JUDGMENT : MOHD. FAIZ ALAM KHAN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. 2. Criminal Appeal No. 941 of 2010 has been filed by appellant-Kamlendra Dwivedi, Appeal No. 254 of 2010 has been filed by the appellants-Raghvendra Dwivedi @ Raghvendra Prasad Dwivedi & Smt. Usha Devi and Criminal Appeal No. 886 of 2010 has been filed by appellants-Krishnanand Dwivedi & Smt. Poonam against the judgment and order dated 01.02.2010 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No.7, Raebareli in Sessions Trial No. 279 of 2005, arising out of Case Crime No. 60 of 2005, under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 of I.P.C. & Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Maharajganj, District Raebareli, whereby all the appellants have been convicted under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 of I.P.C. & Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, while other co-accused Atulendra was acquitted of the charges under Section 304-B, 498-A of I.P.C. Appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi being the husband of the deceased was sentenced under Section 304-B for life imprisonment and under Section 498-A for 02 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1500/-and also under Section 201 I.P.C. for 02 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1500/-, while for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act he is sentenced for 03 months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500 and in default to undergo further imprisonment for 09 months. Appellants Raghvendra Dwivedi, Krishnanand Dwivedi, Smt. Usha Devi and Smt. Poonam were sentenced under Section 498-A for rigorous imprisonment of 02 years and fine of Rs. 1500/-, under Section 304-B for 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and under Section 201 I.P.C. for rigorous imprisonment of 02 years and fine of Rs. 1500/-and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act for 03 months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/-with default imprisonment of 09 months. Above Criminal Appeals No. 941 of 2010, 254 of 2010 and 886 of 2010, for the purpose of convenience and to avoid the repetition in appreciation of the evidence available on record are being decided by this common Judgment. Earlier criminal appeal No. 887 of 2010 was filed by mother-in-law Meena Kumari, which has been abated on account of her death vide order dated 10.11.2010 passed in that appeal. 3. Earlier criminal appeal No. 887 of 2010 was filed by mother-in-law Meena Kumari, which has been abated on account of her death vide order dated 10.11.2010 passed in that appeal. 3. The prosecution case in nutshell is that an FIR was lodged by informant Chandra Bhal Dwivedi against appellants and co-accused Atulendra on 22.06.2005 at 22:10 hours at Police Station Kotwali Maharajganj, Sub District Maharajganj, District Raebareli stating therein that her daughter Poornima was married to appellant Kamlednra Dwivedi son of late Anjani Kumar Dwivedi, resident of Village Salethu, Police Station Maharajganj, District Raebareli and adequate dowry was given in her marriage. When Poonam, first time came back from her matrimonial home she informed that her husband Kamlendra and his above mentioned family members are demanding a motorcycle and Rs. 20,000/-in cash for the purpose of establishing a shop for her husband and also treating her with cruelty. They consoled her that by the passage of time everything shall be allright. When she went to her matrimonial home for the second time appellants again started demanding dowry and also started beating her and treating her with cruelty on non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. Informant along with his brother-in-law Ram Kumar Mishra and Sanjay Kumar went to the matrimonial home of his daughter for the purpose of ‘Vidai’, where all appellants demanded dowry and threatened them that if their demand is not fulfilled in the next 4 to 5 months, they will have to bear the consequences. They tried hard to make them understand and also requested not to treat Poonam with cruelty and they will do everything to meet their demand, but they did not sent Poonam with them. On 21.06.2005 at about 9:00 pm., Raghvendra informed him to come immediately as the daughter of the informant is in miserable condition. He immediately rushed to the matrimonial home of her daughter and found that her daughter had been burnt alive after being assaulted and her body had been hanged from the ledge, but her feets were resting on the ground. On the basis of the above application, (Exhibit-ka-1), the First Information Report (Exhibit-ka-10) was lodged against all above mentioned appellants and Atulendra under Sections 498-A, 304-B of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act at Case Crime No. 60 of 2005 at Police Station Kotwali Maharajganj, District Raebareli. On the basis of the above application, (Exhibit-ka-1), the First Information Report (Exhibit-ka-10) was lodged against all above mentioned appellants and Atulendra under Sections 498-A, 304-B of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act at Case Crime No. 60 of 2005 at Police Station Kotwali Maharajganj, District Raebareli. The substance of this information was entered in the General Diary (Exhibit-ka-11) at Serial No.-41 at 22:10 hours on 22.06.2005 and the investigation of the case was entrusted to Circle Officer of Police Maharajganj. 4. The inquest (Exhibit-ka-8) of the dead body of the deceased Poonam was done by Shri Ved Prakash Tripathi, the then ‘Tehsildar’, Maharajganj in the presence of S.H.O. Kotwali Maharajganj. He also prepared a recovery memo of ‘rope’ as well as of blood stained and simple soil (Exhibit-ka-4 & 5). He also prepared necessary papers for the postmortem of the dead body of Poonam i.e. Photo Lash, Challan Lash, Chitthi C.M.O., Chitthi R.I. (Exhibit-ka-6 to Ka-9) and after properly sealing the dead body, sent the same for postmortem. 5. The postmortem on the dead body of Poornima @ Poonam was performed by Dr. Rajendra Sharma (P.W.-4) on 22.06.2005 at 4:15 pm. at District Hospital, Raebareli, who also prepared the postmortem report (Exhibit-ka-2). He found the age of the deceased to be about 23 years and the deceased was found to be of average built. Her eyes and tongue were protruded, whole face, fore-arms, hands, chest, abdomen and both lower limbs were found burnt showing first to second degrees of burn. Fluid vesicles were found present on the body of the deceased in burnt areas and line of redness was also found present. A ligature mark was also found present below the thyroid cartilage interrupted at the back of neck. Rigor mortis was found passed in upper limbs and was present in lower limbs. One lacerated wound was also found in lower part of vagina in between vagina and anus. On internal examination, brain and its membrances were found congested, sooth particles were found present in larynx, trachea. Right chamber of the heart was found full and left was found empty. Skin of the abdomen was found burnt and 70 ml. of semi-digested food was found in the stomach. Gases were found in small intestine while in large intestine, gases and faecal matter was found. Right chamber of the heart was found full and left was found empty. Skin of the abdomen was found burnt and 70 ml. of semi-digested food was found in the stomach. Gases were found in small intestine while in large intestine, gases and faecal matter was found. Liver was found congested weighing about 1200 grams and the gall bladder was found half full. Spleen and kidneys were congested and in the opinion of the Doctor, the cause of death was shock due to ante-mortem burn injuries. 6. The Investigating Officer of the case namely Shri Charan Pal Singh, Circle Officer of the Police recorded the statement of informant Shri Chandra Bhal Dwivedi, Smt. Kusum Trivedi, Shri Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Shri Subhash Trivedi and also prepared the Site Plan (Exhibit-ka-12) and also collected the postmortem report and inquest report. He also recorded the statement of witness Ram Naresh Tiwari, Rajeev, Shailendra Kumar Tiwari, Vishnu Kant Dwivedi, Smt. Saira Bano and Dr. Rajendra Sharma and also the statement of appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi @ Vidyanand Dwivedi, Head Constable Suresh Kumar Shukla. He also recorded the statements of accused persons Krishnanand Dwivedi and Smt. Poonam as well as of appellant Raghvendra, Smt. Meena Kumari, Smt. Usha Devi and Atulendra Kumar. On 14.07.2005, the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of Smt. Poonam and Krishnanand was recorded, a copy of which was made by him in the case diary and after finding sufficient evidence against all accused persons, he submitted the Charge-Sheet (Exhibit-ka-13) against them under Sections 498-A, 304-B of I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 7. The case being triable by the Court of Sessions was committed to it and the trial Court after hearing the prosecution and appellants framed charges against all accused persons under Sections 498-A, 304-B of I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. All appellants denied the charges and claimed trial. Prosecution in order to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt against the appellants and other accused person Atulendra Dwivedi placed reliance on following documentary evidence:- Written Application (Tehrir F.I.R.), Exhibit-ka-1, Postmortem Report of deceased Poornima @ Poonam, Exhibit-ka-2, Inquest Report, Exhibit-ka-3, Seizure memo of Rope and blood stained and simple soil, Exhibit-ka-4 and Exhibit-ka-5, Photo Lash, Exhibit-ka-6, Challan Lash, Exhibit-ka-7, Chitthi C.M.O., Exhibit-ka-8, Chitthi R.I., Exhibit-ka-9, Chick F.I.R., Exhibit-ka-10, G.D. Qayami, Exhibit-ka-11, Site Plan, Exhibit-ka-12, Charge-Sheet, Exhibit-ka-13. Prosecution in addition to the above documentary evidence also produced following witnesses:-P.W.