JUDGMENT : Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. This second appeal under section 100 of CPC has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 13.12.2018 passed by 3rd Additional District Judge to the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Vidisha in RCA No. 51 of 2017 thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 19.5.2017 passed by 6th Civil Judge, Class-II, Vidisha in Civil Suit No. 61-A of 2015 2. The necessary facts for the disposal of the present appeal in short are that the respondent had filed a suit for eviction against the appellants on the ground of bona fide requirement for residential purposes as well as on the ground of arrears of rent It was the case of the respondent that the plaintiff has purchased the property in dispute by registered sale deed dated 8.10.2003 from Rajendra Kumai Jam and Sanjay Kumar Jam The appellants were the tenants of Rajendra Kumai Jain and Sanjay Kumar Jam and after purchasing the property, they became the tenants of the plaintiff At the time of the execution of the sale deed, the sellers had also sent a registered notice to the appellants informing the fact of sell and they were directed that in future they shall pay the rent to the plaintiff. However, the appellants did not pay the rent to the plaintiff in spite of repeated demands. It was further pleaded that the appellants have not paid the rent till 1.9.2003 and it was further prayed that since the plaintiff cannot claim the arrears of rent prior to last three years, accordingly, it was prayed that the arrears of rent w.e.f. 1.9.2003 till the filing of the suit @ Rs. 60/- per month be also paid. It was further pleaded that although the plaintiff has a house situated inside the Fort, Vidisha but as the same has been occupied by the tenant, therefore, the plaintiff does not have any alternative accommodation for residential purposes in the city of Vidisha. At present, the plaintiff and her husband are residing in an ancestral house, however, because of family partition, they would be required to vacate the said house and to hand over the vacant possession to the co-sharers, therefore, it was prayed that the plaintiff requires the suit property bona fidely for residential purposes. At present, the plaintiff and her husband are residing in an ancestral house, however, because of family partition, they would be required to vacate the said house and to hand over the vacant possession to the co-sharers, therefore, it was prayed that the plaintiff requires the suit property bona fidely for residential purposes. It was further pleaded that the husband of the plaintiff has also purchased the remaining part of house in which the husband of the plaintiff is carrying on the business of Medical Store. On 24.7.2012, the plaintiff had sent a notice through her counsel thereby terminating the tenancy and to vacate the premises as well as to pay the arrears of rent, however, the same was not responded. Accordingly, the suit was filed for eviction on the ground of Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(e) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 3. The appellants filed their joint written statement and pleaded that they were never the tenants. It was further pleaded that no notice was sent by the plaintiff or her father. It was further pleaded that the appellants have regularly paid the rent of the suit premises. The appellants are continuously using the disputed three rooms apart from the other entire area for the last 50 years. The relationship of the landlord and tenant with the plaintiff was also denied and it was also pleaded that the plaintiff had never given any information about the purchase of the property. It was further submitted that the plaintiff has another three storied building situated near Pedhi School, Vidisha. It was further submitted that the ground floor of the property is being used by the appellants for commercial purposes and, therefore, the same cannot be vacated on the ground of bona fide requirement. No cause of action has arisen in favour of the plaintiff and, accordingly, it was prayed that the suit may be dismissed. 4. The Trial Court after framing different issues decreed the suit and it was held that the plaintiff is the owner and landlord of the suit premises. The said suit premises is bona fidely required for her residential purposes as well as the appellants have not paid the rent and, accordingly, the decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(e) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act was passed. 5. The said suit premises is bona fidely required for her residential purposes as well as the appellants have not paid the rent and, accordingly, the decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(e) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act was passed. 5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the appellants filed an appeal which too has suffered dismissal by judgment dated 13.12.2018. 6. Challenging the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that according to the plaintiff herself, she had purchased three rooms out of the entire house from Rajendra Kumar Jain and Sanjay Kumar Jain whereas the suit has been filed for eviction from the entire suit property and since the plaintiff is not the owner of the entire house, therefore, the suit as framed and filed was not maintainable. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellants that in view of several admissions made by the respondent/plaintiff it is clear that alternative accommodation is available with the plaintiff to cater her need of her residential requirement, therefore, the Courts below have committed material illegality by decreeing the suit. It is further submitted that the courtyard and the latrine and bathroom were not purchased by the plaintiff, therefore, the appellants cannot be evicted from the said premises. 7. Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants. 8. So far as the contention of the appellants that the suit has been filed for eviction from the entire suit property purchased by the plaintiff and her husband by different sale deeds is concerned, the said fact is misconceived in the light of the plaint. It is mentioned in the plaint that the plaintiff has purchased the suit property comprising of 3 rooms from Rajendra Kumar Jain and Sanjay Kumar Jain by registered sale deed dated 8.10.2003 and the suit was also filed for eviction from the portion of the property which was purchased by the plaintiff. Therefore, the contention of the appellants that the suit for eviction has been filed in respect of the entire property which was purchased by the plaintiff and her husband by different sale deeds cannot be accepted. 9. Therefore, the contention of the appellants that the suit for eviction has been filed in respect of the entire property which was purchased by the plaintiff and her husband by different sale deeds cannot be accepted. 