JUDGMENT : Abdul Moin, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing counsel appearing for the State-respondents and Sri. S.K. Upadhya, learned counsel appearing as an Intervenor. 2. Under challenge is the order dated 19.08.2019 passed by the Joint Director of Education, Lucknow i.e respondent no. 2 by which it has been found that the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Clerk and the subsequent approval granted by the District Inspector of Schools is vitiated and consequently the respondent no. 2 has directed for initiation of inquiry against the guilty employees after cancelling the promotion of the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that a recommendation for promotion of the petitioner who was working on a Class-IV post in the Institution to the post of Assistant Clerk was made on 10.11.2016. As on 10.11.2016, there were five posts in the Institution i.e. one post of Head Clerk and four posts of Assistant Clerks whereby taking the total to five posts. In terms of Regulation 2 (2) of Chapter-III of Regulations framed under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as "Act 1921"), the post of Head Clerk and Assistant Clerk are clubbed so as to arrive at the quota for promotion or direct recruitment per which the appointments or promotions are to take place on the said posts. The said Regulation provides that 50 percent posts out of total sanctioned post of Head Clerk and clerical cadre shall be filled by promotion of Clerks and Class-IV employees working in the organization. In terms of Note to Regulation 2, it is provided that while computing 50% of the post, the number of post less than half should be ignored and half or more than half should be treated as one, as such, in this case, it would be 2.5 or three posts for promotion. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner belongs to reserve category. There is one sanctioned post of Head Clerk and four sanctioned posts of Assistant Clerks i.e. total five in the Institution. As per the aforesaid Rules, three posts would fall against the promotion quota i.e. to be filled in by promotion. It is contended that two posts of Assistant Clerks have been filled in with the promotion of two Class-IV employees namely Sri Prem Lal and Sri Rajesh Singh. As per the aforesaid Rules, three posts would fall against the promotion quota i.e. to be filled in by promotion. It is contended that two posts of Assistant Clerks have been filled in with the promotion of two Class-IV employees namely Sri Prem Lal and Sri Rajesh Singh. A post of Assistant Clerk fell vacant with the promotion of the said Assistant Clerk as Head Clerk and as three posts are meant for promotees, consequently the third post should have gone to the promotee i.e. the petitioner. The said post was lying vacant since 31.08.2013 and considering that the petitioner was working on a Class-IV post since 22.05.2010, he was promoted as Assistant Clerk and on 25.11.2016 the District Inspector of Schools (II) granted approval to the promotion of the petitioner as Assistant Clerk. A copy of the order dated 25.11.2016 has been filed as Annexure6 to the writ petition. The petitioner was issued with an appointment letter dated 18.03.2017, a copy of which is Annexure7 to the writ petition, and he also joined on 21.03.2017 as Assistant Clerk and his pay fixation was also made on 11.08.2017. Subsequent thereto, the impugned order dated 19.08.2019 was passed, a copy of which is Annexure1 to the writ petition, by the Joint Director of Education cancelling the promotion of the petitioner w.e.f. the date of promotion itself and directing for initiation of inquiry against the guilty officials. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the ground taken in the impugned order is that the Institution in the meeting of the Management Committee dated 10.11.2016 had recommended for promotion of the petitioner although, on the date of proposal, the post of Head Clerk and two Assistant Clerks were already occupied by the promotees and consequently the promotion of the petitioner on the post of Assistant Clerk was erroneously done as the said post fell under the direct recruitment quota and was to be filled in through direct recruitment. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in Special Appeal Defective No. 577 of 2017, State of U.P. and Others vs. Santosh Kumar Mishra and Others, a copy of which has been filed as annexure RA-4 to the rejoinder affidavit to contend that the post of Head Clerk has to be treated to be filled in by direct recruitment inasmuch as one Sri Rajiv Saxena had initially been appointed as Assistant Clerk through order dated 24.03.1995, a copy of which is annexure RA-3 to the rejoinder affidavit on compassionate grounds. On the post of Head Clerk falling vacant, Sri Rajiv Saxena had been promoted and consequently once any compassionate appointment can only be made against a direct recruitment quota, consequently the promotion of Sri Saxena has also to be treated as a promotion made on direct recruitment basis and, as such the respondents have patently erred in the impugned order in contending that as the post of Head Clerk was filled in through promotion as such, the same has to be treated as against promotee quota. It is also argued that in case the analogy given by the petitioner is accepted then the impugned order would become vitiated in the eyes of law as there would be only two promotees as the post of Head Clerk occupied by Sri Rajiv Saxena would be treated as a post for Direct Recruit leaving one post to be filled in through the promotion quota which has correctly been made with the promotion of the petitioner. Another ground taken to challenge the said order is that the Joint Director of Education, Lucknow has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order as the competent authority for granting approval is District Inspector of Schools and thus the impugned order is patently without jurisdiction. 