-1/Chandra Bhal Trivedi (Informant), P.W.-2/Kusum Trivedi (Mother of the informant/deceased), P.W.-3/Ram Naresh Tiwari (Witness), P.W.-4/Dr. Rajendra Sharma (Doctor, who performed postmortem), P.W.-5/Ved Prakash Tripathi, (Tehsildar, who conducted inquest), P.W.-6/Constable Ram Prasad Saroj (Scribe of the Chick FIR and G.D.), P.W.-7/A.P. Singh (First Investigating Officer), P.W.-8/Shri Charan Pal Singh (Second Investigating Officer). 8. After the completion of the prosecution evidence, statement of all appellants was recorded by the trial Court. In their statement, recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., all accused persons have admitted the fact of solemnization of marriage of deceased Poonam @ Poornima with appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi one year before the incident. They denied the other evidence produced by the prosecution and stated that fake documentary evidence has been prepared to falsely implicate them. Appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi has stated that in the morning of the fateful day, there was some verbal altercation between him and his wife Poornima and thereafter he left his home without eating anything in order to meet his nephew Atulendra and returned late in the night at about 8:00 pm. and found that her wife had committed suicide. He informed the police as well as his father-in-law. He further stated that after postmortem his father-in-law started demanding Rs.1 lac to which he denied and in consequence thereof he has been falsely implicated. Appellant Raghvendra in his statement, recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., has stated that he after constructing his own house, is residing at Village Atrehta, Maharajganj since 1997. He is working at Gramin Bank and at the time of incident he was on duty at Chandapur Branch of the Bank and he has been falsely implicated. Appellant Krishnanand has stated that he is residing separately from Kamlendra since 1998 and all properties between them have been partitioned in the year 2003. At the time of the incident, he had gone to Maharajganj to collect ‘Tahbazari’ and he has been falsely implicated. Appellant Krishnanand has stated that he is residing separately from Kamlendra since 1998 and all properties between them have been partitioned in the year 2003. At the time of the incident, he had gone to Maharajganj to collect ‘Tahbazari’ and he has been falsely implicated. Smt. Meena Devi in her statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has stated that in the year 2003, the ancestral house and the agricultural land of her husband was partitioned between herself and her sons and she got ¼th share in agricultural land, Since then, she had been living separately from Kamlendra and at the time of incident she had gone to the house of a co-villager to participate in ‘Akhand Ramayan’ and she had been falsely implicated. Appellant Usha Devi in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C, has stated that since 1997, she had been living separately at Village Atrehta, Maharajganj along with her husband and children and she had been falsely implicated. Similarly, appellant Poonam Devi stated in her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that she had been living separately from Kamlendra for the last 12-13 years and at the time of incident she was in other Village to participate in ‘Akhand Ramayan Path’. 9. In addition to their statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., appellants have also produced witnesses D.W.-1/Mohd. Israr, D.W.-2/Vinod Kumar (Lekhpal), D.W.-3/Bhoopendra Bahadur Singh, Manager, Chandapur Branch of Gramin Bank, D.W.-4/Smt. Sharda Singh Village Pradhan, Atrehta and in documentary evidence, has produced 09 documents in list 14-ka and also recalled prosecution witness No.6/Constable Ram Prasad Saroj, who proved Exhibit-kha-1, G.D. No.-5. 10. The trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record found that the prosecution has been able to prove its case against above mentioned appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and, therefore, convicted the appellants for the offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 of I.P.C. & Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, in the manner described in the second paragraph of this judgment, however, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against accused Atulendra and, therefore, acquitted him of all the charges levelled against him. 11. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 01.02.2010, the appellants have challenged the same in this appeal. 12. 11. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 01.02.2010, the appellants have challenged the same in this appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the trial Court has convicted the appellants purely on the basis of ‘surmises and conjectures’ and has also failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in right perspective. He further submits that the trial Court has ignored the major contradictions present in the testimony of prosecution witnesses and has also not taken note of the fact that P.W.-2/Smt. Kusum Trivedi has contended in her statement that deceased did not tell her about any demand of dowry made by the appellants and, therefore, the trial Court appreciated the evidence in a mechanical manner. He pointed out that appellant No.1-Raghvendra Dwivedi was a Bank employee and was posted in Baroda Gramin Bank, Branch Chandapur, Raebareli at the time of incident and was also on duty at the time of incident. The Bank Manager of the relevant branch has been produced as D.W.-3, who has testified that the appellant Raghvendra Dwivedi was present in Bank on 21.06.2009 from 9:30 am. till 5:00 pm. He has also proved the Attendance Register of the Bank, but the trial Court has misread his evidence. It is next submitted that the trial Court, despite there being sufficient evidence, ignored the fact that Raghvendra Dwivedi had also purchased a plot at Village Atrehta. He had constructed a house there and was residing there with her wife Smt. Usha Devi since 1997. Contrary to this, findings of the trial Court in respect of separate living of appellant Raghvendra Dwivedi is contrary to the evidence on record. It is further submitted that it was apparent and established on record that the appellants Raghvendra, Krishnanad, Smt. Poonam, Smt. Usha and Smt. Meena Kumari were living separately from Kamlendra Dwivedi, therefore, there was no occasion for the trial Court to convict all the appellants for the offence under Section 304-B and 498A of I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, as other appellants except Kamlendera could not be the beneficiary of any dowry and were not in a position to treat the deceased with cruelty. It is next submitted that the evidence of the prosecution is not so strong that on the basis of which, conviction of appellants could be sustained and, therefore, keeping in view the evidence available on record, the appellants are liable to be acquitted of all the charges framed against them. It is also submitted that appellant Kamlendera has been sentenced for life imprisonment for the offence under Section 304-B and the reasons given by the trial Court for inflicting the maximum penalty are not cogent and trial Court failed to understand the fact that instant case is not of a rare specie and therefore the sentence of the appellant Kamlendera under Section 304-B I.P.C. be altered from life imprisonment to the sentence already undergone as the appellant has already undergone sentence of more than 10 years. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on following case laws:- 1. Anil Kumar Vs. State of U.P [2018 JIC (Supp.) 657 (All)]. 2. Mohammad & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. [2018 (1) JIC 693 (All)]. 3. Chandra Prakash Rathur Vs. State of U.P. [2018 (3) JIC 560 (All)]. 4. Ahsan & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. [2019 (1) JIC 660 (All)]. 5. Hari Om Vs. State of Haryana and another (2015) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 141. 6. Baijnath and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2017) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 225. 7. Shailendra Vs. State of U.P. [2018 JIC (Supp.) 54(All)]. 8. Badam Singh Vs. State of U.P. [2018 JIC (Supp.) 861 (All)]. 9. Balram & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. [2018 JIC (Supp.) 1015 (All)]. 13. Per contra, learned A.G.A. submits that the trial Court after taking into consideration and appreciating the evidence available on record in its totality has convicted the appellants for the offence committed by them. Therefore, there is no illegality or irregularity either in the marshalling of facts or in appreciation of evidence by the Court below. It is next submitted that to prove offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. ingredients mentioned therein are required to be proved by the prosecution and if the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the ingredients of Section 304-B I.P.C. then by virtue of application of Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, a presumption shall be drawn against appellants that they have committed the dowry death. Therefore, no illegality has been committed by the trial Court in convicting the appellants and the appeal of the appellants is liable to be dismissed. 