JUDGMENT : N.V. ANJARIA, J. 1. In the facts and circumstances of the case and with request and consent of parties appearing through their learned advocates, the matter was taken up for final consideration today. 1.1 Rule, returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani waives service of notice of Rule on behalf respondent No. 1-State. 1.2 Heard learned advocate Mr. Jigar Gadhavi for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent-State. 2. The petitioner has prayed to set aside order dated 13th June, 2018 passed by respondent- Deputy Conservator of Forests, Mahisagar Forest Range, Lunavada, whereby services of the petitioner came to be terminated with retrospective effect from 17th May, 2018. 3. The petitioner was appointed on 25th January, 2018 as Beat Guard on a fixed pay of Rs. 19,950/- for a period of five years, in the forest department and was posted at Padadara village, Ditvaans Range. On 17th May, 2018, a First Information Report was filed against the petitioner for the alleged offences under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The respondent Department issued notice at the residential address of the petitioner and as the petitioner was jail pursuant to the aforesaid criminal complaint. The notice was received by the father of the petitioner who requested to give a chance of hearing. 3.1 On 13th June, 2018 respondent No. 2-Deputy Conservator of Forests passed the impugned order. In the impugned order of termination, the factum about the registration of the F.I.R. with Mahisagar ACB Police Station against the petitioner for the offence under Sections 7, 13(1) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was mentioned and it was stated that the petitioner was given notice in this regard which was received by the father of the petitioner, whose statement was recorded. 3.2 The impugned order proceeded to recite that in view of the F.I.R. it was established that petitioner has accepted the amount of bribe and thus had committed misconduct. It was stated that petitioner could not be continued in service in view of his misconduct. Accordingly, it was further stated in the order that services of the petitioner who was a fixed pay employee, was terminated with retrospective effect from 17th May, 2018 in view of condition No. 6 of the appointment order. 4. It was stated that petitioner could not be continued in service in view of his misconduct. Accordingly, it was further stated in the order that services of the petitioner who was a fixed pay employee, was terminated with retrospective effect from 17th May, 2018 in view of condition No. 6 of the appointment order. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order was a stigmatic order wherein a ready conclusion was drawn on the basis of F.I.R. only that the petitioner had committed misconduct of taking bribe. He submitted that the State Government had issued Resolutions dated 20th October, 2015 and 28th March, 2016 by which certain conditions of service for the employees appointed on fixed pay were provided and it was stated in condition No. 14A that principles of natural justice and conducting of inquiry would be required to be followed in case of misconduct by an ad hoc employee before terminating his services. 4.1 By the very nature of contents of the order, the order was stigmatic in nature. It was passed without compliance of principles of natural justice, and without holding full scale inquiry against the petitioner for the misconduct alleged against him. 5. The position of law in relation to effecting termination of service of an employee, even if on the fixed pay and who is a fixed term employee by passing an order without following principles of natural justice came to be delineated and discussed by this Court in Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi vs. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No. 17872 of 2017 decided on 30th November, 2017. In that case, petitioner was appointed as Beat Guard. The allegations were raised against him inter alia that he had stolen two pass-books, that he mentioned wrong information in the Register to allow trucks to pass-by illegally. It was stated in the order leading to his termination of service that he used the pass-book for illegal purpose for which it was stolen and due to the act of negligence, caused damage to the forest's properties to a large extent. It was mentioned in the order that if the petitioner was to continue in service, it would entail greater loss and that it was not advisable to continue the petitioner in service since the petitioner was found to be negligent and careless in discharge of his duties. It was mentioned in the order that if the petitioner was to continue in service, it would entail greater loss and that it was not advisable to continue the petitioner in service since the petitioner was found to be negligent and careless in discharge of his duties. 5.1 The law on the aspect was discussed with reference to the decisions of the Apex Court. In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P. (2000) 5 SCC 152 , the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under: “Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry........” (Para 29) (Emphasis supplied) 5.2 The above statement of law that if the order is punitive and stigmatic in nature, even if the employee concerned is a temporary employee or holding the post as on probation, his dismissal or removal would warrant a regular inquiry and full-fledge compliance of natural justice, emanaged from the early decision of the Apex Court in Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 369 . In that case, the Apex Court held that it is permissible for the Court to go behind the formal order of discharge so as to find out the real cause of action. In that case, the Apex Court held that it is permissible for the Court to go behind the formal order of discharge so as to find out the real cause of action. In that case, the appellant was an IPS Officer, undergoing training as a probationer, arrived late by about 22 minutes at the place, even though prior intimation was sent about the time on which, the candidates were required to reach the venue. The incident of delayed reporting was considered to be one by the authorities calling for an inquiry and an explanation was sought for from the petitioner and all other probationer-trainees who had arrived late. On the basis of explanation, the Director recommended the Government for discharge of the appellant from service. The Government passed order of discharge on the basis of recommendation of the Director with whom, the only ground prevailing was that the appellant did not show any sign of repentance. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. However, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the order was punitive. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with full benefits. 5.3 The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 , stated and observed thus: “53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used............” (Para 9) (Emphasis supplied) 5.4 In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 21 , observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. In such circumstances, without becoming stigmatic, the employer can exercise its right to terminate service of the employee concerned. In the other line of decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the facts revealed in the inquiry or from the narration of the order itself that the inquiry into the conduct was not the motive but it was a foundation and the allegation of misconduct considered against employee becomes foundation of termination of service of temporary servant or probationer, such action would become punitive and it would make the order legally unsound. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive. 5.5 In Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi (supra), it was thereafter observed and held: “6. When the impugned order is assessed, evaluated and considered in light of the aforesaid principles, it is even not necessary to adopt the process of lifting of veil. It is not necessary to remove the facade even, for, the order in these very recitals could be manifestly said to be based on allegations of misconduct. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. It is not necessary to remove the facade even, for, the order in these very recitals could be manifestly said to be based on allegations of misconduct. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, even-though the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a full-fledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. Even if the temporary, ad-hoc or probationer employee is driven out of service on the ground of misconduct without holding inquiry and stigma is caste on his career by the punitive order, it is also a facet of behaving with hire and fire attitude by the employer.” 5.6 Also stand to support the petitioner another decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1095 of 2016 decided on 21st September, 2016 in which, it was observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that the order ex facie indicated that the basis of the order of termination was criminal complaint lodged against the petitioner. As the order was passed without compliance of natural justice, it was required indulgence of the Court, stated the Court, after discussing the position of law in that regard. 5.7 Similar principles were reiterated by this Court in Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod vs. Vadodara Municipal Corporation, 2018 (2) GLR 1636 . Decision in Manishbhai Nayanbhai Mod (supra) carried in Letters Patent Appeal No. 189 of 2016 which came to be dismissed by the Division Bench on 20th February, 2018, observing and recording finding in paragraph 4.1 of the judgment and order, as under: “The above act on the part of the competent authority of appellant-Corporation was not only stigmatic, but contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court to which reference is made by learned Single Judge and distinguishing the facts of the present case it was found that termination was punitive. As a necessary corollary, when there is a breach of procedure of instituting full-fledged departmental inquiry, particularly, when termination order referred to following of Gujarat Civil Services [Discipline & Appeal] Rules, 1971, the issuance of show cause notice, receiving reply and then to take final decision to terminate services of an employee was unjust, unreasonable, arbitrary, in breach of the Rules, 1971, violative of principles of natural justice and Article 14 of the Constitution as it would not make any difference whether the employee was appointed temporarily for a fixed term on a fixed salary incorporating various conditions.” 5.8 Having surveyed the principles of law as above, adverting to revisit the basic facts of the present case, the petitioner was appointed by order dated 25th January, 2018 as Beat Guard on a fixed pay of Rs. 19,950/- for a period of five years. Therefore, his term of appointment was upto 25th January, 2023. Petitioner's services came to be terminated by impugned order dated 13th June, 2018 for the grounds stated in the order which was done with retrospective effect from 17th May, 2018. 6. It was clear from the bare reading of the impugned order and the recitals therein that the foundation which led to the passing of order of termination was the event of registration of F.I.R. on which basis it was concluded that the petitioner has committed misconduct of taking bribe. The respondents could not have been arrived at a finding of commission of misconduct under the Disciplinary Rules without following the principles of natural justice and without conducting full-fledged inquiry. Since the allegations of misconduct were foundation for penal action taken against the petitioner, without holding the inquiry, the order is liable to be set aside. Since the petitioner's fixed term is to come to an end on 24/25th January, 2023, reinstatement which is directed herein shall be operative upto the said period to make up total period of five years as per the conditions of original order of appointment. 6.1 As a result of above discussion and reasons, the impugned order dated 13th June, 2018 passed by Deputy Conservator of Forests is hereby set aside. 6.1 As a result of above discussion and reasons, the impugned order dated 13th June, 2018 passed by Deputy Conservator of Forests is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner on the original post of Beat Guard with continuity of service and with salary/wages to be paid for interregnum, as well as with consequential benefits as if the order of termination was never passed. Reinstatement of the petitioner directed as above shall be upto 24/25th January, 2023 so as to make up the total period of employment of five years as per the conditions of appointment. Resultant monetary benefits arising by virtue of the present order shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. 7. Petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. 8. Direct service is permitted.