JUDGMENT : 1. Two parallel skeins of events are weaved into the tapestry which make up this writ petition -and only one of them is WP No.14828 (W) of 2016, instituted by Chandra Sekhar Mondal for quashing of the orders dated July 8, 2013 and July 18, 2013, and for being allowed to work in terms of the appointment letter dated June 15, 2010, all said to be in terms of the order dated November 21, 2011 passed by the respondent no. 2, the Director of School Education, which claims on the tenuous right to have an appointment on compassionate ground by the petitioner, in respect of his father who died in harness on May 18, 1983 and in respect of which the first time that the respondents were directed to take a decision only on November 7, 2005. Whether the writ petitioner's family was on the brink of starvation, how they survived for 22 years, whether this was a case for tiding over the family of the deceased, the only bread earner, immediately after death, cannot be found from the records of the case or even the orders on which the writ petitioner claims. All that can be said is that the writ petitioner has treated the right to be appointed on compassionate ground, when application in that behalf was made by him on attaining majority beyond the statutory period of two years, to be a paternal right or a right to property as he was to the manor born. I am constrained to remark that a coordinate bench of this Court (Brother Maharaj Sinha, as His Lordship then was) found nothing remarkable in it and allowed his prayer and directed mandatory appointment. Whether this has achieved finality or not, is of course, to be considered in this writ petition. 2. The other thread is not just part of the tableaux depicted in the tapestry, but is actually vibrant with events and claims on a regular process of appointment as sanctioned by law in case of a panel prepared after due process where the respondent no.6 was shown as "first" for the post of a clerk which was shown to be vacant as on the date of the advertisement with prior permission of the District Inspector of Schools. The writ petitioner has challenged that process too. The respondent no. 6 has challenged those orders which are in favour. 3. The writ petitioner has challenged that process too. The respondent no. 6 has challenged those orders which are in favour. 3. One of the things I will have to decide is whether it is possible to teeter on the brink of starvation just as whether it is likely that a person will teeter on the edge of falling in love, without falling in or abandoning the contemplation of the abyss for more gainful pursuits. That is the crux of the matter though the writ petitioner has tried to take me away from this consideration. The respondent no. 6 has also tried to draw my attention whether the writ petitioner who has indulged in sharp practice, is entitled to any indulgence by a Court of Equity. All of these are weighty matters, to which I shall naturally refer before I decide the matter. 4. So the questions which arise are, whether a person can claim a right to appointment on compassionate grounds on the basis of a claim prosecuted by him 22 years after the death of the bread-earner in harness, whether the orders of writ courts passed inter partes can create a mode of appointment which is contrary to the statutory rules, whether the writ petitioner is entitled to resume an appointment in terms of the order dated November 21, 2011 or the appointment letter dated June 15, 2010 and whether the respondent no. 6 is entitled to have the logical effect of the selection process which was duly initiated and completed even before the order dated November 7, 2005 by which the writ petitioner's representation was directed to be considered alongwith the conduct of the writ petitioner and whether it disentitles him to any equitable remedy. 5. Let us then start with the facts, however unpalatable they are and however much of avoidable delay they cause. A very curious incident is that though the writ petition starts with the dying in harness of the father of the writ petitioner, the list of dates appended to it, which under the rules of the court have to be furnished along with the writ petition, does not even refer to the fact that this was a claim based on the weak "appointment on compassionate grounds" since the petitioner's father died in harness, but starts with a selection process initiated on August 1, 2005 on which the respondent no. 6 relies. 6. 6 relies. 6. From paragraph 2a of the writ petition it is clear that the writ petitioner's father was an approved teacher of the school in question and died in harness on May 18, 1983 at the age of 44 years, leaving behind him his wife and minor son (the writ petitioner) and a minor daughter. The admitted position is that the name of the petitioner's mother was registered by the statutory authorities on an application made by her within the statutory period of limitation and after the petitioner became major it has been alleged at paragraph 2b that on his application his name replaced his mother's in the Register maintained by the statutory authorities. From paragraph 2c of the writ petition it is clear that the writ petitioner did not approach any authority including this court until 2005 for consideration of his application for appointment on compassionate grounds. So WP No.22209 (W) of 2005 was the first approach by the writ petitioner in support of his claim to have been in dire straits on the death of the sole bread earner of the family - in 1983! The writ petitioner is silent as to how he and his family survived for 22 years. He has not alleged that on the death of the sole bread earner in the family in 1983 they family members were left in penury without any means of livelihood and he has not even cared to explain how he and his family survived for 22 years without livelihood! 