Life Insurance Corporation of India Central Office, Mumbai v. V. A. Shaji
2019-03-29
T.V.ANILKUMAR, V.CHITAMBARESH
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Chitambaresh, J. The respondent while working as a Development Officer in the Life Insurance Corporation of India ('LIC' for short) had tendered his resignation from the post on 7.4.2005 which was accepted on 31.5.2005. LIC later issued Ext.P6 instructions in consonance with the Life Insurance Corporation of India Development Officers (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Amendment Rules, 2005. Ext.P6 instructions inter alia specified the date of notification as 5.9.2005 and revised the pay scale of the employees providing 'equitable relief' for the period from 1.8.2002 to 31.3.2005. The benefit was extended to the Development Officers who were in the whole time salaried service as on 1.8.2002 and have joined in the permanent establishment thereafter. However those Development Officers whose resignation had been accepted on or before the date of notification (irrespective of whether they are relieved or not) were excluded. Similarly those Development Officers whose services had been terminated during the period between 1.8.2002 and 5.9.2005 were declared ineligible for the pay revision arrears. 2. The respondent contended that there is no rationale in denying him the benefit on account of his resignation when the 'equitable relief' was provided for the period from 1.8.2002 to 31.3.2005. The respondent asserted that he was in the whole time salaried service during this period and should not be denied the benefit as the resignation was tendered and accepted later. The respondent pointed out that the net benefits of the pay revision have even been allowed to the Development Officers who retired from service or died on or after 1.8.2002. The respondent added that it is atrocious to treat the Development Officers who have resigned and whose services have been terminated at par in the release of the benefit. The above arguments found favour with the learned single Judge who quashed Ext.P6 instructions in part and directed the disbursement of the pay revision benefit to the respondent. The LIC, its Chairman and the Divisional Manager are in appeal contending that the exclusion of the Divisional Officers who had resigned from the pay revision benefit is not at all arbitrary. 3. We heard Mr C. Varghese Kuriakose, Advocate on behalf of the appellants, Mr S. Radhakrishnan, Advocate on behalf of the respondent as well as Mr S. Easwaran, Advocate as amicus curiae in the case. 4.
3. We heard Mr C. Varghese Kuriakose, Advocate on behalf of the appellants, Mr S. Radhakrishnan, Advocate on behalf of the respondent as well as Mr S. Easwaran, Advocate as amicus curiae in the case. 4. The relevant part of Ext.P6 instructions which decides the eligibility of a Development Officer to receive the benefit of pay revision for the period from 1.8.2002 to 31.3.2005 is as follows: “3. ELIGIBILITY (1) These instructions shall apply to the Development Officers who were in the whole time salaried service in the permanent establishment of the Corporation as on 1.8.2002 and those who have joined the whole time salaried service in the permanent establishment of the Corporation after that date. Provided, however, that those Development Officers whose resignation had been accepted on or before the date of notification irrespective of whether they are relieved or not or whose services had been terminated under LIC of India Development Officers (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989 or Rule 39 of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960, during the period between 1.8.2002 and 5.9.2005 (both days inclusive) shall not be eligible for the arrears on account of this revision. Provided further that the net benefits there under may be allowed to Development Officers who retired from service or died on or after 1.8.2002 as if they were governed by the Amended revision rules. (2) For removal of doubt, it is clarified that the Amended Revision Rules and these instructions shall not apply to: (i) Apprentice Development Officers; (ii) Development Officers whose services have been terminated under Rule 39 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Rules, 1960 on or before the date of notification; and (iii) Development Officers whose services have been terminated on or after 1st August, 2002 under the Special Rules.” (emphasis supplied) It is explicit therefore that those Development Officers whose resignation had been accepted on or before 5.9.2005 (irrespective of whether they are relieved or not) shall not be eligible for the arrears of pay revision. 5. 'Resignation' means to 'cease to hold' or 'loose hold' of the office which unfastens or unties the binding knot or link that holds one to the office and the obligations and privileges attached to it.
