JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. The present Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff /appellant, being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 19th February, 2019, as rendered by the Additional District Judge, Laksar, District Haridwar in Civil Appeal No. 34 of 2016, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh and others dismissing the appeal as well as against the judgment and decree dated 31st July, 2016 as passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Laksar, District Haridwar in Civil Suit No. 185 of 2007, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh & others, whereby, the suit of the plaintiff /appellant was dismissed. 2. In the case, at hand, a very peculiar situation which has emerged is that in relation to the same subject matter in controversy, i.e. the property, in dispute, more particularly, described at the foot of the plaint of Suit No. 185 of 2007, as preferred by the present plaintiff / appellant on 11th July, 2007, wherein, in the relief clause, he has sought a decree in the nature of permanent injunction, restraining the defendants of the present Suit from interference in any manner whatsoever in relation to the property, more particularly, described as a path by figure ‘EFGHIJ’ (as detailed at the foot of the plaint and plaint map), contending thereof, that the defendant may be restrained by way of a decree of permanent injunction from interfering and also from their act of raising construction of a wall and a gate of any nature on part of the property as detailed in the plaint map by figure ‘AI’ as detailed in the plaint map annexed by the plaintiff. 3. On the same day, itself, there was another Suit instituted by the present defendant / respondents, in relation to the same property, which was registered as Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh. Yet again, the said Suit was in relation to the same subject matter of the present suit, i.e. the passage, in question, shown by figure ‘EFGHIJ’ (Suit No. 185 of 2006) and the plaintiff in the said Suit, i.e. the defendant, herein, had described the suit property by the figure ‘ABCD’ in the plaint map annexed along with the Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh. 4. Rakam Singh. 4. The contention of the plaintiff of the said suit, i.e. Suit No. 186 of 2007, i.e. the defendant, herein, was that he claimed his right over the property, in question, was that it exclusively belongs to him since he having purchased the same by virtue of the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, which was placed on record of Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh, in original as paper No. 59-Ga/1 to 59 Ga/3, this document of title goes to show his prima facie case and regarding the title over the property, in question, which was in dispute in Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh, which was sought to be interfered by the present plaintiff / appellant of Original Suit No. 185 of 2007, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh. 5. At this stage, this Court is not going into the detail pertaining to the merits and the adjudication made by Trial Court by way of Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh, inter se between the same set of parties in relation to same subject matter, but, only reference of the same is essentially required to be made because the Trial Court while decreeing the Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh of the present defendants against the present plaintiff / appellant by the judgment dated 31st July, 2016 / 1st August, 2016, the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Laksar, District Haridwar in para 15 and 16 of the said judgment had made reference and had placed reliance upon the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, conferring the title of the properties in dispute on the defendants, the sale deed which was placed on record in the said Suit. Para 15 and 16 of the judgment dated 31.07.2016/01.08.2016 reads as under :- ^^15- nLrkosth lk{; ds :i esa oknh }kjk pkj fdrk QksVks iz'uxr lEifRr vkSj ,d fdrk fyQkQk dkxt la0 10Xk@1 rk 10x@4 o 11 x rFkk lkekU; vk;qDr deh'ku dh fjikssVZ dkxt la0 15x @4 o ,d fdrk lR;izfrfyfi cSukek fnukafdr 11-02-1965 dkxt la0 59x@1 rk 59 x@2 izLrqr fd;s gSA 16- Hkkjrh; Lkk{;h fof/k 1872 ds vUrxZr oknh }kjk izLrqr QksVksxzkQ dk lkf{kd ewY; 'kwU; gS ,oa xkzg; ugh gSA lk{; fof/k dk lqLFkfir fl}kUr gS fd losZ deh'kuj dh fjiksZV rc rd lk{; esa xzkg; ugha gksxh tc rd dh losZ deh'kuj dk U;k;ky; ds le{k ijh{k.k uk gqvk gks vr% QksVksxzkQh