14. Prosecution in order to prove its case before the trial Court has produced 8 witnesses. P.W.-1/Chandra Bhal Dwivedi who is the father of the deceased has stated that her daughter Poornima @ Poonam was married to Kamlendra Dwivedi on 23.04.2004. They gave adequate dowry in her marriage but from the beginning of her marriage, her mother-in-law, Jeth Raghvendra, Jethani Usha, Atulendra and another Jeth Krishnanand and Jethani Poonam started demanding Rs. 20,000/-in cash and a motorcycle and started treating her daughter with cruelty on non-fulfillment of such demand. When they brought Poornima to their house, she told them that the above mentioned accused persons are demanding Rs. 20,000/-and a motorcycle and also treating her with physical cruelty. He consoled her daughter that by the passage of time everything shall be allright. Raghvendra Dwivedi also came to his house for the purpose of ‘Vidai’, but after ‘Vidai’ she was again ill-treated for demand of dowry and was also physically assaulted. It is further stated by him that in the month of May, 2005, he along with his brother-in-law Rajkumar Mishra and a close relative Sanjay Kumar Bajpayee went to perform the ‘vidai’ of Poornima at Village Salethu, where accused persons demanded dowry and asked him to part with the dowry and ‘Vidai Ceremony’ could only be performed then. They threatened that if in the next 4-5 months, a motorcycle and Rs. 20,000/-are not arranged then they will have to face the consequences. They asked them not to treat Poornima with cruelty and that they will arrange whatever they could. On 21.06.2005 at about 9:00 pm., Raghvendra Dwivedi made a call at the shop, where he is working and asked him to come to the Village as the condition of the Poornima was bad. He along with his wife and son and brother-in-law Suresh rushed to Village Salethu and arrived there at 7:00 am. and saw that after burning her daughter they had placed her in hanging condition on a ‘Ledge’ (Chajja). No person from her in-law’s house was present there. He lodged the First Information Report, (Exhibit-ka-1) at P.S. Maharajganj. He along with his wife and son and brother-in-law Suresh rushed to Village Salethu and arrived there at 7:00 am. and saw that after burning her daughter they had placed her in hanging condition on a ‘Ledge’ (Chajja). No person from her in-law’s house was present there. He lodged the First Information Report, (Exhibit-ka-1) at P.S. Maharajganj. P.W.-2/Kusum Trivedi is the mother of the deceased Poornima @ Poonam, has corroborated the statement of P.W.-1/ Chandra Bhal Trivedi, pertaining to the solemnization of marriage of her daughter with Kamlendra Dwivedi on 23.04.2004 and the cruelty committed by the appellants on her for demand of Rs.20,000/-and motorcycle. She also stated that on 21.06.2005, Raghvendra telephonically informed them about the bad condition of their daughter and they reached the matrimonial home of her daughter in the morning at about 6:00 pm. and saw that her daughter was hanging from the ‘Ledge’ (Chajja). P.W.-3/Ram Naresh Tiwari is the witness who arranged this marriage who stated that he was instrumental in solemnization of this marriage, which was solemnized in the year 2004. No demand of dowry was made by the appellants before marriage and even after the solemnization of marriage, no such demand has also been made in his presence. This witness has proved his signatures on ‘Panchnama’. P.W.-4/Dr. Rajendra Sharma has stated to have conducted the postmortem on the dead body of deceased Poornima @ Poonam on 22.06.2005 at 4:15 pm. which was brought by Constable Sarvdev Trivedi and Constable Rajesh Pandey of Police Station Maharajganj, Raebareli. He has proved the postmortem report in his handwriting and signature as Exhibit-ka-2. The details of the postmortem report including the injuries found on the person of the deceased has been elaborately discussed and reproduced at Para 5 of this judgment, hereinbefore. P.W.-5/Ved Prakash Tripathi was Tehsildar Maharajganj, District Raebareli at relevant point of time. He stated to have prepared the ‘Panchnama’ and proved the same as Exhibit-ka-3 in his hand writing and signatures. He has also proved the seizure memo of a ‘rope’ and also the seizure memo pertaining to simple and blood stained soil from the spot as Exhibit-ka-4 & 5. He has also proved preparation of Photo Lash, Challan Lash, Chitthi C.M.O., Chitthi R.I. and proved the same in his hand writing and signatures as Exhibit-ka-6 to Exhibit-ka-9. He has also proved the seizure memo of a ‘rope’ and also the seizure memo pertaining to simple and blood stained soil from the spot as Exhibit-ka-4 & 5. He has also proved preparation of Photo Lash, Challan Lash, Chitthi C.M.O., Chitthi R.I. and proved the same in his hand writing and signatures as Exhibit-ka-6 to Exhibit-ka-9. P.W.-6/Constable Ram Prasad Saroj of Police Station Maharajganj is the witness who registered the FIR and prepared the chick. He has stated that on 22.06.2005, he was posted as Constable Clerk at P.S. Maharajganj, District Raebareli and prepared Chick on the basis of the application, Exhibit-ka-1 and proved the same as Exhibit-ka-10 under his hand writing and signatures. He also prepared the G.D. Serial No. 41 time 22:10 hours dated 22.06.2005 in his hand writing as Exhibit-ka-11. P.W.-7/Shri A.P. Singh was the Circle Officer Police Tiloi on 23.06.2005. He stated that as the then Circle Officer, Police Maharajganj was on leave, he was his link officer and he took the investigation of the case in that capacity and collected the copy of application, Chick FIR and also the copy of General Diary and has written the first ‘parcha’ of the C.D. P.W.-8/Shri Charan Pal Singh is the second Investigating Officer of the crime, who stated in his evidence that on 25.06.2005, he recorded the statement of witness Chandra Bhal Dwivedi, Smt. Kusum Trivedi, Shri Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Shri Shubhash Trivedi and also inspected the spot and prepared the Site Plan in his hand writing and signatures and proved the same as Exhibit-ka-12. He further stated to have arrested the accused Kamlendra Kumar @ Vidyanand Dwivedi and recorded his statement and after recording the statement of the witnesses and recording of the statement of Poonam and Krishnanand under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., submitted the charge-sheet against accused persons under his signatures and his hand writing. 15. The appellants also produced 04 defence witnesses namely D.W.-1/Mohd. Israr, D.W.-2/Vinod Kumar, D.W.-3/Bhoopendra Bahadur Singh and D.W.-4/Smt. Sharda Singh. D.W.-1/Mohd. Israr in his statement has stated that he was the ‘Pradhan’ of Village Salethu for the last five years and knew Krishnanand very well. He further submitted that Krishnanand was residing separately from his brother Kamlendra for the last 10-11 years, while Raghvendra was residing at Village Atrehta, Maharajganj for last 12 years of the incident and hadalso constructed a house there. He further submitted that Krishnanand was residing separately from his brother Kamlendra for the last 10-11 years, while Raghvendra was residing at Village Atrehta, Maharajganj for last 12 years of the incident and hadalso constructed a house there. He also stated that Krishnanand was residing in Village Atrehta with his family and all three brothers have got all the assets of their father partitioned in between them and Krishnanand was not having any concern with either Kamlendra or his family. D.W.-2/Vinod Kumar is ‘Lekhpal’ of Tehsil Maharajganj, District Raebareli, who has proved that the agricultural land of Raghvendra Dwivedi, Krishnanand, Kamlendra Kumar had been partitioned in between them in the revenue records. He also filed an extract of ‘Khatauni’ as Paper No. 153-Kha, which had been issued on 06.08.2009. D.W.-3/Shri Bhoopendra Bahadur Singh is Branch Manager, Chandpur Branch, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank, Raebareli, who has stated that on 21.06.2005, he was Branch Manager of the aforesaid branch and accused/appellant Raghvendra Prasad was working there as Process Server. He also stated to have brought the Attendance Register with him and also stated that the said register was maintained in due course. He stated that on 21.06.2005, Raghvendra Prasad was at his duty in the Bank from 9:30 in the morning till 5:00 in the evening. He has also produced an attested copy of the Attendance Register and also proved the same as Exhibit-kha-3. D.W.-4/Smt. Sharda Singh is the Pradhan of Village Atrehta. She stated that appellant Raghvendra Prasad was known to her and he had been living at Village Atrehta along with his family since 1997 by constructing a house there. We have perused the evidence available on record. A perusal of definition of dowry death as provided under Section 304-B of I.P.C. would reveal that if it is proved that death of a women is caused by any burn or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within 07 years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives and such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with demand of dowry and such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death, then it shall be obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused person(s) have caused the dowry death. In Baijnath and Ors. In Baijnath and Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in MANU/SC/1501/2016 Honble Supreme Court while considering the requirement of section 304B I.P.C. opined as under : “27. The evidence on record and the competing arguments have received our required attention. As the prosecution is on the charge of the offences envisaged in Sections 304B and 498A of the Code, the provisions for reference are extracted hereunder: 304B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purpose of this Sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 28. 28. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are: (i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances and (ii) is within seven years of her marriage and (iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. the offence Under Section 498A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The explanation to this Section exposits "cruelty" as: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) or (ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 29. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences. 30. The expression "dowry" is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression "cruelty", as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry to reiterate is the gravamen of the two offences. 31. Section 113B of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to dowry death in the following terms: 113B. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry to reiterate is the gravamen of the two offences. 31. Section 113B of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to dowry death in the following terms: 113B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) 32. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith. 33. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 34. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 34. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to gloss-over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated in the Sections involved, lest justice is the casualty. 35. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304B of the Code and Section 113B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304B as in Shindo Alias Sawinder Kaur and Anr. v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0499/2011 : (2011) 11 SCC 517 and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/1144/2013 : (2013) 16 SCC 640. In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death Under Section 304B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death Under Section 113B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao MANU/SC/0890/2002 : (2003) 1 SCC 217 to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty and harassment "in connection with the demand for dowry".” The Apex Court in the case of Kaliyaperumal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, MANU/SC/0624/2003 has held that presumption shall be raised only on proving of the following essential:- (I) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. State of Tamil Nadu, MANU/SC/0624/2003 has held that presumption shall be raised only on proving of the following essential:- (I) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (II) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (III) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. (IV) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death. 16. A conjoint reading of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act indicates that if the prosecution has proved that the death of the wife was not natural or accidental death then it brings the case within the purview of 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances and once the prosecution had succeeded in proving that the deceased had died an unnatural death in her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by husband or her relatives, the presumption under Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act shall be attracted. 17. The word "soon before death" fell for consideration in a large number of cases before the Supreme Court and this Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Hira Lal and others v. State (Government of NCT), Delhi, MANU/SC/0495/2003 : (2003) 8 SCC 80 , has considered the scope of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC in the following terms: "9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to expression "soon before" used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods "soon after the theft, is either the thief has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession". The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibriu45m of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence." The principle laid down in this case has been uniformly followed by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibriu45m of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence." The principle laid down in this case has been uniformly followed by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases. Reference may be made to the judgments in the case of Rajinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, MANU/SC/0046/2015 : (2015) 4 SCC 215 ; Baljinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/1047/2014 : (2015) 2 SCC 629 ; and, Vijay Pal Singh and others v. State of Uttarakhand, MANU/SC/1172/2014 : (2014) 15 SCC 163 . 18. We now propose to ascertain whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving the four essentials of Section 304-B I.P.C., as spelt out by the Apex Court in the aforementioned cases for raising the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act by scrutinizing the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the appellants in this regard. It has been stated in the First Information Report that marriage of the deceased Poonam @ Poornima was solemnized with appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi on 23.04.2004. P.W.-1/Chandra Bhal Trivedi, P.W-2/Kusum Trivedi and P.W.-3/Ram Naresh Tiwari (who actually arranged this marriage) have stated in their statement before the trial Court that the marriage of the deceased Poornima @ Poonam was solemnized with appellant Kamlendra on 23.04.2004. The appellants in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. have also admitted that the marriage of deceased Poornima @ Pooam was held with appellant Kamlendra in the year 2004. Therefore, keeping in view the evidence on record, it is proved that the deceased was married to appellant Kamlendra in the year 2004. It is also proved by the evidence available on record that the deceased had died on 21.06.2005. Therefore, there is also no doubt pertaining to the proof of the fact that deceased Poornima @ Poonam died within 07 years of her marriage. Now it has to be seen whether the deceased Poornima @ Poonam died a natural death or her death was otherwise than in normal circumstances. It has been stated by P.W.-1/Chandra Bhal Trivedi and P.W.-2/Kusum Trivedi that when they reached the matrimonial house of the deceased, they found her hanging in a burnt condition. She was hanging with a ‘rope’, however her feets were found on the ground. It has been stated by P.W.-1/Chandra Bhal Trivedi and P.W.-2/Kusum Trivedi that when they reached the matrimonial house of the deceased, they found her hanging in a burnt condition. She was hanging with a ‘rope’, however her feets were found on the ground. In the Inquest Report (Exhibit-ka-3), which was performed on the information given by appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi (husband of the deceased) on 22.06.2005 at 2:05 pm., P.W.-5 Ved Prakash Tripathi found her hanging in burnt condition and she was bleeding from the nose, vagina and anus. He also noted in the inquest report, an injury on the left knee of deceased and burn injuries all over her body. P.W.-4/Dr. Rajendra Sharma, who has conducted postmortem on the body of deceased Poornima @ Poonam, has stated in his statement that the whole face, fore arm and hands, chest, abdomen and both lower limbs of the deceased were burnt by 1st to 2nd degree burns. He further stated that fluid filled vesicles were present on the body of the deceased and at the edge of these, line of redness was also present. A ligature mark was also found around neck of the deceased below thyroid cartilage, length of which was about 28 cms. and it was interrupted at the back of the neck. The cause of death of the deceased was determined as shock due to ante-mortem burn injuries. P.W.4/Dr. Rajendra Sharma has also stated in his cross-examination that the body or injuries of the deceased were not smelling of any kerosene oil and an injury has also been found at the place between the vagina and anus and apart from this no other injury was found. He further stated that it is correct to say that if after an hour or two of the death a rope is tied, the ligature mark, as described in the postmortem report may be inflicted. According to him, no bone of the neck of the deceased was found fractured and the deceased had not died due to strangulation. He stated that the burn injuries could also come by burning at the time of cooking of food or by accidental burn and if in the process of putting off the fire deceased runs here and there and falls on any sharp object she may suffer the injury of the nature found around her private part. Keeping in view the evidence of the Dr. Keeping in view the evidence of the Dr. Rajendra Sharma/P.W.-4, it is evident that the death of the deceased was caused by burn injuries and not by strangulation or smothering. Therfore it is also proved by the evidence available on record that the death of the deceased Poornima @ Poonam had occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances. 