7. This alone is a reason which disentitles him from any appointment on compassionate ground as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia in Umesh Kumar Nagpal-v-State of Haryana and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 138 and also in Life Insurance Corporation of India-v-Asha Ramchandra Ambekar and Another, (1994) 2 SCC 718 which also requires that an inquiry be made as to whether the family of the deceased employee had any means to sustain their livelihood before blessing the writ petitioner with an appointment on compassionate grounds which is an exception to the normal mode of recruitment. 8. 8. So, when this court by its order dated November 7, 2005 passed by a coordinate bench (Brother Pranab Chattopadhyay, J, as His Lordship then was) directed that the representation of the writ petitioner be considered and disposed of in accordance with law, all that was mandated was that the above principles of law be given effect to and only if it was found that the writ petitioner's family did not have any source of livelihood and only it was properly and cogently explained how, without any tangible means of livelihood, the writ petitioner's family while penurious and starving, had still survived for at least 22 years, would the question of granting the petitioner any benefit arise. Otherwise, even if any benefit was given to the writ petitioner by the fiat of the court without considering the aforesaid, and even if it had become final between the parties, the same would be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and hence would not be enforceable, if given a go by, by the statutory authorities, in this court of law, after the period of limitation for contempt of court expired, since at the time of its enforcement, if it is found to be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this court is not bound to give effect to it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. The District Inspector of Schools passed a reasoned order dated December 16, 2005. It is a lucid order and shows that though the name of the writ petitioner had automatically been substituted in the place of his mother in the "Live Register" on his attaining majority, the Director of School Education had rejected such registration. This had been invited by the writ petitioner who, not getting any appointment till 2002 in the school in question or in any secondary school, had approached the District Primary School council for being given appointment in any primary school, and the Chairman of the said Council had ascertained that the Director of School Education had not approved the registration of the petitioner's name in the register. Before the authority, during personal hearing, the writ petitioner had submitted through learned advocate that since the Director of School Education had denied approval of the proposal for appointment as a primary teacher, the petitioner should not be considered for being sponsored for appointment as a clerk in the school in question where his father had served as an Assistant Teacher. The District Inspector of Schools went on the admitted position that the writ petitioner had not applied for enlistment within two years from the date of death of his father, since he was a minor, and though his mother had made such an application, he had canvassed his own nomination in her place which the Director of School Education had rejected, and hence he was not entitled to any appointment as prayed for by him. 10. There was no inquiry as posited by the apex court in Asha Ramchandra Ambekar (supra) nor any finding that the family of the deceased employee was in such dire straits that they had no means of livelihood. I continue to reiterate, that when on December 16, 2005 the writ petitioner was given personal hearing, he did not satisfy the authorities how he and his family of widowed mother and sister had survived for 22 years without livelihood, and it was also not ascertained whether he had married and what his circumstances were. In other words, no one discovered whether he was an "undeserving poor" to whom society has resolutely refused both charity and benefit - sometimes with comic consequences, as appears from George Bernard Shaw's Pygmalion, evinced by the plaintive complaint of P. Alfred Dolittle - or the true object of the welfare statutory rules making an exception to the usual rule that public employment is not available on hereditary basis. 11. Once the prayer for the writ petitioner was rejected by the District Inspector of Schools in the manner mentioned above, by the order dated December 16, 2005, we come to the other tangled skein of the plot. A single post of clerk fell vacant in August 2005 in the same school where the writ petitioner claimed appointment on compassionate grounds. With the petitioner's claim rejected, the school authorities continued with the regular process of appointment as prescribed by the relevant rules applicable to the matter. A single post of clerk fell vacant in August 2005 in the same school where the writ petitioner claimed appointment on compassionate grounds. With the petitioner's claim rejected, the school authorities continued with the regular process of appointment as prescribed by the relevant rules applicable to the matter. With this intention in mind, the authorities conducted an interview with prospective candidates on February 5, 2006. The private respondent in this writ petition was one of the interviewee who participated in the process. The writ petitioner instituted two several writ petitions being WP No.25364 (W) of 2005 challenging the order dated December 16, 2005 denying him sponsorship for the post clerk on compassionate ground and also WP No.2439 (W) of 2006 challenging the date of interview being February 5, 2006, a part of the selection process in terms of the statutory rules. 