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2019 DIGILAW 296 (KAR)

Bhagwan S/o Maharudrappa Chougale v. Karnataka State Bar Council

2019-01-31

H.T.NARENDRA PRASAD

body2019
ORDER : 1. These writ petitions are directed against the order dated 23.8.2015 passed by the Disciplinary Committee No. 1 of the Karnataka State Bar Council, Bengaluru, in DCE No. 72/2014 on I.A. No. II at Annexure-K. 2. The case of the petitioner is that petitioner got enrolled with Karnataka State Bar Council as an advocate and he is practicing at Belgavi. The third respondent herein is the wife of one Sunil Raikar, who had filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(1a)(1b) of Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court at Belgavi numbered as M.C. No. 86/2012. The third respondent approached him and entrusted the case to him. Since, she was placed ex-parte on 17.9.2012, in her presence an application was filed and the ex-parte order was got set aside and matter was adjourned to 27.9.2013 for conciliation. Thereafter, the third respondent did not turn up for filing objections nor did she give any instructions to proceed in the matter. The Family Court proceeded with the case and by its judgment and decree dated 06.02.2013 granted decree of divorce to the husband of the third respondent, which came to be challenged by the third respondent before this Court in MFA No. 22031/2013. In the said appeal, two applications i.e. I.A. Nos. 1 and 2/2013 for stay and for condonation of delay were filed and this Court by judgment and decree dated 9.7.2014 allowed the said appeal setting aside the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court, against which the husband of the third respondent filed SLP (C) No. 21799/2014 before the Supreme Court, which was converted to Civil Appeal No. 415/2015. The Apex Court, by order dated 14.1.2015 allowed the Civil Appeal and set aside the judgment of this Court in MFA No. 22031/2013. In the meantime, the third respondent-wife filed a complaint against the petitioner before the Bar Council as per Annexure-E, which in turn has been referred to the Disciplinary Committee under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (‘Act’ for short). Pursuant to the notice issued by the Committee, the petitioner has submitted reply along with all the necessary documents and has also filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of CPC seeking closure of the disciplinary proceedings. The Committee by order dated 23.08.2015 vide Annexure-K has dismissed the application. Pursuant to the notice issued by the Committee, the petitioner has submitted reply along with all the necessary documents and has also filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of CPC seeking closure of the disciplinary proceedings. The Committee by order dated 23.08.2015 vide Annexure-K has dismissed the application. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 3. Sri. G. Balakrishna Shastry, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the complainant-respondent No. 3 had executed a vakalath in favour of the petitioner and on her instructions, the petitioner had filed vakalath in M.C. No. 86/2012. Subsequently, she had not contacted the petitioner and as such he had not filed any objections. In the complaint, which is filed by the petitioner as per Annexure-E it is stated thus:- “I the complainant never knew, nor had any knowledge by notice of the Hon’ble Family Court, Belgaum, that, my husband had sought divorce in his petition M.C. No. 86/2012, such being facts, I never went to Family Court, Belgaum, never had approached for professional-legal services of this Respondent-B.M. Chougale, or the another junior/ associate Shri. Sunil Kakatkar, I did not sign any vakaltnama having the names of these two advocates. Even until this day, I have not seen, nor can identify these two advocates personally.” But, in the affidavit, which is filed along with the application I.A. No. 1/2013 before this Court in MFA No. 22031/2013 it is stated thus:- “I submit that actual facts which were suppressed by the respondent for obtaining decree of divorce are that, when the notice issued to me was refused, the counsel for the husband took time to settle the dispute and talks were on for taking back me to the house of respondent and thereafter my signature was taken on the vakalath stating that it will be settled and the same was informed to my counsel on behalf of me. Trusting and believing the words of the husband, I have blindly signed the vakalath and informed my counsel that matter is settled. And I was totally unaware about the judgment and decree.” On the basis of these documents, he submits that statement to the effect that “I have informed my counsel” clearly establishes that she had contacted the petitioner. Trusting and believing the words of the husband, I have blindly signed the vakalath and informed my counsel that matter is settled. And I was totally unaware about the judgment and decree.” On the basis of these documents, he submits that statement to the effect that “I have informed my counsel” clearly establishes that she had contacted the petitioner. But in the complaint, she has stated that I did not sign any vakalathnama having the name of petitioner and his colleague, I have not seen, nor can identify these two advocates personally. From this, it is clear that her complaint against the petitioner is only biased. Her stand is not clear as to whether she has signed the vakalathnama or not. It is therefore submitted that without considering these aspects of the matter, the Disciplinary Committee has proceeded to take action against the petitioner. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the third respondent submits that in the statement of objections at Paragraph-3, she has not made admission that she has entrusted the case to the petitioner and he further submits that they have amended the pleading which is made in the memorandum of first appeal. He further contended that at no point of time, the third respondent has signed the vakalath, which is filed by the petitioner in M.C. No. 86/2012. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent-Karnataka State Bar Council submits that the application filed by the petitioner itself is not maintainable. He further submits that as per Section 35 of the Act the Bar Council has referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee. Now enquiry has commenced and first they have to pass order in terms of Section 35(3) of the Act after considering the objections filed by the petitioner and if the complaint is dismissed, then there is no further enquiry and if the complaint is not dismissed, then the Bar Council will have to proceed further to impose punishment. However, any such decision has not yet been taken by the Disciplinary Committee. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 7. On the basis of the complaint given by respondent No. 3, the Bar Council has referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee under Section 35 of the Act. Pursuant to that, the Disciplinary Authority has issued a notice to the petitioner. The petitioner has filed objections. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 7. On the basis of the complaint given by respondent No. 3, the Bar Council has referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee under Section 35 of the Act. Pursuant to that, the Disciplinary Authority has issued a notice to the petitioner. The petitioner has filed objections. The petitioner also filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of CPC seeking closure of the proceedings. The specific contention taken by the petitioner is that the third respondent has engaged the petitioner’s services by signing the vakalath. In the affidavit filed in M.F.A. No. 22031/2013 it is specifically stated that “I submit that actual facts which were suppressed by the respondent for obtaining decree of divorce are that, when the notice issued to me was refused, the counsel for the husband took time to settle the dispute and talks were on for taking back me to the house of respondent and thereafter my signature was taken on the vakalath stating that it will be settled and the same was informed to my counsel on behalf of me. Trusting and believing the words of the husband, I have blindly signed the vakalath and informed my counsel that matter is settled. And I was totally unaware about the judgment and decree.” In the complaint the specific case of the third respondent is that she has not signed any vakalath having a name of these two advocates and she has not seen the petitioner and she cannot identify this advocate personally. There is a contradictory statement made by the third respondent and also this issue has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 415/2015 produced at Annexure-G to the writ petitions. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:- “14. In the present case the main allegation made by the 1st respondent- wife is that the husband played fraud on the Family Court and obtained the decree of dissolution of marriage. In support of such submission she submitted that she had not engaged any counsel in the case and that blank Vakalatnama was taken at the time of settlement for their mutual divorce and that she never appeared before the Family Court. In support of such submission she submitted that she had not engaged any counsel in the case and that blank Vakalatnama was taken at the time of settlement for their mutual divorce and that she never appeared before the Family Court. The High Court failed to notice that this is a case in which there is a disputed question of fact which cannot be decided without framing a proper issue and in absence of evidence on record. 15. There is a disputed question of fact as apparent from the Family Court order dated 17th September, 2012 wherein the Court recorded the presence of the appellant-husband and the 1st respondent-wife and after hearing their arguments, set aside the ex-parte order and put forth the matter for conciliation. The relevant portion of the order dated 17th September, 2012 reads as follows: “Petitioner present Respondent present Sri. BMC filed vakalath for respondent with permission and I.A. u/O 9 R 7 CPC Heard. IA is allowed. Ex-parte order of respondent is set aside. For conciliation by 27-09-2012. 16. The High Court giving reference to the plaint and the written statement presumed that 1st respondent-wife never appeared before the Family Court and failed to notice the aforesaid order dated 17.09.2012 which make it clear that 1st respondent-wife, who was the respondent in the said case, was present in the Court and one Shri B.M. Chougale, Advocate filed Vakalatnama for the 1st respondent-wife with permission. It is clear from the record that only after hearing both the parties the ex-parte order against 1st respondent-wife was set aside. The matter was then sent for conciliation to 27th September, 2012. On 27th September, 2012 and 5th November 2013, the parties were absent. The case was adjourned to 27th November, 2012 on which date the appellant-husband was present and the 1st respondent-wife was absent. The Family Court adjourned the case to 3rd January 2013 for appellant-husband’s evidence observing that 1st respondent-wife had not filed objections. On 7th January 2013, the appellant-husband was present. He filed affidavit evidence, got himself examined as PW-1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P4. This fact was noticed by the High Court at paragraph 2 where brief facts of the case leading to the filing of the appeal was dealt with, which in fact has been reflected in our preceding paragraphs wherein factual matrix of the case has been noticed. 17. This fact was noticed by the High Court at paragraph 2 where brief facts of the case leading to the filing of the appeal was dealt with, which in fact has been reflected in our preceding paragraphs wherein factual matrix of the case has been noticed. 17. It cannot be presumed that the Family Court in its order dated 17th September, 2012 wrongly noted the presence of the appellant-husband and the 1st respondent-wife. In fact, this part of the order sheet has not been referred by the High Court while coming to a conclusion that the appellant-husband has played fraud upon the Family Court as to get a decree of divorce in his favour. Merely, because of the fact that print out of the case papers of both the parties have been taken from one and the same computer software it cannot be presumed that blank Vakalatnama signed by the 1st respondent-wife was misused by the appellant-husband or he played fraud and used the same to engage some other senior counsel. Such finding of the High Court is not based on evidence but on mere presumption and conjecture.” 