o deh'ku fjiksVZ dk Hkkjrh lk{; fof/k 1872 ds vUrxZr lkf{kd ewY; 'kwU; gksus ds dkj.k xzkg; ugha gS tgka rd oknh }kjk cSukek fnukafdr 11-02-2965 dkxt la[;k 59Xk@1 rk 59x@2 dh lR;izfrfi tkjh }kjk mifucU/kd jftLVkj dk;kZy; yDlj dk iz'u gSA mDr cSukesa ds lacU/k esa mDr cSukesa ds vuqlkj nyflag o Hkksikyflag o bZ'oj flag }kjk iz'uxr lEifRr {ks=Qy 16 xt pkS0 o 16 xt yEckbZ [ktku flag iq= jkeizlkn fuoklh xzke fujatuiqj ijxuk Tokykiqj ls 11-02-1965 dks 300 :0 esa jftLVMZ cSukesa ls dz; fd;s gSA mDr lEifRr ds iwoZ esa eq[rkjflag oknhx.k ds firk if'pe esa uSuflag nf{k.k esa jkLrk o mRrj esa i`Fohflag dk gksuk nf'kZr gSA** 6. The Court had made reference and had placed reliance upon the sale deed 11/02/1965 conferring of the title of the property in dispute on the defendants, the sale deed which was placed on record in the said suit. It has been further informed by the learned counsel for the caveator respondents, to the present Second Appeal, that the judgment as rendered by the Trial Court on 31st July, 2016 / 1st August, 2016 decreeing the suit of the defendant against the plaintiff , it was put to challenge by the present plaintiff/appellant by preferring a Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2016, Rakam Singh and others Vs. Dal Singh and the Appeal thus preferred by the plaintiff/appellant too has been dismissed by the Appellate Court’s judgment dated 25th March, 2019, thereby, affirming the findings which has been recorded by the learned Trial Court and, in particular, the reference and impact regarding sale deed 11/02/1965 of the defendant, as was made in para 17 of the judgment, where the Appellate Court while parting with the judgment dated 25th March, 2019, which is quoted hereunder, had placed credence to the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, conferring a valid title and ownership of the property, in question, over the defendants. Para 17 of the judgment dated 25th March, 2019 reads as under :- ^^17- bl lEcU/k esa i=koyh ij dkxt la[;k 59x@1 yxk;r 59x@3 voyksduh; gSA dkxt la[;k 59x@1 ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gS fd iz'uxr foØ; foys[k fnaukfdr 11-02-1965 mi&fucU/kd&izFke gfj}kj }kjk tkjh lR; izfrfyfi gS] ftldk vfHkys[kksa esa udy la[;k 995@2013 gS A mijksDr dkxt la[;k 59x@1 yxk;r 59x@3 voyksdu ls ;g Hkh fofnr gksrk gS fd iz'uxr foØ; foys[k fnaukfdr 11-02-1965 mi&fucU/kd&izFke gfj}kj ds vfHkys[kksa esa ys[ki= la[;k 159@56 ds :i esa iath—r gSA** 7. So far, after rendering of the judgment dated 25th March, 2019 by the Appellate Court arising out of Suit No. 186 of 2007 filed by the defendant against the plaintiff, it is stated by the learned counsel for the caveator respondents that the said judgment has not yet been put to challenge by the plaintiff by preferring any independent Second Appeal till date, hence, so far it has attained the finality as on date. 8. Reverting back to the suit, in question, i.e. Suit No. 185 of 2007, Rakam Singh Vs. 8. Reverting back to the suit, in question, i.e. Suit No. 185 of 2007, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh and others, as preferred by the plaintiff/appellant, herein, he has sought a decree in the nature of injunction as against the present defendants/respondent from restraining them from their interference over the utilization of the alleged passage, which according to the plaintiff/appellant is described in the plaint map by figure ‘EFGHIJ’, which they contend and claim that they have been using the same for last more than 25 years and, as such, they got a right of its utilization in the same manner and under the garb of that, the plaintiff wanted to raise the construction from figure ‘IA’ as described in the plaint map by putting a wall and a gate and according to the plaintiff/appellant, this act of defendant was an act of interference over the property, which he claimed had right to use as a passage and the user of passage by raising the construction which they, i.e. defendants could not have done so because the title over the property didn’t stand vested with the defendant/respondents, herein, by virtue of sale deed dated 11.02.1965. 