12. The two writ petitions were taken up together by a coordinate bench on July 23, 2009. On its face, it did not even remark upon the fact that the writ petitioner had not challenged the decision of the Director of School Education by which his enlistment in the register had been refused. The coordinate bench went only on the point that the District Inspector of Schools had faulted the petitioner because he had not applied within two years from the date of death of his father while at the same time recording that he was a minor at that time. There was no consideration by the coordinate bench of the financial situation of the family of the writ petitioner, on the death of his father, the only earning member in May 1983, or even what happened to the candidature of his mother was admittedly enrolled within the two-year period. Most importantly the investigation posited by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asha Ramchandra Ambekar (supra) or the satisfaction that the financial position of the family of the petitioner was that of one without livelihood as posited by Umesh Kumar Nagpal (supra) was not recorded. Without adverting to this aspect of the matter, the coordinate bench by its order dated July 23, 2009 directed mandatorily that an appointment be given to the petitioner to the position of a clerk at the said school if vacant, and if not, to any other available vacancy in any school in the district of Birbhum. Without adverting to this aspect of the matter, the coordinate bench by its order dated July 23, 2009 directed mandatorily that an appointment be given to the petitioner to the position of a clerk at the said school if vacant, and if not, to any other available vacancy in any school in the district of Birbhum. On that basis, the other writ petition, being W.P. No.2439 of 2006 which challenged the attempt to fill the said vacancy in the said school was disposed of, on the finding that on disposing of W.P. No.25364 (W) of 2005 with the said order, the same need not be kept pending. This was done without hearing the persons who had applied for the selection process which was in effect scuttled by the said order dated July 23, 2009 in W.P. No.2439 (W) of 2006. 13. This is an order of a coordinate bench. Judicial propriety therefore compels me to make only the observations as I have made above. However, it was made after hearing only the writ petitioner. The coordinate bench has not recorded the presence of the respondents or that this was being taken up for hearing and that it was not an order passed on the first date when it was taken up as a motion. Affidavit of service has also not been recorded to have filed. Still the order is on merits and not ex parte which appears to be not in consonance with our rules particularly Rule 26 of Appendix IV to the Appellate Side Rules. Again, I point out that the order has been passed by a coordinate bench and for that alone, I maintain judicial silence, with difficulty though its revival which is a prayer made by the writ petitioner would run into heavy weather for the observations I have already made above. 14. However, after the Order dated July 23, 2009, the statutory authorities had no alternative but to offer employment mandatorily to the writ petitioner. 14. However, after the Order dated July 23, 2009, the statutory authorities had no alternative but to offer employment mandatorily to the writ petitioner. By a letter dated June 7, 2010 the District Inspector of Schools concerned asked the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the school in question (Sultanpur Nivedita Sikshayatan) to offer the writ petitioner employment on compassionate ground to the post of clerk in the said school in terms of the order dated July 23, 2009 passed in W.P. No.25364 (W) of 2005 and W.P. No.2439 (W) of 2006 by Brother Maharaj Sinha, J, as His Lordship then was, within seven days from the date of receipt of that letter. The said Secretary was also asked to furnish to the District Inspector of Schools within three weeks all documents relating to "approval of appointment" within three weeks from date of issuance of the appointment letter. In terms of the same an appointment letter dated June 15, 2010 was issued by the Secretary of the Managing Committee to the writ petitioner. 15. This was pursuant to an order dated July 23, 2009. In the meanwhile, time had not stayed stationary. It is what happened in the meanwhile, which culminated in the other thread of the plot I had referred to in paragraph 11 above. It will be recalled that the interview for the fresh selection for the post of the clerk, in which the petitioner purported to be interested, had been held on February 5, 2006. However, by a resolution dated February 8, 2006,the Managing Committee decided to cancel the interview on grounds of illegality and infirmity alleged to have arisen within the interview process. The resolution of the Managing Committee referred to a finding of the District Inspector of Schools that he had received complaints from some of the candidates that the typewriter machine used in the interview process for the post of clerk, was defective. Consequently, a fresh interview was rescheduled on March 5, 2006 with the candidates sponsored earlier. Accordingly, the private respondent received another interview letter on February 10, 2006 endorsing the date