JUDGMENT : 1. Ghulam Nabi Pandith - respondent herein, has filed a Suit (Annexure-III to petition) under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure Svt. 1977, for recovery of sum of Rs. 28.50 Lacs before the court of Additional District Judge, Srinagar (for short "Trial Court"), on the foundation of Hundi given by defendant - petitioner herein. 2. The case set up by respondent/plaintiff before the Trial Court is that defendant/petitioner deals in sale and purchase of land as well as sale of constructed houses and shops at Baramulla and Srinagar, besides other commercial places of Srinagar and that plaintiff/defendant in different instalments at different times had paid an amount of Rs. 28.50 Lacs to defendant/petitioner for purchase of land at Umerabad, near Narbal Masjid, in the year 2009. Petitioner/defendant is said to have shown the land at Umerabad and put plaintiff/respondent in possession of 02 Kanals of land after receiving the amount and that Rs. 1.50 Lacs was to be paid at the time of registration. It is claimed by plaintiff/respondent in his plaint before the Trial Court that he immediately started filling the land and dumped stones in the said land but while as the work was going on, some locals stopped him and told him that the land actually belonged to them, which resulted in dispute between plaintiff/respondent and defendant/petitioner. In view of the dispute, it is stated by respondent/plaintiff that he demanded repayment of the amount so paid by him, from petitioner/defendant and that due to intervention of some friends, defendant/petitioner executed a Hundi, promising to pay the amount. However, according to respondent/plaintiff, petitioner/defendant did not pay the said amount in terms of Hundi even after one year of the promised date, and despite repeated requests. Even later on defendant/petitioner is stated to have offered to give some shops to plaintiff/respondent out of a Complex, which petitioner was constructing at Jadeed Baramulla, but after construction was complete, petitioner/defendant refused to give any shop from the said building as against outstanding amount and refused to return the amount paid by respondent/plaintiff. This according to respondent has forced him to file a Suit under Order XXXVII before the Trial Court. 3. According to petitioner, when put to notice, he caused his appearance before Trial Court through his counsel on 30th January 2016. This according to respondent has forced him to file a Suit under Order XXXVII before the Trial Court. 3. According to petitioner, when put to notice, he caused his appearance before Trial Court through his counsel on 30th January 2016. Thereafter, he moved an application (Annexure-IV to petition) seeking leave to defend in terms of Rule (3) of Order XXXVII CPC. Petitioner states that he urged availability of good defence to the claim lodged by respondent. Learned Trial Court, however, vide impugned order dated 1st November 2018 while granting leave to defend the suit, has directed petitioner to deposit an amount of Rs. 28.50 Lacs before the Court or in alternative pay or deposit cash security of Rs. 28.50 Lacs in the shape of Bank Guarantee in the name of Court or Demand Draft within a period of 30 days, forcing petitioner to knock at portals of this Court with petition on hand seeking setting aside of the order dated 1st November, 2018. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and considered the matter. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner states that learned Trial Court has passed impugned order in breach and violation of procedure, mechanism and provisions enshrined in Order XXXVII, CPC, inasmuch as learned Trial Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction, so fixed in it, while considering application of petitioner for leave to defend. He also avers that learned Trial Court has overlooked the grounds urged in the application because grounds urged and contentions raised by petitioner prima facie satisfy availability of good defence to the claim of respondent, besides demonstrate existence of triable issues and indicate that petitioner has a fair bona fide/reasonable defence against claim of respondent as also that petitioner disclosed such facts sufficient to entitle him to defend the claim of respondent inasmuch as statement of facts lead to an inference that at the trial of the case defendant/petitioner will be able to establish defence to respondent's claim. He has also vehemently stated that learned Trial Court has not followed provisions of Order XXXVIII. He has also vehemently stated that learned Trial Court has not followed provisions of Order XXXVIII. In support of his submissions as also qua maintainability of petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on Mechelec Engineers and Manufacturers v. M/s Basic Equipment Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 577 ; State Bank of Hyderabad v. Rabo Bank, (2015) 10 SCC 521 ; and IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 5321 . 