JUDGMENT : A.P. THAKER, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code” for short) seeking quashing and setting aside the impugned FIR bearing C.R.No.I-11 of 2017 registered with Mahila Police Station, Dist: Gandhinagar under Sections 498, 506, 406, 323, 503 read with 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short) and under Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 qua the petitioners. 2. Rule. Ms.Moxa Thakker, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State waives service of Rule for the respondent-State and Mr.Kshitij Amin, learned advocate for the respondent no.2- first informant. 3. At the request of learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is heard finally. 4. The brief facts leading to filing of the present petition are as under:- 4.1 The respondent no.2 herein has filed the impugned FIR against the petitioners and their son by making false vexatious allegations against the petitioners. 4.2 It is alleged that her marriage was solemnized with son of the petitioners on 17.02.2014 at Bhuj and at the time of her marriage, gold and silver ornaments were given to her by her parents. It is alleged that though it was her Shridhan, the said ornaments were taken by her mother-in-law, which had not been returned to her till date. 4.3 It is alleged that before marriage, her husband had purchased one residential house at Vadodara on loan and amount of installments of said loan were demanded and on account of not adhering to the said demand, she was subjected to mental and physical harassment by giving ill-treatment. 4.4 It is alleged that her husband used to come late from his office and even after returning late, and she was not permitted to touch his phone. 4.5 It is alleged that on account of non-payment of such amount demanded from her, the accused had started rumors in their community about her and further causing her mental and physical harassment. 4.6 It is also alleged that at the time of marriage, her husband was employed with L & T Company at Vadodara who had been transferred to Khandwa (MP). It is also alleged that the said transfer of her husband had given rise to free hand for giving ill-treatment and harassment to her. 4.6 It is also alleged that at the time of marriage, her husband was employed with L & T Company at Vadodara who had been transferred to Khandwa (MP). It is also alleged that the said transfer of her husband had given rise to free hand for giving ill-treatment and harassment to her. It is also alleged that her husband used to return late at night from his office and pressurizing her for payment of money for the purpose of clearing the amount of loan. 4.7 She has alleged some instances of mental and physical harassment and ill-treatment given to her. It is alleged that behind her back with the help of his father, her husband had made preparation for going to Australia for doing MBA and for the said purpose, she was asked to borrow money from her parents after mortgaging her parents' Gandhinagar house with a view to come out from the financial crises. 4.8 It is alleged that at the time of receiving Visa on 06.10.2015, she was given assurance that, after receipt of spouse Visa within 3 months, she will be taken to Australia. It is alleged that her husband had asked for divorce. It is alleged that since there is no any cogent reason for divorce, on 17.08.2016, her parents in company of her grandfather, uncle and other elders had gone to Bhuj at her in-law's house, however, they had been insulted and kicked out by giving threats. 4.9 It is alleged that on 15.02.2017, she had filed an application before the Superintendent of Police, Sector-27, Gandhinagar and on 14.03.2017, before the Mahila Police Station, Gandhinagar, wherein the present petitioners were summoned on 23.03.2017. However, during counseling by the police, they had refused to take her back and had denied her matrimonial rights and she was served with legal notice for divorce on 13.08.2016 by her husband. 5. Against the reply filed by the first informant, learned advocate for the petitioner has filed affidavit-in-rejoinder affirmed by the petitioner no.1, wherein she has denied the allegations made in the affidavit-in-reply. It is contended that after marriage of her son with first informant, the petitioners-parents have hardly spent time with their son and daughter-in-law. It is also contended that the residential house was purchased in the year 2013 i.e. prior to the date of marriage of their son and the first informant. It is contended that after marriage of her son with first informant, the petitioners-parents have hardly spent time with their son and daughter-in-law. It is also contended that the residential house was purchased in the year 2013 i.e. prior to the date of marriage of their son and the first informant. It is also contended that the allegation of demand of dowry for payment of loan installment towards the residential flat, is an afterthought and to use the same as a platform for placing such false and frivolous instances to give colour of criminality to the disputes between the husband and wife by dragging the petitioners with a view to salvage the situation between the husband and wife. 6. Mr.N.V.Gandhi, learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that first informant has made her best efforts by highlighting such false instances that too by making false allegations for the purpose of bringing her case within the domain of criminal offences and had impleaded the present petitioners, who have nothing to do with the internal dispute between the husband and wife. 6.1 Mr.N.V.Gandhi, learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioner no.2 is a retired Teacher. He retired on 30.10.2016 from Alfred High School, Bhju-Kutch. The son of the petitioners-original accused no.1-husband of the first informant is B.Tech (Electrical) from Nirma University, Ahmedabad had completed the said graduation in the year 2009-10 and immediately was taken in service by L & T Company, Vadodara. He has further submitted that first informant is also possessing the degree of Bachelor of Engineering (IT) from Gujarat Technical University. It is contended that since the son of the petitioners was settled at Vadodara, on 27.08.2013, one residential flat in the joint name of petitioner no.2 and his son after availing financial assistance from SBI Cantonment Branch, Vadodara was purchased. 