JUDGMENT : B.N. Karia, J. 1. Admit. Ms. Sangeeta N. Pahwa, learned Counsel for respondents waives service of notice of admission on behalf of respondents. 2. The present appellant, who was the original objector in Regular Civil Execution (Darkhast) Application No. 21 of 1993, who happens to be son of the judgment debtor-Baloch Ilamkha Umrkha, by way of present appeal under Sec. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code has challenged the judgment and decree dated 7th March, 2019 passed by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2019 dismissing the Regular Civil Appeal preferred by the present appellant and confirming the order dated 24th January, 2019 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Palitana in Regular Civil Execution (Darkhast) Application No. 21 of 1993. 3. This appeal was placed at admission stage, however, on a joint request being made by learned Counsels appearing for respective parties to decide the appeal finally, this appeal is taken up for final hearing. Necessary documents are produced by the appellant to determine the present appeal. 4. Short facts of the present case which emerges from the record are that: 4.1. That, Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983 was filed by the plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction along with the relief of getting vacant possession of the suit property from the defendant (father of the appellant) averring that the suit property (admeasuring Acre 3-Guntha 30 of Survey No. 291) was purchased by the plaintiff by a registered sale-deed dated 22nd March, 1972. That, as the plaintiff was serving out of station in Forest Department, defendant No. 1, being trusted person, was looking after and taking care of the suit property as a chowkidar on a remuneration of Rs. 100/- per month. That, in the year of 1981, the intention of the defendant was found changed, and thus, his service was terminated. The defendant No. 2 was the son of Ilamkha. That, plaintiff was the real owner having the possession of the suit property and was paying revenue dues, however, without obtaining consent of the plaintiff or without informing the plaintiff, the defendant tried to transfer the suit property in his name in the revenue. record. That, Regular Civil Suit No. 83 of 1981 was filed by the plaintiff before the Court of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Palitana. record. That, Regular Civil Suit No. 83 of 1981 was filed by the plaintiff before the Court of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) at Palitana. That, the suit was contested by the defendant by raising dispute of jurisdiction, and thereafter, the said suit was withdrawn by the plaintiff with a liberty to file a fresh suit. As the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and defendant has no right, title or interest in the suit land. It was requested in the suit to pass declaration that plaintiff is the sole owner having possession of the suit property, and restraining the defendant from disturbing the possession and taking crops from the suit property by granting permanent injunction and hand over the vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff. 4.2. That, defendant No. 1 was joined in the suit in individual capacity and in the capacity of representative of his family consisting of his sons as well as Karta of the family. The suit was resisted by the defendant by filing written statement denying the contents as raised by the plaintiff. 4.3. The learned trial Judge, after recording the evidence, was pleased to allow the suit on 23rd April, 1991 in favour of the plaintiff directing the defendant to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property within 60 days. The defendant challenged the aforesaid judgment and decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983 by filing First Appeal No. 709 of 1991 before this Court. Meanwhile, the defendant No. 2-Baloch Kalubha Ilamkha, brother of the defendant No. 1 was passed away. This Court, confirmed the judgment and decree dated 23rd April, 1991 passed in Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983 passed by the 2nd Joint Civil Judge (S.D.), Bhavnagar and dismissed the First Appeal No. 709 of 1991. 4.4. The defendant No. 1, being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 709 of 1991, preferred Special Leave Appeal (Civil) Diary No. 6467 of 2018 before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court directed the appellant to vacate the suit property within a period of six months subject to filing of an undertaking before the Hon'ble Apex Court within a period of four weeks from passing of the order. 4.5. The Hon'ble Apex Court directed the appellant to vacate the suit property within a period of six months subject to filing of an undertaking before the Hon'ble Apex Court within a period of four weeks from passing of the order. 4.5. However, an Execution Application, being Regular Civil Darkhast Application No. 21 of 1993, was preferred by the original plaintiff-decree-holder wherein the present appellant lodged his objections under Order 21, Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was contended by the present appellant in his application that the concerned parties against whom the judgment and decree came to be passed, they were not having the possession of the suit property. The appellant was the affected party and he was residing in the suit property for considerable long period. That, without following due process of law, possession of the suit property cannot be vacated from the appellant. The learned Executing Court after hearing was pleased to reject the objections raised by the present appellant by his order dated 24th January, 2019 and directed for execution and implementation of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as to vacate the property of the subject-matter of the Regular Darkhast for taking over the possession of the suit property. 