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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 295 (MP)

Abdul Saleem v. State of M. P

2019-04-05

J.K.MAHESHWARI

body2019
ORDER 1. Invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the validity of the order Annexure P-2 dated 7.12.2016 passed by District Magistrate Panna and the order of the appellate authority i.e. the Commissioner, Sagar Division, Sagar Annexure P-3 dated 27.6.2017 directing to revoke his arm licence, inter alia contending that such an action is illegal, arbitrary and without application of mind. 2. In the order passed by licensing authority, it is mentioned that recently a case is registered at Crime No. 225/2015 which is pending in the competent Court, however, revocation of the arm licence is necessary to maintain public peace and for public safety. Thus, in exercise of power under section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the Act) the licence bearing No.08/pratan/panna/2010 dated 3.11.2010 is revoked with direction to deposit the firearm (gun). The Commissioner, Sagar Division, Sagar while dismissing the appeal, has referred the facts of the case from Para 1 to 7 and in concluding para 8 in reference to the recommendation made by the Superintendent of Police, Panna opined that the arm licence may be mis-utilized affecting security of public peace and public safety. However, dismissing the appeal said, the licence has rightly been revoked by the licensing authority, but without adverting the arguments advanced and assigning the reasons. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the arm licence was granted in the year 2010. The alleged criminal cases referred from Sr. Nos. 1 to 6 in the impugned order dated 7.12.2016 (Annexure P-2) were prior to grant of arm licence, in which he is acquitted long back by the competent Court prior to grant of licence. Only the case mentioned at Sr. No.7 of the impugned order of Crime No. 225/2015 was registered in 2015 falsely implicating him. In the said case on the basis of compromise the Court acquitted the accused on 6.9.2016 prior to passing the impugned order. In the said case misuse of arm licence or use of the gun with intent to affect the public at large was not alleged. Therefore, security of public peace or public safety is not in danger. In fact merely because the complainant is a journalist, who alleged against the petitioner, however, in the facts of this case, revocation of arm licence is arbitrary and contrary to law. Therefore, security of public peace or public safety is not in danger. In fact merely because the complainant is a journalist, who alleged against the petitioner, however, in the facts of this case, revocation of arm licence is arbitrary and contrary to law. 4. It is urged, the licensing authority has exercised the power under section 17(3)(b) of the Act, for variation, suspension and revocation of the licence, which can be exercised, where “deems it necessary” for the “security of the public peace and public safety”. The phrase “deem it necessary” confers a discretion to be exercised only in “the security of the public peace and public safety” after subjective satisfaction. The said issue has been considered by various High Courts in Bhim Sen v. State of Punjab reported in 1965 SCCOnline P&H 382; Labh Singh v. Divisional Commissioner reported in 1971 SCCOnline P&H 206; Changga Prasad Sahu v. State of UP reported in 1984 SCCOnline All 61; Ganesh Chandra Bhatt v. District Magistrate, Almora reported in AIR 1993 All 291 ; Ramesh Singh v. State of UP and others reported in 2007 SCC Online All 961; Ajay Jayawant Bhosale v. Commissioner of Police, Pune and others reported in 2016 SCCOnline Bom 5019. Looking to the provisions of law and the above precedents, in the facts of this case, nothing is available on record to show that “the public peace or public safety” is on peril, for which revocation of licence of the petitioner is necessary. 5. It is further contended that in the year 2011, Superintendent of Police, Panna requested for revocation of arm licence of the petitioner to the District Magistrate which was rejected vide order dated 12.8.2013 (signed on 10.9.2013) holding that the prosecution has failed to bring sufficient material and reasons justifying the request for revocation. While making previous recommendation, the cases referred in the impugned order from Sr. Nos. 1 to 6 were the same and the bonds to bound over him were also the same. It is only one case referred at Sr. No. 7 of the impugned order i.e. an offence registered at Crime No. 225/2015 is new wherein use of firearm or misuse of arm licence has not alleged. There was no seizure of any Gun in the said case. It is only one case referred at Sr. No. 7 of the impugned order i.e. an offence registered at Crime No. 225/2015 is new wherein use of firearm or misuse of arm licence has not alleged. There was no seizure of any Gun in the said case. More so, the said case has been decided by the Court vide order dated 6.9.2016 acquitting the accused on the basis of compromise, therefore, the authority is having no objection to revoke the licence looking to the previous order dated 12.8.2013/10.9.2013. Neither the licensing authority nor the appellate authority has duly considered the said aspect while passing the order. 