JUDGMENT : N. Anand Venkatesh, J. 1. Mr. A. Natarajan, learned Public Prosecutor takes notice for the 1st respondent. Notice to the 2nd respondent returnable by four weeks. Private notice is also permitted. 2. This case raises a very important issue as to whether any words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise, made against an individual person, whatever position he is holding and which does not result in promoting feelings of enmity or hatred between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc., will come within the purview of Section 153A of IPC. This position must be clarified since it is noticed that in many cases which involves governmental authorities, particularly having political overtones and which at the best only affects the interest/reputation of the individuals concerned, and does not in fact cause any disharmony or promotes any hatred between religion, race, community etc., FIR is being registered for an offence u/s. 153A and 505 IPC. 3. In the present case the FIR has been registered by the respondent Police based on the Complaint given by the 2nd respondent who claims to be the Secretary of the IT Wing of the AIADMK who claims to have watched a video circulating on the social media which is targeted against the present Hon'ble Chief Minister and also the former Hon'ble Chief Minister and other Ministers. The Complaint further claims that the video was uploaded with the intention to cause riot and disharmony in the Society. The respondent Police based on the Complaint given by the 2nd respondent have proceeded to register an FIR for an offence under Section 153A, 505(1)(b), 505(1)(c) and 505(2) IPC. 4. This petitioner has been shown as A1 in the FIR and apart from this petitioner there are six other named accused persons and others who are involved in the alleged crime. This accused person claims himself to be an investigative journalist. He has taken a documentary and published the same which contains the video of some of the interactions that have been made with certain accused persons who are connected with the murder and robbery, which took place at Kodanadu residence of the late Hon'ble Chief Minister. In this video it is alleged that some reckless allegations have been made as against the present Hon'ble Chief Minister and also the former Hon'ble Chief Minister and certain other Ministers. 5. In this video it is alleged that some reckless allegations have been made as against the present Hon'ble Chief Minister and also the former Hon'ble Chief Minister and certain other Ministers. 5. Mr. N.R. Elango, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the documentary relates only to one person viz; the present Hon'ble Chief Minister and no person in the documentary makes any statement regarding any group, much less any statement or act promoting enmity or disharmony amongst two different communities. The learned Senior counsel would further submit that the person aggrieved as against the documentary can only be the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and he has not preferred any Complaint, although it is alleged that he is personally aggrieved by the video. The learned Senior counsel would further submit that the documentary is only a journalistic work and it has faithfully reported the facts, including the statements of the persons appearing in the documentary, as revealed to the petitioner. The learned Senior counsel therefore would submit that the entire prosecution is attended with mala fides and even if all the allegations made in the Complaint are taken as it is, it does not constitute any offence under Section 153A or under Section 505 of IPC. The learned senior Counsel further contended that if the Hon'ble Chief Minister has been attributed with certain allegations, even if it is proved to be correct, can only at the best be prosecuted by way of a defamation and the present criminal prosecution as against the petitioner and other persons is nothing but a total misuse of power by the Government. 6. Mr. A. Natarajan, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the 1st respondent Police submitted that the issue regarding the murder and robbery which took place at Kodanadu, has already been investigated by the Police and Final Report has already been filed as against the accused persons. If the accused persons had anything to say by way of defence on their side, they should have approached the concerned Court and given statements under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. or they could have made the statements or taken the stand in the course of proceedings. If the accused persons had anything to say by way of defence on their side, they should have approached the concerned Court and given statements under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. or they could have made the statements or taken the stand in the course of proceedings. Instead of doing that, they have made reckless and defamatory statements as against the Hon'ble Chief Minister and also the former Hon'ble Chief Minister and certain other Ministers of Tamil Nadu and this cannot be allowed in the name of the so called investigative journalism. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that this documentary has unnecessarily caused a lot of disharmony and disturbance among the general public which has given raise to demonstration being conducted by the opposition parties and affecting the normal life of the general public. Therefore according to the learned Public Prosecutor, the act of this petitioner along with the other accused persons squarely attracts the offence under Section 153A. The learned Public Prosecutor wanted this Court to give a wider meaning to the expression “or any other ground whatsoever” and the learned Public Prosecutor also wanted an expansive meaning to be given to the word “communities”. The learned Public prosecutor therefore submitted that the respondent Police must be permitted to proceed further with the investigation and this Court should not interfere with the FIR that has been registered by the respondent Police. 