6.2 Learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that with a view to give platform to such false and frivolous allegations about cruelty and harassment, the story of demand of amount of installments was put forward by the first informant, which can be seen from the fact that, the marriage was solemnized on 17.02.2014. It is contended that after marriage, husband and wife were residing at Vadodara and due to transfer at Khandva (MP), they were residing from separately from December-2014 and on 27.10.2015, their son left for Australia for doing MBA. It is contended that after marriage, husband and wife were residing at Vadodara and due to transfer at Khandva (MP), they were residing from separately from December-2014 and on 27.10.2015, their son left for Australia for doing MBA. 6.3 Learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that Mahila Police Station, Gandhinagar has no jurisdiction to investigate the said impugned FIR mainly on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. It is contended that due to influence of father of the first informant, who is a Government Employee and is serving with Gujarat Government i.e. Secretary at Gandhinagar, the impugned FIR had been registered and further on 26.08.2017, the petitioner had been served with summons under Section 41(1) of the Code by the special messenger jeep. It is also contended that the first informant, after her marriage, though had not spent any longer time with the petitioners, she has given false instances of harassment. 6.4 Learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the allegations levelled in the impugned FIR are baseless, without any evidence and with ulterior motive and is nothing, but abuse of process of law. It is also contended that the impugned FIR is groundless and appears to have been filed with an ulterior motive and in the guise of such vague FIR, the first informant is applying pressurizing tactics upon the petitioners to see that their son (husband of the first informant) may not take any further legal steps for their divorce. 6.5 Learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the FIR has been filed under Sections 498, 506, 406, 323, 503 read with 114 of the IPC and under Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, but the same does not disclose the commission of any offence qua the petitioners in the eyes of law and hence, on the said ground alone the FIR deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6.6 Learned advocate for the petitioners has narrated the same facts which are mentioned in the application and in rejoinder affidavit. He has contended that there is a dispute between the husband and wife and the parents are wrongly dragged into litigation. This is nothing, but misuse of process of law. He has contended that marriage of the first informant was solemnized on 17.02.2014. He has contended that there is a dispute between the husband and wife and the parents are wrongly dragged into litigation. This is nothing, but misuse of process of law. He has contended that marriage of the first informant was solemnized on 17.02.2014. After marriage, husabnd and wife were residing at Vadodara, accused no.1-husband of the first informant employed with L & T, Vadodara and the petitioner no.2 was serving as a Teacher at Bhuj. Thereafter, son of the petitioners was transferred to Khandva (MP) in the month of December-2014 and on 27.10.2015, he had left for Australia for doing MBA. On 30.10.2016, the petitioner no.2 retired from the service of Teacher on account of superannuation. Moreover, the petitioners have no any occasion to spent longer time with their son and daughter-in-law either at Vadodara, Khandva or at Bhuj. As such, they have not spent any time at Gandhinagar. On account of dispute between husband and wife, they are unnecessarily dragged into the controversy in their retired life. He has also contended that the alleged incident of harassment was occurred at Bhuj, Vadodara and Khandva and no incident has taken place at Gandhinagar, and therefore, there is no territorial jurisdiction with the Gandhinagar Police. 6.7 In support of his submissions, learned advocate for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Hemant @ Chandu V Advani Vs. State of Gujarat,2015 JX(Guj) 1281 for the proposition of law that the Gandhinagar Police or Court has no jurisdiction, as no incident has been occurred within the jurisdiction of Gandhinagar, and therefore, impugned FIR is required to be quashed and set aside. 7. Ms.Moxa Thakker, learned APP for the respondent-State has contended that the first informant and their relatives went to Bhuj for settlement, but the petitioners have refused. It is also contended that the application was given by the first informant to Mahila Police Station, Gandhingar, and therefore, the petitioners were called by the concerned Police Station and they appeared before the Gandhinagar Police Station. She has also contended that in view of the contents of the FIR, there is prima facie material against the present petitioners of committing offences charged against them, and therefore, present FIR may not be quashed and set aside at this stage and the investigation may be permitted to be carried out further. 8. She has also contended that in view of the contents of the FIR, there is prima facie material against the present petitioners of committing offences charged against them, and therefore, present FIR may not be quashed and set aside at this stage and the investigation may be permitted to be carried out further. 