JUDGMENT [Judgment of this Court was made by T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J.] PRAYER: Writ Appeal is filed under Clause 15 of the Letter Patent Act, to set aside the order dated 30.10.2012 made in W.P.(MD)No.11284 of 2012, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Heard Mr.N.S.Karthikeyan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. S.Visvalingam, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 63 and Mr. Mr.A.K.Baskarapandian, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 64. 2. By consent of both parties, this writ appeal is taken up for final disposal. 3. This appeal is directed against the common order in W.P. (MD)Nos.11283, 11284, 11410, 12180, 12202, 12215, 12222, 11257 and 11258 of 2012, dated 30.10.2012. It is not in dispute that an identical issue was considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal Nos.1398 of 2013 etc., batch, dated 08.07.2015 and the appeal filed by the appellant/Municipal Corporation was allowed. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:- “...5. It is not in dispute that an identical issue was considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal Nos.1398 of 2013 etc., batch, dated 08.07.2015 and the appeal filed by the appellant/Municipal Corporation was allowed. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:- “...5. The factual details that we have culled out from the 18 writ appeals and 109 writ petitions on hand, would show the following:- (i) that what was claimed by all the employees in the writ petitions, was a grant of Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.162, dated 13.4.1998; (ii) that all the employees pitch their claim only on the basis of the earliest order of a learned Judge of this Court dated 30.9.2008, which was confirmed by a Division Bench by an order dated 1.9.2009; (iii) that in the order that happens to be the original source for this litigation, what was prayed for and what was granted was only a direction to grant Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.162 and not a specific direction to grant Rs.5,000/- or Rs.5,500/-; (iv) that unfortunately, this Court, while passing orders in favour of other employees, following the original source namely the order of the learned Judge dated 30.9.2008, made a specific mention of the amount such as Rs.5,000/- or Rs.5,500/-, though that was not the purport of the first order; (v) that in most of the writ petitions, that were already disposed of and in most of the writ petitions which are now pending, the prayer is not for the grant of a particular time scale of pay but only for the grant of the benefits of the Government Order G.O.Ms.No.162, dated 13.4.1998; (vi) that unfortunately, most of the writ petitions filed on the basis of the earliest order of the learned Judge dated 30.9.2008, were allowed even at the time of admission, without any notice to the Government, on the sole ground that the reliefs claimed in the writ petitions are already covered by the order of the learned single Judge dated 30.9.2008, which was confirmed by the Division Bench by the judgment dated 1.9.2009; (vii) that as a consequence of all the writ petitions and writ appeals getting disposed of at the stage of admission, the Government was never in a position even to raise the question of delay and laches on the part of the employees in approaching the Court; (viii) that as the historical background of this litigation narrated in para 2 of the above would show, 99% of the cases allowed in favour of the employees, were filed at least after 10 to 12 years of the Government Order G.O.Ms.No.162, dated 13.4.1998 and the question of delay and laches was never examined; (ix) that as could be seen from the two tables given under para 4 above, most of the employees who have come before the Court have retired long ago and they came up with writ petitions seeking revised scales of pay with retrospective effect from 1.1.1996, by filing writ petitions at least after a decade namely after the year 2006; and (x) that it is not a case where the rights of the employees were tested on the touchstone of well settled principles of law, but a case where this Court got entangled into a web created by the original sin, so that it was compelled to follow the previous orders without any end in sight now. 6. Keeping the above factual details in mind, if we now go back to the core question as to what the employees are actually entitled to, it will be clear that the recommendations of the V Tamil Nadu Pay Commission were implemented with effect from 1.6.1988, by the Government issuing a set of Rules known as Tamil Nadu Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1989, under G.O. Ms.No.666, Finance dated 27.6.1989. These Rules were issued in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The Schedule to these Rules contain a list of about 30 common categories of posts. The post of driver/van driver was at S.No.11 in the first part of the Schedule to the 1989 Rules. It was mentioned in Sl.No.11 of the Schedule to the 1989 Rules that the post of driver which carried a scale of pay of Rs.610-1075, would have a revised scale of pay of Rs.950-1500/-. 