6. Per contra learned Government Advocate contends that as per section 17(3)(b) of the Act, if the licensing authority is satisfied that continuation of the arm licence by a citizen adversely affects the security of public peace and public safety, it can revoke the same. On exercise of such power, it is not open to judicial scrutiny unless the satisfaction is palpably illegal or suffers from the jurisdictional error. It is said various criminal cases were registered against the petitioner right from the year 1997 and recently on 3.7.2015. In the said case as per prosecution, petitioner assaulted to one Ram Bihari Goswami, Journalist/Press Reporter and broken his camera giving threat to him of dire consequences by use of gun. However, on his complaint FIR Annexure R-1 was registered at Crime No. 225/2015 under sections 323, 294, 506, 427, 34 of the IPC, to which challan was filed on 27.7.2015. It is said, Superintendent of Police, Panna received a report from the SHO dated 7.9.2015, however, relying upon the said report (Annexure R-2) the Superintendent of Police vide letter dated 25.9.2015 recommended for cancellation of the arm licence. On the said recommendation, the District Magistrate sought reply issuing show cause notice to the petitioner, which was filed as per (Annexure R-4). In reply the factum of acquittal due to compromise was not mentioned, however, after recording the satisfaction, the licensing authority has rightly revoked the licence vide order dated 7.12.2016, which is confirmed by the appellate authority on 27.6.2017. Thus, the power exercised by the licensing authority is only for the security of public peace and public safety, therefore, interference in this petition is not warranted. 7. Thus, the power exercised by the licensing authority is only for the security of public peace and public safety, therefore, interference in this petition is not warranted. 7. After having heard learned counsel for both the parties, the core question arises for determination is, whether in the facts of the case, revocation of the arm licence by licensing authority is within the scope of the power conferred on him section 17(3)(b) of the Act and the order passed is after subjective satisfaction for the security of public peace and public safety? 8. Upon hearing, to advert their arguments and to deal the said issues, the provision of section 17 of the Act would be relevant, therefore, relevant part of it is reproduced as under : 17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences.- (1) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (2) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence- (a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reasons unfit for a licence under this Act; or (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or (c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence. (4) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (5) Where the licensing authority makes an order varying a licence under sub-section (1) or an order suspending or revoking a licence under sub-section (3), it shall record in writing the reasons therefor and furnish to the holder of the licence on demand a brief statement of the same unless in any case the licensing authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such statement. (6) The authority to whom the licensing authority is subordinate may by order in writing suspend or revoke a licence on any ground on which it may be suspended or revoked by the licensing authority; and the foregoing provisions of this section shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the suspension or revocation of a licence by such authority. (7) A Court convicting the holder of a licence of any offence under this Act or the rules made thereunder may also suspend or revoke the licence : Provided that if the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the suspension or revocation shall become void. (8) An order of suspension or revocation under sub-section (7) may also be made by an appellate Court or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision. (9) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (10) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 9. On perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that the licensing authority may suspend the licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke it, if it is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by the Act or by any other law for the time being in force to acquire and having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit to hold a licence. As per subsection (b), the licensing authority may suspend or revoke the licence if “it deems necessary” for “the security of the public peace or for public safety”. As per subsection (b), the licensing authority may suspend or revoke the licence if “it deems necessary” for “the security of the public peace or for public safety”. The licence may also be suspended or revoked if it was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information or in contravention of any of the conditions of the licence. In addition, if the licensing authority wants to vary the condition, to which notice has been issued, if not complied, it can suspend or revoke the licence under sub-section (1) of the section 17 of the Act. While passing the order of suspension or revocation, the authority shall record a reason and furnish it to the holder on demand by a brief statement unless in his/her opinion it will not be in the public interest. As per sub-section (6), the authority, to whom, the licensing authority is subordinate may also have power to suspend or revoke the licence similar to the licensing authority. The Court trying the offence, if convicted the holder of a licence of any offence under this Act or the Rules, may also suspend or revoke the licence but in case if the conviction is set aside in appeal, the suspension or revocation shall become void. The power of suspension or revocation has also been conferred to the appellate Court or the High Court akin to sub-section (7) of section 17 of the Act. 10. Thus, for the purpose of the case at hand and on reading the aforesaid, while exercising the power under section 17(3)(b) of the Act, the licensing authority must record its satisfaction to the effect that by an act of licensee “the security of the public peace or public safety” is on peril or going to be affected, therefore, revocation of licence is necessary. 