submitted that present was a case of circumstantial evidence as there was no direct evidence available on record. Since it was a case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution miserably failed to complete the chain of circumstances in a fashion which could only lead to the conclusion that it was none other than the appellant who committed the offence alleged in the present case. There were material contradictions and omissions in the prosecution witnesses. He further submits that the witness of the recovery i.e. PW.5 Shiv Narayan did not support the recovery and thus was declared hostile. Even the testimony of PW. 1 Ramdayal who is also a witness of recovery is not reliable and worth credence. He further submits that there was no motive on the part of the accused appellant to kill the deceased Devraj as both the brothers were engaged under the contractor Surajdev and there was no enmity between them. 12. On the strength of the submissions made above, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant has prayed that the present appeal may be allowed and the appellant may be acquitted of the charge levelled against him by setting aside the judgment dated 03/11/2017 passed by learned trial Court. 13. 12. On the strength of the submissions made above, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant has prayed that the present appeal may be allowed and the appellant may be acquitted of the charge levelled against him by setting aside the judgment dated 03/11/2017 passed by learned trial Court. 13. Per contra, learned public prosecutor has submitted that the prosecution had been able to prove the allegations levelled against the appellant in the present case beyond all reasonable doubt on the strength of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses examined before the trial Court. He further submits that the recovery of the bloodstained pant (trouser) of the accused (Ex.11) on the information supplied under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (Ex.P.26) shows that the appellant was the only person responsible for the offence alleged in the present case. He, therefore, prays that learned trial Court was justified in convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC vide judgment dated 03/11/2017 and, there fore, no interference is warranted therein. We have considered the submissions made at bar and have closely scrutinized the record of the trial Court. PW.1 Ramdayal was the attesting witness of the recoveries effected by the police during the course of investigation. PW.3 Surajdev @ Suryadev who lodged the first information report stated that for last 20-22 years, he was labour contractor in J.K. Factory, Gotan and 20-25 labours were working under him. About 30 persons of Orissa were also working with him. They were staying near the dairy located close to J.K. Factory. The body of Devraj was recovered from a pit located about 3 kms away from the place where they were staying. Devraj sustained an injury on the back of his head. Devraj and his brother Lochandas were engaged as Labourers under him for last 1 -2 months. He was not aware as to who killed Devraj. This witness was declared hostile by the prosecution. PW.4 Pramod Sethi also did not support the prosecution story, thus was declared hostile. PW.5 Shiv Narayan who was the witness of the recovery of bloodstained pant (trouser) of the accused and the site plan was also declared hostile. PW.8 Dr. Tanveer Mansuri who conducted the autopsy upon the dead body of the deceased Devraj described the number of injuries sustained by the deceased along with their dimension and location. PW.5 Shiv Narayan who was the witness of the recovery of bloodstained pant (trouser) of the accused and the site plan was also declared hostile. PW.8 Dr. Tanveer Mansuri who conducted the autopsy upon the dead body of the deceased Devraj described the number of injuries sustained by the deceased along with their dimension and location. He also stated that cause of death was fracture of the temporal bone of the brain of the deceased. He further stated that such injuries could have been sustained in the accident as well, inasmuch as, if a person is inebriated then such injuries could also be sustained by falling on the stones. PW.12 Bhanwar Lal is the Investigating Officer who investigated the matter. During the course of investigation, he recorded statements of witnesses, collected samples, prepared memos in accordance with the provisions of law and submitted the charge sheet before the Court of competent jurisdiction. Ex. P. 20 is the postmortem report wherein the cause of death was shown to be “ante mortem blunt traumatic brain injury (fractured temporal bone)”. 14. A close reading of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the documents exhibited during the course of trial show that present is a case of circumstantial evidence and, therefore, it is necessary that the prosecution has to complete the chain of circumstances in a fashion which can conclusively prove that it was none other than the appellant who committed the offence alleged in the present case and the same is required to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 15. In the present case, we find that no one except PW.3 Suraj Dev @ Suryadev who lodged the FIR stated that the accused and the deceased were brothers and were employed with him performing the job of labour. He further stated that the appellant had gone with the deceased from their dwelling tent (Dera) on 12/03/2016. He was declared hostile. 16. The other relevant witnesses i.e. PW.4 Pramod Sethi, PW.5 Shiv Narayan and PW.6 Govind Ram were declared hostile. PW. 1 Ramdayal though in the examination in chief deposed that the bloodstained stone was recovered at the instance of accused Lochandas in his presence vide Ex.P.8 but in the cross-examination, he categorically deposed that on 14/03/2016 at around 4 p.m., no bloodstained stone was recovered by the police in his presence. PW. 1 Ramdayal though in the examination in chief deposed that the bloodstained stone was recovered at the instance of accused Lochandas in his presence vide Ex.P.8 but in the cross-examination, he categorically deposed that on 14/03/2016 at around 4 p.m., no bloodstained stone was recovered by the police in his presence. In this view of the matter, the testimony of the witnesses stated i above who did not support the prosecution case is of no help in reaching to the conclusion that the present appellant was involved in the commission of the offence alleged in the present case. 17. The recovery of the dead body of the deceased from the pit located about 3 kms away from the place of their residence and the recovery of empty bottles of wine and other edible articles from the place near the pit where the dead body was found show that after consumption of the liquor, the deceased Devraj might have fallen into the pit and sustained the fatal head injury. It has also come on record that number of stones were lying in the pit. 18. Our view is well supported by the statement of PW.8 Dr. Tanveer Mansuri who stated that the injuries suffered by the deceased could be sustained by falling on the stones if a person was in an inebriated condition. 