7. The revised pay scale of Rs.950-1500 as ordered in the Schedule to the Tamil Nadu Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1989 was further revised to Rs.975-1660 under G.O.Ms.No.818, Finance, dated 9.9.1989. Therefore, there is no dispute or doubt about the fact that upon the implementation of the recommendations of the V Tamil Nadu Pay Commission and the Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1989, the scale of pay of the ordinary grade of the post of driver became Rs.975-1660. None of the drivers who came before this Court and succeeded in all previous cases and none of the drivers who are now before us, dispute this fact namely that the ordinary grade scale of pay of their post became Rs.975-1660 after the implementation of the V Tamil Nadu Pay Commission. 8. Therefore, when Selection and Special Grades were granted to persons who had completed 10 years and 20 years of service respectively, under G.O.Ms.No.304, Finance, dated 28.3.1990, the Selection Grade Scale of pay was made as Rs. 1200-2040 and the Special Grade scale of pay was as Rs. 1320-2040, for all posts carrying ordinary grade scale of pay of Rs. 975-1660. This was under Annexure I to G.O.Ms.No.304, dated 28.3.1990. 9. Thereafter, the next revision of pay scales came under the Tamil Nadu Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1998, issued under G.O.Ms.No.162, dated 13.4.1998 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. 975-1660. This was under Annexure I to G.O.Ms.No.304, dated 28.3.1990. 9. Thereafter, the next revision of pay scales came under the Tamil Nadu Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1998, issued under G.O.Ms.No.162, dated 13.4.1998 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. In Schedule I to the 1998 Rules, a table was provided giving the revised scale of pay that would correspond to every existing scale of pay. In serial number XX of Schedule I to the 1998 Rules, all posts carrying the existing scale of pay of Rs.975-1660 were granted a revised scale of pay of Rs.3200-4900. In Schedule II, the posts carrying the revised ordinary grade scale of pay of Rs. 3200-4900 were granted a revised Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs.4000-6000 and a revised Special Grade scale of pay of Rs. 4300-6000. 10. Therefore, as we have pointed out earlier, the cumulative effect of all the Government Orders G.O.Ms.No.666, dated 27.6.1989, G.O.Ms.No. 818, dated 9.8.1989, G.O.Ms.No.304, dated 28.3.1990 and G.O.Ms.No. 162, dated 13.4.1998, was as follows:- (i) that prior to the implementation of the recommendations of the V Tamil Nadu Pay Commission, the scale of pay of drivers was Rs.610-1075; (ii) that after the implementation of the recommendations of the V Tamil Nadu Pay Commission, this scale of pay was first increased to Rs.950-1500 and later to Rs. 975-1660; (iii) that for an ordinary grade scale of pay of Rs. 975-1660, a Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs.1200-2040 and a Special Grade scale of pay of Rs.1320-2040 was granted; (iv) that after the implementation of the recommendations of the Central Pay Commission, under Tamil Nadu Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1998, the ordinary grade scale of pay of Rs.975-1660 became Rs.3200-4900, the Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs.1200-2040 became Rs.4000-6000 and the Special Grade scale of pay of Rs.1320-2040 became Rs.4300-6000. 11. Therefore, we are completely at a loss to understand as to how the drivers who came up before this Court started claiming a Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs.5,000-8000 and a Special Grade scale of pay of Rs.5,500-9000. Neither the drivers who came to Court previously explained the rationale behind their claim nor this Court took care to find out what was the recommendation of the Pay Commission and what was actually implemented. Sl.Nos. Neither the drivers who came to Court previously explained the rationale behind their claim nor this Court took care to find out what was the recommendation of the Pay Commission and what was actually implemented. Sl.Nos. 6 to 9 in the table under Schedule II to the Tamil Nadu Revised Scale of Pay Rules, 1998 issued under G.O.Ms.No.162, dated 13.4.1998 would steer clear of any doubt that one may have, about who is entitled to what Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay. Therefore, that portion is extracted as follows:- Sl.No. Ordinary Grade Selection Grade Special Grade 6. 3200-85-4900 4000-100-6000 4300-100-6000 7. 3625-85-4900 4300-100-6000 4500-125-7000 8. 4000-100-6000 5000-150-8000 5500-175-9000 9. 4300-100-6000 5000-150-8000 5500-175-9000 12. The drivers never claimed that after the implementation of the Revised Scales of Pay in the year 1998, with effect from 1.1.1996, their ordinary grade scale of pay became Rs.4,000-6000 or Rs.4300-6000. Unless their ordinary grade scale of pay had become Rs.4000-6000 or Rs.4300-6000 with effect from 1.1.1996 under the 1998 Rules, they were not entitled to claim a Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs.5000-8000 and a Special Grade scale of pay of Rs. 5500-9000. 13. On the contrary, the ordinary scale of pay of drivers was originally Rs.610-1075. It first became Rs.950-1500 and later became Rs.975-1660. Subsequently, it became Rs.3200-4900. But this was completely lost sight of in a series of litigations that has gone on from 2006 until D.Hariparanthaman,J, demolished the whole myth by his judgment dated 18.11.2013. Therefore, on the core question to what the drivers are entitled to, we have no hesitation in holding that after the issue of the 1998 Revised Scale of Pay Rules, the ordinary grade scale of pay of the drivers was Rs.3200-4900, the Selection Grade scale of pay was Rs.4000-6000 and the Special Grade scale of pay was Rs.4300-6000. 