19. Now it has to be seen as to whether deceased Poornima @ Poonam was subjected to any cruelty or harassment by her husband Kamlendra or his relatives (other appellants) soon before her death in connection with any demand of dowry. P.W.-1/Chandra Bhal Trivedi in his evidence has stated that since beginning of the marriage of her daughter Poornima @ Poonam all accused persons were demanding Rs. 20,000/-and a motorcycle in dowry and were treating Poornima with cruelty. It is also stated by him that in the month of May, 2005, he went to Village Salethu for ‘Vidai Ceremony’, but in-law’s of deceased did not perform ‘vidai’ and asked him to provide Rs. 20,000/-and a motorcycle within 4 to 5 months or to face grave consequences and thereafter on 21.06.2005 appellant Raghvendra Dwivedi informed them about the incident. He further stated that when he reached at the spot he found deceased hanging from the ledge (Chajja) in a burnt condition, but her clothes were intact and none of the members of the appellant’s family was there. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the demand of Rs. 20,000/-and motorcycle started after solemnization of marriage and this demand was not having any connection with the marriage. He did not lodge any report against accused persons for demanding the dowry and he did not mention the fact of going to the matrimonial home of deceased in May, 2005. He further submitted that he did not file any FIR even when the appellants threatened him. He admits that it is correct to say that appellant Raghvendra Dwivedi was having a “LML Vespa Scooter” from the last 10-12 years and the age of mother-in-law of the deceased namely Smt. Meena Kumari was about 65-70 years. He further admits that after death of the father of the appellants, the agricultural land inherited by them had been partitioned by them on 11.09.2003 amongst themselves and their mother. He also admitted that appellant Raghvendra was serving at Baroda Gramin Bank Chandpur Branch and his duty hours were from 9:30 am. He further admits that after death of the father of the appellants, the agricultural land inherited by them had been partitioned by them on 11.09.2003 amongst themselves and their mother. He also admitted that appellant Raghvendra was serving at Baroda Gramin Bank Chandpur Branch and his duty hours were from 9:30 am. to 5:00 pm. This witness has claimed that this fact was not in his knowledge that appellant Raghvendra was living in Village Atrehta from 1992 by constructing a house in that village. He also shows ignorance of the fact that appellant Krishnanand was doing the job of collecting ‘Tahbazari’ at Tempo Stand at Maharajganj. It is admitted to him that the main door of the appellant Krishnanand’s house is situated towards the South and the ‘kothri’, wherein he lives with his wife which is ‘kacchi’. He further admits that the mother-in-law of the deceased is living in a room built separately towards East of the house. He also shows ignorance about the fact that a Separate ‘Parivar Register’ of appellant Krishnanand was maintained and has admitted that on 21.06.2005 appellant Raghvendra informed him through telephone at 9:00 pm. that deceased Poornima @ Poonam had committed suicide. He shows ignorance of the fact that appellant Kamlendra informed the Police Station, Maharajganj through a written application about the suicide committed by the deceased, which was entered at Serial No.5 of the G.D. dated 22.06.2005 at 2:05 pm. P.W.-2/Kusum Trivedi, who is the mother of the deceased has stated about the fact of demand of dowry of Rs. 20,000/-and motorcycle by accused persons after the marriage and also that the same continued till May, 2005. She stated that when they reached the matrimonial house of the deceased, her daughter was bleeding from nose and she noticed an injury on her Naval area and she was also bleeding from her private part and anus and her body was in burnt condition. She stated in her cross-examination that she did not see any accused person throughout the inquest proceeding. This witness was contradicted with her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., wherein she had stated that in the night of 21.06.2005, appellant Raghvendra informed them through telephone that deceased Poonam had committed suicide. She further stated in her cross-examination that she had 03 daughters and Mithilesh Kumari was the eldest one amongst them, who had also committed suicide. She further stated in her cross-examination that she had 03 daughters and Mithilesh Kumari was the eldest one amongst them, who had also committed suicide. It was admitted by her that they did not lodge any FIR against in-law’s of Mithilesh. It is also admitted by her that appellant Kamlendra was not doing any job at the time of incident and Raghvendra was serving in a Bank, while appellant Krishnanand was collecting ‘Tahbazari’ at Tempo Stand of Maharajganj. She admitted that she never went to the matrimonial home of her daughter and had never met with mother of Kamlendra, Krishnanand or Raghvendra’s wife and she could not recognize them. She shows ignorance of the fact that appellant Raghvendra was living at Village Atrehta by constructing a house since 1997 and that her daughter went to her matrimonial home happily after her marriage. She admitted in her cross-examination that appellant Kamlendra wanted to establish a shop, but she is not aware of the fact, as to for what business he was demanding money. She further stated that her daughter did not tell the fact of demand of dowry to her, but she told this to her father and her father in turn informed her about the demand and the cruelty committed to his daughter by the appellants. P.W.-3/Ram Naresh Tiwari has also admitted in his evidence that he was instrumental in arranging the marriage of deceased with Kamlendera and also that no dowry was demanded at the time of marriage. In his cross-examination he admitted that he was aware that Raghvendra was serving in a Bank and he was living at Village Atrehta with his family since 1997. P.W.-8/Charan Pal Singh, Circle Officer of the Police (2nd Investigating Officer) has stated in his cross-examination that ‘Panchnama’ of the body of the deceased was prepared on the basis of information given by appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi @ Vidyanand Dwivedi, because he got the General Diary, where in the information given by him was registered at Serial No.-5 on 22.06.2005. He further stated that informant in his statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. had not taken the name of appellant Raghvendra Dwivedi in connection with the second ‘vidai’ of the deceased. He further stated that informant had told him that motorcycle and Rs. 20,000/-were being demanded for establishing a shop. He further stated that informant in his statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. had not taken the name of appellant Raghvendra Dwivedi in connection with the second ‘vidai’ of the deceased. He further stated that informant had told him that motorcycle and Rs. 20,000/-were being demanded for establishing a shop. He further admitted that on 10.07.2005, appellant Raghvendra Dwivedi told him that he lived at Village Atrehta along with his family for the last one and half years, but he did not verify it, as there was sufficient evidence against Raghvendra Dwivedi. He admitted that Krishnanad Dwivedi also told him that he lived separately and in the Site Plan prepared by him, he shows his house towards south. He has not shown any door of appellant Krishnanand’s house towards East. Perusal of this Site Plan, Exhibit-ka-12, which has been proved by Investigating Officer/P.W.-8 Shri Charan Pal Singh, would reveal that the house of appellant Krishnanand is shown towards South and there is no door of this portion opening towards East where appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi was living. Perusal of this Site Plan would further reveal that it is shown in this Site Plan that deceased Poornima @ Poonam was living in a room shown by word “B”, while her body was found in hanging position at the place shown by the word “A”, which is situated in front of the room shown to be of appellant Raghvendra. A separate room of mother-in-law namely Smt. Meena Kumari has also been shown in this Site Plan. No objection has been raised by anyone, pertaining to the authenticity of this Site Plan, therefore, this Site Plan in the background of the statement of P.W.-8/Charan Pal Singh would reveal that mother-in-law of the deceased namely appellant Meena Kumari, appellant Krishnanand and deceased Poornima @ Poonam along with her husband Kamlendra were living separately in the same house and appellant Krishnanand's was living in a seprate house, main gate of which was situated towards the South, while the door of the house where deceased was living along with her husband and mother-in-law was opening towards North and both these houses were separate. 20. Perusal of record would also reveal that appellants have produced oral as well as documentary evidence in their favour. In oral evidence appellants have produced D.W.-1/Mohd. Israr, D.W.-2/Vinod Kumar, D.W.-3/Bhoopendra Bahadur Singh and D.W.-4/Smt. Sharda Singh. D.W.-1/Mohd. 20. Perusal of record would also reveal that appellants have produced oral as well as documentary evidence in their favour. In oral evidence appellants have produced D.W.-1/Mohd. Israr, D.W.-2/Vinod Kumar, D.W.-3/Bhoopendra Bahadur Singh and D.W.-4/Smt. Sharda Singh. D.W.