6. This Court after considering the facts of the case had summed up the issue on 29.11.2019 as per the aforesaid arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner which order, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced below: “Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing counsel appearing for the State-respondents and Sri S.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel appeared as an intervenor. Under challenge is the order dated 19.08.2019 passed by the Joint Director of Education, Lucknow i.e respondent no. Under challenge is the order dated 19.08.2019 passed by the Joint Director of Education, Lucknow i.e respondent no. 2 by which it has been found that the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Clerk and the subsequent approval granted by the District Inspector of Schools is vitiated and consequently the respondent no. 2 has directed for initiation of inquiry against the guilty employees. From a perusal of records it comes out that the recommendation for promotion of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Clerk took place on 10.11.2016. As on 10.11.2016, there were five posts in the Institution with which the present controversy is concerned i.e one post of Head Clerk and four posts of Assistant Clerks whereby taking the total as five posts. In terms of Regulation 2 (2) of Chapter-III of Regulations framed under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as "Act 1921"), the post of Head Clerk and Assistant Clerk are clubbed so as to arrive at the quota i.e promotion or direct recruitment with which the appointments or promotions are to take place. The said quota provides that 50 percent posts out of total sanctioned post of Head Clerk and clerical cadre shall be filled by promotion of Clerks and Class-IV employees working in the organization. From a perusal of the averments made in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit it comes out that one post of Head Clerk and two posts of Assistant Clerks were already filled as on 10.11.2016 in by persons who had been promoted leaving two posts to be filled in by direct recruitment. It is contended that the petitioner had been promoted against the quota manned for direct recruitment and his promotion was thus found to be irregular and consequently the impugned order has been passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in Special Appeal Defective No. 577 of 2017, State of U.P. and Others vs. Santosh Kumar Mishra and Others, a copy of which has been filed as annexure RA-4 to the rejoinder affidavit to contend that the post of Head Clerk has to be treated to be filled in by direct recruitment inasmuch as one Sri Rajiv Saxena has initially been appointed as Assistant Clerk through order dated 24.03.1995, a copy of which is annexure RA-3 to the rejoinder affidavit on compassionate grounds. On the post of Head Clerk falling vacant, Sri Rajiv Saxena had been promoted and consequently once any compassionate appointment can only be made against a direct recruitment quota, consequently the promotion of Sri Saxena has also to be treated as a promotion made on direct recruitment basis and consequently the respondents have patently erred to contend that the post of Head Clerk was filled in through a promotion and the same has to be treated as direct recruitment and thus in case the analogy given by the petitioner is accepted then the impugned order would become vitiated in the eyes of law as there would be only two promotees and one direct recruit i.e Sri Rajiv Saxena leaving one post to be filled in through the promotion quota which has correctly been made with the promotion of the petitioner. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the point in issue would be that where a person has been appointed as Assistant Clerk on compassionate grounds meaning thereby that his appointment would be treated to be against the direct recruitment quota then whether his promotion as Head Clerk would also be treated to have been made against direct recruitment quota. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays for some time to address the Court on the aforesaid issue. As such, on his request, list this case after ten days as fresh.” 7. Today, Sri B.K. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ramji Singh vs. District Inspector of Schools, Ballia, 2006 (2) ESC 1015 (All) as well as a judgment of this Court in the case of Jai Kumar Singh vs. District Inspector of Schools and Others, (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1517 to contend that the aforesaid query of this Court stands answered in both the judgments. 