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2019 DIGILAW 295 (HP)

Satish Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2019-03-19

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The impugned order passed by learned Sessions Judge, Chamba, to say the least, has been passed in the most reckless manner bordering on brazenness and above all without any sanctity or authority of law. 2. After having recorded the statements of two witnesses, the Court below noticed that smell of alcohol was emanating from the mouth of the accused and he straightway proceeded to cancel the bail granted to the petitioner by observing as under: "At this stage, the smell of alcohol is badly emanating from the mouth of accused. The act and conduct of the accused while appearing in this Court under the state of intoxication in a Sessions Trial being faced by him, is not upto the mark. As such, he is not entitled to enjoy the discretionary relief of bail granted by this Court. Henceforth, his bail bonds are cancelled and forfeited to the State of HP and he is committed to judicial custody till 27.3.2019. Jail warrant be prepared accordingly ." 3. I really fail to understand as to under which provision of law and under what authority has the Sessions Judge proceeded to cancel the bail which had earlier been granted to the petitioner on 8.5.2015. 4. If at all the bail of the petitioner was to be cancelled, the same could have only been done in accordance with law by taking recourse to Section 439 (2) Cr.P.C. 5. The distinction between the rejection of bail in a non- bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail after it has been granted, is well settled and this Court need only refer to the recent decision rendered by three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MS. X vs. The State of Telangana and another, Criminal Appeal No. 000716 of 2018, decided on 17.5.2018, wherein it was observed as under: 12. In a consistent line of precedent this Court has emphasised the distinction between the rejection of bail in a non-bail able case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail after it has been granted. X vs. The State of Telangana and another, Criminal Appeal No. 000716 of 2018, decided on 17.5.2018, wherein it was observed as under: 12. In a consistent line of precedent this Court has emphasised the distinction between the rejection of bail in a non-bail able case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail after it has been granted. In adverting to the distinction, a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in Dolatram v State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 observed that: "Rejection of a bail in a non-bail able case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of the bail, already granted, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion of attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial." These principles have been reiterated by another two Judge Bench decision in Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad v Subramani Gopalakrishnan, (2011) 5 SCC 296 and more recently in Dataram Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 2 Scale 285 : "It is also relevant to note that there is difference between yardsticks for cancellation of bail and appeal against the order granting bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of bail already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concessions granted to the accused in any manner. These are all only few illustrative materials. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail are, interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concessions granted to the accused in any manner. These are all only few illustrative materials. The satisfaction of the Court on the basis of the materials placed on record of the possibility of the accused absconding is another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. In other words, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial." 6. Apart from the above, the learned Sessions Judge has not found an overt act on the part of the petitioner nor has he found the petitioner to be causing obstruction in the Court proceedings. 7. The learned Sessions Judge appears to have felt offended by the very fact of the petitioner coming to the court after taking liquor, but that by itself could not have been a ground for cancelling the bail. 8. It has been held by this Court in Ramesh Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1989) 2 ShimLC 1 that merely appearing in a drunken state in a Court is neither offering an insult nor causing interruption to the Presiding Officer of the Court. The relevant observations read thus: "5. Perusal of the record shows that the petitioner may have taken liquor while appearing in the Court. However, it appears, the petitioner did not by any overact cause any intentional insult to the court nor caused any obstruction in its proceedings. The learned Judge, I see, felt offended like many others in such circumstances, by the very fact of the petitioner coming to the court after taking liquor. This caused annoyance to him and feeling annoyed over it, he proceeded to initiate proceedings against the petitioner under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code there and then. There is no evidence that the petitioner by his act or by uttering any remark insulted the court intentionally or misbehaved while appearing in his case and the court conducting the proceedings. There is no evidence that the petitioner by his act or by uttering any remark insulted the court intentionally or misbehaved while appearing in his case and the court conducting the proceedings. Drunken condition, as I understand, is a stage which does not appear to have reached because it may imply a stage when a person has lost control of himself and behaves in a very shabby fashion by his utterances and actions. Here is no such condition and no such fault on the part of the petitioner. It appears to be a simple case of having taken liquor quite sometime before coming to the Court. 6. Shri Lokender Thakur seeks assistance from (State of Uttar Pradesh v Ratan Shukla, (1956) AIR Allahabad 258). I am in respectful agreement with the principles laid down in this judgment. Merely appearing in a drunken state in a court is neither offering an insult nor causing interruption to the Presiding Officer of the Court. Sometimes it is seen that such like persons show more respect to the court than others who may not have ' taken liquor, the sine-qua-non of the offence is causing of intentional insult to the court and obstruction to its proceedings. These essential factors of this offence are totally missing in the present case." 9. The impugned order not only exhibits the wanton breach on the part of the Presiding Officer of the governing principles of law and procedure but has been passed in the most reckless manner in utter disregard to the legal principles. Thus, the impugned order passed by learned Sessions Judge on 14.3.2019 is not at all sustainable and is accordingly set-aside. 10. Since the petitioner is in custody, Registry is directed to prepare and send the release warrants to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith, if not required in any other case. 11. The revision is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending application, if any. 12. However, before parting, Sessions Judge, Chamba is directed to show cause, well before the next date of hearing, as to under what provisions of law it chose to pass the impugned order.