11. The phrase “Public Peace and Public Safety” is defined in Advance Law Lexicon 5th Edition by Shakeel Ahmed Khan by which it do not mean ordinary disturbance of law and order, it is said that the public safety means safety of public at large and not safety of few persons only. The words “security of public peace” have also been defined in the Advanced Law Lexicon to mean “maintenance of public tranquility and order”. The words “security of public peace” have also been defined in the Advanced Law Lexicon to mean “maintenance of public tranquility and order”. It is in reference to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sunderlal Bhardwaj v. State reported in, 1961 MPLJ Note 80. 12. The word “public” is having some significance to the above said phrase as referred in section 17(3)(b) of the Act relatable to peace and safety. As per Corpus Juris Secundum, the word “public” is defined as meaning the whole body politic, or all the citizens of the state; the general body of mankind, or of a nation, state, or community; everybody; the people; the body of the people at large; the community at large, without reference to the geographical limits of any corporation like a city, town, or county. “Public” is also defined or employed as meaning the inhabitants of a particular place; all the inhabitants of a particular place; the people the neighborhood; a particular body or section of the people; often, specifically, a clientele. The word “public”, however, does not mean everybody all the time; it does not mean all of the people in the state, or in any county or town. It does not mean all the people, or most of the people, or very many of the people of a place, but so many of them as contradistinguishes them from a few. It designates individuals in general without restriction or selection. “Public” also means of, or relating to, the government, and it may be defined as meaning owned by the public, that is, by the government or some of its sub divisions, as a public building, public Courthouse, etc. “Public” is also the term used in designating the legal character of various acts, rights, occupations, etc. that affect or belong to the collective body of a state or community. “Public” is also defined as meaning shared in or to be shared or participated in or enjoyed by the people at large; open to all; common to all or many; pen to common or general use; general; open for general or common use or entertainment, as a public highway or road, a public house; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community. Thus, affecting the security of public peace and safety, it should not affect a few but the inhabitants of a particular place because it is a synonymous of People distinguished from private. 13. Learned Government Advocate representing the State has raised an objection that the order passed by the authorities are not open for judicial scrutiny. In this regard, it is a trite law that the Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can appropriately look into the reasoning assigned by the authorities while passing the impugned order not intending to look into the sufficiency of the fact but to see that those reasoning satisfied the purpose mentioned in the statute. Therefore, argument advanced that the orders impugned are not open to judicial scrutiny is hereby repelled. Thus, in the facts of the case, it may be looked into that the order has been passed for securing public peace or public safety after recording subjective satisfaction in the context of the facts and the provisions of the statute. 14. In the context of affecting the Public Peace and Public Safety, some judgments of the different High Courts and Hon’ble the Supreme Court are relevant. In the case of Bhim Sen v. The State of Punjab & others (supra), the issue of revocation of arm licence came up for consideration before the Punjab and Haryana High Court wherein the Court dealing with the issue with respect to the reasons specified in the said case has observed as under : The petitioner then filed an application for review of the order of the District Magistrate. The review petition was dismissed by Shri B.S. Randhawa, District Magistrate, Sangrur, on 18th October, 1963. It was stated in the order that no doubt the police had recommended the grant of revolver licence to the petitioner but that was prior to statement given in Court by the petitioner as a witness in FIR case No. 11, dated 30th January, 1962 under section 61 of the Excise Act. Thereafter the police had recommended the cancellation of the petitioner’s gun licence on the ground that he did not support the prosecution in the above said excise case against Faqir Singh who was alleged to have been caught red handed with a working still. Thereafter the police had recommended the cancellation of the petitioner’s gun licence on the ground that he did not support the prosecution in the above said excise case against Faqir Singh who was alleged to have been caught red handed with a working still. The District Magistrate observed that since the petitioner had resiled from making a statement in support of the Police, therefore, the report was against him and the District Magistrate felt that in those circumstances there was no justification to upset the order for not renewing the petitioner’s gun licence. The original order refusing to renew the gun licence had been passed (according to ara 3 of the written statement) by Mr. M.S. Bedi, the then