JUDGMENT Ashok Kumar Gaur, J. - The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the sale/transfer by the sale certificate dt. 19th February, 2019, to be void, inoperative and bad in law and to restore the possession of secured asset permitting him to deposit the amount which may be found due by the Bank before or at the time of initiating the proceedings under Section 13(8) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short "Act of 2002") read with Rules 8 & 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for short "the Rules of 2002"). 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is lawful owner and is in possession of land under Patta No. 176 measuring 67.03 square yards, sitauted at Nayka Mohalla, Near Nageshwar Bagichi, Sikar. Counsel submitted that the petitioner had taken loan for construction of residential house from the respondent-Bank and the loan of Rs. 11,50,000/- was to be repaid in the 167 monthly installments and it was agreed between the parties that the petitioner would pay the monthly installment of Rs.13,814/-. 3. Counsel submitted that the petitioner had paid regular installment, however, when some of the installments were not paid, notice under Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002 dt. 14th September, 2018, for amount of Rs. 12,38,494/- was issued to the petitioner and the said notice was not served on the petitioner and the petitioner was having no knowledge and as such the petitioner was precluded from filing reply to the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002. 4. Counsel submitted that the petitioner first time had come to know that the respondent-Bank had dispossessed the petitioner on 25th February, 2019 and the petitioner found lock hanging on the outer door of the said property. When, the petitioner made enquiry, he came to know that the respondent-Bank had moved an application under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 dt. 20th December, 2018, alleging that there was outstanding amount of Rs. 12,34, 494/- to be paid by the petitioner and to be recovered from the secured assets. 5. When, the petitioner made enquiry, he came to know that the respondent-Bank had moved an application under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 dt. 20th December, 2018, alleging that there was outstanding amount of Rs. 12,34, 494/- to be paid by the petitioner and to be recovered from the secured assets. 5. Counsel submitted that the petitioner after obtaining copy of the order passed by the District Collector under Section 14 of the Act of 2002, approached the Revisional Court by filing a revision before the Session Judge, Sikar and the Session Judge, Sikar has refused to interfere in the matter by observing that for order passed under Section 14 of the Act of 2002, the Civil Court is not proper remedy. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to satisfy this Court with regard to availability of writ jurisdiction to the petitioner to assail the proceedings, which was initiated against the petitioner under the Act of 2002. 7. This Court also appraised learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 2 WLC(Raj) 421 has taken a view that the writ petition is not maintainable against the order of the Magistrate taking over the possession of the secured assets. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, after going through the said judgment, submitted that the petitioner has not challenged the order passed under Section 14 of the Act of 2002. Counsel submitted that since sale certificate itself has illegally been issued and no notice has been given, the petitioner has rightly approached this Court. 9. Learned Senior Counsel-Mr. R.K. Agarwal, appearing for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Apex Court in the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. V. Noble Kumar and Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 620 ; Hindon Forge Private Limited and Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 2 SCC 198 ; Vasu P. Shetty Vs. Hotel Vandana Palace and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 660 ; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. And Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 311 . 10. V. Noble Kumar and Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 620 ; Hindon Forge Private Limited and Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 2 SCC 198 ; Vasu P. Shetty Vs. Hotel Vandana Palace and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 660 ; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. And Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 311 . 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the strength of the said judgments, submitted that the Apex Court has clearly laid down that if compliance of the provisions of Sections 13 (6) and 13 (8) of the Act of 2002 read with Rules 8 & 9 of the Rules of 2002 have not been made, the aggrieved person has a remedy of filing the writ petition. 11. Learned counsel submitted that the remedy which is provided under Section 17 of the Act of 2002 is only in respect of the measures, which are referred in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act of 2002 and can be challenged by making an application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal"). Counsel submitted that the petitioner is not feeling aggrieved against any such action taken under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act of 2002 and as such, there is no necessity to file the appeal before the Tribunal. 12. I have heard the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner and perused the material available on record. 13. This Court while considering the scope of Section 17 in the case of Pradeep Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) has interpreted the scope of Section 17 of the Act of 2002 and further the judgment which has been passed by the Apex Court in the case of Hindon Forge Private Limited and Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) has also been taken into account. 14. The relevant portion of the order passed by this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) is quoted heredunder: "17. This court finds that if the secured creditor finds that one of the measures including taking possession of the secured assets is to be adopted, an application under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002 is to be filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate to assist the secured creditor in taking possession of secured assets. 18. This court finds that if the secured creditor finds that one of the measures including taking possession of the secured assets is to be adopted, an application under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002 is to be filed before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate to assist the secured creditor in taking possession of secured assets. 