5. 'Resignation' means to 'cease to hold' or 'loose hold' of the office which unfastens or unties the binding knot or link that holds one to the office and the obligations and privileges attached to it. It is the relinquishment of one's right in relation to an office and connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office which may take different forms depending on the nature of office. Union of India and others v. Gopal Chandra Misra and others [ (1978) 2 SCC 301 ] and Moti Ram v. Param Dev and another [1993) 2 SCC 725] are decisions on the point. The distinction between the terms 'retirement' and 'resignation' has been succinctly stated in UCO Bank and others v. Sanwar Mal [ (2004) 4 SCC 412 ] as follows: “9. We find merit in these appeals. The words 'resignation' and 'retirement' carry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions 'resignation' and 'retirement' have been employed for different purposes and carry different meanings.” Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala [2008(4) KLT 597(SC)] quotes the above decision to hold that a person who has resigned from service is not entitled to the benefit of pay revision with retrospective effect. The instant case is no different since Ext.P6 instructions issued in implementation of the amended Rules itself denies the benefit of pay revision to the Development Officers who have resigned. 6. It has been held in Manojbhai N. Shah and others v. Union of India and others [ (2015) 4 SCC 482 ] that employees retiring under Voluntary Retirement Scheme form a separate class by themselves. Therefore denial of pay revision benefit to them though granted with retrospective effect was held to be not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The exclusion of resigned employees from the benefits in the Pension Regulations of the bank was held to be not an unreasonable classification in Sanwar Mal's case (supra).
Therefore denial of pay revision benefit to them though granted with retrospective effect was held to be not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The exclusion of resigned employees from the benefits in the Pension Regulations of the bank was held to be not an unreasonable classification in Sanwar Mal's case (supra). The Development Officers who have resigned and whose services have been terminated prematurely form a class by themselves who can be excluded from the benefit of pay revision. Such a stand taken by the LIC consciously falls in the realm of policy decision in the larger interest of its administration and the same is not arbitrary or unconstitutional by any means. 7. Heavy reliance was placed on Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India [2015 KHC 4691(SC)] to contend that resignation from service is in essence a voluntary retirement. The pensionary benefits were directed to be disbursed therein despite the ineligibility under the Pension Rules for a resigned employee as he had served the LIC for more than 20 years. It is the case of the respondent that he had also put in more than 20 years of unblemished service in LIC and that the benefit of revised pay shall not be denied to him. But the view in Asger Ibrahim Amin's case (supra) has been expressly dissented from in LIC v. Shree Lal Meena [ AIR 2016 SC 1394 ] and the issue referred to a Larger Bench. The reference has since been answered by judgment dated 15.3.2019 observing that the provisions in beneficial schemes have to be read as they read unless there is some confusion. It was further held that it would be inadvisable to expand such schemes beyond their contours to extend them to employees for whom they are not meant for by the legislature. We find that the benefits of pay revision have been denied to Class I Officers too who have resigned from service by the Rules framed under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. Similar is the Scheme framed by the General Insurance Corporation of India wherein also the Officers who have resigned are denied the benefit of pay revision. The irresistible conclusion therefore is that the stipulation in Ext.P6 instructions not to extend the benefit of pay revision to Development Officers who have resigned is not unreasonable.
Similar is the Scheme framed by the General Insurance Corporation of India wherein also the Officers who have resigned are denied the benefit of pay revision. The irresistible conclusion therefore is that the stipulation in Ext.P6 instructions not to extend the benefit of pay revision to Development Officers who have resigned is not unreasonable. The learned single Judge grossly erred in setting aside that part of Ext.P6 instructions which denies the benefit of revised pay to the Development Officers who have resigned before 5.9.2005. 8. There is a faint plea that the benefit of encashment of 215 days of Privilege Leave in the credit of the respondent should also be extended at the revised rate notwithstanding the resignation from service. The impugned judgment is silent on that aspect and it is submitted that the application for review filed by the respondent is still pending consideration before the learned single Judge. But the claim in this regard is seen negatived in Ext.P7 letter relying on Regulation 19(4) read with Regulation 19(2) and Regulation 19(2A) of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The said Regulations are not under challenge either in the writ petition or in the writ appeal and Ext.P7 letter of the LIC relying on the same cannot alone be impugned. The reasons already stated for denying the benefit of revised pay apply fortiori to the encashment of Privilege Leave in the case of a Development Officer who has resigned. We hold that the respondent being a resigned employee of the LIC is not entitled to the benefits sought for and we dismiss the writ petition in complete reversal of the judgment impugned. 9. Mr S. Easwaran, Advocate was exuberant as usual in his submissions as amicus curiae and we applaud it. The writ appeal is allowed. No costs.