7. EVOLUTION OF SECTION 153-A OF THE IPC (i) Section 153-A was inserted into the Code vide Section 5 of the Indian Penal Code Amendment Act (V of 1898). (ii) The original Section 153-A, as it stood prior to 1961, runs as under “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Explanation.--It does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section to point out, without malicious intention and with an honest view to their removal, matters which are producing or have a tendency to produce, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India.” (iii) In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 , the Supreme Court noticed the legislative intent behind the 1961 amendment of Section 153-A and observed 28. Interestingly, simultaneous with the introduction of the Bill to amend the Act, a Bill to amend Section 153-A of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) was moved by Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the amendment notes that it was, inter alia, to check fissiparous, communal and separatist tendencies whether based on grounds of religion, caste, language or community or any other ground. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reads as follows: STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS In order effectively to check fissiparous, communal and separatist tendencies whether based on grounds of religion, caste, language or community or any other ground, it is proposed to amend Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code so as to make it a specific offence for anyone to promote or attempt to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities. The Bill also seeks to make it an offence for anyone to do any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Section 295-A of the Penal Code is being slightly widened and the punishment for the offence under that section and under Section 505 of the Code is being increased from two to three years. New Delhi Lal Bahadur Shastri 5-8-1961. (iv) The Law Commission of India, in its 42nd Report on the Indian Penal Code, observes as follows: The amendment of 1961 made three changes in the original section. a. The term “classes” was replaced by religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities'. New Delhi Lal Bahadur Shastri 5-8-1961. (iv) The Law Commission of India, in its 42nd Report on the Indian Penal Code, observes as follows: The amendment of 1961 made three changes in the original section. a. The term “classes” was replaced by religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities'. b. Secondly, the scope of the section was enlarged, by making it an offence also for anyone to do any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups, or castes or communities and which is likely to disturb public tranquillity. c. Thirdly, the Explanation was omitted. Bona fide writing or speech was no longer excepted from the purview of the section. (v) Post the 1961 amendment, the Section read as under “153-A. Whoever-- (a) Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes, or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities, or (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” (vi) In 1969, the section was expanded further, and the statement of reasons for the amendment is as follows: “Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc., is made an offence under S. 153 of the IPC. It is proposed to include therein promoting enmity between different groups on grounds, such as, place of birth, or residence as well. It is also proposed to widen the scope of the provision so as to make promotion of disharmony or feelings of ill-will an offence punishable thereunder. Cl. (b) of the said section provides for the punishment for doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different groups. That provision is also proposed to be widened so as to include acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different regional groups as well. Cl. (b) of the said section provides for the punishment for doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different groups. That provision is also proposed to be widened so as to include acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different regional groups as well. It is also proposed to provide for enhanced punishment...for any such offence committed in a place of worship.” (vii) Mens rea under Section 153-A Discussing the requirement of mens rea under Section 153-A the Law Commission, in its 42nd Report, points out “Three possible views can now be put forth as to the requirement of mens rea under Section 153-A. First, intention is still the gist of the offence, and has to be proved by the prosecution like any other fact, though it is open to the Court to infer it as is usually done in other cases. (Majority view before 1961). Secondly, intention is still the gist of the offence but there is a rebuttable presumption about it. By virtue of S. 81 of the Code, read with S. 106 of the Evidence Act, however, the accused can rebut the presumption (view expressed in Debates in Parliament in 1961). Thirdly, intention is not required and mere tendency to promote ill will, etc. is enough. (Allahabad view before 1961).” (viii) The Law Commission concluded as under “Hence we would support the first view, and recommend that the word “intentionally” should be inserted before the word “promotes” in Section 153-A to make it clear that mens rea is essential and has to be proved as in any other case.” (ix) Discussing the ingredients of the Section a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Maulana Azizul Haq Kausar Naqvi v. State, (1980) 17 ACC 152 : 1980 AWC 173 : AIR 1980 All 149 at page 162, opined as under “40. The essential ingredients of the aforesaid provision of law are: (1) That the accused promoted or attempted to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or caste or communities or that the accused has done an act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups or caste or communities and which is likely to disturb public tranquillity. (2) That he promoted or attempted to promote feelings of enmity or hatred by