9. The Suit, thus preferred, was contested by the defendants by filing the written statement, before the learned Trial Court and in the written statement the defendants/respondents had specifically denied the plaintiff was ever having any right being vested with him i.e. the plaintiff and, in particular, the right of interference in any manner over the act of defendant by way of construction of wall and placement of the gate on the place shown in plaint map by figure ‘AI’ as depicted in the plaint map, as same was being raised on his own property purchased by him. Besides this, the defendant / respondent has also taken a plea to the effect that the Suit, in question, was barred by the provisions contained under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, to be read with Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as no decree of the nature sought could be granted in the absence of any title vested with plaintiff. Thus, the suit deserved dismissal on this ground itself. 10. Thus, the suit deserved dismissal on this ground itself. 10. In order to controvert the plea taken by the plaintiff/appellant to the effect that the property, in dispute, was being utilized as a common passage, which the plaintiff claimed to have been utilizing the same since considerable long time, the defence taken by the defendants was to the effect that in case, if that is the case if at all pleaded by the plaintiff, then it was incumbent upon him that he ought to have complied with the provisions contained under Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC, for seeking a permission from the competent Court for instituting the proceedings of the Suit No. 185 of 2007, in a representative capacity in order to safeguard the alleged public passage as claimed by the plaintiff / appellant which was allegedly claimed by the plaintiff in the Suit, was being utilized so by people since long, in these circumstances, he ought to have filed suit after complying the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the C.P.C.. 11. The defendants further contended that in accordance with the map which they have appended along with the written statement, the part of land shown by figure ‘ABCD’ is the property of the defendants and the property shown by figure ‘ABF’ is the property over which there exists a permanent construction of the defendant himself and the property described by figure ‘CDEF’, in fact, on spot, it is an open land over which, as the plaintiff allegedly contends that there constitutes to be a disputed property as claimed by the plaintiff for which the defendants have replied that the plaintiff would not have right over the same as it was the property which was purchased by the plaintiff by the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, the said part of the disputed property formed part and parcel of the same and as a consequence thereto defendants stood recorded in the revenue records. The said part of property shown in written statement by figure ‘CDEF’, in fact, and as per the revenue record is a private land covered by sale deed dated 11.02.1965 having an area of 16 yards x 16 yards of open land, which is being claimed by the plaintiff as to be a public passage. 12. The said part of property shown in written statement by figure ‘CDEF’, in fact, and as per the revenue record is a private land covered by sale deed dated 11.02.1965 having an area of 16 yards x 16 yards of open land, which is being claimed by the plaintiff as to be a public passage. 12. Defendants have further contended that in the plaint map, which allegedly partition depicted by the passage by figure ‘ABFD’ is, in fact, a 14 feet wide passage which exists on the northern side extending upto the main road and is not a property which was ever exclusively vested with the plaintiff/appellant as claimed to be utilized as a passage, but rather as per evidence of defendant, it was the property which was exclusively titled with the defendant and was under his recorded ownership. 13. In the written statement filed in Suit No. 185 of 2007, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh and others, itself, a reference in its para 22 was made by the defendants of having instituted a Suit No. 186 of 2007, on the same day, i.e. on 11th July, 2007, seeking a decree of permanent injunction by way of restraint as against the present plaintiff /appellant from raising any construction over the disputed property and, in particular, by raising a wall and placement of gate on the property as shown by figure ‘AI’ over which, yet against, it was reiterated by the defendants that in the earlier Suit too, which is based on the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, it has already been held that the property, in question, stood vested with the defendants, over which, the plaintiff/appellant has no right to raise any construction whatsoever as that it was not a public passage as described by the plaintiff in the plaint by figure ‘EFGHIJ’, rather it is a claim contrary to the vesting of title with the defendant by the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, which stood concurrently settled by the judgment of Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh, filed by defendants, which had concurrently held them to be the owner by sale deed dated 11.02.1965. 