8. Mr.Kshitij Amin, learned advocate for the respondent no.2-first informant has reiterated the facts of FIR which has been narrated by first informant in the impugned FIR. He has submitted that as there are ingredients of offences, as narrated in the impugned FIR, prima facie, offences against the present petitioners are made out. He has contended that after marriage, even though the first informant and her husband went to Vadodara, but they used to visit Bhuj on weekends, festivals, diwali, marriage etc. Also, the petitioners used to reside with the first informant and her husband at Vadodara frequently. It is only when her husband went to Australia in October-2015, the first informant went to Bhuj to reside with her in-laws. 8.1 Learned advocate for the respondent no.2-first informant has submitted that after husband of the first informant went to Bhuj to reside with her in-laws, after some time, when the house situated at Baroda was to given on rent, in laws took her to Baroda and told her to shift some goods to her Gandhinagar house and they sent the first informant at Gandhinagar and in laws went to Bhuj. 8.2 Learned advocate for the respondent no.2-first informant has submitted that the first informant was eagerly waiting for the VISA to the Australia and was preparing for the same, however, to the utter shock and surprise, her husband in August-2016 (after two days when she arrived from Baroda with goods) has called her and asked for divorce without any cogent reason. He has contended that the first informant also came to know that the petitioners went to Australia to meet her husband and they are in constant touch with her husband. He has contended that petitioners are taking undue advantage of the process of law and is misguiding this Court by stating that they are no way responsible for bringing the divorce situation. He has contended that petitioners are taking undue advantage of the process of law and is misguiding this Court by stating that they are no way responsible for bringing the divorce situation. 8.3 Learned advocate for the respondent no.2-first informant has submitted that the complainant and her father have tried their best to resolve the issues with her husband and with her in laws, but the petitioners as per their cunning strategy went underground from Bhuj and with dire shock to the first informant and her father had sent an email to her father stating clearly which they used to call the same to the present first informant that the first informant is not their daughter in law and are not concerned with her at all. He has submitted that since prima facie offences are made out, at this stage, the impugned FIR may not be quashed and set aside. 8.4 Learned advocate for the respondent no.2-first informant has stated same facts which are narrated in the affidavit-in-reply of the respondent no.2. He has submitted that the FIR can be filed where the complainant is residing and there is prima facie case made out by the first informant in her FIR. While referring to the email sent by the petitioners, it has been contended that the petitioners herein have clearly insulted the present first informant and their conduct itself shows that they have given harassment to the first informant. He has also submitted that after marriage, first informant and husband used to visit Bhuj on weekends, festivals, diwali, marriage etc. Therefore, he has submitted that present petition may not be entertained and dismissed. 9. Against the submissions made by learned advocate for the respondent no.2, Mr.Gandhi, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that another legal remedy is available with the first informant and the first informant has also moved Mahila Police Station, but no step was taken, as no offence was committed by the present petitoners. It is also contended that as the petitioners were called by the Mahila Police Station, Gandhinagar, they have appeared before the Police, but that does not give jurisdiction to the Gandhingar Court or Police. 10. In the case of Hemant @ Chandu V Advani Vs. State of Gujarat,2015 JX(Guj) 1281, this Court has observed thus:- “17. On the ground of jurisdiction alone, this application deserves to be entertained. 10. In the case of Hemant @ Chandu V Advani Vs. State of Gujarat,2015 JX(Guj) 1281, this Court has observed thus:- “17. On the ground of jurisdiction alone, this application deserves to be entertained. As noted above, no cause of action appears to have arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court. The parents of the complainant resided at Ahmedabad with whom she had left the child for some time. It is quite apparent that for obvious reasons to lend jurisdiction to the Court at Ahmedabad, suitable averments in the first information report are made. Being convinced that the present first information report cannot lie within the jurisdiction of the Court at Ahmedabad (in the State of Gujarat) as provided under sections 177 to 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for there being not even part of the cause of action having arisen at Ahmedabad, intervention is necessary. 18. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for ordinary place of inquiry and trial and every offence is ordinarily to be investigated into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed. Section 178 speaks of place of inquiry or trial. If there are several local areas where offence might have been committed, it could be tried by the Court having jurisdiction in any of these areas. This section envisages that the Court having territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence over any of these local areas, can inquire and conduct the trial.” 