14. Once the factual position about what the drivers are entitled to in the ordinary grade, Selection Grade and the Special Grade is clear, it will be easy for us to answer the legal issues addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the employees. 14. Once the factual position about what the drivers are entitled to in the ordinary grade, Selection Grade and the Special Grade is clear, it will be easy for us to answer the legal issues addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the employees. The legal issues raised by all the learned learned counsel appearing for the drivers are:- (i) that when hundreds of drivers have approached this Court, obtained orders in their favour and those orders have also been implemented, it is not open to the respondents to refuse to extend the same benefit to the remaining employees; (ii) that when several Benches of this Court both Single and Division, have passed orders in a particular manner, it is not open to the respondents to again and again to re-agitate the same issue in every writ petition; and (iii) that the contention of the State that an illegality cannot be perpetrated, has to be rejected outright, in view of the settled position that what was done by the Court cannot be treated as an illegality. CONTENTION 1: 15. The first contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the employees is that when hundreds of drivers have approached this Court, obtained orders in their favour and those orders have also been implemented, it is not open to the respondents to refuse to extend the same benefit to the remaining employees. 16. In other words, the first contention is based upon Article 14. The Writ Petitioners claim that when one set of employees have already reaped the benefit of fixation of the Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay at a particular level, especially through Court orders, the State cannot discriminate the other set of employees. 17. In support of this contention, Mr. R. Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the Petitioners in three Writ Petitions relies upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, one in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam v. Bachan Singh [ 2009 (14) SCC 793 ] and the second in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Aravind Kumar Shrivastava [ 2015 (1) SCC 347 ]. 18. R. Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the Petitioners in three Writ Petitions relies upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, one in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam v. Bachan Singh [ 2009 (14) SCC 793 ] and the second in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Aravind Kumar Shrivastava [ 2015 (1) SCC 347 ]. 18. But it is seen from the decision of the Supreme Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam that it was a case of a person who rendered services in a work charged establishment for a period of eighteen years from 1963 till 1981, before getting regularised into service and in respect of whom the pensionary benefits were confined only to the period of regular service. The Government itself had issued circulars for counting the previous service, in favour of all similarly placed employees. Therefore the Supreme Court held in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 28 of the Report that there cannot be a discrimination. 19. In other words, the Supreme Court applied Article 14 only after finding that the employee was actually entitled in law for the benefit that he was seeking. The Supreme Court did not apply Article 14 blindfold, merely because other similarly placed employees got a benefit. Therefore, the Court has a duty before invoking Article 14 to see whether the employee is entitled to the benefit he was seeking. 20. In the second decision relied upon by the Writ Petitioner, namely State of Uttar Pradesh v. Aravind Kumar Shrivastava, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the question as to how and when the Courts are obliged to extend the benefit of similar orders to persons who are similarly placed. In Paragraph 22 of the Report, the Supreme Court elicited the following principles, to be applied in such cases: "22.1.The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement, the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C.Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." 21. But we are at a loss to understand as to how the above principles could be applied to the cases on hand. But we are at a loss to understand as to how the above principles could be applied to the cases on hand. All the aforesaid principles could be applied only to cases where the employees are legitimately entitled to some benefit but it was denied to them either wrongly or on a wrong application/interpretation of the rules/circulars. The principles laid down in Aravind Kumar Shrivastava could not be invoked in cases where one set of employees get through Court orders, a benefit that is not legitimately due to them. The principles laid down in the aforesaid decision could be invoked only in two types of cases namely (1) cases of wrongful denial of a rightful benefit or (2) cases of wrongful denial of a doubtful benefit. They cannot be applied to a rightful denial of a benefit which is not due to them. 22. Let us again have a look at the facts of the batch of cases on hand, to see if what the Writ Petitioners demand, is something to which they are legitimately entitled. 23. As we have pointed out earlier, the post of drivers carried an ordinary grade scale of pay of Rs.610-1075/-, before the implementation of the recommendations of the V Tamil Nadu Pay Commission. This was first revised to Rs.950-1500 and later to Rs. 975-1660. With effect from 01.01.1996, this ordinary grade scale became Rs.3200-85-4900. The selection grade scale for such an ordinary grade scale became Rs.4000-100-6000 and the Special Grade Scale of Pay for the same ordinary grade scale became Rs. 4300-100-6000. 24. The drivers working in all the Departments of the State of Tamil Nadu were actually conscious of what they were actually entitled to. This is why most of them merely prayed in their Writ Petitions for the grant of Selection and Special grades under G.O.Ms.No.162, without specifying the actual amounts as Rs.5000/- or Rs.5500/-. 25. Even in the very first judgment of a learned Judge of this Court dated 30.09.2008, which has led to hundreds and hundreds of Writ Petitions, no direction was issued to fix the selection grade scale at Rs.5000/- and special grade scale at Rs.5500/-. But unfortunately, the subsequent orders passed by this Court, mentioned these amounts, without any basis. 26. 25. Even in the very first judgment of a learned Judge of this Court dated 30.09.2008, which has led to hundreds and hundreds of Writ Petitions, no direction was issued to fix the selection grade scale at Rs.5000/- and special grade scale at Rs.5500/-. But unfortunately, the subsequent orders passed by this Court, mentioned these amounts, without any basis. 26. Therefore unless the law has developed to such an extent that once the Court commits a mistake, the same becomes irredeemable, even at the cost of public money, it is not possible for us to invoke Article 14. As we have pointed out elsewhere- (a) the very first order of a learned Judge of this Court merely directed the grant of selection and special grades as per G.O.Ms. No. 162, without indicating the exact scales of pay; (b) all subsequent orders passed in favour of the other employees, by various learned Judges of this Court, were passed at the stage of admission, without putting the Government on notice and without giving them an opportunity, solely on the basis that the issue raised in those cases were already covered by the decision of a single Judge dated 30.09.2008, which was also affirmed by the Division Bench by an order dated 01.09.2009; (c) all subsequent orders got implemented by those petitioners, under threat of contempt. 27. Therefore, the Writ Petitioners in the present batch of cases cannot rely upon Article 14, when this Court never went into the question (except in the decision of D.Hariparanthaman,J) as to whether the drivers are entitled to a selection grade scale of pay of Rs.5000/- and a special grade scale of pay of Rs.5500/-. 28. As rightly pointed out by the Learned Advocate General, the pressure that keeps mounting upon this Court due to the huge pendency and the tendency that results therefrom, to dispose of at least those cases which are covered by earlier decisions, even on the first or second date of hearing, has actually led to this position. Therefore we cannot sweep the core issue under the carpet and reiterate the same mistakes by taking recourse to Article 14. Hence we reject the first contention advanced on behalf of the employees. CONTENTION 2: 29. Therefore we cannot sweep the core issue under the carpet and reiterate the same mistakes by taking recourse to Article 14. Hence we reject the first contention advanced on behalf of the employees. CONTENTION 2: 29. The second contention of the learned counsel appearing for the employees is that when several Benches of this Court both Single and Division, have passed orders in a particular manner, it is not open to the respondents to again and again re-agitate the same issue in every writ petition. 30. In this connection, Mr.M.Ravi, learned counsel for some of the writ petitioners relies upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Asati v. State of Uttar Pradesh [ (2012) 5 SCC 552 ], and Sandhya Educational Society v. Union of India [ (2014) 7 SCC 701 ]. 31. But, what was laid down in Om Prakash Asati was that once a pure question of law is settled by the Court and the same had attained finality, it is not open to one of the parties to re-agitate the same question of law again and again. That case arose out of the procedure adopted by the screening committee of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam for prematurely retiring its employees. In two earlier decisions, the Court had held that the criteria adopted by the screening committee was illegal. Therefore, the Supreme Court held in para 9 that once a pure question of law is answered in a particular manner and the same had also attained finality, the respondents should accept the same without any further protestation. 32. But in the case on hand, the question as to whether the drivers are entitled to a particular Selection Grade scale of pay and a particular Special Grade scale of pay is not a pure question of law. It is a question of fact, to be culled out from the schedules to the Tamil Nadu Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1989 and 1998. Moreover, the earliest decision of this Court, only based upon which hundreds of writ petitions were subsequently allowed, never discussed or laid down any factual finding that the drivers were entitled to a particular scale of pay in the Selection Grade or Special Grade. Hence, the decision in Om Prakash Asati is of no application. 33. The second decision in Sandhya Educational Society is of no relevance. Hence, the decision in Om Prakash Asati is of no application. 33. The second decision in Sandhya Educational Society is of no relevance. The said decision dealt with the question relating to the maintainability of a Review Application before the High Court, especially after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. While dealing with the said question, the Supreme Court pointed out in para 9 that judicial decorum and discipline is paramount and that a coordinate Bench has to respect the judgments and orders passed by another Bench. 34. It is true that consistency helps the parties to a litigation to know where they stand. But, when it is brought to the notice of the Court that on most of the earlier occasions, several similarly placed employees obtained orders at the stage of admission, on the ground that the issue is already covered by a decision of this Court and that it was only in this manner that several employees got a benefit that was not legitimately due to them, the Court cannot shut its eyes and choose to prefer maintenance of discipline rather than upholding public interest. 35. As a matter of fact, the greatness of the Court lies only in its courage and ability to correct its mistakes. Justice is more precious than discipline. This was the principle that the Supreme Court highlighted in A.R.Antulay vs. R.S.Nayak [ AIR 1988 SC 1531 ]. It was observed in the said decision that "in rectifying an error, no personal inhibitions should debar the Court because no person should suffer by reason of any mistake of the Court." The Supreme Court focused on the elementary rule of justice that no party should suffer due to the mistake of the Court. Therefore, this Court should not feel shackled either by the rules of procedure or by the principles of propriety, when it is so glaring that a gross injustice has been done to the State (1) by writ petitions getting allowed at the stage of admission and (2) by getting those orders implemented under threat of contempt. This is especially so when the earliest decision that was followed in all other cases, did not decide the scale of pay to be granted for Selection and Special Grades. Hence, the second contention of the writ petitioners is also liable to be rejected. CONTENTION 3: 36. This is especially so when the earliest decision that was followed in all other cases, did not decide the scale of pay to be granted for Selection and Special Grades. Hence, the second contention of the writ petitioners is also liable to be rejected. CONTENTION 3: 36. The third contention of the writ petitioners is that the argument of the State that an illegality cannot be perpetrated, has to be rejected outright, in view of the settled position that what was done by the Court cannot be treated as an illegality. 37. In support of this contention, Mr. R.Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for some of the Writ Petitioners invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt v. State of Jammu and Kashmir 2008 (9) SCC 24 . In that case,one person working as a constable got promotion to the post of Sub- Inspector, in relaxation of the rule relating to 50% quota for direct recruitment. Other persons approached the High Court and in respect of one individual, a single Judge allowed the claim. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Appeal filed by the State. Therefore, that individual was promoted as Sub-Inspector. As a consequence, the Writ Petitions filed by the other individuals were allowed by another Learned Judge. But this decision was reversed by the Division Bench, forcing the individuals to take up the matter to the Supreme Court. When the individual employees pitched their claim on the basis of Articles 14 and 16, the State contended that there could be no equality in illegality. But, the said argument was rejected by the Supreme Court, on the ground that once a Court had granted a benefit, the same cannot be treated as illegal. 38. Paragraphs 21 to 23 of the order read as follows: "21. It was no doubt contended by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent State that Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution cannot be invoked and pressed into service to perpetuate illegality. It was submitted that if one illegal action is taken, a person whose case is similar, cannot invoke Article 14 or 16 and demand similar relief illegally or against a Statute. 22. There can be no two opinions about the legal proposition as submitted by the learned counsel for the State. It was submitted that if one illegal action is taken, a person whose case is similar, cannot invoke Article 14 or 16 and demand similar relief illegally or against a Statute. 