14. Rakam Singh, filed by defendants, which had concurrently held them to be the owner by sale deed dated 11.02.1965. 14. In the Suit, in question, the defendants had also placed on record sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, by virtue of the notorized affidavit, which was registered as paper No. 7-Ga/7 and 7-Ga/9, as original certified sale deed was already filed by the defendant in his Suit No. 186 of 2007, as paper No. 59-G/1 to 59-Ga/3, filed against the plaintiff /defendant. 15. Based on the rival contentions and evidences led by the parties, the learned Trial Court had framed the following issues :- ^^1& D;k oknh dh viuh vkcknh lEifRr ij vkus&tkus ds fy, bZ-,Q-th-,p-vkbZ-ts- dk bLrseky djrk pyk vk jgk gS vkSj ekSds ij ;g ,d jkLrk gS ;fn gka rks izHkko \ 2& D;k oknh dfFkr jkLrs bZ-,Q-th-,p-vkbZ-ts- dks fcUnq vkbZ- ,- ij nhokj cukdj cUn djkuh pkgrs gS \ 3& D;k okn oknh /kkjk 41 ,p- fof'k"B vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e ls ckf/kr gS\ 4& D;k okn oknh vkns'k 01 fu;e 8 lh-ih-lh- ls ckf/kr gS \ 5& D;k izfroknhx.k dh lEifRr ij vkus&tkus dk nwljk jkLrk iwoZ ls ekSds ij pyk vkrk gS \ ;fn gka rks izHkko \ 6& D;k oknh dk okn vkns'k 07 fu;e 11 O;ogkj izfd;k lafgrk ls ckf/kr gS \ 7& D;k oknh }kjk lEifRr dk uD'kk ekSds o okLrfodrk ds foijhr cuk;k x;k gS \ ;fn gka rks izHkko \ 8& vuqrks"k \** 16. Both the parties in support of their respective case had placed reliance on oral as well as documentary evidences and the main argument in the present appeal, as extended by the appellant’s Counsel Mr. M.S. Tyagi before this Court was that once the defendant was placing reliance on the sale deed, paper No. 7-Ga/2 in order to show his title and in order to substantiate his rights in relation to the property, in question, having purchased by him by virtue of sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, then, in those circumstances, it was incumbent upon him that in view of the provisions contained under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, the contents of the documents were required to be proved by the procedure of primary or secondary evidence as contemplated under Sections 62 and 63 of the Indian Evidence Act. The substantial question of law, which was attempted to be argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the notorized affidavit, by virtue of which, the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, was placed on record and read in evidence, its content was required to be proved in consonance with the provisions contained under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, before Court accepts the title of the person, who claims his title to be flowing from those documents. 17. Consequently, the Suit proceeded and learned Trial Court while dealing with the issue No. 1 to the effect that as to whether it is an abadi of the defendants or a public passage, as claimed by the plaintiff had considered the evidence and has recorded a finding to the effect that so far the propriety of the presentation of the sale deed in original on record in Suit No. 185 of 2007, is concerned, the same would have no relevance for the reason being that the plaintiff/appellant had at no point of time ever in the pleading or evidence had ever disputed the propriety of the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965. Following findings was recorded by the Trial Court, while deciding issue No. 1 :- ^^9- oknh }kjk izfroknhx.k ds tokcnkos ds fo:) dksbZ tokcmy tokc izLrqr ugh fd;k x;kA------------------- ---------------jftLVjh—r cSukek fnukafdr 11-02-1965 ds vuqlkj iz'uxr Hkwfe nyflag] Hkksikyflag o bZ'ojflag }kjk [ktkuflag iq= jkeizlkn fuoklh xzke&fujatuiqj ijxuk Tokykiqj gfj}kj ls fnuakd 11-02-1965 dks eqcfyax 300 :0 esa jftLVjh cSukesa ls Ø; fd;s gSA izLrqr okn esa jftLVjh cSukesa dh izekf.kr izfr dk oknh dh vksj ls dksbZ [k.Mu izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA mDr jftLVjh cSukek fnukafdr 11-02-1965 izLrqr okn esa ,d egRoiw.kZ nLrkosth lk{; gSA------------** 18. After hearing the arguments of the parties, this Court is of the view that so far the provisions as contained under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act is considered, on which reliance is placed by appellant’s counsel, the responsibility which is casted upon the party while placing reliance on a document, it is to