District Magistrate, on the solitary ground that the petitioner had “sworn false testimony in a Court of law.” Having failed to get the order reviewed, the petitioner went up in appeal to the Commissioner, Patiala Division. His appeal was dismissed by Shri H.B. Lall, the appellate authority on 21st January, 1964, on the ground that an appeal against an order refusing to review an earlier order was not competent. He further held that the appeal filed by the petitioner in the form in which it was filed was not maintainable. In the written statement filed by the District Magistrate, Sangrur, it has been fairly and frankly stated that the copy of order refusing to renew the petitioner’s licence was wrongly refused and that the refusal of renewal of the licence was based only on the above-said Police report. Under section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act the renewal of an arms licence can be refused by the appropriate authority either in the interest of securing public peace or in the interest of public safety. The ground on which the petitioner’s gun licence was declined to be renewed, is wholly extraneous and is not even relevant under section 17 of the Act. It has been held in Ahmadnoor Roshan v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (1), that the licensing authority under section 17 of the Act cannot exercise powers in a haphazard way. It was held in that case that there are three checks provided by law for assuring the licensee that the administrative power is exercised in public interest, for the purpose given in the law and under control. It was held in that case that there are three checks provided by law for assuring the licensee that the administrative power is exercised in public interest, for the purpose given in the law and under control. Firstly, the reasons should be recorded, secondly they should be relatable to the security of public peace, and thirdly, they are subject to further examination in appeal by the administrative authority immediately superior. In the instant case I find that the solitary reason for which the renewal of the petitioner’s gun licence was refused is not in any manner relatable to the security of public peace. The order of the District Magistrate, Sangrur, declining to renew the petitioner’s gun licence and the order of the appellate authority cannot be sustained and are, therefore, set aside. As a result this writ petition is allowed without any order as to costs. 15. In the case of Labh Singh v. The Divisional Commissioner (supra), again the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the context of pendency of criminal case, has held as under : Held : that it cannot be laid down as a matter of law that a gun license cannot be cancelled during the pendency of the criminal case relating to the use of the arm by the licensee. The cancellation of a gun license does not in all cases pre-judge the criminal case. But where a criminal case regarding the use of the licensed arm is pending against a licensee, his license is suspended and the possession of the arm is taken over from him it is better if the District Magistrate should await the decision of the case before cancelling the license. The arms of the licensee having been taken over, he cannot possibly use the same till it is restored to him. His license having been suspended, he cannot acquire another arm. The Court trying the criminal case also has the jurisdiction to direct cancellation of the arms license of the accused, if he is convicted of any offence under the Arms Act, or the Rules made thereunder. The non-cancellation of the license, therefore, till the decision of the criminal case will not endanger public peace. The Court trying the criminal case also has the jurisdiction to direct cancellation of the arms license of the accused, if he is convicted of any offence under the Arms Act, or the Rules made thereunder. The non-cancellation of the license, therefore, till the decision of the criminal case will not endanger public peace. Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying that a writ of mandamus, certiorary, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction be issued quashing the order dated 5th January, 1971, passed by Divisional Commissioner, Ambala, Respondent No. 1, confirming the order of the District Magistrate, Karnal, Respondent No. 2, dated 4th July, 1970, revoking the Arms License of the petitioner. 16. On perusal of the aforesaid, it is apparent that if a criminal case is registered alleging the use of arm licence, it does not pre-judge the authority prior to its decision because the criminal Court also have jurisdiction to direct the cancellation of the arm licence. Meaning thereby, if the arm licence has been used in commission of the offence, its cancellation without affording an opportunity is not justified, that too during the pendency of the criminal case because on setting aside conviction or acquittal as per section 17(7) ibid, it shall become void. 17. A Full Bench (consists of three Judges) of Allahabad High Court in the case of Changga Prasad Sahu v. State of UP (supra), in the context of applicability of the provision of section 17 of the Act with respect to recording satisfaction and to explain the object of enquiry has held as under : 15. The object of the enquiry that a licensing authority may, while proceeding to consider the question as to whether or not an arms licence should be revoked or suspended, like to make, clearly is to enable the licensing authority to come to a conclusion as to whether or not the facts stated in clauses (a) to (e) of section 17 (3) exist and as already explained it is not obliged to before considering that a case for revocation/ suspension of licence