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2019 DIGILAW 2769 (RAJ)

STATE OF RAJASTHAN, THROUGH PP v. BABU LAL

2019-10-31

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2019
ORDER 1. The instant leave to appeal application has been preferred by State of Rajasthan under Section 378(iii) & (i) Cr.P.C. being aggrieved by judgment dated 02.04.2018, passed by Special Judge, NDPS Act Cases, Pratapgarh in Sessions Case No.38/2016, whereby, learned trial Judge, convicted the accused Babu Lal @ Jagdish and Banshi Lal for the offence under Section 8/15 of the NDPS Act, but, no specific finding was recorded by the trial Court on the charge framed against Babu Lal for the offence under Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act. 2. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned Public Prosecutor and gone through the impugned judgment. 3. It is true that trial Court framed specific charges against accused-Babu Lal for the offences under Sections 8/15 & 8/25 of the NDPS Act, but, while concluding the case, no finding was recorded by trial Court in the impugned judgment for the charge under Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act. To that extent, the trial Court committed grave and legal error while rendering the impugned judgment. Nonetheless, I have gone through the impugned judgment dated 02.04.2018, passed by trial Court and find that as per prosecution case, accused-Babu Lal @ Jagdish, who is alleged to be the registered owner of loading tempo bearing registration No.RJ06-GB-1020 from which, the contraband poppy straw weighing 361 kgs and 300 gms. was recovered, was himself found present in the tempo. 4. In view of this fact and the fact that the vehicle was registered in name of Babu Lal @ Jagdish, charges were framed against him in the above terms. Manifestly, as charges had been framed against the accused-Babu Lal @ Jagdish offence under Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act, the trial Court was under an obligation to deal with such charges while deciding the case. 5. Nonetheless, while considering this leave to appeal application, it can very well be presumed that the accused-Babu Lal @ Jagdish was acquitted of the charge under Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act. 6. 5. Nonetheless, while considering this leave to appeal application, it can very well be presumed that the accused-Babu Lal @ Jagdish was acquitted of the charge under Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act. 6. As per Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act, a person being the owner or occupier or having the control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance, knowingly permits it to be used for the commission by any other person of an offence punishable under any provision of this Act, then such owner or occupier or person in control would be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence. Thus, this section lays down vicarious liability on the owner or occupier of place, animal or conveyance for the offence under the NDPS Act, which is committed by another person while using such place, animal or conveyance. 7. In the present case, the offending vehicle was being driven by the respondent-Babu Lal himself. Thus, it is clearly not a case wherein the accused, charged for the offence under Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act, allowed a third person to use his vehicle for the commission of an offence under the NDPS Act. As such, the respondent could not have been held responsible for the charge under Section 8/25 of the NDPS Act even if the trial Court had diligently passed the judgment. 8. In view of the above discussion, I find no reason to entertain the instant leave to appeal application, which is dismissed as being devoid of merit. 9. Record be returned to the trial Court forthwith.