11. In the case of Y.Abraham Ajith and Ors Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr., AIR (2004) SC 4286, the Apex Court has observed thus:- “Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows: Section 178: PLACE OF INQUIRY OR TRIAL (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 9. “All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal, (1961) AIR SC 1589, L.N.Mukherjee V. State of Madras, AIR (1961) SC 1601, Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., AIR (1963) SC 1620 and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., (2001) 4 SCC 350 , exception implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand. 10. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand. 10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr., AIR (1973) SC 908, continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or noncompliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. 11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30 . There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied. 12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. 13. While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action” is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases. 14. While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action” is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases. 14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. 15. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”. 16. The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. 17. The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In “Words and Phrases” (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.” 12. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties and perused the material on record. 13. It is settled law that for considering the petition under Section 482 of the Code, it is necessary to consider as to whether the allegations in the complaint prima facie make out a case or not and the Court is not to scrutinies the allegations for the purpose of deciding whether such allegations are likely to be upheld in trial. It is also well settled that though the High Court possesses inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code, these powers are meant to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. The Supreme Court, time and again, has observed that extraordinary power should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The High Court would be justified in exercising the said power when it is imperative to exercise the same in order to prevent injustice. 14. The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is required to examine whether the averments in the complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for an offence alleged under the Penal Code. If the averments taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence, the criminal proceedings may be quashed under Section 482. A criminal proceeding can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint do not disclose the commission of an offence under the Penal Code. If the averments taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence, the criminal proceedings may be quashed under Section 482. A criminal proceeding can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint do not disclose the commission of an offence under the Penal Code. The complaint must be examined as a whole, without evaluating the merits of the allegations. Though the law does not require that the complaint reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence verbatim, the complaint must contain the basic facts necessary for making out an offence under the Penal Code. 15. A court exercising its inherent jurisdiction must examine if on their face, the averments made in the complaint constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence. 16. This Court has perused the contents of the FIR threadbare. A perusal of the allegations made against the petitioner nos.1 and 2, who are father and mother in law of the respondent no.2 would reveal that there is a dispute between the husband and wife and it also appears that after the marriage, husband and wife were residing at Vadodara, and thereafter, they shifted to Khandva (MP), wherein also husband and wife were residing together, and thereafter, husband has left the India for Australia. On perusal of the allegations made in the FIR, it clearly transpires that the entire incident of cruelty has happened at Vadodara or at Khandva (MP). Of course, at some place, it has been narrated that in laws were indirectly demanding dowry. It also reveals that after the husband left India, the first informant was residing with in laws at Bhuj and thereafter, she was sent to her parental house at Gandhinagar. On bare reading of the entire FIR, it clearly transpires that no incident has happened at Gandhinagar. Whatever allegations are made are about incidents happened at Vadodara, Khandva or Bhuj. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, it is inevitable conclusion that no part of cause of action arose in Gandhinagar, and therefore, the concerned Police or Magistrate has no jurisdiction and present petition is liable to be quashed and set aside. 17. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, it is inevitable conclusion that no part of cause of action arose in Gandhinagar, and therefore, the concerned Police or Magistrate has no jurisdiction and present petition is liable to be quashed and set aside. 17. Under the circumstances, the FIR being I.C.R.NO.11 of 2017 registered with Mahila Police Station, Gandhinagar for the offences punishable under Sections 498, 506, 406, 323, 503 read with and 114 of the IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and other consequential proceedings arising out the same FIR are hereby quashed and set aside qua the present petitioners original accused nos.2 and 3 with a liberty to the respondent no.2-first informant, who, if she so choses, may file the same before the appropriate Police/Court, to be dealt with in accordance with law. The present petition stands allowed, accordingly. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.