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2019 DIGILAW 2824 (MAD)

V. Sounder Rajan v. Deputy Registrar of Co-op. Societies Office, rep. by the Deputy Registrar, Trichy Circle, Tiruchirapally

2019-10-17

J.NISHA BANU

body2019
JUDGMENT : Prayer: Review Application filed under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the order dated 30.11.2017 made in C.R.P(MD)No.1301 of 2014 on the file of this Court. 1. This review application has been filed by the petitioner as against the order dated 30.11.2017 passed in C.R.P(MD)No.1301 of 2014. 2. The petitioner was working in the second respondent's Society as Office Assistant and criminal action was taken against him as there was some irregularities in issuing the consumer loans. On the recommendation of the District Committee, he was relieved from service without prejudice to the pending criminal case and he was not allowed to retire from service on 30.11.2008. Hence, the petitioner filed an application before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Tiruchirapalli under Section 90(1)(c) of Co-operative Societies Act to order payment of the Provident Fund Amount of Rs.3,33,766.94 to him. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies has dismissed the petition stating that the petition is not maintainable under Section 90(1) of the Act and directed the petitioner to move the Controlling Authority Assistant Commissioner of Provident Fund Office under Section 7(A) of the Provident Fund Act. Against the said order, he preferred an appeal before the Principal District Judge, Tiruchirapalli. The learned Principal District Judge, Tiruchirapalli has dismissed the matter stating that the claim of the petitioner is regarding service matter and the observation of the Deputy Registrar that the petitioner cannot claim the amount under Section 90 of the Act, is correct. Against which, the petitioner filed C.R.P(MD)No.1301 of 2014 on the ground that the learned Principal District Judge, Tiruchirappalli, without considering the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, simply confirmed the order of the Deputy Registrar and the order is a cryptic order. This Court, by order, dated 30.11.2017, allowed the Civil Revision Petition holding that since the petitioner is an Office Assistant, he has no power to release any loan and the loan disbursed has been recovered in full and also directed the second respondent to release the P.F. amount of Rs.3,33,766.94 within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. Seeking to review the said order, the petitioner / defendant filed this review petition. 3. Seeking to review the said order, the petitioner / defendant filed this review petition. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the review petitioner relying upon the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Viyay L.Mehrotra v. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2000 II L.L.J - 253, would submit that as the second respondent delayed the payment inordinately, the petitioner is entitled to get 18% simple interest for the delay in making payment. Thus, he prayed to direct the second respondent to pay 18% simple interest for the P.F. amount. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would submit that as per Section 7Q of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, the petitioner is entitled to only the prevailing rate of interest from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment and the respondent is bound by the same, though there is no specific direction given by this Court. Therefore, the decision relied on by the petitioner is not applicable. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. 6. The power of this Court in matters of review is very limited. Such power can be exercised only when there is error apparent on the face of the record or in the event an order is not reviewed, it would amount to miscarriage of justice. For the said proposition, we may usefully refer to the Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, in Union of India, rep by the Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, Chennai, Vs. The Registrar, Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, wherein the Division Bench has made a complete survey of several Judgments of the Supreme Court, on this question, and has ultimately, in Paragraph No.10, held as follows:- "10. In yet another Judgment reported in 2013 (8) SCC 320 , [Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and others], the Hon'ble Apex Court, after examining various Judgments passed earlier has held as follows" "12. This Court has repeatedly held in various Judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only there is an error apparent on the face of record. Mayawati and others], the Hon'ble Apex Court, after examining various Judgments passed earlier has held as follows" "12. This Court has repeatedly held in various Judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained only there is an error apparent on the face of record. A mere repetition through different counsel, of old and overrulled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient......." In the above Judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the principles as under: "19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XL VII Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the Judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned Judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the principles: 20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable, as stipulated by the statute: 20.1 When the review will be maintainable:- (i).Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii). Mistake or error apparent on the face of record; (iii). Any other sufficient reason. The words 'any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram Vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Most Rev.Mar Poulose Athanasius & others [1955] 1 SCR 520, to mean, "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India Vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., ors., JT (2013) 8 SC 275. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii). Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii). Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv). Review is not maintainable, unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermine its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v). (ii). Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii). Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv). Review is not maintainable, unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermine its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v). A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi).The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii). The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii). The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate Court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix). Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived." 7. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the Judgment, referred to above, it may be mentioned that the review is not an appeal in disguise and therefore, this Court cannot consider any of the new materials, which were not placed before the Court, argued and not considered. 8. The petitioner has filed this review application seeking 18% interest for the period of belated payment of P.F. amount. The learned Additional Government Pleader for the first respondent submitted that the petitioner is entitled only for the prevailing rate of interest. 9. At this juncture, this Court is of the view that it would appropriate to extract Section 7Q of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the same reads as follows: “7Q. Interest payable by the employer.- The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment: Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank”. 10. 10. From the above provision, it is clear that the employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank. As rightly stated by the learned Additional Government Pleader for the first respondent, though there is no specific direction given by this Court with regard to the payment of interest, they are deemed to pay the interest as per law. Therefore, the claim made by the petitioner is not sustainable. The decision relied upon by the petitioner was of the year 2000. Now, much water has flown and therefore, the same need not be relied upon. This Court finds no error apparent on the face of the record. Thus, the present Review Application is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Review Application is dismissed. No costs.