4.6. The present appellant as well as his other brothers have also preferred Regular Civil Suit No. 77 of 2018 against the respondents-original plaintiffs, which was pending before the Court of learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Palitana. 4.7. The present appellant, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 24th January, 2019 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Palitana in Regular Civil Darkhast Application No. 21 of 1993 whereby the objections of the appellant came to be rejected, preferred an appeal before the District Court, Bhavangar being Regular Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2019 challenging the order dated 24th January, 2019 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Palitana in Regular Civil Darkhast No. 21 of 1993. 4.8. The learned 5th Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar, after hearing the parties, was pleased to dismiss the appeal preferred by the present appellant vide order dated 7th March, 2019. Hence, this appeal. 5. 4.8. The learned 5th Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar, after hearing the parties, was pleased to dismiss the appeal preferred by the present appellant vide order dated 7th March, 2019. Hence, this appeal. 5. Following substantial question of law are framed to determine present appeal: A. Whether both the Courts below have committed substantial error of law in not considering and allowing the objections raised by the present appellant under the provisions of Order 21, Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure? The Question Nos. B, C, D, E, F as suggested by present appellant were not pressed to decide this appeal as they are not material. 6. Heard learned Counsel for the appellant and respondent respectively. 7. It was submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that the present appellant was the affected party and from the beginning at the time of filing of the suit and at the time of passing of the decree, he was in occupation and possession of the suit property. That, said aspect was within the knowledge of the Courts below, though without impleading the affected party, the suit came to be referred and proceeded further, and therefore, judgment and decree passed by the Hon'ble Courts are nullity and same would not be binding to the appellant-third party-objector. That, the decree cannot be executed by the Executing Court qua the present appellant as he was never heard by the Courts on merit without impleading the appellant as a party. It was further submitted that Courts below have committed substantial error of law in interpreting the provisions of Order 21, Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That, the appellant is in possession of the suit property in his individual capacity, and therefore, no adverse order would have been passed by the Courts below. That, the decree cannot be executed against the person who is not a party to the proceedings in which the decree came to be passed and came to be confirmed. That, the Executing Court has to consider the objections which were raised by the present appellant as third party and however without considering the aforesaid aspects, the Courts below have passed the judgment, and therefore, they are liable to be quashed and set aside. That, the Executing Court has to consider the objections which were raised by the present appellant as third party and however without considering the aforesaid aspects, the Courts below have passed the judgment, and therefore, they are liable to be quashed and set aside. Order passed by the Courts below suffers from substantial error of law, and therefore, it was requested by learned Counsel for the appellant to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the Executing Court as well as the First Appellate Court challenged by the appellant in the appeal. In support of his arguments, learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgments reported in Niyamat Ali, [ AIR 2008 SC 225 ]; Ranzeem-e-Sufia, [ AIR 2002 SC 3083 ]; Shreenath, [ AIR 1998 SC 1827 ]; Ram Swamp, [ AIR 1969 All. 440 ]; Bhagwat Narayan, [ AIR 1974 MP 26 ]. 8. From the otherside, learned Counsel for the respondents has strongly objected the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant submitting that the suit was filed by the plaintiff against the father of the present appellant and Baloch Kalukha Ilamkha. That, the defendant No. 1 was joined in the suit in his individual capacity and in the capacity of the representative of his family consisting of his sons as well as Karta of the family. It is undisputed fact that the suit filed by the plaintiff i.e. Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983 was decreed on 23rd April, 1991 and it was declared that the suit property was of the ownership of the original plaintiff. On 22nd December, 1993, Regular Civil Execution Application No. 21 of 1993 was filed by the original plaintiff before the Civil Court at Palitana. In the Execution Application preferred by the plaintiff, notice was issued to the original, defendant to remain present on 22nd December, 1993. It appears from the record produced before this Court that the said notice was signed by the present appellant on behalf of the original defendant. That, in the Order passed by the Executing Court on 24th January, 201.9, it was observed that the present appellant was aware about the facts of the suit filed by the plaintiff i.e. Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983. That, in the Order passed by the Executing Court on 24th January, 201.9, it was observed that the present appellant was aware about the facts of the suit filed by the plaintiff i.e. Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983. Thereafter, the defendant preferred the First Appeal No. 709 of 1991 before this Court, which also came to be dismissed by this Court. The appellant in First Appeal No. 709 of 1991 was the father of the present appellant. The present appellant did not file any appeal in his individual capacity, and therefore, waived his right to file the appeal in his individual capacity. The order passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 709 of 1991 was challenged by preferring S.L.P. before the Hon'ble Apex Court on 20th March, 2018. As per the direction issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court, undertaking was filed by the original defendant stating that the suit premises will be vacated within a period of six months. It also appears that in this connection original defendant has also filed an affidavit before the Civil Court at Palitana declaring that suit premises was vacated as per the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. When the original plaintiff approached for taking possession of the suit property, an obstruction was made by the defendant, and therefore, Regular Civil Execution Application No. 21 of 1993 was filed by the plaintiff. For the first time, on 4th October, 2018 the present appellant-son of the original defendant No. 1 filed the objections in the Regular Civil Execution Application No. 21 of 1993, which were came to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge, Palitana on 24th January, 2019. It also appears from the record that one Special Civil Application No. 2149 of 2019 was also preferred by the present appellant challenging the order passed in Execution Application and the same was withdrawn with a liberty to file First Appeal on 5th February, 2019. Thereafter, considering the evidence on record and agitating the issues, on 7th March, 2019 First Appeal was rejected by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar. 9. Thereafter, considering the evidence on record and agitating the issues, on 7th March, 2019 First Appeal was rejected by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar. 9. Under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the holder of a decree has prayed for possession of the suit properties after passing the decree by the Civil Court, if it was resisted and obstructed, may make an application before the Executing Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. 10. Under Order 21, Rule 101 - all questions (including questions relating to the right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, would be determined by the Court dealing with the application, and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. 11. The dispute raised by the present appellant in his application Exh. 46 before the Executing Court i.e. Regular Civil Execution (Darkhast) Application No. 21 of 1993 was that he was not joined as a party in Regular Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983 and he had interest in the suit property as he was staying since last many years as well as the defendants who were joined in Execution Petition were never in possession of the suit properties, were rightly considered by the Executing Court in its order. The Executing Court has observed in its order that notice Exh. 11 was forwarded to the defendant through the bailiff of the Civil Court at Palitana in 1994, wherein the objector has received the notice under his signature which was available in record. The statement of the objector that he was not aware with the proceedings and the order passed by the Court cannot be believed by the Court. 12. Now, if we refer the facts of the case of the original Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983 filed by the plaintiff, defendant No. 1-father of the present appellant was working as a watchman under the plaintiff and he was paid Rs. 100/- per month for the purpose of his duty. 12. Now, if we refer the facts of the case of the original Special Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983 filed by the plaintiff, defendant No. 1-father of the present appellant was working as a watchman under the plaintiff and he was paid Rs. 100/- per month for the purpose of his duty. The appellant in his objections before the Executing Court has not clarified that in what capacity the possession of the suit property was held by him. It was only averred that since last several years, he was in possession of the suit property and other documents were produced by him. Undisputedly, appellant is the son of original defendant No. 1 in the suit and was stayed with original defendant No. 1 at the time of filing of the suit by the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 was occupying the suit property as a servant of the plaintiff, who was taking care of the suit property as a watchman. While considering the aspect of possession and claim made on the basis of the possession, Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment of Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (Dead) Through L.Rs., reported in 2012 (5) SCC 370 , has clearly observed that possession is a flexible term and is not necessarily restricted to actual possession of the property. It was further observed that merely because a servant who is employed as a care taker or chowkidar or a watchman to look after the property cannot be said to have entered into the possession of the property. In paragraph No. 97, the Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed as under: "(1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand. (3) The Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand. (3) The Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. (4) The protection of the Court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour. (5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession." 13. Present appellant, being the son of the original defendant No. 1, who was working as a chowkidar would not get any better title or interest in the suit property as approved by the defendant No. 1, who is still alive. Alleging mere possession of the suit property in an individual capacity would not entitle the present appellant to occupy the same as per the issue decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court directing the father of the present appellant to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession within a period of six months in the S.L.P. (Civil) Diary No. 6467 of 2018 preferred by him. Affidavit of undertaking was also asked of the father of the present appellant in the aforesaid proceedings before the Hon'ble Apex Court vacating the premises within a period of six months from 20th March, 2018. As per the undertaking, the possession was handed over to the plaintiff. Now, being the son of the defendant No. 1, the appellant cannot raise a separate dispute under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure requesting the Executing Court to decide the issue of his alleged possession occupying it independently. When the decree assumed finality almost 26 years back, its execution cannot be objected by the appellant. When the objections are made by third party, Executing Court is not bound to stay its hands till full investigation is made. When the decree is passed by the High Court and confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Executing Court is the High Court itself. Therefore, Executing Court cannot entertain any application obstructing execution of the decree passed by the High Court. When the decree is passed by the High Court and confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Executing Court is the High Court itself. Therefore, Executing Court cannot entertain any application obstructing execution of the decree passed by the High Court. When the plaintiff-decree-holder has permitted the father of the present appellant to occupy the suit property in his own personal capacity, the present appellant being the son or any person claiming through him cannot resist the decree or again against the father even if he is one of the member of the joint family. Provision of Rule 97 of Order 21 is only permissive and not mandatory. On a objection of stranger, Court cannot start inquiry. The Executing Court has no jurisdiction to start an inquiry suo motu or at the instance of a third party other than the decree-holder or action predecessor under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The filing of application by decree-holder for resistance or removal of such obstruction is conditional precedent for applicability of Order 21, Rule 97. Here the Executing Court has applied its mind to the objections as well as various orders which were passed inter parties and found that the objections of the objector had no force. The objector-present appellant cannot complain that the Court should have framed issues regarding his objections and then proceeded with the inquiry. The words "All questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97", would refer only such questions as would legally arisen for determination between the parties. In other words, the Court is not obliged to determine the questions merely because resistance raised it. The questions which Executing Court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts, first is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties. 14. In case of Ram Swamp v. Mahabir Prasad, reported in AIR 1969 All. 440 , in application under Order 21, Rules 97, 99 obstruction was raised to deliver the possession. It was held that Court has to follow procedure laid down in Rule 97(2) and objections filed to application by objector in his own right are to be heard. 14. In case of Ram Swamp v. Mahabir Prasad, reported in AIR 1969 All. 440 , in application under Order 21, Rules 97, 99 obstruction was raised to deliver the possession. It was held that Court has to follow procedure laid down in Rule 97(2) and objections filed to application by objector in his own right are to be heard. Considering the order dated 24th January, 2019 passed by the Executing Court and order dated 7th March, 2019 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2019, it can never be said that objector was never heard by the Court. Opportunity of hearing was certainly given to the present appellant by the Courts below. Considering the facts of this case, the judgment is never helpful to the present appellant. 15. Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon a judgment in the case of Shreenath v. Rajesh, reported in AIR 1998 SC 1827 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paras 10, 14, 15 has held as under: "The expression "any person" under sub-clause (1) of Rule 97 is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so that the Executing Court could adjudicate the claim made in any such application under Order 21, Rule 97. Thus, by the use of the words 'any person', it includes all persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property even those not bound by the decree, includes tenants or other persons claiming right on their own including a stranger. Under the law as it stood prior to 1976 amendment as well as after the amendment the right of a tenant or any person claiming right on his own of the property in case he resists, his objection under Order 21, Rule 97, has to be decided by the Executing Court itself. Rule 100 of the old law and Rule 99 of