8. In view of the above, the petitioner has raised the jurisdiction point itself on the ground that it is not maintainable, now the proceedings have been initiated under Section 35 of the Act. Section 35 of the Act reads as under: “35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct - (1) when on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. (1A) The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a proceedings pending before its disciplinary committee and direct the inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that State Bar Council. (2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State. (2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State. (3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard, may make any of the following orders, namely:- (a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed. (b) reprimand the advocate. (c) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit. (d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates. (4) Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause (c) of sub-section (3), he shall, during the period of suspension, be debarred from practicing in any Court or before any authority or person in India. (5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General under sub-section (2) the Advocate-General may appear before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf.” Under Section 35 of the Act Disciplinary Committee has to afford an opportunity of hearing to the advocate but it does not prescribe the procedure to be followed at the time of hearing. The procedure to be followed in an enquiry under Section 35 of the Act is under Rule 8 of Part VII, Chapter-I of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 made under the authority of Section 60 of the Act, which reads as under: “Rule 8.(1) The Disciplinary Committee shall hear the Attorney General or the Additional Solicitor General of India or the Advocate General, as the case may be or their advocate, and parties or their advocates, if they desire to be heard and determine the matter on documents and affidavits unless it is of the opinion that it should be in the interest of justice to permit cross examination of the deponents or to take oral evidence, in which case the procedure for the trial of civil suits shall as far as possible be followed. (2) On every document admitted in evidence, the following endorsement shall be made which shall be signed by the Chairman or any member of the Committee:- The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of........Exhibit No......Date of Document............Produced by......Date......Signature of............ (3) The Exhibits shall be marked as follows:- (a) Those of the complainant as C1, C2, etc. (b) Those of Respondents as R1, R2, etc. (c) Those of Disciplinary Committee as D1, D2, etc. (4) The Disciplinary Committee may at any stage direct the parties or their advocates to furnish such further and better particulars as it considers necessary.” 9. From reading the above provisions, it is clear that the Committee on the basis of the documents and affidavits, can decide the issue. If they desire to be heard, and determine the matter on documents and affidavits unless it is of the opinion that it should be in the interest of justice to permit cross examination of the deponent or to take oral evidence, the procedure for trial be followed. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of An Advocate vs. Bar Council of India and Another, AIR 1989 SC 245 has considered the provisions of Sections 35 and 42 of the Act and Rule 8(1) of Part VII, Chapter-I of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder: “7. The point arising in the context of the non-framing of issues has also significance. As discussed earlier Rule 8(1) enjoins that “the procedure for the trial of Civil suits shall as far as possible be followed.” Framing of the issues based on the pleadings as in a Civil suit would be of immense utility. The controversial matters and substantial questions would be identified and the attention focused on the real and substantial factual and legal matters in contest. The parties would then become aware of the real nature and content of the matters in issue and would come to know (1) on whom the burden rests (2) what evidence should be adduced to prove or disprove any matter (3) to what end cross examination and evidence in rebuttal should be directed. When such a procedure is not adopted there exists inherent danger of miscarriage of justice on account of virtual denial of a fair opportunity to meet the case of the other side. When such a procedure is not adopted there exists inherent danger of miscarriage of justice on account of virtual denial of a fair opportunity to meet the case of the other side. We wish the State Bar Council had initially framed a charge and later on framed issues arising out of the pleadings for the sake of fairness and for the sake of bringing into forefront the real controversy.” 10. By reading the above provisions and the Apex Court judgment this Court is of the opinion that the Disciplinary Committee as far as possible shall follow the procedure for the trial of civil suit and the framing of the issues based on the pleading as in a civil suit, would be of immense utility. Once the Bar Council referred the matter to Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Committee has to frame the issues on the basis of pleading of the parties, before taking any decision under Section 35 of the Act. 11. Under Section 42(1) of the Act the Disciplinary Committee has been conferred power vested in a civil Court in respect of certain matters. In the case on hand, the petitioner has raised the issue regarding the maintainability of the complaint. The Disciplinary Committee rejected the application on the ground that at this stage it cannot be considered without recording evidence. But in view of the above discussion the Disciplinary Committee as far as possible shall follow the procedure for the trial of civil suit after framing the issues on the pleading. Therefore, the Disciplinary Committee is directed to frame a preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the complaint, decide the preliminary issue after recording the evidence of the parties and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. If the Disciplinary Committee holds that the complaint is maintainable, then proceed further to consider the other issues in accordance with law. If the parties want to file any further documents, they may be permitted to do so. 12. With the above observations, these writ petitions stand disposed of.