18. This court finds that Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, 2002 permits any person, including borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures, referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, 2002, to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date on which such measures had been taken. This court finds that if the petitioner finds himself aggrieved against the measure of taking possession of the secured asset, he is free to exercise his right under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, 2002. The definition of "any person" is of a wide import and within its ambit it not only covers the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by action taken under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act, 2002. 19. The Apex Court in the case of Hindon Forge Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has laid down the law that borrower/debtor can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, 2002 at the stage of possession notice under Rules 8(1) and 8(2) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. 20. The Apex Court in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Anr. (supra) has again reiterated that normally a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available. The extract of the judgment, relevant for the present purpose, are reproduced as under:- "13. In Ikbal it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the 'SARFAESI Act' available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon, observing : "27. In Ikbal it was observed that the action of the Bank under Section 13(4) of the 'SARFAESI Act' available to challenge by the aggrieved under Section 17 was an efficacious remedy and the institution directly under Article 226 was not sustainable, relying upon Satyawati Tandon, observing : "27. No doubt an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 but by now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 28............In our view, there was no justification whatsoever for the learned Single Judge to allow the borrower to bypass the efficacious remedy provided to him under Section 17 and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction in his favour when he had disentitled himself for such relief by his conduct. The Single Judge was clearly in error in invoking his extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in light of the peculiar facts indicated above. The Division Bench also erred in affirming the erroneous order of the Single Judge." 14. A similar view was taken in Punjab National Bank and another vs. Imperial Gift House and others, observing:- "3. Upon receipt of notice, the respondents filed representation under Section 13(3-A) of the Act, which was rejected. Thereafter, before any further action could be taken under Section 13(4) of the Act by the Bank, the writ petition was filed before the High Court. 4. In our view, the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition against the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act and quashing the proceedings initiated by the Bank." 15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of exparte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. In financial matters grant of exparte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon, has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- "46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order." 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference. 17. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference. 17. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd., observing :- "32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops." 18. The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed. 27. This court finds that the Apex Court in the cases of Hindon Forge Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore (supra) and ICICI Bank Ltd. Etc. Etc. (supra) has laid down the law that if measures are taken under Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, 2002 and then the application is filed to the same effect under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002 by the secured creditor, the remedy lies by way of filing appeal and the order as such is required to be assailed in appeal by any person feeling aggrieved against any of the action taken by the secured creditor to take possession of the secured asset. 28. This court following the above referred judgments of the Apex Court, finds that the present writ petition is not maintainable before this Court. The petitioner is always free to avail the statutory alternative remedy provided to challenge the action of the respondents. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable." 15. This Court finds that in the instant case, the respondent- Bank has filed an application under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 and on their application, the order dt. The petitioner is always free to avail the statutory alternative remedy provided to challenge the action of the respondents. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable." 15. This Court finds that in the instant case, the respondent- Bank has filed an application under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 and on their application, the order dt. 24th January, 2019, has been passed. 16. This Court further finds that the sale certificate has also been issued which has been placed on record by the petitioner dt. 19th February, 2019, said to be registered on 1st April, 2019. 17. Learned counsel submitted that though the order was passed by the District Collector on 24th January, 2019, however, possession was handed over on 25th February, 2019 and as such there is wholesome breach of the statutory provision contained in Section 13 of the Act of 2002. 18. This Court finds that the action, which has been taken by the Bank of issuing sale certificate is after the order, which has been passed under Section 14 of the Act of 2002. 19. This Court further finds that the grievance, which the petitioner has in respect of violation of notice, being not given or sale certificate being issued in illegal manner, has adequate remedy, as the measures have been taken by the Bank under Section 13 (4) of the Act of 2002. 20. This Court, keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court, is afraid to interfere in the instant matter. The petitioner is not remediless, as he has statutory remedy to challenge the action of the respondent-Bank and he is free to do so. 21. This Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition and accordingly the same is dismissed.