9. So far as the contention of the appellants that the plaintiff has an alternative accommodation and, therefore, she has failed to prove her bona fide requirement is concerned, this Court was taken through the evidence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has specifically stated in her cross-examination that the house situated inside the Fort is an ancestral house and a family partition has taken place and she is required to vacate the premises as the said house has fallen to the share of her elder brother-in-law. 10. In paragraph 38 of her cross-examination, it is also conceded by the plaintiff that one more house in the city of Vidisha was purchased by her father-in-law in the joint name of the plaintiff and her Jethani Chanda Bai. It has been further clarified that the said house is being used by her elder brother-in-law. She has further admitted that the said house was purchased by her father-in-law and the said house has not been partitioned so far. In paragraph 19 of her cross-examination, she has stated that the house situated in Bada Bazar was also purchased by her father-in-law and was constructed by him. Thus it is clear that the other properties which have been referred by the appellants were purchased by father-in-law of the plaintiff and, accordingly, if she has come up with a case that she is not the exclusive owner of the said property and as the other properties are ancestral and are being used by her in-laws, then the same cannot be disbelieved. The property in question has been purchased by the petitioner and her husband by two different sale deeds. The appellants could not point out any other property in exclusive ownership and in possession of the plaintiff to show that she has any other alternative accommodation to cater the residential need of the plaintiff. Even otherwise, the tenants cannot compel the plaintiff to reside at any place. It is the choice of the plaintiff to make a decision in this regard. Even otherwise, the tenants cannot compel the plaintiff to reside at any place. It is the choice of the plaintiff to make a decision in this regard. It is further well established principle of law that this Court in exercise of powers under section 100 of CPC cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the Courts below. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi and others reported in 2016 (1) R.C.R. (Rent) 98 : (2016) 3 SCC 78 has held as under: "8. "Perversity" has been the subject-matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam, it has been held at para 11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. It is settled law that in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." The Supreme Court in the case of Pakeerappa Rai v. Seethamma Hengsu Dead by L.R.S. and others reported in (2001) 9 SCC 521 has held as under: "2.......... But the High Court in exercise of power under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the erroneous finding of fact howsoever gross the error seems to be......." The Supreme Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki reported in 2006 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 561 : (2007) 1 SCC 546 has held as under: "46. In Bholaram v. Ameerchand a three-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 47. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait a three-Judge Bench of this Court held: (a) that the High Court should be satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law and not mere question of law; (b) reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded; (c) it has the duty to formulate the substantial questions of law and to put the opposite party on notice and give fair and proper opportunity to meet the point. The Court also held that it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage. 48. This Court had occasion to determine the same issue in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor. The Court stated that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. 49. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand that the judgment rendered by the High Court under section 100 CPC without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. On this short ground alone, this appeal is required to be allowed. 50. In Kanai Lal Garari v. Murari Ganguly this Court has observed that it is mandatory to formulate the substantial question of law while entertaining the appeal in absence of which the judgment is to be set aside. In Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari the Court reiterated the statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law. These judgments have been referred to in the later judgment of K. Raj v. Muthamma. A statement of law has been reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the Court in second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly delineated the scope of section 100 CPC. A statement of law has been reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the Court in second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly delineated the scope of section 100 CPC. The Court observed that an obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the Court. In the said judgment, it was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code and Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. 52. In Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram the Court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. 53. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil this Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 54. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 54. In the same case, this Court observed that in a case where special leave petition was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with findings of fact of the lower appellate court. This Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. This Court again reminded the High Court in Commr., HRCE v. P. Shanmugama that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. 56. Again, this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 57. Again, in Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai this Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 58. Again, in Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh this Court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. In this case, the findings of the trial court and the lower appellate court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC. In this case, the findings of the trial court and the lower appellate court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under section 100 CPC. This Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. 