words or signs or visible representations or otherwise or had acted prejudicially to the maintenance of harmony which disturbs or is likely to disturb public tranquility.” “54. It is thus firmly established, both in India and in England, that criminality for the offence of blasphemous libel, or criminality under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code, does not attach to the things said or done but to the manner in which it is said or done. If the words spoken or written are couched in temperate, dignified, and mild language, and do not have the tendency to insult the feelings or the deepest religious convictions of any section of the people, penal consequences do not follow.” (x) In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432 at page 219, the Supreme Court endorsed the approach of the Law Commission and held that mens rea is essential to constitute an offence under Section 153-A. The Court said “9. Insofar as the offence under Section 153-A IPC is concerned, it provides for punishment for promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever or brings about disharmony or feeling of hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups or castes or communities. In our opinion only where the written or spoken words have the tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affect public tranquillity, that the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. The facts and circumstances of this case unmistakably show that there was no disturbance or semblance of disturbance of law and order or of public order or peace and tranquillity in the area from where the appellants were apprehended while raising slogans on account of the activities of the appellants. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the provisions of Section 153-A IPC, by their raising casually the three slogans a couple of times. The offence under Section 153-A IPC is, therefore, not made out.” (xi) In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 , the Supreme Court examined the commonality between Section 153-A and Section 505 of the IPC, and opined as under : “15. The common feature in both sections being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will “between different” religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. Merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections.” 16. The result of the said discussion is that the appellant who has not done anything as against any religious, racial or linguistic or regional group or community cannot be held guilty of either the offence under Section 153-A or under Section 505(2) of IPC.” (xii) In Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417, the Supreme Court reiterated “The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning.” The Court also referred to its earlier decision in Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266 : AIR 1988 SC 775 wherein it was held that a TV serial Tamas did not depict communal tension and violence and the provisions of Section 153-A IPC would not apply to it. The Court approved the felicitous observations of Vivian Bose, J. (as he then was) in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., AIR 1947 Nagpur 1 wherein the learned judge has held “the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. ... It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law 'the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus'.” (xiii) In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1299 at page 612, the Supreme Court held 23. Similarly, Section 509 IPC criminalises a “word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman” and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act. Clearly this offence cannot be made out when the complainants' grievance is with the publication of what the appellant had stated in a written form. Likewise, some of the complaints have mentioned offences such as those contemplated by Section 153-A IPC (promoting enmity between different groups, etc.) which have no application to the present case since the appellant was not speaking on behalf of one group and the content of her statement was not directed against any particular group either. Likewise, some of the complaints have mentioned offences such as those contemplated by Section 153-A IPC (promoting enmity between different groups, etc.) which have no application to the present case since the appellant was not speaking on behalf of one group and the content of her statement was not directed against any particular group either. (xiv) Subal Kumar Dey v. State of Tripura, (2009) 1 Gau.L.R. 265 : 2007 Cri.L.J. 1195 : (2008) 1 CCR 338 at page 265, the accused was being prosecuted under the following circumstances 1. The petitioner Subal Kumar Dey is the Editor and Publisher of the Bengali daily named “Syandam Patrika” printed, published and circulated from Agartala. One Yudhisthir Ray lodged a complaint on 8.5.1997 in Chebri police station under Khowai sub-division against Mr. Dey that his newspaper published a news item on 25.2.1997 that some explosives had been recovered from the house of a person named Ganga Charan Debbarma who was the relative of the then Chief Minister, which was false and fabricated. According to the informant the said news item was published with a view to malign the democratically elected Chief Minister and to incite disharmony between the tribal and the Bengali communities. The written complaint was registered as Kalyanpur P.S. Case No. 46 of 1997 under sections 501, 505(i)(b)(c), 153, 153(A) and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The investigation following the said FIR found prima facie evidence resulting to submission of a charge sheet against Mr. Dey, the petition herein. On the prayer of the petitioner the case was transferred from the court of Judicial Magistrate, Khowai to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala. On 30.6.2000 Mr. Dey submitted a prayer for his discharge on the ground that the criminal proceeding against him was not maintainable in law as no personnel injury was attributed to the informant. The prayer for