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2019 DIGILAW 2766 (ALL)

Nahar Singh v. State Of U. P.

2019-12-12

RAM KRISHNA GAUTAM

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JUDGMENT : Ram Krishna Gautam, J. This Application, under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been filed by the Applicants, Nahar Singh, Manmohan @ Teetu, Deepu @ Devendra and Manoj, with a prayer for setting aside summoning order, dated 19.9.2019, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Sadabad, Hathras, and, thereby, entire criminal proceeding, in Complaint Case No. 164 of 2018, Shashi Prabha vs. Nahar Singh and others, under Sections-452, 323 and 354 of IPC, Police Station-Sahpau, District-Hathras 2. Learned counsel for applicants argued that a civil suit was filed for cancellation of sale deed, which was got executed by the complainant and as a result of the same this malicious prosecution, in misuse of process of law, wherein, there is no medico legal report of any injury, but, even this, summoning order has been passed. Hence, for avoiding abuse of process of law, this Application, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has been filed, with above prayer. 3. Learned AGA, representing State of U.P., has vehemently opposed this Application. 4. From perusal of the complaint, it is apparent that the reason for lodging this complaint has been said in it, i.e., alleged sale deed, which was got executed on 25.5.2017 from Ranvir Singh, whereupon, accused persons did encroach over the land, claiming it to be of theirs, for which some proceeding before Sub Divisional Magistrate, concerned, was taken, thenafter, this assault was made on 11.4.2018, with occurrence, reported, was committed by those accused persons, by way of committing criminal trespass in the house of the complainant. This fact has been narrated and reiterated, in the statement, recorded, under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., as well as under Section 202 of Cr.P.C., in the enquiry made by the Magistrate and the impugned summoning order has been passed, on the basis of above evidence, collected by the Magistrate, which was perfectly well, in accordance with law. 5. Hence, under all above facts and circumstances, this Court, in exercise of inherent power, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., is not expected to make a meticulous analysis of factual aspect because the same is a question, to be gone into, during course of trial, by the Trial court. 6. Apex Court, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gaurishetty Mahesh, (2010) 6 JT 588 SC: (2010) 6 SCALE 767 : 2010 Cr. 6. Apex Court, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gaurishetty Mahesh, (2010) 6 JT 588 SC: (2010) 6 SCALE 767 : 2010 Cr. LJ 3844, has propounded that "While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court". In another subsequent judgment, in the case of Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474 , Hon'ble Apex Court propounded that "Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which after filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, or to delay the trial which enable to win over the witness or may disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of Justice". In again yet another judgment, in the case of Monica Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781 , the Apex Court has propounded "Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself." While interpreting this jurisdiction of High Court Apex Court, in the case of Popular Muthiah v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296 , has propounded "High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings". 7. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings". 7. Regarding prevention of abuse of process of Court, Apex Court, in the case of Dhanlakshmi v. R.Prasana Kumar, (1990) CriLJ 320 (DB): AIR 1990 SC 494 , has propounded "To prevent abuse of the process of the Court, High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, could quash the proceedings, but, there would be justification for interference only when the complaint did not disclose any offence or was frivolous vexatious or oppressive" as well as in the case of State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1989) CriLJ 1005: AIR 1989 SC 1 , Apex Court propounded "In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not". Meaning thereby, exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is within the limits, propounded as above. 8. In view of what has been discussed above, this Application, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., merits dismissal and it stands dismissed accordingly. 9. However, it is directed that if the applicants appear and surrender before the court below within 30 days from today and apply for bail, their prayer for bail shall be considered and decided in view of the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P., 2004 57 AllLR 290 as well as judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2009) 3 ADJ 322 (SC) 10. For a period of 30 days from today, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants. 11. In case, if the applicants do not appear before the Court below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against them.