59. In H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa delivered on 6.2.2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes re-appreciation of evidence. This Court found that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and needed to be set aside." The Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, reported in 2010 (4) R.C.R. (Civil) 859 : (2010) 13 SCC 216 has held as under:- "16. Thus, it is evident from the above that the right to appeal is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the parties or by the order of the court. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance, acquiescence, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by the legislature and conferring a court or authority with jurisdiction, is a legislative function. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with the law in force, ensuring full compliance with the conditions mentioned in the provision that creates it. Therefore, the court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provisions. A second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law, which is something distinct from a substantial question of fact. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of section 100 CPC. It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari; Sarjas Rai v. Bakshi Inderjit Singh; Manicka Poosali v. Anjalai Animal; Sugani v. Rameshwar Das; Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal; P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan; Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh; V. Ramaswamy v. Ramachandran and Bhag Singh v. Jaskirat Singh.) 17. In Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India this Court observed: "12.... it is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in subsection (5) of section 100 CPC. Under the proviso, the Court should be 'satisfied' that the case involves a 'substantial question of law' and not a mere 'question of law'. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be 'recorded' by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that would be alleged at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded." [Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, 1997 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 197 : (1997) 5 SCC 438 , pp. 445-46, para 10] 18. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa this Court observed: (AIR pp. 1637-38, para 12) "12. ... It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded." [Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, 1997 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 197 : (1997) 5 SCC 438 , pp. 445-46, para 10] 18. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa this Court observed: (AIR pp. 1637-38, para 12) "12. ... Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by Section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid." 19. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 637-38, para 6) "6.... it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible - it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection." 20. While dealing with the issue, this Court in Leela Soni v. Rajesh Goyal observed as under: (SCC p. 502, paras 20-22) "20. While dealing with the issue, this Court in Leela Soni v. Rajesh Goyal observed as under: (SCC p. 502, paras 20-22) "20. There can be no doubt that the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is confined to the framing of substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and to decide the same, section 101 CPC provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in section 100 CPC. Thus it is clear that no second appeal can be entertained by the High Court on questions of fact, much less can it interfere in the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court. This is so, not only when it is possible for the High Court to take a different view of the matter but also when the High Court finds that conclusions on questions of fact recorded by the first appellate court are erroneous. 21. It will be apt to refer to section 103 CPC which enables the High Court to determine the issues of fact: *** 22. The section, noted above, authorises the High Court to determine any issue which is necessary for the disposal of the second appeal provided the evidence on record is sufficient, in any of the following two situations: (1) when that issue has not been determined both by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court or by the lower appellate court; or (2) when both the trial court as well as the appellate court or the lower appellate court have wrongly determined any issue on a substantial question of law which can properly be the subject-matter of second appeal under section 100 CPC." 21. In Jadu Gopal Chakravarty v. Pannalal Bhowmick the question arose as to whether the compromise decree had been obtained by fraud. This Court held that though it is a question of fact, but because none of the courts below had pointedly addressed the question of whether the compromise in the case was obtained by perpetrating fraud on the court, the High Court was justified in exercising its powers under section 103 CPC to go into the question. (See also Achintya Kumar Saha v. Nanee Printers.) 22. (See also Achintya Kumar Saha v. Nanee Printers.) 22. In Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh this Court held that in case the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under section 103 CPC, in view of the fact that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated on account of non-consideration of additional evidence of a vital nature, the Court may itself finally decide the case in accordance with section 103(b) CPC and the Court must hear the parties fully with reference to the entire evidence on record with relevance to the question after giving notice to all the parties. The Court further held as under: (Bhagwan Sharma case, SCC p. 499, para 5) "5. ... The grounds which may be available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by the court below is vitiated in law, does not by itself lead to the further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be finally arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal of the entire evidence the ultimate conclusion may go in favour of either party and it cannot be prejudged, as has been done in the impugned judgment." 23. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 278-79, para 34) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-a-vis the concept of justice. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-a-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication-what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 12. Thus, in absence of any perversity in the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the Courts below, this Court is of the considered opinion that no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal. 13. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.