19. We also note that nothing has come on record which shows any inimical relationship between two brothers or that the relationship between them was not cordial. Much less, we find that there was no motive on the part of the appellant to kill Devraj. 20. We further note that PW.5 Shivnarayan who was the witness of the recovery of bloodstained pant (trouser) was declared hostile. Besides this, we also note that recovery of the bloodstained pant (trouser) which was effected on 15/03/2016 vide Ex.P.11 on the information given by the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, is of no significance as it is not understood as to why a person will keep the bloodstained pant (trouser) in the suitcase for three days waiting for the police to recover the same. This cannot be a normal conduct of human being. This cannot be a normal conduct of human being. If a person had committed the murder of his own brother, then he could not preserve the incriminating article i.e. bloodstained trouser in a suitcase for the same to be used in evidence against himself at a late stage. Thus, the recovery effected in the present case also does not inspire confidence as the testimony of both the recovery witnesses is not reliable and unworthy credence. Besides this, we also note that merely the recovery of the bloodstained pant (trouser) will not lead to any conclusion for holding the appellant guilty in the absence of the same having been corroborated by the cogent evidence that the bloodstains on the trouser of the accused were matching with the blood group of the deceased. 21. We are gainfully supported by the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1978 SC 1574 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “35. As regards Circumstance 10, the prosecution case was that after making the confessional statement (Ex. P-10) to the Police Inspector (P.W. 34). A-l led the police party into the house and produced therefrom the blood-stained sari (M.O. 1), a kaili (M.O. 2) belonging to the deceased and the towel (M.O. 23) belonging to the appellant. These articles were seized by P.W. 34 under the Mahazar (Ex. P-14) in the presence of P.W. 21. 36. Mr. Atlaf Ahmad contends that there was reason to suspect that the story of the recovery of these bloodstained clothes of the deceased at the instance of the appellant was a fabrication because firstly, these clothes were found on the dead body of the deceased on January 7, 1974 and secondly, the appellant was not a lunatic to keep these useless incriminating articles in his house for 23 days after the murder. 37. We find merit in this contention. In the first place, it is in the evidence of Sundarambal (P.W. 2), that when she along with others went to see the dead body of the deceased at the scene of occurrence, the sari and the jacket were on the dead body. Secondly, neither in the statement (Ex. P. 10), nor in the Mahazar (Ex. P. 14) is there any mention that these clothes were found blood-stained. Secondly, neither in the statement (Ex. P. 10), nor in the Mahazar (Ex. P. 14) is there any mention that these clothes were found blood-stained. Thirdly, there is a discrepancy between the Statement (Ex. P. 10) and the Mahazar (Ex. P. 14), inasmuch as the former speaks of the Sari of the deceased in addition to the Kaili of the deceased, and the towel, but in the Mahazar there is no mention of the Sari, but only of the Kaili of the deceased. Fourthly, it does not stand to reason that the appellant would preserve and keep these worthless incriminating articles in his house for 23 days after the murder.” There fore, we are of the view that in the present case, the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge levelled against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt by leading a chain of circumstances that it excludes all possibilities of innocence of the appellant. Thus, benefit of doubt has to be extended in favour of the appellant as in the present case purely resting on of circumstantial evidence, the link in the chain of circumstances is not so complete to establish that it was none other than the appellant who committed the offence alleged. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sonu @ Amar v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2017 SC 3441 has held that in the case of circumstantial evidence, certain principles are to be followed which are as under: “1. The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be proved must be cogently or firmly established. 2. The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. 3. The circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 4. 2. The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. 