JUDGMENT : (Order on application for Condonation of Delay in filing Revision-C.M. Application No.81056 of 2019) 1. Present revision is filed under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act, 1995. 2. Office has submitted a report dated 16.07.2019 noting that revision is filed beyond a period of 90 days and, hence, the same is barred by the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963. 3. Counsel for revisionist submits that the revision is filed within a period of three years and, therefore, same is maintainable under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Counsel for revisionist submits that the Waqf Act is a special Act and, therefore, it is not the period of 90 days but the period of three years available as per Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. 4. Counsel for opposite party states that the report submitted by the registry is correct and the Article 137 is not applicable. 5. The law with regard to applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to a Special Act has been considered in number of cases by the Supreme Court. Some of them are:- (i) Ganesan represented by its Power Agent G. Rukmani Ganeshn Vs. Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board and Others reported in (2019) 7 SCC 108 . Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as follow:- "33. In The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634 , this Court had occasion to consider applicability of Article 137 of Limitation Act, application filed under Section 16 of the Telegraphs Act, 1885. This Court in the above case differing with the view taken by the two Judge Bench in Athani’s case held that application under Article 137 of Limitation Act is not confined to application contemplated by or under the C.P.C. However, the application contemplated under Telegraphs Act has to be an application to a Court. In paragraphs 18 and 22 following has been laid held: “18. The alteration of the division as well as the change in the collocation of words in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 compared with Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act shows that applications contemplated under Article 137 are not applications confined to the Code of Civil Procedure. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division between applications in specified cases and other applications as in the 1963 Limitation Act. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division between applications in specified cases and other applications as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words “any other application” under Article 137 cannot be said on the principle of ejusdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division. Any other application under Article 137 would be petition or any application under any Act. But it has to be an application to a court for the reason that Section 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry of prescribed period when court is closed and extension of prescribed period if applicant or the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application during such period. 22. The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two judge bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.” 34. In the above case since the application under the Telegraphs Act was filed before the Court, this Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act was applicable. It is to be noticed that in the above mentioned cases this Court held that applications contemplated under Limitation Act are applications to a Court but in the above cases the Court did not refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act." (ii) The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 282. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment reads as:- "10. In Nityananda M. Joshi and Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. the appellants filed applications against the respondent under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computing in terms of money, the benefit of holidays and for recovering the amount. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment reads as:- "10. In Nityananda M. Joshi and Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. the appellants filed applications against the respondent under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computing in terms of money, the benefit of holidays and for recovering the amount. The Labour Court dismissed the applications in so far as the claim was for a period beyond three years on the ground that the applications were barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In Nityananda Joshi's case (supra) this Court held as follows : Article 137 contemplates applications to ordinary courts. Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is "when the court is closed". Further under Section 5 of the Limitation Act only a court is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. The Labour Court is not a court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. 18. The alteration of the division as well as the change in the collocation of words in Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 compared with Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act shows that applications contemplated under Article 137 are not applications confined to the CPC. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division between applications in specified cases and other application as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words "any other application" under Article 137 cannot be said on the principle of ejusdem generis to the applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division. Any other application under Article 137 would be petition or any application under any Act. But it has to be an application to a court for the reason that Section 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed and extension of prescribed period if applicant or the appellant satisfies the court and he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application during such period." (iii) Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Vs. Thakoredas, Major and others reported in (1997) 11 Supreme Court Cases 412. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore Vs. Thakoredas, Major and others reported in (1997) 11 Supreme Court Cases 412. Paragraph-3 of the said judgment reads as:- "3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service of the notice, the respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the Civil Court under Section 18. Under the amended Sub-section 3(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from September 1, 1970 make reference under Section 18 to the Civil Court which he failed to do. Consequently by operation of Sub-section 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had accrued to the respondents to make an application to the Civil Court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. There is no period of limitation prescribed in Subsection 3(b) to make that application but it should be done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no Article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary Article under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed by Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b) i.e. the date on which cause of action had accrued to the respondent-claimant. Since the applications had been admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon the case in Municipal Corporation of Athani , which has