6. What is deducible from above milieu is that a civil suit has been filed by respondent against petitioner before the Trial Court. Petitioner there moved an application in terms of Order XXXVII Rule 3, CPC, for grant of leave to defend the suit filed by respondent. In said application, petitioner has denied to have received any payment from respondent on the ground that if at all any purchase/sale of any land at Umerabad near Narbal Masjid, would have been made in respect of plaintiff/ respondent, then an agreement to sell/sale deed would have been executed with regard to the same. It is claimed by petitioner that in reality respondent owes money to him. His further contention in application before Trial Court is that Hundi is a false and without any factual backing. It is maintained by petitioner before learned Trial Court that since the Hundi has been executed on 05.02.2010 at Baramulla and any suit other than the normal suit is required to be filed at a place where the petitioner/defendant resides or carries on his business and that plaintiff/respondent has, by taking recourse to fraud, very cleverly withheld such a fact from his pleadings in the suit, and in fact, the plaintiff has not even mentioned in his suit the area of jurisdiction in which the suit would like, so as to misled the Court from essential point of jurisdiction. Petitioner has also maintained in his application that the Hundi as is alleged by plaintiff/respondent to have been executed petitioner/defendant, is fake. It is also pleaded in the application that suit has not been filed in accordance with Order XXXXVII, CPC, inasmuch as petitioner has no liability towards respondent. 7. Petitioner has also maintained in his application that the Hundi as is alleged by plaintiff/respondent to have been executed petitioner/defendant, is fake. It is also pleaded in the application that suit has not been filed in accordance with Order XXXXVII, CPC, inasmuch as petitioner has no liability towards respondent. 7. It is pertinent to mention here that petitioner's topmost and prime plea for leave to defend is that Hundi, if any, allegedly executed, had been executed at Baramulla and it is the Court at Baramulla that has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit and not learned Trial Court. Petitioner's another submission is that respondent owes petitioner. Another submission of petitioner before learned Trial Court, is that Hundi is fake. Three stand(s) have been taken by petitioner before learned Trial Court. All three contentions, made basis by petitioner before learned Trial Court, are per se contradictory. 7.1. Learned Trial Court, as meticulous examination of impugned order would divulge, has had threadbare discussion of all facets of the subject-matter as envisaged under Order XXXVII, CPC, for vouchsafing grant of leave to defend. 7.2. Order XXXVII, CPC, has been included in the Code of Civil Procedure with an aim to allowing a person, who has a clear and undisputed claim in respect of any monetary dues, to recover the dues quickly by a summary procedure instead of taking long route of a regular suit. 7.3. The Courts have consistently held that if an affidavit filed by defendant discloses a triable issue that is, at least, plausible, leave should be granted, but when defence raised appears to be moonshine and sham, unconditional leave to defend cannot be granted. What is required to be examined for grant of leave is whether defence taken in application under Order XXXVII Rule 3 CPC makes out a case, which if established, would be plausible in a regular suit. 7.4. What is required to be examined for grant of leave is whether defence taken in application under Order XXXVII Rule 3 CPC makes out a case, which if established, would be plausible in a regular suit. 7.4. Even if we go by the judgement, relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner, rendered in the case of IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. (supra), it has been said by the Supreme Court that if defendant satisfies the Court that he has a substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to succeed, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment, and defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit, but, if defendant raises triable issues indicating that he has a fair or reasonable defence, although not a positively good defence, plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment, and defendant is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend and even if defendant raises triable issues, if a doubt is left with the trial judge about defendant's good faith, or genuineness of triable issues, the trial judge may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court or furnishing security. The Supreme Court has also said that care must be taken to see that the object of provisions to assist expeditious disposal of commercial causes is not defeated. 7.5. The Supreme Court has also held that care must also be taken to see that such triable issues are not shut out by unduly severe orders as to deposit or security; if defendant raises a defence which is plausible but improbable, the trial Judge may impose conditions as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court, or furnishing security. As such a defence does not raise triable issues, conditions as to deposit or security or both can extend to the entire principal sum together with such interest as the court feels the justice of the case requires and that if defendant has no substantial defence and/or raises no genuine triable issues, and the court finds such defence to be frivolous or vexatious, then leave to defend the suit shall be refused, and plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith; if any part of the amount claimed by plaintiff is admitted by defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit, even if triable issues or a substantial defence is raised, shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court. 7.6. In IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. case (supra), leave to defend had been declined by the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to defend the suit, subject to the condition that defendant would deposit the whole principal amount or gives security of the principal amount. The Supreme Court also directed expeditious disposal of the suit. 7.7. In the aforesaid backdrop, petitioner has failed to made out any case and as a corollary, impugned order dated 1st November, 2018 does not warrant any interference. 