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2019 DIGILAW 2896 (RAJ)

Anupama Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan

2019-11-22

SANDEEP MEHTA

body2019
JUDGMENT Sandeep Mehta, J. - The complainant petitioner Anupama Kashyap has approached this court by way of this revision petition for assailing the judgment dated 04.12.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Woman Atrocities Cases), Jodhpur Metropolitan in Criminal Appeal No.100/2015, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 372 CrPC against the judgment dated 17.06.2015 passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (PCPNDT Act Cases), Jodhpur Metropolitan in Criminal Original Case No.10/2014, whereby the respondent-accused Alok Kumar Kashyap was acquitted of the charges under Sections 498- A, 406 and 323 IPC. 2. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the impugned judgments as well as the original record. The learned trial court appreciated in entirety, the facts and circumstances available on record and came to a conclusion that the allegations set out by the complainant in the FIR and her sworn testimony were not corroborated by any independent evidence. Many of the allegations set out by the complainant in the FIR and her sworn testimony were found to be at variance with her police statement. Likewise, contradictions were noticed by the trial court in the statements of Om Prakash (P.W.2), Shobha (P.W.3), the father and the mother respectively of the petitioner complainant. The Investigating Officer Smt. Mukta Pareek (P.W.5) admitted in her cross-examination that Alok used to work at Delhi and the complainant resided with him at Delhi. She made no investigation from any person, who resided in their neighbourhood at Delhi. Likewise, the complainant's matrimonial home was at Lucknow and the Investigating Officer did not conduct any investigation from any independent person residing near the house of her in-laws. Learned trial court observed that the complainant party came out with a specific case that Alok and his relatives used to come to Jodhpur, where Om Prakash would give them money to satisfy their demands. Moreover, no independent person from the neighbourhood of Omprakash was examined to corroborate this allegation. The complainant came out with a case in her complaint the community counselling was attempted to resolve the dispute, but no such community member was examined to prove this assertion. The complainant admitted in her cross-examination that no dowry was given at the time of marriage. She submitted a list of dowry articles alongwith the complaint, in which, there was no reference of any ornaments. The complainant admitted in her cross-examination that no dowry was given at the time of marriage. She submitted a list of dowry articles alongwith the complaint, in which, there was no reference of any ornaments. The trial court also observed that no sooner, the FIR came to be lodged, the accused returned all the household articles to the Investigating Officer and thus, the offence under Section 406 IPC was not made out. The complainant also alleged that she was beaten up and suffered numerous injuries at the hands of the accused frequently, but no injury report was proved to support this allegation. The complainant also alleged that over a period of one and half years between 13.07.2012 and 03.04.2013, a sum of Rs.6.50 lacs was given to Alok and his family members to satisfy their demand of dowry, but the evidence of the material witnesses was found contradictory and unconvincing on this aspect. It was admitted by the complainant and her parents that no dowry was given at the time of marriage. In this backdrop, the allegation of the complainant that she was beaten up soon after she reached the matrimonial home on the issue of quality and quantity of dowry articles was held to be totally unacceptable. After making this entire discussion, the trial court proceeded to acquit the accused respondents of the charges. 3. The complainant preferred an appeal under Section 372 CrPC before the Sessions Judge, Jodhpur Metropolitan to challenge the judgment of acquittal dated 17.06.2015. The appeal so preferred was transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge (Woman Atrocities Cases), Jodhpur Metropolitan. After hearing the arguments advanced by the parties and re-appreciating the evidence available on record, the learned trial court dismissed the appeal by the judgment dated 04.12.2017. Both these judgments, i.e. the judgment of acquittal and that of dismissal of appeal are assailed in this revision. 4. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced by Mr. Pradeep Choudhary, learned counsel representing the petitioner, Mr. Manish Chittora, learned counsel representing the respondent-accused as well as the learned Public Prosecutor. After having appreciating the facts available on record, I am duly satisfied that the finding recorded in the judgments of the courts below that the complainant could not bring home the case against the respondent accused by leading evidence proving the commission of the alleged offences beyond all manner of doubt. After having appreciating the facts available on record, I am duly satisfied that the finding recorded in the judgments of the courts below that the complainant could not bring home the case against the respondent accused by leading evidence proving the commission of the alleged offences beyond all manner of doubt. The two courts of competent jurisdiction have recorded concurrent findings of facts in this regard and I am of the firm opinion that these findings do not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever. That apart, the scope of High Court's powers while entertaining a revision is defined by Section 401 CrPC, the Clause (3) whereof reads as below : Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. 5. Manifestly, thus, the law prohibits the High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The only possible order in these circumstances would be to direct re-trial of the accused, which can only be ordered, if at all there has been a failure of justice. Manifestly, no such circumstances exist on the record, which could justify re-trail of the accused for the charges because neither the impugned judgment suffers from misreading of evidence nor from ignorance of material facts. Thus, I find no merit in this revision preferred by the petitioner complainant for assailing the acquittal of the respondent by the trial court and dismissal of the appeal against acquittal. 6. Resultantly, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed as such.