stood overruled, the Order of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeals are accordingly allowed, and the application made to the Court by the respondent stands rejected." (iv) Raichurmatham Prabhakar and Another Vs. Rawatmal Dugar reported in (2004) 4 SCC 766 . Paragraph 26 of the said judgment reads as:- "26. The appeals are accordingly allowed, and the application made to the Court by the respondent stands rejected." (iv) Raichurmatham Prabhakar and Another Vs. Rawatmal Dugar reported in (2004) 4 SCC 766 . Paragraph 26 of the said judgment reads as:- "26. Where the tenant fails to deliver possession on or before the specified date to the landlord, the landlord may execute the order of the Controller by filing an execution petition which will be governed by Rule 23 and hence shall have to be filed within a period of six months from the date of the order. The application is by landlord who is a decree-holder having an executable order in his favour in his hands. A tenant exercising his right of re-entry is neither a decree-holder nor seeking execution of any order in his favour; he is seeking enforcement of a solemn undertaking given by the landlord but for which the Controller would not have made an order under sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act. The tenant's application is not an application for execution and hence does not attract applicability of Rule 23. It would be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963; it being an application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere and the period of three years shall begin to run when the right to apply accrues. The right to apply will accrue on the date specified by the Controller under sub-section (2) in this behalf. The period of limitation prescribed by Rule 23 may become otiose if applied to tenant as the period for completion of building by landlord may itself be more than six months and the period of limitation for tenant if governed by Rule 23 would have already expired by that time. An application filed before Rent Controller can attract applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 (See Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5 . There are three single-Judge Bench decisions of Andhra Pradesh High Court, namely, K.S. Hanumantharayappa Vs. A.N. Vittal Rao 1987 (1) ALT 474 , K.Manik Rao and Ors. Vs. Smt. M. Bikshapamma & Anr. 1987 (2) ALT (Notes on Cases) 15 and Navin Chandra Vs. Smt. Prema Bai Pitti 1992(3) ALT 181 , taking the view that the limitation for application by tenant seeking restoration of possession to him is governed by Rule 23. A.N. Vittal Rao 1987 (1) ALT 474 , K.Manik Rao and Ors. Vs. Smt. M. Bikshapamma & Anr. 1987 (2) ALT (Notes on Cases) 15 and Navin Chandra Vs. Smt. Prema Bai Pitti 1992(3) ALT 181 , taking the view that the limitation for application by tenant seeking restoration of possession to him is governed by Rule 23. These decisions do not lay down the correct law and are overruled." 6. Further even this Court in case of U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqf and Others Vs. Khursheed Haider and Others reported in 1971 ALJ 1126 has held:- "7. It was then contented by the learned counsel for the Board that Article 137 in the Schedule of the new Act being a substitute for Article 181 of the Schedule of the Old Act will bear the same meaning and Board's application under Section 63(5) of the Act not being an application under the Civil Procedure Code would not be governed by Article 137 of the New Limitation Act. It was suggested that there is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for an application under Section 63(5) of the Act. I am conscious of law as laid down by the Supreme Court relating to Article 181 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act of 1918 that it was not applicable to applications under any other Act and it was limited in its scope and only covered applications under the Civil Procedure Code. The reason being that the schedule to the old Limitation Act dealt throughout with applications under the Civil Procedure Code and as a residuary Article it would partake of the same colour as if the words "under the Code" were written it. 8. I do not think in considering the scope of Article 137 of the Limitation Act of 1963 I am bound by the interpretation or the meaning put on Article 181 in the schedule of the old Act. It would be found that in the third division of the schedule of the new Limitation Act applications under the Constitution of India, namely, for the fitness of appeal to the Supreme Court and for special leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court also find a mention at serial Nos. 132 and 133. Such applications are not covered by the Limitation Act which provides for an application for revision under the Criminal Procedure Code 1898. 132 and 133. Such applications are not covered by the Limitation Act which provides for an application for revision under the Criminal Procedure Code 1898. In the definition clause of the Limitation Act 1963 the word 'application' under Section 2(b) includes a petition. The intention is manifest that motions apart from the Civil Procedure Code were contemplated which required initiation by petitions. Under the Civil Procedure Code motions by petitions are not contemplated. In the statement of Objects and Reasons when introducing the Bill it was stated that : "A new definition of 'application' is being inserted so as to include a petition, original or otherwise. The object is to provide a period of limitation for original applications and petitions under special laws as there is no such provision now. Consequential changes have been made in the definition of 'appellant'." It appears to me that there is no good reason why should the residuary Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 be not held to cover in its ambit applications and objections under the special laws or any other law and its language ought not to be interpreted narrowly so as to keep it confined to applications under the Civil Procedure Code, there being no warrant for it in the phraseology of that Article or in the scheme of the schedule to the New Limitation Act. Even if it be held that the remedy for the first time was available to the Board when Act of 1960 came into force the application under Section 63(5) of the Act should have been filed much earlier and there was so justification for the Board not to act for 6 years almost. I am in agreement with the finding of the court below that the application of the Board under Section 63(5) of the Act was time barred." 7. The above clearly shows that Courts have already laid down the law that Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable on proceedings held under any Special Act for which no period of limitation is provided. In the present case also, the revision is filed under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act for which no period of limitation is provided in the said Act. In the present case also, the revision is filed under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act for which no period of limitation is provided in the said Act. Article 137 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to such revisions filed under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act, 1995 and, therefore, limitation for filing such revision is three years and not three months. 8. In view thereof, the objections of the registry are set aside and the revision is treated to be filed within time. 9. List this case in week commencing 03.01.2020.