8. That part, it may not be out of place to mention here that judicial pronouncements concerning object and scope of power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is pari materia to Section 104 of the J&K State Constitution, leaves little scope to interfere with the orders of subordinate courts as a matter of routine. This power cannot be taken as right of another appeal to aggrieved party nor this power can be invoked to point out an error of law or fact in the order or decision of a subordinate court. This power cannot be used to make out that the decision of subordinate court could have been or must have been other than what it was. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. This power cannot be used to make out that the decision of subordinate court could have been or must have been other than what it was. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the requirements that the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and that a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, are satisfied. 9. It is well-settled that power of superintendence, so conferred on the High Court, is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in High Court is paving path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. Power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else parameters invoking exercise of power are almost similar. 10. The Supreme Court in Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc. ( AIR 1977 SC 842 ), has observed that the Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre--conceived notions of the ideological structure or the scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under disguise of interpretation. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets law and cannot legislate it. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under disguise of interpretation. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law, it is for legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. 11. Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in administration in larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, "the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but", as held by the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 (8) SCC 329 , "its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline." The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain the efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of the justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of the justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of the justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi and another (2011) 12 SCC 600 , after recapitulating what has been observed in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case qua Article 227, held that "learned Single Judge of the High Court totally ignored the principles and parameters laid down" by the Supreme Court "for exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution qua an interlocutory order passed by the Subordinate Court and set aside the order of the trial Court without assigning any tangible reason." Jurisdiction under Article 227 must be sparingly exercised and may be exercised to correct the errors of the jurisdiction and the like, but not to upset the findings of the fact, which falls in the domain of an appellate court only. Same is true about the present case. The petition on hand is, from the above discussion, an appeal under the attire of petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir. My above views are fortified by the fiats rendered in Nibaran v. Mahendra AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; D.N. Banerjee v. Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 58 ; Nizzar Rawther v. Varghese Mathew AIR 1992 Ker 312 ; and Khimji Vidhu v. Premier High School AIR 2000 SC 3495 . Judgements relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, are distinguishable from the fact of present case and do not render any aid and assistance to case of petitioner. It is apt to mention here that the power under Article 227 is broader than that conferred on the High Court by Article 226. For example, through its power to issue certiorari under Article 226, a High Court can annul the decision of a tribunal while under Article 227 it can do that and do something-it can issue further directions in the matter. For example, through its power to issue certiorari under Article 226, a High Court can annul the decision of a tribunal while under Article 227 it can do that and do something-it can issue further directions in the matter. But under Article 227, the High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal inasmuch as it is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior Court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision. The power of superintendent conferred by Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. 12. From the foregoing discussion, it is deducible that instant petition does not call for any interference. The powers, vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K, are neither substitution to revisional nor appellate power, inasmuch as order impugned is neither perverse nor has occasioned serious miscarriage of justice. Any interference by this Court would only prolong the trial inordinately. Even otherwise, impugned order does not warrant interference by exercise of extraordinary or supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, in that neither the decision-making process of Trial Court suffers from any bias nor do impugned order cause any miscarriage of justice or otherwise suffer from any error of law. 13. In the background of preceding discourse, the petition on hand is devoid of any merit and as a consequence of which, the same is dismissed, with connected IA(s). 14. Copy of this order be sent down.