8. On the other hand, learned Standing counsel on the basis of averments contained in the counter affidavit argues that through letter dated 10.11.2016 sent by the Management/ Principal of the Institution, a recommendation/proposal for promotion of the petitioner, a Class-IV employee on the vacant post of Clerk which was vacant after promotion of Sri Nankau on the post of Head Clerk on 31.08.2013, was made. The promotion of the petitioner was approved by the then District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 25.11.2016. The promotion of the petitioner was approved by the then District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 25.11.2016. Complaints were received in the office of Joint Director of Education, Lucknow against the said promotion but to no avail. Subsequent thereto, through letter dated 10.04.2019 issued by the Joint Director of Education, the petitioner and the Manager/ Principal of the Institution were called for hearing on 23.04.2019 on which date the petitioner and Principal of the Institution submitted their case. Records were also produced and after perusal of the file it was revealed that when the petitioner was promoted, the promotion quota of the college in the clerical cadre was complete and accordingly next promotion could only be made as direct recruitment. It is admitted that there are five posts in the clerical cadre in the Institution namely one post of Head Clerk and four posts of Assistant Clerk. The post of Assistant Clerk had fallen vacant on 31.08.2013 on account of Promotion of Sri Nankau on the post of Head Clerk and the resultant vacancy was sought to be filled in with the promotion of Sri Pradeep Kumar but on the said date one Head Clerk and two Assistant Clerks were already working in the College in question in the promotion quota and consequently the promotion of the petitioner had been done against the direct recruitment quota which was patently illegal and the approval thereto was also done illegally by the District Inspector of Schools through his order dated 25.11.2016. Taking all this into consideration, the impugned order was passed by the Joint Director of Education. 9. Sri Vinod Shukla, learned Standing counsel submits that when the promotion of the petitioner was itself illegal, consequently even if an order was passed by the Joint Director of Education who had no jurisdiction to do so and the said order is to be set aside on the ground of technicality raised by the petitioner yet as the petitioner has argued his case threadbare, the Court may itself, considering the aforesaid facts, pass suitable orders in this regard instead of remanding the said matter on technicality. Placing reliance on the judgment of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and Others, (1999) 6 SCC 237 it is contended that futile writs may not be issued and the Court may itself go into the merits of the case. 10. Placing reliance on the judgment of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and Others, (1999) 6 SCC 237 it is contended that futile writs may not be issued and the Court may itself go into the merits of the case. 10. Sri S.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the Intervenor also adopts the arguments of learned Standing counsel. 11. Heard learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties and perused the records. 12. From a perusal of the records and the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the contesting parties it comes out that there are five posts in clerical cadre in the Institution of which one post is for Head Clerk and four posts are for Assistant Clerk. In terms of the relevant regulation, the quota would be three posts for promotion quota while two posts are meant for direct recruits. The controversy revolves around the post which fell vacant on account of Sri Rajiv Saxena, Assistant Clerk who was appointed on compassionate grounds having been promoted as Head Clerk. The name of Sri Rajiv Saxena being promoted as Head Clerk has come for the first time in the Rejoinder affidavit while in the writ petition, it had been stated by the petitioner that Sri Nankau Prasad, an Assistant Clerk had been promoted as Head Clerk and thus the post of Assistant Clerk fell vacant. The official respondents have also indicated about the post of Assistant Clerk having fallen vacant on account of promotion of Sri Nankau Prasad. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner is trying to set up a new case through rejoinder affidavit which is legally impermissible. However, as the case has been argued threadbare, the Court proceeds to consider whether with the promotion of a person appointed on compassionate ground, the promotee would be considered a direct recruit. It is not the case of the petitioner that post of Head Clerk has been filled in by direct recruitment rather it is admitted that the post has been filled in by promotion of Sri Rajiv Saxena. Thus, it can safely be said that when the said post of Head Clerk was filled in on account of promotion of Sri Rajiv Saxena then the said post would go towards the promotion quota. Admittedly, the other two posts were also filled in by promotes leaving two posts against direct recruit quota. Thus, it can safely be said that when the said post of Head Clerk was filled in on account of promotion of Sri Rajiv Saxena then the said post would go towards the promotion quota. Admittedly, the other two posts were also filled in by promotes leaving two posts against direct recruit quota. Once it was the post meant for direct recruitment quota which was filled in with the promotion of the petitioner against which complaints were made and thereafter it was found that the approval which had been granted to the promotion of the petitioner against the direct recruitment post was illegally granted and considering these facts, the impugned order has been passed by the Joint Director of Education after perusal of the records by invalidating the promotion of the petitioner from the date of his promotion itself and action has also been directed to be initiated against the guilty officials then taking into consideration the aforesaid facts, this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order issued by the Joint Director of Education, Lucknow. 