3. The circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” Keeping in mind the above principles we are of the view that the evidence available on record is not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 1PC in the present case. 23. In our opinion, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case beyond all reasonable doubts as the distance between “may be true” and “must be true” has not been travelled successfully by the prosecution in the present case as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarwan Singh v. The State of Punjab reported in AIR 1957 SC 637 which is as under: “In his cross-examination Dr. Singh admitted that injury No. 1 could have been caused by razor blade as suggested by the counsel for Sarwan Singh and injuries Nos. 2 to 4 could have been caused by rubbing against some hard substance. In other words, on medical evidence it is difficult to reject the explanation of the accused as unreasonable or palpably untrue. Then we have the evidence of blood-stains on the shirt and chadar worn by Sarwan Singh. If the explanation given by Sarwan Singh about his injuries is not unreasonable then the presence of blood-stains on his dress cannot be seriously pressed against him. The evidence of Rakha about the negotiations and purchase of a pistol from him and about the part of Sarwan Singh in that transaction no doubt may suggest that Sarwan Singh was associated with the criminals but that is very far from proving the charge of murder against him. Incidentally, as we have already observed, if the pistol was purchased it is difficult to understand why it was not used. Then we have the evidence of the shoes which were found on the spot. Incidentally, as we have already observed, if the pistol was purchased it is difficult to understand why it was not used. Then we have the evidence of the shoes which were found on the spot. The evidence of the shoe-maker Santa Singh suggests that he had identified the pair of shoes as belonging to Sarwan Singh that very night. According to him, he has been manufacturing shoes like this pair though not on a large scale Unfortunately, in his examination under S. 342 of the Code, no question had been put to Sarwan Singh about these shoes. It is not unlikely that Sarwan Singh may have offered to demonstrate that the shoes did not fit in with his feet. In any event, failure to give him an opportunity to explain the circumstances by putting an appropriate question to him under S. 342 justifies his argument that this circumstance should not be used against him. Besides, like the evidence given by Rakha, the identity of the shoes would also be a very minor circumstance in relation to the charge of murder for which Sarwan Singh is being tried. The result is that, if the approver's evidence is discarded as unworthy of credit and his own retracted confession is excluded from consideration as not being voluntary or true, whatever circumstantial evidence remains is obviously insufficient to bring home to Sarwan Singh the charge framed against him. If that be the true position, we must hold that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in convicting Sarwan Singh of the offence of murder. It is no doubt a matter of regret that a foul coldblooded and cruel murder like the present should go unpunished. It may be as Mr. Gopal Singh strenuously urged before us that there is an element of truth in the prosecution story against both the appellants. Mr. Gopal Singh contended that considered as a whole, the prosecution story may be true; but between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’ there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence. We have carefully considered all the arguments which Mr. Mr. Gopal Singh contended that considered as a whole, the prosecution story may be true; but between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’ there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence. We have carefully considered all the arguments which Mr. Gopal Singh urged before us; but we do not think it would be possible to regard the approver as a reliable witness or to hold that the confession of Sarwan Singh is voluntary or true. In the result, the appeal preferred by Sarwan Singh must be allowed, the order of conviction and sentence passed against him must be set aside and he must be acquitted and discharged. Appeals allowed.” 24. In Sudesh Singh v. State of Rajasthan through P.P. 2014 (3) WLC (Raj.) 421, a coordinate bench of this Court has observed as under: “The law on the question of circumstantial evidence is well settled that an accused can be convicted in a case of circumstantial evidence only if the chain of circumstances against him is so complete as to rule out every single hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence. Standard of proof in a criminal matters is always beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the prosecution in every such case is required to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If there is any scope of reasonable doubt, benefit of such doubt has to be extended to the accused. The rival submissions have to be therefore tested on that yardstick to find out whether alleged offences against the accused appellant have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is trite that in a case of circumstantial evidence there must be complete chain of evidence which should lead to conclusion that the accused was the only person, who could have committed offence and none else. Each of circumstances that is proved against the accused should form a chain so complete so as to rule out every other hypothesis, which may be compatible with innocence of the accused. Though the prosecution sought to produce a large number of independent witnesses to prove the factum of last seen, motive and recovery against accused-appellants but their testimony stands on a shaky ground and has many contradictions, inconsistencies and does not prove any of those three factors, viz., last-seen, recovery and motive, beyond reasonable doubt. Though the prosecution sought to produce a large number of independent witnesses to prove the factum of last seen, motive and recovery against accused-appellants but their testimony stands on a shaky ground and has many contradictions, inconsistencies and does not prove any of those three factors, viz., last-seen, recovery and motive, beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecution has not been able to prove any of these three circumstances independently beyond reasonable doubt, let alone forming a chain of circumstance. Analysis of the evidence that we have made above, makes it evident that there are several missing links in the chain of circumstances, which cannot be accepted to be so complete as to point to the guilt of the accused and none else and when every single possibility of accused being innocent is ruled out”. In view of the discussion made above, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 03/11/2017 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Merta in Sessions Case No. 48/2016 is quashed and set aside. The accused appellant Lochandas is acquitted of the charge for the offence under Section 302 IPC by giving him the benefit of doubt. He shall be released from the judicial custody forthwith if not wanted in any other case. The record of the trial Court be returned forth with.