has been made out, associate the licensee in such enquiry. In this view of the matter it can safely be taken that where a licensing authority embarks upon such an enquiry it is, till then, not convinced about existence of the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of section 17(3) of the Act. So long as it is not so convinced no case to make an order either revoking or suspending an arms licence as contemplated by the section will be made out. 18. The said case of Changga Prasad Sahu v. State of UP (supra), has been reconsidered by Five Judges’ Bench of Allahabad High Court in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1996 All LJ 301 19. The scheme of the Act i.e. section 17 itself contemplated suspension or revocation on two independent counts; when challenge is made to suspension directed by the licensing authority; the ground for suspension is to be scrutinised to find out as to whether it falls under the scheme of section 17(3) or not. The action of suspension if found justified and in accordance with the provisions of section 17(3) its affect and validity shall not be denuded only because the licensing authority wants to give an opportunity before cancelling the licence. As laid down by all the Full Benches the revocation order can be made if satisfaction is recorded under section 17(3) without giving an opportunity to the licensee. However, five Judge Full Bench in Kailash v. State of Uttar Pradesh case (AIR 1985) All 291) (supra) has observed that finality to such revocation be not attached unless the licensee is given an opportunity to represent against such revocation. Although power is given to revoke a licence on being satisfied with the grounds under section 17(3) but in a case where licensing authority wanted to give an opportunity before passing the revocation order, the said action cannot denude the jurisdiction and power of the licensing authority to suspend the licence. Each case has to be examined from the orders passed by the licensing authority to test it whether the suspension has been ordered without forming requisite opinion or the authority has not formed opinion and wanted to enquire before forming opinion, as noted above, if the authority has not formed a definite opinion and is in process of enquiry to come to a definite conclusion suspension cannot be ordered. However, if the opinion is recorded and there is already material, suspension of arm licence cannot be faulted with. 19. In the case of Ganesh Chandra Bhatt v. District Magistrate, Almora (supra), the Allahabad High Court has considered the issue of grant of licence in the context of provision of section 14 of the Act. However, the said case can only be relevant in the context of meaning of the phrase “public peace and public safety” otherwise the power of grant of licence and its revocation are in contradistinction to each other. 20. In the case of Ajay Jayawant Bhosale v. The commissioner of Police, Pune City, Pune and others (supra), the Division Bench of Bombay High Court has considered the question of cancellation of arm licence and held as under : 12. The question, therefore, arises as to whether there was sufficient material placedi before the Commissioner of Police for arriving at subjective satisfaction that continuation of licence or renewal would be endangering public peace or public safety. It seems that the show-cause notice was issued by the Commissioner, Pune consequent to filing of application by the petitioiner to the Home Department of the State Government for getting all India arms licence. Nevertheless at any stage the licensing authority after getting subjectively satisfied and on the basis of material placed before it could revoke licence under section 17 of the Act but whether there was sufficient material with the licensing authority to pass order of revocation. 13. The right to life and liberty are guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Arms licence is granted for personal safety and security after due enquiry by the authorities in accordance with provisions contained in the Arms Act, 1959. The provisions of Arms Act with regard to suspension or cancellation of Arms licence cannot be invoked lightly in an arbitrary manner. The provisions of the Arms Act particularly section 13 to 17 indicate that once a licence is granted under the Act, the same shall be renewed from time to time unless there exist a ground of refusal as enumerated under section 14 of the Act. Protection to life, property of citizen is responsibility of the State. It is only when person apprehends that machinery of State would not come to his help for protection, he/she applies for licence under the Act. Protection to life, property of citizen is responsibility of the State. It is only when person apprehends that machinery of State would not come to his help for protection, he/she applies for licence under the Act. The provisions of section 17 A of the Arms Act indicate that arms licence can be cancelled or suspended if the licensing authority finds it necessary for the security of public peace or public safety. Merely because a criminal case is pending, the provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act would not be attracted. Such provisions would be attracted in case the licensing authority finds that continuance of licence is detrimental to public peace or public security and safety. But the authority concerned will have to record a finding that how and under what circumstances and in what manner possession of arms licence could be contrary to the provisions of section 17 B of the Arms Act. Each case is required to be considered on its own merits. 14. Nothing was placed before us by the respondents to indicate that the petitioner had misused the licenced weapon at any point of time in past. The order of revocation of license refers to two criminal cases registered against the petitioner. In the facts we find that mere registration of criminal case/cases could not be a ground to revoke the license. The order shall indicate clearly that continuance of licence would be against public peace, safety and security. 15. Learned Counsel appearing for petitioner submits that in fact petitioner and his driver were attacked in the year 2009 regarding which he had filed a complaint. Considering the business activities, political and social work of the petitioner, it was submitted that to protect petitioner’s life and property, arms licence was applied for and it was granted. The petitioner still requires the same. The licensing authority has not given any opinion as to whether the petitioner requires licence to protect his life and property. The subjective satisfaction of the authority, therefore, plays a vital role while assessing merits of a case before passing orders under the provisions of section 13, 14 or 17(b). Each case needs to be assessed, tested on its own merits. The subjective satisfaction of the authority, therefore, plays a vital role while assessing merits of a case before passing orders under the provisions of section 13, 14 or 17(b). Each case needs to be assessed, tested on its own merits. Therefore, it is imperative that before arriving at a conclusion of invoking powers under the provisions of section 17(b), the licensing authority ought to have considered the entire material, threat perception of the licencee and pass appropriate orders. 21. This Court in the case of Badshah alias Taj Mohammad v. State of M.P. and another, reported in (2007)4 MPLJ 527 have an occasion to consider altogether similar issue as involved in the present case wherein the Court relying upon some of the judgments of the Allahabad High Court observed as under : From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that there is no finding in the aforesaid criminal cases that the firearm owned by the petitioner under valid licence was ever used or misused by the petitioner. No threat is stated to have been extended by the petitioner on the strength of the said firearm. There is no specific provision in Arms Act or elsewhere that no licence is to be issued when criminal cases are pending against the applicant. There is further no material on record to infer that the petitioner has caused obstruction to public safety. This being so, the revocation of the petitioner’s licence on the ground of public safety is not sustainable in law. On perusal of the order dated 8.1.2001 contained in Annexure P-3 it may be seen that certain criminal cases were pending at that time against the petitioner. This position was entirely changed at the time of passing of the impugned orders contained in Annexures P-1 and P-2 in the year 2005 because firstly, no criminal case was pending against the petitioner, secondly, cases under sections 107, 110, 116(3) of Criminal Procedure Code came to an end on account of expiry of six months. Only in one criminal case namely Criminal Case No. 285/92, a fine was imposed on the petitioner. Remaining criminal cases stood terminated in his favour on account of acquittal or compromise. From perusal of the record of criminal cases, it is ample clear that the firearm was not found to have been used or misused. Only in one criminal case namely Criminal Case No. 285/92, a fine was imposed on the petitioner. Remaining criminal cases stood terminated in his favour on account of acquittal or compromise. From perusal of the record of criminal cases, it is ample clear that the firearm was not found to have been used or misused. Even in the order of District Magistrate, Narsinghpur, there is no mention that the licensed weapon was used or misused. Mere apprehension of the District Magistrate that the licensed firearm may be misused by the petitioner has no foundation and does not provide a ground for revoking the licence of the firearm. Moreover, it is quite clear that the licensing authority did not take into consideration the effect of termination of criminal cases while passing the impugned order. In view of this, the earlier order dated 8.1.2001 cannot form a basis for passing the impugned orders in the year 2005 when admittedly, the criminal cases against the petitioner were not pending. Thus, on the date of impugned orders the grounds assigned for cancellation of licence earlier on 8.1.2001 were non-existent and the impugned orders are, therefore, found to be unsustainable in law. Considering the case in hand on the aforesaid parameters, it may be seen that there is absolutely no material on record to establish that the petitioner used or misused the firearm and that possession of firearm poses a threat to the security of the public peace and public safety. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders contained in Annexures P-1 and P-2 are clearly unsustainable in law and the same are hereby set aside. Respondent No. 2 is hereby directed to consider the application of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the aforesaid observations within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 22. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sunderlal Bhardwaj v. State (supra), has dealt with the issue regarding cancellation of arm licence for the security of public peace or public safety. In the said case, the Court while considering the issue of cancellation of arm licence interpreted the words “for the security of public peace” in the context of section 17(3)(b) of the Act and observed that expression “security of public peace” means maintenance of public tranquility and order. In the said case, the Court while considering the issue of cancellation of arm licence interpreted the words “for the security of public peace” in the context of section 17(3)(b) of the Act and observed that expression “security of public peace” means maintenance of public tranquility and order. The Court referring the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Romesh Thappar Versus State of Madras reported in AIR 1950 SC 124 observed that public safety ordinarily means security of public or their freedom from danger. 23. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi Administration and others reported in (1982)2 SCC 403 has an occasion to consider the issue affecting “public order” vis-a-vis “law and order”. As discussed, “public order” would include the public peace and public safety. However, the observations of Hon’ble the Apex Court in the said case, in the context of this case are relevant, therefore, they are reproduced as under : “12. The most crucial question on which the decision must turn is whether the activities of the detenu fall within the domain of ‘public order’ or ‘law and order’ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 13. The true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 24. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 24. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that any act disturbing the peaceful life of a community or prejudicial to the same, would fall within the purview of “security of public safety and public peace”. 25. This Court in the case of Mahendra Singh Bhadauria v. State of M.P. and others reported in 2009(1) MPLJ 540 considered the issue regarding suspension of the arm licence on account of seizure of 30 rounds (live cartridges) from the possession of the petitioner and registration of criminal case under the Act. The Court was of the opinion that the authority was not justified to suspend the arm licence merely due to pendency of the criminal case. 26. In the context of the statutory provision of the Act and the interpretation made by the aforementioned judgments, the parameters which can be broadly carved out for suspension or revocation of the arm licence, are as under : (i) Power of suspension or revocation of the licence are with the authorities, when “it deems necessary”, after “subjective satisfaction” for “the security of public peace and public safety”. (ii) Public Peace would mean the “maintenance of public tranquility and order” and the public safety includes security of public or their freedom from danger, it does not mean law and order or affect the individual. (iii) The authority may exercise the power of suspension or revocation with due care and caution even in pending or disposed criminal cases on proof of use or misuse or threat given by use of the said weapon. (iv) In the order of suspension and revocation, the reasons ought to be recorded by the authority and furnish it to the holder on demand unless its supply is prohibited in public interest. (v) The power of licensing authority is under the supervisory control of the higher authority as per section 17(6) of the Act and Rule 5(2) of the Arms Rules. (v) The power of licensing authority is under the supervisory control of the higher authority as per section 17(6) of the Act and Rule 5(2) of the Arms Rules. (vi) The Court trying the offence under the Arms Act against the licensee can also suspend or revoke the licence including the appellate Court and the High Court. (vii) The cases must be examined on the facts of each case regarding sufficiency of the material and degree of danger to the security of public peace and safety. (viii) The action for revocation of the licence ought to be taken affording an opportunity to the affected persons. The aforementioned are the broad parameters which may be looked into by the licensing authority as well as the appellate authority while passing the order of suspension or revocation of the arm licence. It is made clear here that the said parameters are illustrative but not exhaustive. The authority while exercising the power under section 17 of the Arms Act is having discretion conferred by the statute to examine sufficiency of the material placed before it but the said discretion ought to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or capriciously. 27. In the context of said legal position, the judgment of this Court in the case of Rajbahadur Singh v. State of M.P. and others reported in 2009(2) MPLJ 291 relied by learned Government Advocate is required to be referred. In the said case, this Court referring the provision of section 17 and looking to the sufficiency of the material of the said case and the degree of danger to the security of public peace and public safety because various cases were registered against the petitioner, however, looking to the facts of the said case, the High Court has declined to interfere while the facts of the present case are entirely different. 28. 28. In reply, the petitioner has placed reliance on the order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 5490/2016 (Naved Ahmed v. The State of M.P.) on 27.2.2017 wherein it was observed that in the criminal case, due to which the power of suspension of gun licence has been exercised and the finding of use or misuse of said gun has not been recorded, the impugned order revoking the licence was found not in accordance to law, however, quashed the same relying upon the judgment of Badshah @ Taj Mohammad v. State of M.P. (supra). In the context of aforesaid legal position, the facts of the present case are required to be analyzed. 