be discharged only when the contents of the document or its propriety, on which, the reliance has placed by the adversary is repelled by the opposite party, then it is to be proved by otherwise by way of leading primary evidence or the secondary evidence by the process contemplated under Sections 62 and 63 of the Indian Evidence Act. But, in the present case, since plaintiff had not controverted the sale deed dated 11.02.1965 or its propriety and as there was no replication filed to the written statement of the defendant, its contents remained un-rebutted by the plaintiff / appellant. Section 61, 62 and 63 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under :- “61. Proof of contents of documents. - The contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. 62. Primary evidence. - Primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Explanation 1.-Where a document is executed in several parts, each part is primary evidence of the document; Where a document is executed in counterpart, each counterpart being executed by one or some of the parties only, each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties executing it. Explanation 2.- Where a number of documents are all made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography or photography, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest; but, where they are all copies of a common original, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the original. 63. Secondary evidence.- Secondary evidence means and includes- (1) Certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained; (2) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies; (3) Copies made from or compared with the original; (4) Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them; (5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it.” 19. As far as the plaintiff/appellant is concerned, since he in his pleadings or in his evidence adduced before the Trial Court to support his case or in continuance thereto even before the Appellate Court, while extending his argument in relation to the issue No. 1, he had never controverted nor disputed the act with regard to the propriety of the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965 and the vesting of title in favour of the defendants by virtue of it and thus, the argument as extended by the counsel for the appellant, that there was non compliance of the provisions contained under Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, would have been only relevant when the plaintiff in his pleading or evidence denies the contents of the document of title of the defendants, which is lacking in the case at hand. Besides the said question, as no other question of law has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant before this Court, because based on the same sale deed, the parallel Suit No. 186 of 2007, the plaintiff/appellant has been held a judgment debtor by the unchallenged judgment dated 25.03.2019. 20. Consequently, the Suit proceeded and the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Laksar, District Haridwar dismissed the same by the judgment dated 31st July, 2016. The said judgment was put to challenge by the plaintiff appellant, herein, by preferring a regular first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being Appeal No. 34 of 2016, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh, which too, met with the same destiny and was dismissed by the order dated 19th February, 2019. Thus the present Second Appeal is concluded by concurrent finding of facts, supported by concurrent finding recorded in the suit of defendant too, i.e. Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh as decided on 31.07.2016/01/08/2016, which was affirmed in Appeal No. 35 of 2016, against the plaintiff/appellant of the said suit vide judgment dated 25.03.2019. 21. Hence, so far as the question of title in relation to the property, in question, which the plaintiff claims in the suit, as to be a passage, in fact, has not been established by the evidence placed by plaintiff on record rather to the contrary the document of title which was filed by the defendant in original in Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh, shows that passage, in question, which was claimed by the plaintiff, in fact, constituted to be part of the land of defendants’ open land, which was subject matter of purchase and formed part of the sale deed of the defendants, purchased by the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965. 