for the fresh interview. Aggrieved, the private respondent being the respondent no. Consequently, a fresh interview was rescheduled on March 5, 2006 with the candidates sponsored earlier. Accordingly, the private respondent received another interview letter on February 10, 2006 endorsing the date for the fresh interview. Aggrieved, the private respondent being the respondent no. 6 challenged the order of holding fresh interview in a writ petition being W.P. No. 6068 (W) of 2006 filed before this Court and obtained an interim order dated November 2, 2006, restraining the School authorities from holding any fresh interview for making appointment to the said vacancy till the disposal of the writ petition. The petition was finally decided by an order dated June 29, 2010 passed by a coordinate bench, (coram Brother Debasish Kargupta, J, as His Lordship then was) setting aside the letter for fresh interview with a direction to the respondent authorities to take a decision on the approval of the panel prepared on the basis of the interview conducted on February 5, 2006 unless a justifiable reason warranted that the said panel be cancelled. 16. This order dated June 29, 2010 was not challenged by anyone. However, without even making the said respondent no. 6 a party, in the meanwhile, as stated in paragraph 11 above, the writ petitioner in the present case, had filed the two writ petitions referred to therein, challenging the denial of his sponsorship on compassionate grounds in the post of the clerk, and also challenging the interview fixed on February 5, 2006. As stated in paragraph 12 of this judgment, the writ petition being W.P. No.25364 (W) of 2005 was allowed with a mandatory direction on the statutory authorities and the school authorities to appoint the writ petitioner to the post of the clerk for which the private respondent no. 6 had been contending, and on that basis W.P. No.2439 (W) of 2006 filed by the present writ petitioner was also disposed of, without hearing the respondent no. 6 or anyone affected by the said order, which scuttled a lawfully initiated selection proceeding under statutory rules. 17. The private respondent no. 6 was justifiably aggrieved by the order dated July 23, 2009 passed in the said two writ petitions which virtually threw him out of court and the opportunity of being considered for grant of public employment and thus earning his livelihood, without following procedure established by law and even before hearing him. 17. The private respondent no. 6 was justifiably aggrieved by the order dated July 23, 2009 passed in the said two writ petitions which virtually threw him out of court and the opportunity of being considered for grant of public employment and thus earning his livelihood, without following procedure established by law and even before hearing him. Accordingly, he preferred a leave to appeal against the order dated July 23, 2009, which was granted and marked as M.A.T No.901 of 2010 which was registered as F.M.A No.1130 of 2010. In this appeal the respondent no. 6 as appellant submitted that the due process for fresh selection had commenced prior to July 23, 2009 and therefore it could not have been scuttled without hearing. The present writ petitioner as respondent claimed that no panel had been prepared and so the question of its approval by the District Inspector of Schools in terms of the Order dated June 29, 2010 passed in W.P. No.6068 (W) of 2006, did not at all arise. The State submitted that the entire set of facts, id est, whether there had been preparation of earlier or not, or whether there was any selection process or not, or whether the approval to the appointment of the present writ petitioner on compassionate ground or not, were to be ascertained and decided by the District Inspector of Schools. 18. The said appeal being F.M.A. No.1130 of 2010 was disposed of by an order dated June 17, 2011 passed by an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court comprising their Lordships the Hon'ble Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta and the Hon'ble Justice Syamal Kanti Chakrabarti with the following observations: After considering the respective contentions of the Learned Counsels for the parties and having gone through the records, we are of the view that if the selection process has been undertaken prior to passing of the order of this Court on account of compassionate ground, D.I., shall, in terms of the order of Justice Kar Gupta dated 29th June 2010, take a decision on the panel. He will first decide whether there has been any preparation of panel actually or not. If there is so on fact, then of course legality and validity thereof has to be examined. In this context the D.I. shall serve notice upon the school authority, the appellant and also the writ petitioner/respondent. He will first decide whether there has been any preparation of panel actually or not. If there is so on fact, then of course legality and validity thereof has to be examined. In this context the D.I. shall serve notice upon the school authority, the appellant and also the writ petitioner/respondent. The D.I. shall take decision on this issue first. If he finds that the writ petitioner/respondent has been appointed by selection process in the same post before the writ petitioner/ respondent approached this Court on account of compassionate ground obviously he has to take a decision for approval to the panel. On considering of facts and materials if the D.I. finds that factually there has been no preparation of panel, obviously he will take a decision in his own way and thereafter he will take a decision on the question of approval to the appointment made in favor of the writ petitioner/ respondent. Entire exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. If any legal difficulties arises in relation to interpretation of law or any order, then the D.I. may seek opinion of the Director of School Education in this regard. Whatever observation made by the Learned Trial Judge or by any of the Court or by ourselves, would not be influencing and binding factor on the D.I. he will take decision on his own way". 