13. So far as the judgment of Jai Kumar Singh (supra) is concerned, the facts were that in the Institution in question there were three sanctioned posts of Class-III employees. Relevant Regulations of Chapter-III of the Act, 1921 provided that 50 percent of the total sanctioned strength of Head Clerk and Clerk should be filled in by promotion. The Note of Regulation 2 further provides that while computing 50 percent of the post, the number less than half should be ignored and half or more than half should be treated as one. The total number of sanctioned strength being three, promotion quota according to Regulation 2 (2), comes to 1.5 and by virtue of note, two posts were to be treated under promotion quota. The first post fell vacant on 31.12.1994 on the retirement of Sri Basudeo Singh. One Sri Triloki Nath, a Class-IV employee staked his claim for promotion under Chapter-III, Regulation-II of the Intermediate Education Act on the ground that the said post is under promotional quota. The management instead of promoting Sri Triloki Nath, appointed Sri Kunwar Tribuwan Singh on direct recruitment basis which led to litigation. Meanwhile one Sri Baij Nath Prasad who was working as Assistant Clerk was promoted as Head Clerk on the retirement of Sri Achhaybar Nath Mishra. The management instead of promoting Sri Triloki Nath, appointed Sri Kunwar Tribuwan Singh on direct recruitment basis which led to litigation. Meanwhile one Sri Baij Nath Prasad who was working as Assistant Clerk was promoted as Head Clerk on the retirement of Sri Achhaybar Nath Mishra. On account of Sri Baij Nath Prasad being promoted, his post had fallen vacant and again the Management appointed one Sri Jai Kumar Singh as a direct recruit. As the appointment of Sri Jai Kumar Singh was not approved he filed Writ Petition No. 10891 of 1996 praying for approval of his appointment. The claim of Jai Kumar Singh and Kunwar Tribhuwan Singh were considered and an order dated 04.05.1998 was passed whereby the appointment of Jai Kumar Singh was held to be bad and the appointment of Kunwar Tribhuwan Singh was approved. In such circumstances, this Court held that the post which had fallen vacant due to retirement of Sri Basudeo Singh was against promotion quota and had to be filled in by promotion and the appointment of Kunwar Tribhuwan Singh as direct recruit was done wrongly by the District Inspector of Schools and on the post of Baij Nath the promotion of Sri Triloki Nath ought to have been considered. The said decision does not deal with the point in issue. 14. So far as the judgment of Ramji Singh (supra) is concerned, the said judgment too does not deal with the question as has been raised by this Court in the order dated 29.11.2019. 15. So far as the judgment of Santosh Kumar Mishra (supra) is concerned, suffice to state that a categoric averment was made in the said case on behalf of the State Government that the post of Head Clerk was occupied by direct recruitment. However, in the instant case, the respondents themselves have stated that the post of Head Clerk was occupied by a promotee. Thus, the said judgment in the case of Santosh Kumar Mishra (supra) is distinguishable on its own facts and will not be applicable in the facts of the instant case. 16. In this regard, though no assistance has been rendered by either learned counsel for the petitioner or the learned Standing Counsel yet the Court has itself come across certain judgments which have a direct bearing on the issue in question. 17. 16. In this regard, though no assistance has been rendered by either learned counsel for the petitioner or the learned Standing Counsel yet the Court has itself come across certain judgments which have a direct bearing on the issue in question. 17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal Tandon vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 has held that where the promotees and direct recruits form one class in Grade D they could not be thereafter classified again depending upon the source from which they are drawn for the purpose of promotion to the next higher grade. For the sake of convenience, relevant observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court are reproduced as under: “5.......In our opinion, the constitutional objection taken by the petitioner to this part of the notification is well-founded and must be accepted as correct. At the time when the petitioner and the direct recruits were appointed to Grade ‘D’ there was one class in Grade ‘D’ formed of direct recruits and the promotees from the grade of artisans. The recruits from both the sources to Grade ‘D’ were integrated into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade-C. To put it differently, once the direct recruits and promotees are absorbed in one cadre, they form one class and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further promotion to the higher Grade-C.” 18. Likewise, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of J&K vs. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCC 19 after considering the judgment of Roshan Lal Tandon (supra) has held as under: “44. The key words of the judgment are: “The recruits from both the sources to Grade ‘D’ were integrated into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade-C. (Emphasis supplied) By this was meant that in the matter of promotional opportunities to Grade ‘C’ no discrimination could be made between promotees and direct recruits by reference to the source from which they were drawn. That is to say, if apprentice train examiners who were recruited directly to Grade ‘D’ as train examiners formed one common class with skilled artisans who were promoted to Grade ‘D’ as train examiners, no favoured treatment could be given to the former merely because they were directly recruited as train examiners and no discrimination could be made as against the latter merely because they were promotees. This is the true meaning of the observation extracted above and no more than this can be read into the sentence next following: “To put it differently, once the direct recruits and promotees are absorbed into one cadre, they form one class and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further promotion to the higher Grade-C. In terms, this was just a different way of putting what had preceded.” 19. Recently, the Apex Court in the case of B. Manmad Reddy and Others vs. Chandra Prakash Reddy and Others, (2010) 3 SCC 314 after considering the judgments of Triloki Nath Khosa (supra) and Roshan Lal Tandon (supra) has held as under: “The short question that falls for consideration and that was argued at considerable length before us by learned Counsel for the parties is whether persons drawn from different sources and integrated into one class/cadre/category can be classified into separate categories for purposes of promotion on the basis of the source from which they were drawn. The question is, in our opinion, squarely covered by the decisions of this Court to which we shall presently refer but before we do so, we may briefly set out the factual backdrop in which controversy arises.......The integration of promotees and direct recruits into one class would wipe out their birth marks with the result that the same can not be made a basis for a valid classification. Any such classification would amount to classifying equals in the matter of further promotion based solely on the source from which they were drawn. Any such classification would amount to classifying equals in the matter of further promotion based solely on the source from which they were drawn. Relying upon the decisions of this Court, the Tribunal and the High Court have held that inasmuch as Note 6 to Rule 3 classifies the promotees and direct recruits for the purpose of future promotion, even after their integration into one cadre the same was discriminatory hence ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution......Such a classification based on the birth mark that stood obliterated after integration of officers coming from different source into a common cadre/category would be wholly unjustified and discriminatory.” 20. Accordingly, when the facts of the instant case are tested at the touchstone of law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Roshan Lal Tandon, Triloki Nath Khosa and B. Manmad Reddy (supra) what clearly comes out is that a direct recruit on being appointed in one class would loose his birth mark and on being promoted would not retain his original source of being a direct recruit rather the integration of such persons into one class i.e. Assistant Clerk would wipe out their birth marks with the result that any such classification for further promotion based on the source from which they are drawn could not be made a basis for valid classification. Thus, once a person was appointed on direct recruitment basis as Assistant Clerk, his promotion as Head Clerk, as in the instant case, would not be treated to be a direct recruitment rather has to be treated as promotion. Viewed in this manner, it is apparent that the impugned order dated 19.08.2019 indicating that three posts i.e. one post of Head Clerk and two posts of Assistant Clerks were filled in by promotees and the promotion of the petitioner was made against direct recruitment basis thus requires no interference by this Court. 21. So far as the ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no such order could have been passed by the Joint Director of Education, suffice to state that this Court has itself gone in detail into the facts of the case whereby the Court finds that the impugned order is justified. Consequently relegating this matter on the basis of technicality to the competent authority would be a useless formality. 22. Consequently relegating this matter on the basis of technicality to the competent authority would be a useless formality. 22. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra) has held as under: “12. On the above submissions, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether this Court, in exercise of powers under Article 32 (or the High courts, generally under Article 226) is bound to declare an order of government passed in breach of principles of natural justice as void or whether the court can refuse to grant relief on the ground that the facts of the case do not justify exercise of discretion to interfere or because de facto prejudice has not been shown? (2) Whether the court is not bound under Article 32 (or High Courts under Article 226) to quash an order of government on ground of breach of natural justice if such an action will result in the restoration of an earlier order of government which was also passed in breach of natural justice or which was otherwise illegal?” 15. It is true that, whenever there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, the Courts can be approached for a declaration that the order is void or for setting aside the same. Here the parties have approached this Court because the orders of the department were consequential to orders of this Court. Question however is whether the Court in exercise of its discretion under Article 32 or Article 226 can refuse to exercise discretion on facts or on the ground that no de facto prejudice is established. On the facts of this case, can this Court not take into consideration the fact that any such declaration regarding the 10.3.1999 order will restore an earlier order dated 30.7.1997 in favour of Bharat Petroleum Corporation which has also been passed without notice to HPCL and that if the order dated 10.3.1999 is set aside as being in breach of natural justice, Bharat Petroleum will be getting two plots rather than one for which it has no right after the passing of the latter order of this Court dated 7.4.1998? 16. 16. Courts are not infrequently faced with a dilemma between breach of the rules of natural justice and the Court's discretion to refuse relief even though rules of natural justice have been breached, on the ground that no real prejudice is caused to the affected party. 17. We shall initially refer to two cases where discretion was exercised not to grant relief and the first one was a case where relief was refused even though there was breach of natural justice. The first one is Gadde Venkteswara Rao vs. Government of A.P. and Others, (1966) 2 SCR 172 . There the Panchayat Samithi, in exercise of its statutory powers passed a resolution on 25.8.1960 to locate a primary health center at Dharmajigudem. Later, it passed another resolution on 29.5.1961 to locate it at Lingapalem. On a representation by villagers of Dharmajigudem, government passed orders on 7.3.1962 setting aside the second resolution dated 29.5,1961 and thereby restoring the earlier resolution dated 25.8.1960. The result was that the health center would continue at Dharmajigudem. Before passing the orders dated 7.3.1962, no notice was given to the Panchayat Samithi. This Court traced the said order of the government dated 7.3.1962 to Section 62 of the Act and if that were so, notice to the Samithi under Section 62(1) was mandatory. Later, upon a review petition being filed, government passed another order on 18.4.1963 cancelling its order dated 7.3.1962 and accepting the shifting of the primary center to Lingapalem. This was passed without notice to the villagers of Dharmajigudem. This order of the government was challenged unsuccessfully by the villagers of Dharmajigudem in the High Court. On appeal by the said villagers to this Court, it was held that the latter order of the government dated 18.4.1963 suffered from two defects, it was issued by Government without prior show cause notice to the villagers of Dharmajigudem and government had no power of review in respect of government orders passed under Section 62(1). But that there were other facts which disentitled the quashing of the order dated 18.4.1963 even though it was passed in breach of principles of natural justice. This Court noticed that the setting aside of the latter order dated. 18.4.1963 would restore the earlier order of Government dated 7.3.1962 which was also passed without notice to the affected party, namely, the Panchayat Samithi. This Court noticed that the setting aside of the latter order dated. 18.4.1963 would restore the earlier order of Government dated 7.3.1962 which was also passed without notice to the affected party, namely, the Panchayat Samithi. It would also result in the setting aside of a valid resolution dated 29.5.1961 passed by the Panchayat Samithi. This Court refused relief and agreed that the High Court was right in not interfering under Article 226 even if there was violation of natural justice. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) observed (p. 189) as follows: Both the orders of the government, namely, the order dated March 7, 1962 and that dated April 18, 1963, were not legally passed the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi and the latter, because the Government had no power under Section 72 of the Act to review an Order made under Section 62 of the Act and also because it did not give notice to representatives of Dharmajigudem village. His Lordship concluded as follows: In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the government dated April 18, 1963? If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order it would have given the Health center to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case. 18. The above case is clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of the natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 23. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is made out with the impugned order. The writ petition is dismissed.