discharge was dealt with by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in his order dated 7.8.2001. While rejecting the prayer the trial court observed that the charge sheet was filed against the accused petitioner under sections 153A, 505(b)(c) of the Indian Penal Code in support of which sufficient materials exist on record. The prayer for discharge was dealt with by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in his order dated 7.8.2001. While rejecting the prayer the trial court observed that the charge sheet was filed against the accused petitioner under sections 153A, 505(b)(c) of the Indian Penal Code in support of which sufficient materials exist on record. It was further observed that both the provisions being analogous, the alleged offence had to be understood after ascertaining whether the news item was published and circulated to excite commotion and create communal disharmony and whether such news was false and fabricated. The learned court felt that at the stage of taking cognizance on the basis of the police report it was not possible to come to a definite finding whether the accused had published the news item without deliberate and malicious intention. At such a stage the court would just consider if there was ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence. According to the learned trial court at the stage of cognizance there is no scope to record a conclusion that the materials on record are not likely to lead to conviction at the end of the trial. After taking a view that it will be premature to say that there is no sufficient materials against the accused, the petition for discharge came to be rejected. Aggrieved, the accused petitioner by means of this revision petition under sections 397 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code called in question the correctness and validity of the said order dated 17.8.2001 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate with a prayer for setting aside the said order and discharge the accused from the said proceeding. 8. The legal position set out above, when applied for scrutiny of the allegation made in the FIR and the charge sheet, it would unmistakably show that the allegation that the news item in question maligned the Chief Minister and prompted disharmony between tribals and Bengalies is not borne by any iota of evidence. There is no direct or indirect hint about two communities fighting each other and the statement that Ganga Charan Debbarma is related to the then Chief Minister Dasharath Deb (who is no more) is found correct from the statement of Ganga Charan Debbarma himself. There is no direct or indirect hint about two communities fighting each other and the statement that Ganga Charan Debbarma is related to the then Chief Minister Dasharath Deb (who is no more) is found correct from the statement of Ganga Charan Debbarma himself. Neither Dasharath Deb or any of his legal heirs nor Ganga Charan Debbarma made any allegation that they were maligned by the said news item or what was narrated had the ingredients of causing disharmony between the tribals and the Bengalies. No statement from any para military force who allegedly recovered carbine has been recorded to establish that no recovery of carbine from the house of Ganga Charan Debbarma was at all made. Even if the statement about the recovery of Carbine from the house of Ganga Charan Debbarma is found to be not correct, it cannot be said that such wrong statement caused or was likely to cause disharmony between two communities. Thus, before registering a case on the basis of the allegation made by Yudhistir Ray, the contents of the news item should have been carefully gone into by the investigating officer to satisfy himself whether ingredients constituting offences under sections 153A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code were prima facie present. Freedom of expression which includes freedom of press being one of the cardinal principles of a democratic polity would be the casualty if such unfounded allegation is quickly taken cognizance of without carefully examining the contents. In my considered view this is a fit case in which this court should step in to prevent the abuse of the process of court. It needs no emphasis to observe that the court below while making the impugned order failed to comprehend that the news item in question had nothing to incite or promote disharmony between two groups of people. The High Court held that in the absence of any material to show that the act complained of had excited disaffection and disharmony between two groups, a prosecution under Section 153-A IPC, on the ground that the act complained of had maligned the Chief Minister, was patently misconceived. The High Court held that in the absence of any material to show that the act complained of had excited disaffection and disharmony between two groups, a prosecution under Section 153-A IPC, on the ground that the act complained of had maligned the Chief Minister, was patently misconceived. (xv) In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 , the majority judgment in the Constitution Bench was of the view that Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 must be construed in the light of the amendments made in Section 153-A of the Code. This is because Section 123 of the RP Act, 1951 and Section 153-A of the IPC were, a “package deal” to Parliament making any appeal to communal, fissiparous and separatist tendencies, an electoral offence leading to voiding an election and a possible disqualification of the candidate from contesting an election or voting in an election for a period. An aggravated form of any such tendency could also invite action under the criminal law of the land. The Court then concluded 50.1. The provisions of clause (3) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are required to be read and appreciated in the context of simultaneous and contemporaneous amendments inserting clause (3-A) in Section 123 of the Act and inserting Section 153-A in the Penal Code, 1860. (xvi) The word “community” in the context of Section 123(3) of the RP Act, 1951 (which deploys the same phraseology as Section 153-A IPC) came up for interpretation before a Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in Khilumal Topandas v. Arjundas Tulsidas, AIR 1959 Raj 280 at page 283, and Court held as under “15. The Parliament went a step further by providing in Section 123(3) of the Act that a systematic appeal on grounds of caste, race, community or religion was a corrupt practice as a candidate elected on such basis must be deemed to be not a true representative of the people as a whole. In S. 123(3), the word 'community' has been inserted which has not been used anywhere in the Constitution. The dictionary meaning of the word 'community' is very wide. It may even mean the body of men having common interest. Such interest may be social, economic or political. 16. In S. 123(3), the word 'community' has been inserted which has not been used anywhere in the Constitution. The dictionary meaning of the word 'community' is very wide. It may even mean the body of men having common interest. Such interest may be social, economic or political. 16. It is evident that the word 'community' cannot be construed in its wider sense when it is used in S. 123(3). In India a community is often organised on the basis of caste or religion. We speak of the Khatri community or the Agarawal community on the basis of caste. We speak of the Hindu community or the Muslim community on the basis of religion. Of course our history is so old that we have obliterated all kinds of racial prejudices, but a community may be organised on the basis of racial distinctions. When a community is organised on the basis of caste, race or religion, it is evident that such an organisation does come within S. 123(3). At the same time we have communities organised not on the basis of caste, race or religion but on social, economic or political basis. 17. Thus we may have an organisation of the mercantile community based on economical considerations aiming at the development of trade. We have also political bodies organised on different ideologies. The word 'community' used in S. 123(3) has only to be confined to such an organisation which in effect divides the citizens of the country into groups sometimes opposed to one another. It is only when the organisation of the community is such as aims to divide the citizens of the country and releases forces antagonistic to the unity of the country that it comes within the purview of S. 123(3). Communities organised for the purpose of cementing the citizens for the purpose of social, economic and political pro-grass of the country, do not come under S. 123(3). 18. The words which are used immediately before and after the word community in that sub-section are 'caste, race and religion.' The word 'community' must be construed by reference to the words 'caste, race and religion'. “It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them”. Robertson v. Day (1879) 5 AC 63 at p. 69. “It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them”. Robertson v. Day (1879) 5 AC 63 at p. 69. This is merely an application of the rule of noscitur a socits. In Wharton's Law Lexicon 14th Edition at page 697 this rule is referred as follows: “Where there is a string of words in an Act of Parliament and the meaning of one of them is doubtful, that meaning is given to it which it shares with the other words”. (xvii) In the light of the judgment in Commachen, this interpretation of Section 123(3) of the RP Act, 1951 will also, perforce, apply to interpret Section 153-A of the Code. The expression “any other ground whatsoever” occurring in Section 153-A IPC cannot receive a liberal construction since the provision, being penal in nature, must receive a strict construction. Explaining the construction of penal statutes the Supreme Court in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta, (2009) 1 SCC 516 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 567 at page 529 held as under 38. In Craies Statute Law (7th Edn. at p. 529) it is said that penal statutes must be construed strictly. At p. 530 of the said treatise, referring to U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 L Ed 37 : 18 US (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820). it is observed, thus: “The distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has, no doubt, in modern times almost disappeared, and the question now is, what is the true construction of the statute? I should say that in a criminal statute you must be quite sure that the offence charged is within the letter of the law. This rule is said to be founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature, and not in the judicial department, for it is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment.” 39. In Tuck & Sons v. Priester [(1887) 19 QBD 629 (CA)], which is followed in London and Country Commercial Properties Investments Ltd. v. Attorney General [(1953) 1 WLR 312 : (1953) 1 All ER 436], it is stated: “We must be very careful in construing that section, because it imposes a penalty. In Tuck & Sons v. Priester [(1887) 19 QBD 629 (CA)], which is followed in London and Country Commercial Properties Investments Ltd. v. Attorney General [(1953) 1 WLR 312 : (1953) 1 All ER 436], it is stated: “We must be very careful in construing that section, because it imposes a penalty. If there is a reasonable interpretation, which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. Unless penalties are imposed in clear terms they are not enforceable. Also where various interpretations of a section are admissible it is a strong reason against adopting a particular interpretation if it shall appear that the result would be unreasonable or oppressive.” 