19. Therefore, the question of the writ petitioner's appointment on compassionate grounds was not given finality. First the District Inspector of Schools was to ascertain whether the selection process for the post of clerk in terms of the recruitment rules had commenced before the order dated July 23, 2009 directing appointment of the writ petitioner on compassionate grounds had been passed by this Court. If it was found that the selection process had been so undertaken, then he would decide whether a panel had been prepared or not. If he found that a panel had been prepared (as claimed by the private respondent no. 6) then he would decide on its legality and validity. If he found that there was a panel prepared (where the name of the respondent no. If he found that a panel had been prepared (as claimed by the private respondent no. 6) then he would decide on its legality and validity. If he found that there was a panel prepared (where the name of the respondent no. 6/appellant appeared) before the writ petitioner had approached this court for appointment on compassionate grounds, then naturally he had to take a decision on approval of the panel prepared pursuant to such selection process, and the appointment made under the order of Brother Maharaj Sinha, J, could not be given primacy. Only if factually there was no preparation of the panel, and the District Inspector of School held so, would he take a decision in his own way and decide on the question of the approval of the appointment made to the writ petitioner on compassionate grounds. 20. This order dated June 17, 2011 holds the field. I have paraphrased and expressed the order meaningfully, such that the obvious typographical errors did not detract from what the Hon'ble Division Bench decided, and for this reason I have summarized the submissions of the parties before the Hon'ble Division Bench. 21. However, the parties did not stop here. The then District Inspector of Schools, in terms of the liberty for him to seek guidance from the Director of School Education, if he faced difficulty in interpretation of any law or order, wrote to that worthy by a memo dated September 22, 2011seeking his legal opinion in respect of the approval of appointment on compassionate grounds of the writ petitioner. The very subject line shows that he did not comply with the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench dated June 17, 2011 as to which issue he was to decide first before seeking the opinion on a subsidiary question which he was to decide last, and contingent on the panel pursuant to the selection process had not been prepared or validly prepared. This was done without any opportunity of being heard being granted to the writ petitioner or the private respondent no. 6. This was done without any opportunity of being heard being granted to the writ petitioner or the private respondent no. 6. An important thing which, however, the District Inspector of Schools, did admit on facts on the basis of the records was that the process of selection of a clerk at the said school was initiated by prior permission granted on August 1, 2005 whereas the order was passed by the coordinate bench in W.P. No.25364 (W) of 2005 on July 23, 2009. Therefore, the order to appoint the writ petitioner to that post was passed after the selection process had duly commenced. In the said request for legal opinion the District Inspector of schools held that an interview was held on February 5, 2006 but neither was a panel prepared on the basis of merit nor did the Managing Committee approve it. The entire case for opinion was so drafted as to slant it towards granting the present writ petitioner appointment on compassionate grounds even before deciding the issues that the District Inspector of Schools had been mandated to decide before anything else by the Hon'ble Division Bench on June 17, 2011. 22. On that basis the respondent no. 6 became aggrieved and instituted W.P. No.1783 (W) of 2012. In the said writ petition a coordinate bench of this court by an interim order dated February 7, 2012 restrained the then District Inspector of Schools from approving the appointment of the respondent 6 in that writ petition who is the writ petitioner herein. Thereafter no salary was paid to the writ petitioner as a clerk by the State of West Bengal. Subsequently by an order dated June 28, 2013, the strange behaviour and conduct of the District Inspector of Schools, who had not complied with the order of the Hon'ble Division Bench was recorded and a copy of the order was directed to be served on his superior statutory authorities for necessary action, while giving him time, as prayed for by the State of West Bengal, to comply with the order of the Hon'ble Division Bench dated June 17, 2011 and dispensing with personal appearance. 23. 