-1/Mohd. Israr is the 'Pradhan' of Village Salethu, wherein the matrimonial home of the deceased is situated and he has stated that appellant Krishnanand is living separately from his brother appellant-Kamlendra for the last 10-11 years and appellant Raghvendra is also living separately along with his family by constructing a house at Village Atrehta from before 12 years. He has also stated that appellants Kamlendera, Raghvendera and Krishnanand have partitioned their agricultural land amongst themselves, which they inherited from their father and appellant Krishnanand was not having any concern with appellant Kamlendra or his family. In his cross-examination, he has stated that Village Salethu is about 7 to 8 kilometers away from Village Atrehta and appellant Kamlendra is the youngest of the three sons of Anjani, who is residing in a separate house, while the appellant Krishnanand is residing in a separate house. D.W.-2/Vinod Kumar is a 'Chakbandi Lekhpal', who has proved the fact that appellants Raghvendra, Kamlendra and Krishnanand have got their agricultural land partitioned amongst themselves along with their mother Meena Kumari. He also produced an extract of the 'Khatauni' which has been placed on record as Paper No. 153-Kha. The testimony of this witness, who is a Government servant, proves that three sons of Anjani i.e. appellants Kamlendra, Raghvendra and Krishnanand had partitioned the agricultural land amongst themselves which they inherited from their father. D.W.-3/Bhoopendra Bahadur Singh is the Branch Manager of baroda Gramin Bank and he has proved that appellant Raghvendra was working in his branch situated at Village Chandapur as Process Server and on 21.06.2003 he was present in the Chandpur branch of the Bank from 9:30 am. to 5:00 pm. He has produced a copy of Attendance Register in the trial Court. Evidence of this witness is not of much significance as the trial Court has convicted the appellants of the charges under Sections 304-B, 498-A and Section 201 of I.P.C. and deceased, as per the statement of Kamlendra under Section 313 Cr.P.C., died at 8:00 pm. on 21.06.2005. He has produced a copy of Attendance Register in the trial Court. Evidence of this witness is not of much significance as the trial Court has convicted the appellants of the charges under Sections 304-B, 498-A and Section 201 of I.P.C. and deceased, as per the statement of Kamlendra under Section 313 Cr.P.C., died at 8:00 pm. on 21.06.2005. D.W.-4/Smt. Sharda Singh is the ‘Pradhan’ of Village Atrehta and she has stated that appellant Raghvendra is living in Village Atrehta along with his family since 1997 by constructing his own house. 21. In documentary evidence appellants have produced electricity bill, a copy of sale deed and also a certificate issued by the Bank Manager which establishes the fact that appellant Raghvendra was working in Baroda Gramin Bank, Chandapur Branch and is also residing at Village Atrehta. However, being employed in the bank would not necessarily mean that he has severed all his connection from his ancestral home situated at Village Salethu. It is common practice amongst those who do jobs outside their home towns or villages to keep a room or two of their ancestral house with themselves for their use, even if they do not reside there and they use to come to their ancestral home on special occasions like marrige or festivals. So, in the background of this factual matrix, if Investigating Officer has shown one room of appellant Raghvendra at Village Salethu in the Site Plan of the house where Kamlendera lives, the same is not of much significance, as it is otherwise established from the evidence on record that both brothers of Kamlendra i.e. Raghvendra and Krishnanand Dwivedi were living separately and in fact Raghvendra was living at Village Atrehta, while there was no connection of the house of Krishnanad with the house where appellant Kamlendra was residing. It is also established on record that deceased was also living separately in a room of the house shown by the Investigating Officer in the Site Plan and appellant Meena Kumari was residing separately in a separate room, though in the same house. It is also established on record that deceased was also living separately in a room of the house shown by the Investigating Officer in the Site Plan and appellant Meena Kumari was residing separately in a separate room, though in the same house. So, when it is established that appellants Raghvendra, Krishnand along with their family and Meena Kumari were living separately from appellant Kamlendra, in absence of any specific role alleged against them, they should not have been convicted by the trial Court only on the basis of general and sweeping allegations of demand of dowry and cruelty in lieu of such demand, specially in the background of the fact that P.W.-2/Smt. Kusum Trivedi in her evidence has clearly admitted that Kamlendra was willing to establish a shop, but she did not know as to for what business, the money was being demanded. This statement and other pieces of evidence available on record clearly suggests that the demand of Rs.20,000/-along with a motorcycle was being made by none other than appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi only, as he, at that point of time was not doing anything and was solely dependant on the income from his agricultural land, while the other two brothers namely Raghvendra and Krishnanand, apart from holding agriculture land, were also doing their separate jobs and, therefore, demand of Rs. 20,000/-and motorcycle could only be for the benefit of Kamlendra. It is hard to believe that in this era of nuclear families, brothers who are residing separately and having their independent source of income would commit cruelty with the deceased, in lieu of demand such dowry which could only benefit their brother i.e. appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi. Therefore, keeping in view the overall evidence available on record, we are not inclined to believe that deceased Poornima @ Poonam was subjected to any cruelty in lieu of any demand of dowry by appellant Raghvendra, his wife Usha Devi, Krishnanand Dwivedi and his wife Smt. Poonam or Smt. Meena Kumari (mother-in-law). Since it is apparent from the evidence on record that appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi was dependant only on the income of his agricultural land and was also living separately with the deceased, he alone could be the only beneficiary of the demand of Rs. 20,000/-for the purpose of establishing a shop and also of a motorcycle, which can only be used by him. 20,000/-for the purpose of establishing a shop and also of a motorcycle, which can only be used by him. The trial Court contrary to the evidence on record has concluded at Page No. 22 and 23 of its judgment that only on the basis of separate living it could not be presumed that the above mentioned appellants were not having any connection with the husband of the deceased i.e. Kamlendra Dwivedi and also that Raghvendra was having good relation with his brothers. The trial Court thereafter also disbelieved the defence of separate living of appellants Raghvendra, Krishnanand Dwivedi and mother-in-law Meena Kumari and concluded that even if it is presumed that they were living separately, it was their moral and social duty to save the deceased from the cruelty which was being allegedly committed by appellant Kamlendra and hold that all of them have treated the deceased with cruelty in lieu of demand of dowry. We are unable to concur with this finding of the trial Court that the above mentioned appellants could be convicted only on the basis that they failed to discharge their social or moral obligations. The trial Court has completely forgotten one of the mandatory ingredient and important ingredient of Section 304-B I.P.C. i.e. soon before the death of the deceased she was subjected to cruelty by the appellants for or in connection with any demand of dowry. Therefore to prove this ingredient some positive act is required on behalf of the appellants and only on the basis of non discharge of any social or moral obligation offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. could not stand proved nor any adverse presumption could be raised against these appellants under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. No evidence is either available against these appellants pertaining to the charge of section 498A and Section 201 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as they were living separately and for the commission of the offence under section 201 of the IPC there is no presumption available either. No evidence is either available against these appellants pertaining to the charge of section 498A and Section 201 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as they were living separately and for the commission of the offence under section 201 of the IPC there is no presumption available either. Therefore, the trial Court has committed a manifest error in appreciating the evidence on record, pertaining to appellants Raghvendra, Krishnanand, Smt. Usha Devi and Smt. Poonam Devi in holding that they were not living separately and the trial Court has based its findings on ‘surmises and conjectures’, so far it relates to the above mentioned appellants and appeal filed by them is liable to be allowed. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs State of Maharashtra reported in MANU/SC/8543/2006, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under : “10. The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in last few years. Cases are frequently coming before the Courts, where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in Court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonize a neighbourhood family. The parents or other family members of the bride being away from the scene of commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused except regarding the demand of money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should go unpunished. 11. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh MANU/SC/0585/2003 : 2003 CriLJ 3892). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: (b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.” 22. Therefore so far as appellant Kamlendra is concerned, we are of the considered view that he is the person with whom deceased Poornima @ Poonam was living separately in a room of the house. In the normal course he should be present with his wife at the time of incident. Therefore so far as appellant Kamlendra is concerned, we are of the considered view that he is the person with whom deceased Poornima @ Poonam was living separately in a room of the house. In the normal course he should be present with his wife at the time of incident. Perusal of Site Plan (Exhibit-ka-12) would also reveal that the deceased got burnt in the room where she was living with her husband i.e. Kamlendra Dwivedi. Therefore, what actually had happened in that room could only be in the specific knowledge of appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi and, therefore, by virtue of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi was required to explain as to how and in what circumstances deceased Poornima @ Poonam had died and if no reasonable and acceptable explanation is given by the appellant Kamlendera or a false explanation is coming from his side, adverse inference will be drawn against him and since demand of Rs. 20,000/-and of a Motorcycle was being made, as claimed by P.W.-2/Kusum Trivedi for establishing a shop for him and the motorcycle can only be used by him would clearly suggest that there is ample evidence on record to establish that soon before her death he has subjected Poornima @ Poonam to cruelty in lieu of demand of dowry and thus on the basis of evidence on record a presumption as provided under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act could be drawn against appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi that he has caused the dowty death of deceased Poornima @ Poonam. He has also failed to rebut this statutory presumption and, therefore, his conviction under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 201 of I.P.C. is liable to be sustained. 23. At this juncture learned counsel appearing for the appellant Kamlendra submits that the appellant Kamlendra has already undergone 12 years of imprisonment and still continues to be in jail, this Court should alter the award of life sentence to that of one already undergone by the appellant. He has further submitted that though Section 304-B IPC prescribes awarding of imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years which may extend for life, yet according to him the instant case is not a case where the trial judge should have awarded life sentence to the appellant. He has further submitted that though Section 304-B IPC prescribes awarding of imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years which may extend for life, yet according to him the instant case is not a case where the trial judge should have awarded life sentence to the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that any term of more than seven years could meet the ends of justice and this Court should allow the appeal to the extent of modifying the impugned judgment in sofar as the quantum of sentence is concerned and reduce the same from life imprisonment to that of already undergone. Learned counsel for the State, while refuting the submission made by the counsel for the appellant Kamlendra has submitted that having regard to the totality of circumstances emerging out from the evidence and the fact that the wife of appellant was murdered in her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage, the award of sentence of life imprisonment to the appellant is fully justified and hence, this Court should not interfere in quantum of sentence. 24. In State of U.P. vs. Virendra Prasad, MANU/SC/0079/2004 Hon’ble Supreme Court while discussing principles of sentencing opined as under: 23. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. 24. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. 24. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilized societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times on account of misplaced sympathies to the perpetrator of crime leaving the victim or his family into oblivion. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the gravity of the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences. 25. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCG Dautha v. State of California: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. 26. These aspects were highlighted by us in State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja MANU/SC/0976/2003 : 2004 CriLJ 579. 27. The object should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by imposing appropriate sentence. 26. These aspects were highlighted by us in State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja MANU/SC/0976/2003 : 2004 CriLJ 579. 27. The object should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the Courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.” 25. The question as to whether we should reduce the appellant Kamlendra's sentence and if so, to what extent, as urged by the appellant's counsel, has been the subject matter of debate before the Apex Court in many cases, pertaining to Section 304-B /Section 498-A IPC and wherein the Apex Court while interpreting the expression "may" occurring in Section 304-B IPC has held that it is not mandatory for the Court in each and every case to award life imprisonment to the accused once he is found guilty of offence under Section 304-B. It has been held that the Court could award sentence in exercise of its discretion between seven years to life imprisonment depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was held that in no case it could be less than seven years and that extreme punishment of life term should be awarded in "rare cases" but not in every case. 26. In State of Karnataka vs. M.V. Manjunathegowda and Ors., MANU/SC/0005/2003 It was held that “26. The next question to be considered is the quantum of punishment. While considering the quantum of punishment, the Court must keep in view the background and intendment of the legislature so as to eradicate the evil practice of giving and taking dowry by prescribing the deterrent punishment. This was clear from the Objects and Reasons of Amending Act of 1986 (Act 43 of 1986). Consequent upon the aforesaid amendment Section 304B IPC was introduced in which the punishment is, imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. As would reveal from the various amendments as noticed above, despite stringent law, the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry remains unabated. On the contrary, it is menacingly on the increase. As would reveal from the various amendments as noticed above, despite stringent law, the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry remains unabated. On the contrary, it is menacingly on the increase. In the instant case, the conduct of the accused is of vital importance while considering the quantum of punishment. The marriage of the accused with the deceased on 17.5.1987 is neither an arranged marriage nor a love marriage. As already noticed, is a marriage by accident and the main consideration was the payment of dowry and nor out of love. It also appears from the testimony of PW-9 that a suggestion was put to the witness that accused used to permanently go to one Kallugudde Earegowda's house for work and that Kallugudde Earegowda has three female children. It was also suggested that accused was also having love affair with the first daughter of Kallugudde Earegowda. All this go to show that the main consideration of the accused marrying with the deceased was love of dowry and not love for the girl. So greed of the accused of the dowry, even for a paltry sum of Rs. 2000/-and three sovereign of gold, would cost the precious life of a human being. Such conduct of the accused is not only abhorrent to the concept of rule of law, but also against the conscience of the entire society. The practice of giving and demanding dowry is a social evil having deleterious effect on the entire civilized society and has to be condemned by the strong hands of judiciary. Despite various amendments providing deterrent punishment with a view to curb the increasing menace of dowry deaths, the evil practice of dowry remains unabated. The Court cannot be oblivion to the intendment of the legislature and the purpose for which the enactment of the law and amendment has been effected. Every court must be sensitized to the enactment of the law and the purpose for which it is made by the legislature keeping in view the evil practice of giving and taking dowry, which is having a deleterious effect on the civilized society. It must be given a meaningful interpretation so as to advance the cause of interest of the society as a whole. No leniency is warranted to the perpetrator of the crime against the society. It must be given a meaningful interpretation so as to advance the cause of interest of the society as a whole. No leniency is warranted to the perpetrator of the crime against the society. Keeping these overall accounts and circumstances in the background, we are of the view that a deterrent punishment is called for. Accused No. 1 (M.V. Manjunathe Gowde) is accordingly convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years.”