22. During the course of dictation of judgment, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant had also tried to draw the attention of this Court towards the finding on issue No. 2, which was not principally argued at the time of the admission of the Second Appeal and had made reference to the statement as made by DW1 as recorded on 12.02.2013, before the Court below to the following effect:- ^^14- okn fcUnq la0&1 ds fuLrkj.k esa ;g fu.khZr fd;k tk pqdk gS fd oknh dh viuh lEifRr ij vkus tkus ds fy, okni= ds lkFk layXu uD'kk utjh esa nf'kZr bZ0,Q0th0,p0vkbZ0ts0 esa ls bZ0ts0vkbZ0,0 dksbZ jkLrk ugha gSA vifrq ;g izfroknhx.k dh laifRr gSA oknh dh vksj ls dksbZ Hkh ,slk nLrkosth ,oa ekSf[kd lk{; izLrqr ugha fd;k gS ftlls ;g lkfcr gks fd izfroknhx.k iwoZ ls if'pe dh vksj pyus okys ds jkLrs ,0,p0,Q0th0 ij nhokj fuekZ.k dj cUn djuk pkg jgs gSA vr% i=koyh ij miyC/k ekSf[kd ,oa nLrkosth lk{; ds vk/kkj ij mDr oknfcUnw dk fuLrkj.k oknh ds fo:) ,oa izfroknh ds i{k fd;k tkrk gSA** 23. The learned counsel for the appellant had tried to interpret the statement as recorded by DW1 on 12.02.2013, as if, the defendants had admitted the fact that the land, in question, which the appellant claims to be a passage, in fact, has rather admitted that it was a passage and used so, which could be utilized by any person, thus, it admittedly constitutes to be a public passage. The interpretation given to the statement of DW1 to the effect that the passage has been admitted by the defendant to be utilized by any person is a mis-interpretation, which has been given by the plaintiff to the said statement of DW1 by the plaintiff appellant as the finding which has been recorded on issue No. 1, if the statement of DW1 is read along with the finding recorded on issue No. 2, which relates to the following effect: “As to whether the plaintiff had made an effort to raise the construction by wall from figure ‘A and I’”. 24. 24. The answer given while deciding issue No. 2 in relation to the statement of DW1, if read in context of its intention, it was with regard to an act of raising of a wall from figure ‘A to I’ and the interpretation attempted to be given by the appellant’s counsel to the statement of DW1, which has been sought to be read to give colour that as if the property, in dispute, happens to be a public passage, in fact, is a misnomer, based on misreading of statement of DW1 by the plaintiff/appellant, rather it has been specifically contended by the defendant / respondent, that if the specification/ dimensions as given in the sale deed dated 11th February, 1965, is taken into consideration, the property, in dispute, would definitely constitute to be and would rather fall to be as a part and parcel of the sale deed by virtue of which the defendants had purchased the property, based on which, he was recoded in the revenue record. 25. Besides this, we will also have to bear in mind that with regard to the statement extended by the defendant as DW1 on which appellant’s counsel has relied, it was in relation to sale deed in Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh, the finding had already been recorded in favour of defendant, they are with regard to the defendants being the owners and having title over the property, after scrutinization of the original sale deed, paper No. 59-Ga/1 and 59-Ga/3, which was placed on record in the said suit, the judgment rendered in the Suit of defendant, i.e. Original Suit No. 186 of 2007, Dal Singh Vs. Rakam Singh, has been produced before this Court and the said fact has not been denied by the appellant’s counsel. Furthermore, the same has attained finality as admittedly no Second Appeal has been preferred against the Appellate Court’s judgment dated 25.03.2019 by the present plaintiff /appellant. 26. Consequently, this Court does not find any substantial question of law involved in the present Second Appeal as the same is concluded by concurrent finding of facts recorded in the two judgments, i.e. in Original Suit No. 185 of 2007, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh and others filed by the plaintiff and Civil Appeal No. 34 of 2016, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh and others, filed by the plaintiff/appellant. Dal Singh and others filed by the plaintiff and Civil Appeal No. 34 of 2016, Rakam Singh Vs. Dal Singh and others, filed by the plaintiff/appellant. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed as it does not involve any indulgence and adjudication of any substantial question of law as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant. 27. Thus, the Second Appeal is dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs.