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2019 DIGILAW 280 (AP)

Siddibiram Shaik Saheb v. SHO, Nandyal II Town P. S.

2019-10-16

M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

body2019
ORDER : M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J. 1. This petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short 'Cr.P.C.') is filed to quash the proceedings against the petitioners/accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in Crime No. 52 of 2013 of Nandyal II Town Police Station, Kurnool District, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC. 2. One Shajida Bi reported to the Circle Inspector of Police, II Town Police Station, Nandyal alleging that the house bearing door No. 2/52 is the ancestral property. Her maternal uncle S. Pakkirsa had acquired the property to an extent of Ac. 0.28 cents. He and his wife Rabia Bi mortgaged the property with K.D.C.C. Bank, Kurnool District, which was purchased by (1) Shajida Bi, W/o. Nabi Naik; (2) Nabi Naik, S/o. Khadar Naik; and (3) S. Abdul Rahim, S/o. Soudagar Pakkir Saheb under a registered sale deed dated 18-06-1991. One Nasyam Jabbar purchased an extent of Ac. 1.00 cents in Sy. No. 2326/9 Pyki under a registered sale deed dated 25-07-1991, an extent of Ac. 1.55 cents was purchased by the complainant Shajida Bi in Sy. No. 2326/9 by registered sale deed dated 07-04-1992. Siddbiram Pakkir Saheb and his wife Rabia Bi are the residents of H. No. 2/52 donated Ac. 0.02 cents of land to Bilal Mosque. Dr. Nouman and K. Abdul Kareem attested the deed of donation. Ac. 0.28 cents was retained by Kajun Bi, S/o. S. Fakirsab for himself and he has no issues. Ac. 0.82 cents in Sy. No. 2326/9 is in possession and enjoyment of Shajida Bi and S. Rokakhi. The husbands of Shajida Bi and S. Rokakhi by name Nabi Naik and S. Abdul Rahim respectively died. On 03-01-2012 Sahik Sahib, Abdul Azeez, Srinivasulu and K.D.C.C. Bank Manager R.R. Thimmareddy intentionally and unlawfully committed theft of documents relating to mortgage by producing death certificate etc., and committed the offence punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC. 3. Based on the complaint lodged with the police the police registered the above crime for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC. The present petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings on the ground that none of the allegations made in the complaint do not attract the alleged offences. Filing of complaint and registration of crime in the said circumstances is nothing but abuse of process of Court. 4. The present petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings on the ground that none of the allegations made in the complaint do not attract the alleged offences. Filing of complaint and registration of crime in the said circumstances is nothing but abuse of process of Court. 4. It is further contended that the 1st petitioner started civil litigation which resulted in exchange of notices, filing of caveats by both the parties apart from issuing paper statements. A notice was published on 05-03-2013 in Sakshi Telugu daily claiming that the 1st petitioner is the owner of the subject properties being the son of late Pakkirsa whereas the complainant herein is falsely claiming without any right etc., and the alleged release of document by A1 and A.4 with the help of A.5 who is the friend of A.1 is nothing but illegal implication of the parties to the litigation in the said crime and they have nothing to do with the civil disputes. Therefore, registration of the crime is nothing but abuse of process of the Court and requested to quash the proceedings. 5. It is an undisputed fact that the 2nd respondent is a relative of S. Abdul Rahim and his role is only accompanying A.1 to the KDCC Bank and receiving the documents pertaining to the property mortgaged with the bank and mere accompanying with the 1st petitioner would not constitute an offence punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC, and he being a relative assisted him to go to the bank and discharged the mortgage debt, received the document. Therefore, the allegations made in the complaint do not constitute any offence much less the offence punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC. The petitioners 3 and 4 are only attestors of deed of donation in favour of Mosque and they are not liable for any prosecution since the role of attestors is only to sign on the document when the document was executed in their presence and no knowledge is attributable to the person who attested the document in view of Section 3 of Transfer of Property Act. 6. The Apex Court in Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar and another in Crl.M.P. No. 1695 of 2009 specifically held that the attestors are not liable for prosecution for the offence punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC. 6. The Apex Court in Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar and another in Crl.M.P. No. 1695 of 2009 specifically held that the attestors are not liable for prosecution for the offence punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC. Therefore, the proceedings against the petitioners 3 and 4 are liable to be quashed. 7. The major allegations made against the 1st petitioner are that he committed theft of document with the aid of R.R. Thimma Reddy, Manager of KDCC Bank. When the complainant is claiming that she is the owner of the property and discharged the mortgage debt with the KDCC Bank receiving or collection of title deeds of the property mortgaged with the bank by deposit of title deeds, after discharging the debt would not constitute an offence punishable under Section 379 IPC, since removal of any property from the possession of any other person without his consent does not arise for the reason that the said Thimma Reddy being the Branch Manager of KDCC Bank is under legal obligation to return the documents and title deeds deposited with the bank after discharging the mortgage debts as per the provision of the Transfer of Properly Act. Therefore, such act would not constitute an offence punishable under Section 379 IPC i.e., theft as defined under Section 378 IPC. To constitute an offence punishable under Section 379 IPC there must be taking away of any immovable property with dishonest intention without consent of the person in possession, but these requirements are lacking. Hence, I find no prima facie nature to constitute an offence punishable under Section 379 IPC. Section 378 IPC: Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any moveable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft. 8. The other offence allegedly committed by the petitioners punishable under Section 420 IPC does not arise as there is no cheating or inducement of any other person with dishonest intention. 8. The other offence allegedly committed by the petitioners punishable under Section 420 IPC does not arise as there is no cheating or inducement of any other person with dishonest intention. The offence punishable under Section 420 IPC is described as follows:- Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.--Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 9. The ingredients to constitute an offence punishable under Section 420 IPC are follows:- (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or omission; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property; or (iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit. 10. For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out. 11. In the present case there was no complaint about such allegation, and mere breach of contract will not give raise to any such offence. Taking into consideration of the totality of the circumstances and exchange of notices between the parties and filing of caveats against one another claiming rights to the property filed a private complaint is nothing but abuse of process of Court and those allegations do not constitute any offence much less the offence under Section 420 IPC. 12. Taking into consideration of the totality of the circumstances and exchange of notices between the parties and filing of caveats against one another claiming rights to the property filed a private complaint is nothing but abuse of process of Court and those allegations do not constitute any offence much less the offence under Section 420 IPC. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal the following seven guidelines were laid down to exercise inherent jurisdiction: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 13. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 13. As per guidelines 1st and 2nd, if the allegations made in the complaint of accepted on its face value as true, do not constitute an offence, the court can exercise its power to quash the proceedings and at the same time the last guideline referred supra permits the court to quash the proceedings, when the report lodged with the police is by abuse of process of law or that the report lodged with the police to wreck vengeance against the petitioners or to come to the terms of the complainant. 14. As discussed above none of the allegations made in the private complaint which is the basis for registration of the crime under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. do not constitute any offence even if the allegations are acceptable on its face value. Hence, the proceedings against the petitioners are liable to be quashed. 15. In the result, petition is allowed quashing the proceedings against the petitioners/Accused Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 in Crime No.52 of 2013 of Nandyal II Town Police Station, Kurnool District, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 379 IPC. However, this finding will have no bearing on pending civil and criminal disputes between the parties. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.