(Emphasis Ours) 27. The case law, i.e., Hari Om vs. State of Haryana (31.10.2014 SC) : MANU/SC/0987/2014 which has been relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellants is also on the said issue wherein the Apex Court has held that extreme sentence of life term should be awarded in rare cases but not in every case. Relevant Para of the said judgment is reproduced here in below:-- “21. This issue has been the subject matter of debate before this Court in several cases, which arose out of Section 304B read with Section 498B and wherein this Court while interpreting the expression "may" occurring in Section 304B Indian Penal Code held that it is not mandatory for the Court in every case to award life imprisonment to the accused once he is found guilty of offence Under Section 304B. It was held that the Court could award sentence in exercise of its discretion between seven years to life imprisonment depending upon the facts of each case. It was held that in no case it could be less than seven years and that extreme punishment of life term should be awarded in "rare cases" but not in every case. 22. In the case of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0026/1995 : (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the courts below had awarded life term to the accused Under Section 304B read with Section 498A but this Court reduced it to 10 years. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held as under: 7 ...the accused-Appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. This was also a case where the accused was a police officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held as under: 7 ...the accused-Appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304B Indian Penal Code only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the Appellant Under Section 304B Indian Penal Code, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' RI.... 23. Similarly this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.V. Manjunathegowda and Anr. MANU/SC/0005/2003 : (2003) 2 SCC 188 , while convicting the accused Under Section 304B awarded 10 years imprisonment in somewhat similar facts. 24. Recently in G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka MANU/SC/0088/2010 : (2010) 3 SCC 152 , this Court while allowing the appeal filed by the accused only on the question of sentence altered the sentence from life term to 10 years on more or less similar facts. Hon'ble H.L. Dattu, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held as under: 31. In conclusion, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellant was rightly convicted Under Section 304B Indian Penal Code. However, his sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the courts below appears to us to be excessive. The Appellant is a young man and has already undergone 6 years of imprisonment after being convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court. We are of the view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a sentence of 10 years' rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the Appellant Under Section 304B Indian Penal Code, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment. The other conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant are confirmed. 25. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the Appellant Under Section 304B Indian Penal Code, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment. The other conviction and sentence passed against the Appellant are confirmed. 25. Applying the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would meet, if we reduce the sentence of the Appellant from life imprisonment to that of 10 years. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a "rare case" as envisaged by this Court so as to award to the Appellant the life imprisonment. That apart, we also notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the courts below did not assign any reasons.” 28. Having perused all the evidence and other materials on record, we find that the deceased after being burnt was either hanged herself or she was hanged by some other person as a ligature mark was found around her neck. The cause of death of deceased has been determined as shock due to ante-mortem burn injuries, therefore, hanging was not the cause of death of deceased. A lacerated wound has also been found on the person of deceased in between her vagina and anus. P.W.-4/Dr. Rajendra Sharma in his statement has stated that grievous injuries of burn were not caused to the deceased and the one injury found on the person of deceased, according to the Doctor may come by falling on some sharp object during the course of running here and there in an attempt to put off the fire. The Doctor has also opined that no bone of the neck of the deceased was found fractured. 29. The above factual matrix thus reveals that the deceased, though, was not seriously burnt but she died of 1st and 2nd degree burn injuries. However, her clothes were found changed and much emphasis has been given by prosecution to take this fact into consideration for awarding maximum sentence of life imprisonment. We may realize that the deceased was burnt and there is no possibility that any part of her clothes would have been intact. However, her clothes were found changed and much emphasis has been given by prosecution to take this fact into consideration for awarding maximum sentence of life imprisonment. We may realize that the deceased was burnt and there is no possibility that any part of her clothes would have been intact. Therefore, in such a scenario, if fresh clothes were put on her person by the appellant Kamlendra, it is not a circumstance on the basis of which the extreme penalty of life imprisonment should be awarded. 30. Keeping into mind, the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that justice would be served, if we alter the sentence of the appellant Kamlendra from life imprisonment to that of 12 years. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a "rare case" on the parameters set forth herein before so as to award the appellant the life imprisonment . That apart we are also not satisfied by the reasoning given by the trial Court for awarding Life imprisonment to appellant Kamlendra, the conviction of the appellant is hereby upheld but the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to him by the Trial Court under section 304-B I.P.C. is hereby reduced to 12 years rigorous imprisonment. The impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is modified to that extent only with respect to appellant Kamlendra, who is in jail as on date. The conviction and sentence of appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi for the offence under sections 498A, 201 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act shall remain the same as was awarded by the trial Court and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed to this extent. The appeal filed by appellant Kamlendra Dwivedi is this partly allowed. 31. In view of the foregoing discussions, we order as follows:- (i) Criminal appeal Nos. 254 of 2010 and 886 of 2010 are allowed. The recorded conviction of the appellants Raghvendra, Krishnanand, Smt. Usha Devi and Smt. Poonam Devi and the sentences awarded to them under Sections 304-B, 498 A and 201 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, are hereby set aside. 254 of 2010 and 886 of 2010 are allowed. The recorded conviction of the appellants Raghvendra, Krishnanand, Smt. Usha Devi and Smt. Poonam Devi and the sentences awarded to them under Sections 304-B, 498 A and 201 IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, are hereby set aside. Appellants Raghvendra, Krishnanand, Smt. Usha Devi and Smt. Poonam Devi are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. They are on bail, they need not to surrender. Their bail bonds are cancelled and their sureties are discharged. However, they will comply with the provisions of Section 437-A of Code of Criminal Procedure and file two sureties each to the satisfaction of the trial Court concerned in the trial Court within one month from today. (ii) Criminal appeal No. 941 of 2010 also succeeds and is allowed in part. The recorded conviction of the appellant-Kamlendra under Sections 304-B, 498A and 201 IPC is upheld, but the awarded sentence of life imprisonment to him under section 304-B I.P.C. is reduced to 12 years' rigorous imprisonment. The Sentence awarded by the trial Court pertaining to Section 498A and 201 IPC, as well as under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act shall remain the same as awarded by the trial Court. He will also get the benefit of Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. He is detained in prison and he will serve out the sentence awarded by the trial Court as altered by this court. In case appellant Kamlendra has served out the imprisonment awarded by the trial Court as altered by this Court, he will be released from the prison if he is not liable to be detained in any other case. He will also comply with the provisions of Section 437-A of Code of Criminal Procedure and file two sureties to the satisfaction of the trial Court concerned in the trial Court within one month from his release from the prison today. The record of the trial Court along with a copy of this Judgment be sent to the trial Court, at the earliest.