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2019 DIGILAW 296 (JHR)

Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand v. Central Coalfields Limited, A Government Company

2019-01-29

PRAMATH PATNAIK

body2019
JUDGMENT Pramath Patnaik, J. - By way of filing the instant review application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for review and recall of judgment and order dated 22.06.2018 passed in W.P. (S) No. 28 of 2015. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that order dated 22.06.2018 has been passed mainly on two counts. Firstly, against 6.01 acres of land Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu were given employment and further these appointees vide their written letter dated 16.08.1985 refused to join as apprentice hence they were absorbed/employed as Clerk Grade III and thereby they exhausted benefit of six acres of land. In this regard, it is submitted that so-called letter dated 16.08.1985 has never been brought on record and even otherwise also, the appointment letter to these persons i.e. Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu, were given much after this letter and the Opp. Party-Central Coalfields Limited in its note dated 26.03.1985 has mentioned that that the employment has been given against 5.69 1/6 acres of land and further employment has been made as an apprentice for two years on stipend basis on Clerk Grade. As a matter of fact, in the circular/policy of 1984 meant for land losers, which came into effect from 01.01.1985, though there is mention of scheme for employment as apprentice of one person against two acres of irrigated land but the amount to be paid during the period of apprentice has not been mentioned. For the reasons aforesaid, while considering the case of Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, CCL sought clarification from Director (Personnel) and Director (Finance) and only after clarification obtained from Director (Personnel) and Director (Finance), said Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu were directed to be offered employment as Trainee on initial basic pay of Clerk Grade III for a period of two years, as evident from note-sheets dated 7.6.1985 to 23.09.1985 obtained by the petitioner through R.T.I Act and annexed with the present review application as Annexure 16 and annexed as 16 series to the rejoinder affidavit to counter affidavit in the writ application Hence, it is much clear that against four acres of land, Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu were given employment as apprentice. Since out of total land of 12 acres of land, only five employments were given then still one employment is still lying and basing on this fact even the case of the present petitioner was recommended by the authority of respondents/Opp. Parties. It has further been submitted from the documents of the respondentsCCL, it is quite apparent that they were given employment against 5.62 acres of land, then it is presumed that they have given employment against four acres of land (two employment) and only in case of complete six acres of lands, respondents-authorities can offer two employments in regular cadre and not in apprentice. Second ground for approaching the Court at a belated stage i.e. after lapse of about four decades of acquisition of land. In this regard, it has been submitted that the respondents-authorities vide letter dated 1.7.1991 admitted that land measuring 6.32 acres of land out of total 12.02 acres of land is still in dispute and immediately when the Competent Court of law made decision in favour of ancestors of petitioner, they approached before the authorities lastly all the representations made by the petitioner were considered by Samadhan Cell of Central Coalfields Limited and vide letter dated 5.8.2014, directed to consider the case of petitioner taking left over 2.01 acres of land. It has further been submitted that there was no partition deed in the petitioner''s family. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that whole confusion has been crept in because of the misleading statement made in the counter affidavit and candidly speaking some of the annexures could not be forcefully placed, hence, the patent error that has crept in the impugned judgment be modified and clarified. In support of his submission, learned counsel further submits that the High Court being a Court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, has a power and duty to correct its records being Court of superior jurisdiction as per the law laid down in the case of M.M. Thomas Vs. State of Kerala & Anr as, (2000) 1 SCC 666 and also in the United India Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors as, (2000) 3 SCC 581 . Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court, South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala & Anr as, (2000) 1 SCC 666 and also in the United India Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors as, (2000) 3 SCC 581 . Learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court, South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of M.P & Ors, (2003) 8 SCC 648 wherein at paragraph 28, it has been held that no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to erroneous act of the court; the "act of the court" embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the Court would not have acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and law. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that service register in respect of Sri Suresh Prasad Sahu clearly reflects that his date of first appointment was 24.12.1985 in the capacity of Clerk Grade III. Furthermore, initially Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu were given option to join as an apprentice but they declined to join and requested for being appointed in clerical cadre. Moreover, now four decades has lapsed the very purpose of giving employment has become frustrated. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and on scrutinizing the materials available in writ application as well as in review petition, it is quite apparent that grounds enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding review of order, are specific. The principles for interference in exercise of review jurisdiction are well settled. The Court passing the order is entitled to review the order, if any of the grounds specified in the aforesaid provision are satisfied. In this regard, the Hon''ble Apex Court in case of Board of Control for Cricket in India and Another vs. Netaji Cricket Club and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 741 , at paragraph-89 and 90 has been held as under: "89. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words "sufficient reason" in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit"." 6. Further, the Hon''ble Apex Court in case of M.M. Thomas Versus State of Kerla and Another, (2000) 1 SCC 666 , at paragraph-14, 15 and 16 has been held as under: "14. The High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court''s power in that regard is plenary. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra a nine-Judge Bench of this Court has recognised the aforesaid superior status of the High Court as a court of plenary jurisdiction being a court of record. 15. In Halsbury''s Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 10, para 713) it is stated thus: "The chief distinctions between superior and inferior courts are found in connection with jurisdiction. 15. In Halsbury''s Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 10, para 713) it is stated thus: "The chief distinctions between superior and inferior courts are found in connection with jurisdiction. Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court. An objection to the jurisdiction of one of the superior courts of general jurisdiction must show what other court has jurisdiction, so as to make it clear that the exercise by the superior court of its general jurisdiction is unnecessary. The High Court, for example, is a court of universal jurisdiction and superintendency in certain classes of actions, and cannot be deprived of its ascendancy by showing that some other court could have entertained the particular action." (Though the above reference is to English courts the principle would squarely apply to the superior courts in India also.) 16. Referring to the said passage and relying on the decision of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar a twoJudge Bench of this Court in M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading (P) Ltd. has observed thus: (AIR Headnote) "The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction ." 7. From perusal of Annexure 4, 5 and 6 series of the review application, it is quite apparent that out of total land of 12.02 acres, compensation was paid against land of 5.69 1/6 acres, as rest of land was the subject matter of civil dispute before competent Court of law. Further, from Annexure 12 to the rejoinder affidavit filed in review petition, it appears that once application dated 2.9.1983 filed on behalf of two of the land losers, claiming employment was denied on the ground that there are approx only 5.69 of land, in such circumstance one employment against 3.00 acres of land can be given. Further, from Annexure 12 to the rejoinder affidavit filed in review petition, it appears that once application dated 2.9.1983 filed on behalf of two of the land losers, claiming employment was denied on the ground that there are approx only 5.69 of land, in such circumstance one employment against 3.00 acres of land can be given. Further, from Note-sheets, as annexed as 16, it appears that when new rule/circular came into force w.e.f 1.1.1985, in addition to previous provision to the effect that "the standard norm should be one employment for 3 acres of non-irrigated land and 2 acres of irrigated land", it has been inserted that "However, if the land-loser being considered for employment is a matriculate or above, the norm may be reduced to 2 acres per person if he opts to join initially as an apprentice for a period of 2 years during which he may be paid a fixed stipend per month", their cases were considered afresh and they were given employment. Here, the dispute arose whether they were given each employment against three acres of land or two acres of land. From the incessant findings of the respondents-CCL it was against approx 5.69 acres of land, then certainly as per rule/circular each employment was given two per acres. From the note-sheets annexed as 16 to rejoinder affidavit filed in the review application, it is quite apparent that the discussion was only with respect to what amount to be paid while serving on apprenticeship as circular/rule was silent on this issue. Hence, the Chairman-cumManaging, CCL sought opinion from the competent officers/Director (Personnel) and Director (Finance) and on their opinion, said Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu were directed to be offered employment as Trainee on initial basic pay of Clerk Grade III for a period of two years. 8. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons, relevant provisions of Act and judicial pronouncements, and in order to rectify the error, which has crept in the judgment dated 22.06.2088 passed in W.P. (S) No. 28 of 2015, paragraphs 6 and 7 are hereby deleted and in place thereof, following paragraphs are directed to be inserted and shall be read accordingly. In view of the aforesaid facts, reasons, relevant provisions of Act and judicial pronouncements, and in order to rectify the error, which has crept in the judgment dated 22.06.2088 passed in W.P. (S) No. 28 of 2015, paragraphs 6 and 7 are hereby deleted and in place thereof, following paragraphs are directed to be inserted and shall be read accordingly. "6.After bestowing my anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised by the parties and on perusal of the documents available on record, in particular, the rules/circulars relating to employment norm against the land acquisition during the relevant period; in the context of the case at hand it is manifestly clear that "standard norm is for one employment for 3 acres of non-irrigated land and two acres of irrigated. However, if the land loser being considered for employment is matriculate or above the norm may be reduced to two acres per person, if he opts to join initially as an apprentice of a period of two years during which he may be paid fixed stipend per month." Here, the Rule/circular is specific, that only for apprentice rule has been relaxed for two acres, as applicable to the case of petitioner. From the pleadings available on record, in the case at hand though against approx 5.69 acres of land two persons, namely, Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu were given employment as Trainee/apprentice for a fixed period of two years on initial basic pay of Clerk Grade III and they will be regularized on successful completion of training. Hence, after exhausting four acres of land, rest land of 1.69 acres remained for future employment and when judgment came in the civil case in favour of petitioners'' family, they rightly claimed for employment. So far letter dated 16.5.1985 (inadvertently written in writ application as 16.08.1985), whereby it is alleged that so called Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu, is concerned though it has been disputed by the petitioner however, even if it is taken to have been submitted, the same was submitted before employment was given to so called Suresh Prasad Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu and after considering their application relevant rule appointment letter for apprentice was given to them. Hence, letter dated 16.5.1985 shall not come in the way of present petitioner and would not strength the case of respondents. Hence, letter dated 16.5.1985 shall not come in the way of present petitioner and would not strength the case of respondents. Taking into these facts, the recommendations made by authorities of the respondents, as evident from Annexure 22 to writ application does not suffer from any illegality. So far knocking the door of this Court at this distant period of time is concerned, the review petitioner has well explained at paragraph 23 to the rejoinder affidavit filed in review application, which he had not well explained in writ petition, hence to meet the ends of justice, this Court considers the delay in approaching to be natural. 7.For the reasons aforesaid, the petitioner has succeeded in making out a case for issuance of writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for employment as per scheme of rehabilitation/land losers. 8.With the aforesaid observations and direction, the writ application stands disposed of." 9. With the aforesaid modification/clarification and insertion of the paragraphs, as stated above, the review application stands disposed of.