23. It appeared that the District Inspector of Schools had changed in the meanwhile, and the new District Inspector of Schools, after going through the records, came to the following conclusion in his reasoned order dated July 8, 2013: - "On perusal of the records the undersigned is of the opinion that the selection process has been undertaken long back on 5th February, 2006 and a panel was submitted on the basis of such selection process in which the writ petitioner (Monoj @ Manoj Kumar Mondal) placed in the first position and the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court on 23rd July, 2009 on account of compassionate grounds is subsequent one, thus admittedly the selection process was undertaken prior to passing of the order of the Hon'ble Court on account of compassionate ground and as such it should be held that there has been preparation of a legal and valid panel on the basis of the interview held on 5th February, 2006 and the appointment of Chandra Sekhar Mondal on account of compassionate ground was illegal and in violation of statutory provisions under the Management of Recognized Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) Rules, 1969 thus in terms of the aforesaid orders the said panel is deserved to be approved for appointment of the writ petitioner in W.P. No.1783 (W) of 2012 and the appointment of Chandra Sekhar Mondal is deserved to be cancelled." 24. I have chosen to leave the native woodnotes wild and aberrant grammar and syntax untouched to give a feeling of the original decision of the new District Inspector of Schools. At least this much is clear that he has travelled 180 degrees to the contrary of the earlier finding on fact - he holds that the selection process under the statutory rules commenced before the order dated July 23, 2009 was passed by the coordinate bench and he also holds that the panel was prepared and submitted on the basis of the interview held on February 5, 2006 which was a legal and valid panel. 25. 25. Since the opinion of the Director of School Education dated November 21, 2011 is a conditional one, that if the District Inspector of Schools is of the opinion that "the question of approval to the panel as well as consequent appointment in favour of the appellant (i.e., Manoj Kumar Mondal) does not and cannot arise; and the question of approval of appointment in favour of the writ petitioner/respondent no. 1 (i.e., Chandra Sekhar Mondal) is wise to be accorded in terms verdict dated 17.06.2011 of the Hon'ble Division Bench, she/he may proceeding accordingly in taking all steps within the prescribed stipulation of the said order dated 17.06.2011", once the that opinion is changed on the basis of the records by the District Inspector of Schools who is to take the final decision, who has held as in paragraph 23 above, that opinion of the Director of School Education without even granting the parties any hearing, cannot be binding on even the statutory authorities, far less this court. 26. In such view of the matter, I find that the writ petitioner has in effect sought the enforcement of the order dated July 23, 2009 directing mandatorily the grant of appointment on compassionate grounds in terms of the order dated June 17, 2011 passed by the Division Bench, on reversal of a finding of fact in the order dated July 8, 2013. He has not made out any case in 2016 which is better than the case made out in 2005 explaining how his family survived the death of their only bread earner in May 1983 and how the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as summarized by me in paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of this judgment, are fulfilled and what is the nature of this starvation which lingers for 22 years and by what miracle the petitioner, his mother and his sister survived unemployment, penury and such starvation. There is no cogent reason which allowed me to revisit the finding of the fact recorded in the order dated July 8, 2013. I am persuaded - though I do not wish to dwell on this aspect of the matter - that Mr. Yamin Ali, the original advocate for the writ petitioner and Mr. There is no cogent reason which allowed me to revisit the finding of the fact recorded in the order dated July 8, 2013. I am persuaded - though I do not wish to dwell on this aspect of the matter - that Mr. Yamin Ali, the original advocate for the writ petitioner and Mr. Rajendra Banerjee the present advocate - are guilty of sharp practice in moving applications without service on the other side, obtaining ex parte orders, getting applications dismissed ex parte, and then moving fresh applications on false premises of dire straits on the death of the sole bread earner and a miraculous starvation that lasted 22 years at the least. Since the writ petitioner has not on facts been able to satisfy the tests laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia in Umesh Kumar Nagpal-v--State of Haryana and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 138 and also in Life Insurance Corporation of India-v-Asha Ramchandra Ambekar and Another, (1994) 2 SCC 718 , I am afraid that I cannot accede to the prayers of the writ petitioner or any of them. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, the purported appointment of the writ petitioner on June 15, 2010 is quashed and the question of its approval, consequently, does not arise. The appointment of the private respondent no. 6, Manoj Kumar Mondal, in terms of the order dated July 8, 2013 passed by the District Inspector of Schools shall become final with effect from the date of the appointment letter and approval thereto shall be accorded if not already approved within three weeks from date of the communication of this order. This order is passed under the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which I exercise so that the dragging of the litigation by the writ petitioner does not operate inequitably to the respondent no. 6 and only because I have passed this order in favour of the respondent no. 6, do I forbear from imposing costs on the writ petitioner. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.