29. In the present case, petitioner was granted the licence bearing No. 08/pratan/panna/2010 as per order dated 3.11.2010. The recommendation for cancellation of said arm licence was made first time by Superintendent of Police, Panna vide letter No. G-3655/2011 dated 1.7.2011 referring the criminal cases mentioned at Sr. Nos. 1 to 6 of the impugned order Annexure P-2 dated 7.12.2016. The Collector after receiving the report from the Police authorities and reply of the petitioner, turned down the request of the Superintendent of Police vide order dated 12.8.2013. Thereafter one more FIR was lodged against the petitioner at Crime No. 225/2015 for the petty offences under sections 323, 294, 427, 506, 34 of the IPC. On registration of said case, again a request was made by Superintendent of Police vide letter No. 22/2015 Panna dated 21.9.2015 relying upon the letter No. 2554B/2015 dated 7.9.2015 submitted by the SHO, P.S. Kotwali, District Panna. The reply was sought from the petitioner issuing show cause notice on 29.10.2015, which was submitted by him. In the reply it is stated that in the said criminal case of Crime No. 225/2015 (bearing No. 944/2015), the petitioner has been acquitted vide order dated 6.9.2016 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panna on account of compromise between the parties. In this regard, in the reply filed by the State Government in this petition, said that the fact written by hand was not in typed material submitted before the authority. In this regard, in the reply filed by the State Government in this petition, said that the fact written by hand was not in typed material submitted before the authority. Looking to the said objection, this Court asked for the report regarding existence of the said fact from Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panna, who vide letter dated 1.4.2019 informed that in Criminal Case No. 944/2015 registered by P.S. Kotwali at Crime No. 225/2015 the accused/petitioner has been acquitted vide order dated 6.9.2016. One Camera of make “Olympus” was seized in the case, which was returned to the complainant. The licence of petitioner was not seized in the said case, therefore, the fact remains that on the date of passing the order on 7.12.2016 the criminal case, due to which revocation was proposed was already decided acquitting the petitioner. In the said case, the licensed gun was not seized. It is nowhere explained, how and in what manner the public peace or safety is in danger merely due to the said criminal case. 30. In the reply, along with the letter of the SHO, criminal record of the petitioner was submitted. On perusal thereto, it reveals that as and when criminal cases were registered against the petitioner, action to bound over, taking bond from him under section 107, 116(3) and 110 (chh) of the CrPC was made by Police. The bonds furnished were from the year 2001 to 2007 and the last bond was of 2015, which relates to Criminal Case No. 944/2015 of Crime No. 225/2015. The period of those bonds have already elapsed, on the date of passing of the order impugned Annexure P-2 dated 7.12.2016. In view of the above discussion, there was no reason before the licensing authority to record satisfaction for revocation of the licence merely due to registration of a case at Crime No. 225/2015. Nothing is on record to show the public safety affecting public tranquility is in peril or going to be affected showing an act of petitioner affecting the public at large or community. Nothing is on record to show the public safety affecting public tranquility is in peril or going to be affected showing an act of petitioner affecting the public at large or community. It is pertinent to mention that the licensing authority on previous proposal vide order dated 12.8.2013 was of the opinion that revocation of the arm licence is not required, however, rejected the first request of S.P. Panna but after 3 years on 7.12.2016 merely due to registration of one criminal case, changed his opinion without any basis, however, it cannot be regarded the exercise of discretion after subjective satisfaction for security of public peace and safety. Therefore, the order passed by the licensing authority is without due application of mind and arbitrary without justifying the test enumerated under section 17(3)(b) of the Act and the broad parameters carved out hereinabove. 31. The appellate authority while deciding the appeal on 27.6.2017 in the order from Paragraphs 1 to 7 referred the facts of the case mentioning the previous request of Superintendent of Police, Panna. Thereafter, in the last Para 8 referring the registration of criminal case of Crime No. 225/2015 for offence under sections 323, 294, 427, 506, 34 of the IPC by four line order affirmed the order of the licensing authority presumably saying that it may affect public peace and public safety. This Court is unable to recognize such order as legal and after due application of mind. In fact the appellate authority has also not applied its mind while exercising the appellate power, which is quasi judicial in nature, therefore, the order passed by the appellate authority is also liable to be set aside. 32. In view of the foregoing discussion, the inescapable conclusion which can be arrived at that the licensing authority as well as the appellate authority have not exercised their powers as per the spirit of section 17(3)(b) of the Act. The power exercised by them is without application of mind, arbitrary and without recording subjective satisfaction on the parameters as discussed in Paragraph 26 hereinabove. 33. Accordingly, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order Annexure P-2 dated 7.12.2016 passed by the licensing authority affirmed by the appellate authority vide order Annexure P-3 dated 27.6.2017 are hereby set aside. In the facts of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.