ORDER : T. Rajani, J. 1. This petition is filed seeking to declare the action of the 1st respondent in terminating the services of the petitioner as Standing Counsel vide G.O. Rt. No. 291, Law (G), dated 10.10.2019, issued by the 1st respondent during the subsistence of valid tenure as per G.O. Rt. No. 109, Law (G) Department, dated 25.4.2018, read with G.O. Ms. No. 187, Law (G) Department, dated 6.12.2000, respectively, without any notice or reasons as wholly illegal. 2. Heard Sri Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, and the Government Pleader for Home appearing for the 1st respondent and the Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj & Urban Development appearing for the 2nd respondent. 3. The petitioner, who is a Law Graduate, was initially appointed as Assistant Government Pleader vide G.O. Rt. No. 794, Law (G) Department, dated 12.7.2014, attached to the Government Pleader's Office, Municipal Administration Department for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh. After completion of three years 'tenure' as AGP, stipulated in the G.O. Rt. No. 794, the 1st respondent issued another G.O. Rt. No. 180, Law (G) Department, dated 10.8.2017, for extension of one more term of three years from the date of expiry i.e., 13.7.2017 or till the termination of services, whichever is earlier under Instruction 4 read with 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 (for short, "Instructions"). The name of the petitioner was recommended by the Advocate General for the post of Standing Counsel for Zilla Praja Parishads, Mandal Praja Parishads and Gram Panchayat's for Andhra Region excluding SPSR Nellore, Prakasam, Guntur and Krishna Districts. He was appointed as Standing Counsel for the above said Region vide G.O. Rt. No. 109, Law (G) Department, dated 25.4.2018, and took charge on 30.4.2018. While things stood thus, the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated and a new High Court for the State of Andhra Pradesh was established on 1.1.2019. The petitioner was being continued as Standing Counsel, but due to change of political scenario in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the 1st respondent issued the impugned G.O. Ms. No. 291, dated 10.10.2019, without even referring to his appointment order vide G.O. Rt.
The petitioner was being continued as Standing Counsel, but due to change of political scenario in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the 1st respondent issued the impugned G.O. Ms. No. 291, dated 10.10.2019, without even referring to his appointment order vide G.O. Rt. No. 109, dated 25.4.2018, terminating him on political pressure, without any notice and reasons, as contemplated under Rules prescribed in the Instructions, vide G.O. Ms. No. 187, dated 6.12.2000, and also contrary to the tenure, as stipulated under G.O. Rt. No. 109, Law (G) Department, dated 25.4.2018. Assailing, the said termination order as illegal, the petitioner seeks to issue direction to continue him as Standing Counsel. 4. The petitioner's Counsel, during arguments, places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537 , wherein the Supreme Court dealt with termination of all the appointments of Government Counsel in the Districts of State of Uttar Pradesh by an omni bus order. The Supreme Court observed that no common reason is applicable to all of them justifying their termination in one stroke and no reasonable ground has been shown. The submission of the Government Pleader made therein that the petitioners were likely to be reappointed, was taken as a proof that there was total non-application of mind to the individual cases before issuing the general order terminating all the appointments. 5. The Government Pleader relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh between Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Pushpindar Kaur, 2003 (6) ALD 214 (DB) : 2003 Law Suit 1013 (AP), wherein the Division Bench has distinguished the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra) and observed that in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down in very general terms that no case where instances of public employment is involved, the employer is bound to act within reasonable limits. It also observed that the above case is an extreme one on facts, as in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), on the change of party in power, the Government issued a general instruction that all Law Officers of State Government shall immediately demit office. It also observed that the Supreme Court in the said situation held that by one stroke, seemingly resorted to the Spoils system alien to our constitutional scheme.
It also observed that the Supreme Court in the said situation held that by one stroke, seemingly resorted to the Spoils system alien to our constitutional scheme. The Division Bench also observed that it was the validity of that general action-slaughter, which was the question for consideration by the Supreme Court. Observing as such, the Division Bench felt that a situation like the one dealt with by it whereof appointment or engagement of individual was terminated in accordance with the provisions contained in the conditions governing the orders of his appointment did not arise in that decision. 6. Even the case on hand is not a case similar to the one dealt with by the Supreme Court. An individual order of termination is served on the petitioner. The petitioner assails the said order on the ground that the content of the order itself reflects non-application of mind. The appointment order of the petitioner is by G.O. Rt. No. 109, dated 25.4.2018. He was appointed as Standing Counsel for the regions excluding SPSR Nellore, Prakasam, Guntur and Krishna Districts; in the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad where the termination order shows that the appointment of the petitioner is for the Andhra Region including Krishna and Guntur District, excluding SPSR Nellore and Prakasam Districts. 7. The Government Pleader explains the same on the premise of typographical error, which contention cannot be dismissed. The Government Pleader also submits that the incumbent, who was appointed after the termination of the petitioner, also took charge and the petitioner has handed over the charge consciously. Hence, he cannot be heard to assail the order in the present writ petition. 8. There is yet another ground on which the termination order is assailed. The Counsel, by drawing the attention of this Court to the Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000, makes an effort to convince the Court that Law Officer is different from Standing Counsel and the termination of Law Officers alone is provided under the said Instructions and the Standing Counsel cannot be terminated. The said argument does not stand to the merit of the argument extended by the Government Pleader, as the appointment order of the petitioner itself shows that the Standing Counsel's were also considered as Law Officers.
The said argument does not stand to the merit of the argument extended by the Government Pleader, as the appointment order of the petitioner itself shows that the Standing Counsel's were also considered as Law Officers. It can, at this stage, be observed that the drafting of the Instructions is not in accordance with the intention that can be gathered by reading the Instructions as a whole. There cannot be any reason for not providing for the termination of services of the Standing Counsel when the termination of services of Law Officer is provided under the said Instructions. 9. Though the termination order does not spell any reason, it followed the procedure prescribed by the above said Instructions wherein, in lieu of one month's notice, one month's Honorarium is paid to the petitioner. The judgment of the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh, referred to above, by observing that the appellants have scrupulously followed the procedure prescribed, held that in such a situation, the principles of natural justice cannot be pressed into service to invalidate the order. It also observed that a situation like the one there, whereby appointment or engagement of individual was terminated in accordance with the provisions contained in the conditions governing orders of his appointment did not arise in the decision of the Supreme Court. Similar is the situation in this case also. Hence, this Court is inclined to dismiss the writ petition. 10. With the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.