22. There can be no two opinions about the legal proposition as submitted by the learned counsel for the State. But in the case on hand, in our opinion, there was no illegality on the part of the learned Single Judge in allowing Writ Petition No.519 of 1987 instituted by Abdul Rashid Rather and in issuing necessary directions. Since the action was legal and in consonance with law, the Division Bench confirmed it and this Court did not think it proper to interfere with the said order and dismiss the Special Leave Petition. To us, in the circumstances, the learned Single Judge was wholly right and fully justified in following the judgment and order in WP No.519 of 1987 in the case of the present writ petitioners also. 23. In fairness and in view of the fact that the decision in Abdul Rasheed Rather had attained finality, the State authorities ought to have gracefully accepted the decision by granting similar benefits to the present writ petitioners. It, however, challenged the order passed by the Single Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court ought to have dismissed the letters patent appeal by affirming the order of the Single Judge. The letters patent appeal, however, was allowed by the Division Bench and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge was set aside. In our considered view, the order passed by the learned Single Judge was legal, proper and in furtherance of justice, equity and fairness in action. The said order, therefore, deserves to be restored." 39. But, as seen from paragraph 22 of the report in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt, the Supreme Court factually found that there was no illegality on the part of the learned Judge in allowing the first writ petition W.P.No.519 of 1987. Therefore, in para 22 of the report, the Supreme Court clarified that once an action was found to be legal and in consonance with law, the State cannot argue that it was an illegality that cannot be allowed to be perpetrated. 40. In this case, we have gone through the Government Orders many times, to find out what scale of pay the drivers are entitled to, in the Selection and Special Grades. 40. In this case, we have gone through the Government Orders many times, to find out what scale of pay the drivers are entitled to, in the Selection and Special Grades. We are unable to find, however lenient our approach is, that the writ petitioners could legitimately lay a claim for a Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs. 5000-8000 and Special Grade scale of pay of Rs.5500-9000. Therefore, what they have claimed and got in most of the previous decisions of this Court is not what they are lawfully entitled to. Once this is clear, it would follow as a natural consequence that the writ petitioners herein want only that illegality to be perpetrated. An illegality will not undergo a metamorphosis and become legal, merely because it received the seal of approval of a Court of law. Therefore, the third contention is also liable to be rejected. 41. In Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal [(2010) (2) SCC 422], the Supreme Court, relying upon its previous decisions in various cases including the one in State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh [(2009) 5 SCC 69], held that Article 14 is a positive concept and that it cannot be enforced in a negative manner. The Court further held that if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior Court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a wrong order. Interestingly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Kartick Chandra Mondal was subsequent to the decision in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and the decision in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt is also referred to in Kartick Chandra Mondal. 42. Therefore, in the result, all the writ petitions filed by the individual employees claiming Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs. 5000-8000 and Special Grade pay scale of Rs.5500-9000 are liable to be dismissed. However, there are a few writ petitions such as W.P.Nos. 23550 of 2010, 5498 of 2012 and 30616 of 2012, where the employees claim that they are not even granted the admissible Selection Grade and Special Grade scales pay of Rs.4000-6000 and Rs.4300-6000 respectively. 43. 5000-8000 and Special Grade pay scale of Rs.5500-9000 are liable to be dismissed. However, there are a few writ petitions such as W.P.Nos. 23550 of 2010, 5498 of 2012 and 30616 of 2012, where the employees claim that they are not even granted the admissible Selection Grade and Special Grade scales pay of Rs.4000-6000 and Rs.4300-6000 respectively. 43. Therefore, with a clarification that all the petitioners in the writ petitions and the respondents in the writ appeals are entitled only to a Selection Grade scale of pay of Rs.4000-100-6000 and a Special Grade scale of pay of Rs.4300-100-6000, but not more than that, all the writ petitions filed by the employees are dismissed. All the writ appeals filed either by the State Government or by various Heads of Departments or by various officers of the Government or by various Local Bodies or Boards or Corporations, shall stand allowed. There will be no order as to costs.” 4. Following the same, the Writ Appeal stands allowed. Consequently, connected civil miscellaneous petition is closed.