40. Blackburn, J. in Willis v. Thorp [(1875) LR 10 QB 383] observed: “When the legislature imposes a penalty, the words imposing it must be clear and distinct.” (xviii) Thus viewed, the expression “any other ground whatsoever” must be interpreted to mean a ground that is analogous to the grounds that precede it. There is no difficulty in applying the principle of ejusdem generis to understand the meaning of the aforesaid expression. This is on account of the fact that the first limb of Section 153-A makes a pointed reference to two sets of grounds viz, “grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever”. The first category of grounds is “religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community”. Each of these grounds constitute what the Supreme Court collectively calls immutable characteristics i.e., traits which each human being is powerless to change. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) the US Supreme Court speaking through Brennan, J defined an immutable characteristic in the following terms (“[R]ace, like gender and illegitimacy, is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside.” In Commachen's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while construing the provisions of Section 123-A RPA, Act observes “118. These, among other provisions of the Constitution demonstrate that there is no wall of separation between the State on the one hand and religion, caste, language, race or community on the other. The Constitution is not oblivious to the history of discrimination against and the deprivation inflicted upon large segments of the population based on religion, caste and language. These, among other provisions of the Constitution demonstrate that there is no wall of separation between the State on the one hand and religion, caste, language, race or community on the other. The Constitution is not oblivious to the history of discrimination against and the deprivation inflicted upon large segments of the population based on religion, caste and language. Religion, caste and language are as much a symbol of social discrimination imposed on large segments of our society on the basis of immutable characteristics as they are of a social mobilisation to answer centuries of injustice. They are part of the central theme of the Constitution to produce a just social order. Electoral politics in a democratic polity is about mobilisation. Social mobilisation is an integral element of the search for authority and legitimacy. Hence, it would be far-fetched to assume that in legislating to adopt Section 123(3), Parliament intended to obliterate or outlaw references to religion, caste, race, community or language in the hurly burly of the great festival of democracy.” 8. The contention made by the learned Public Prosecutor that the expression “or any ground whatsoever” and “community” must be given an expansive meaning to even include words or signs or visible representation made as against an individual, to be brought within the purview of Sec. 153-A, prima facie seems far fetched and it requires a detailed consideration. This Court is of the considered view that these words must be read ejusdem generis with the previous words used in the Section, since those words constitutes a genus and discloses a category. 9. The law relating to the principle of ejusdem generis is well settled and is no more res integra. The principle of ejusdem generis is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words. In such a case the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. The rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of the other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. The rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of the other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. The rule applies only when (1) the statute enumerates the specific words, (2) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category, (3) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration, (4) the general terms follow the enumeration, and (5) there is no indication of a different legislative intent. If the subjects of enumeration belong to a broad-based genus, as also to a narrower genus there is no principle that the general words should be confined to the narrower genus. The rule cannot be applied unless there is genus constituted or a category disclosed. If the preceding words do not constitute mere specifications of a genus but constitute description of a complete genus, the rule has no application. The rule has to be applied with care and caution. This is not an inviolable rule of law, but it is only permissible inference, in the absence of any indication to the contrary. Where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import it becomes the duty of the Courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning. Useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd., Vs. Collector of Customs, Bombay, AIR 2002 SC 1706 and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra University of Health Sciences and Ors. Vs. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1325 . 10. A bare reading of Section 153-A of IPC postulates any act which promotes enmity between the groups on grounds of religion and race etc., or which are prejudicial to national integration, punishable. The purpose of enactment of such a provision was to check fissiparous communal and separatist tendencies and secure fraternity so as to ensure the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. The purpose of enactment of such a provision was to check fissiparous communal and separatist tendencies and secure fraternity so as to ensure the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. Similarly Section 505 of IPC is aimed at reports calculated to produce mutiny or to induce one Section of the population to commit offences against another and to prevent and remove communal and religious tensions. The common feature in Section 153-A and Section 505, being promotion of felling of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or cause and communities, it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. 11. Taking into consideration the scope of Sec. 153-A which has been discussed in detail herein above with the supporting case laws and also the provisions of Sec. 505 IPC, which has similar ingredients, this Court grants stay of all further investigation in Cr. No. 21 of 2019, on the file of the first respondent Police for a period of four weeks.