the new law covers cases where persons other than judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder, of course, such cases are also covered to be decided by the Executing Court. But this will not defeat the right of such person to get his objections decided under Rule 97 which is a stage prior to his dispossession or a case where he is in possession. But this will not defeat the right of such person to get his objections decided under Rule 97 which is a stage prior to his dispossession or a case where he is in possession. In other words, when such person is in possession the adjudication is to be under Rule 97 and in case dispossessed, adjudication is to be under Rule 100 (old law) and Rule 99 under the new law. Thus, a person holding possession of an immovable property on his own right can object in the execution proceeding under Order 21, Rule 97. One has not to wait for his dispossession to enable him to participate in the execution proceedings. This shows that such person can object and get adjudication when he is sought to be dispossessed by the decree-holder." (Paras 10, 14, 15) In the cited case, the third party, who was claiming possession was independent tenant, therefore, it was held that he can get his claim adjudicated when he is sought to be dispossessed by the decree holder. The expression "any person" under sub-clause (1) of Rule 97 would certainly includes all persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property even those not bound by the decree, includes tenants or other persons claiming right on their own including a stranger. Here, the objector was a son of the defendant No. 1, who was serving as a chowkidar engaged by the plaintiff. As per the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) Diary No. 6467 of 2018, possession of the suit property or premises was handed over to the plaintiff and purshis was passed before the Hon'ble Apex Court. Thereafter, the present appellant/objector has raised the issue that he has an independent right in the suit property. Considering the facts of this peculiar case on hand, the appellant cannot be covered under the definition of "any person" as he has not disclosed in his application before the Executing Court that in what capacity he was in possession of the suit property. The judgment would not be helpful to the appellant. 16. In another case, in the matter between Ranzeem-e-Sufia v. Bibi Haliman, reported in AIR 2002 SC 3083 , third party was claiming independent right in the suit property and resisted the decree for possession. The decree-holder thereupon claiming writ of delivery of possession. The judgment would not be helpful to the appellant. 16. In another case, in the matter between Ranzeem-e-Sufia v. Bibi Haliman, reported in AIR 2002 SC 3083 , third party was claiming independent right in the suit property and resisted the decree for possession. The decree-holder thereupon claiming writ of delivery of possession. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that writ of delivery claimed was in fact and application under Order 21, Rule 97 could not have been decided without hearing objector. Refusing hearing on ground that objector had filed civil suit or that he should file objection under Order 21, Rule 99 was not proper. Here, the Executing Court has certainly given opportunity of hearing to the present appellant in application submitted by him. There was no case of the appellant-objector that no opportunity of hearing was given to him. Against the order passed by the Executing Court dismissing his application below Exh. 46 in Regular Civil Execution (Darkhast) Application No. 21 of 1993. Regular Civil Appeal No. 8 of 2019 was preferred by him which also came to be dismissed on merits. Considering the facts of the cited case and facts of the case on hand, the judgment would not be applicable and/or helpful to the appellant. 17. In case of Niyamat Ali Molla v. Sonargon Housing Co-operative Society Ltd., reported in AIR 2008 SC 225 , the applicants were not parties to the suit and were not bound by the decree. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that they would be entitled to take recourses to such remedies which were available to them in law including filing of an application under Order 21, Rules 97 and 99, if any occasion arises therefor. As per the facts of the case cited by learned Counsel for the appellant, in a suit for declaration and possession as also for damages, an ex-parte decree was passed against the appellant, who was arrayed as defendant No. 6 in the suit. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that so far the application for impleadment of the applicants, they being non-parties of the suit are not bound by the decree. Applicants themselves be entitled to take recourses to such remedies, which were available to them in law including filing of an application under Order 21, Rules 97 and 99, if any occasion arises therefor. Applicants themselves be entitled to take recourses to such remedies, which were available to them in law including filing of an application under Order 21, Rules 97 and 99, if any occasion arises therefor. As and when said applicants take recourses of law, the same has to be determined in accordance with the law. The present appellant has exhausted the remedy by filing his objections under Order 21, Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 vide Exh. 46 before the Executing Court in Regular Civil Execution (Darkhast) Application No. 21 of 1993, which was in turn decided on merits. The objections raised by the appellant were rightly decided by the Executing Court in its order dated 24th January, 2019. Considering the facts, this judgment would not be helpful to the present appellant as the remedy provided was certainly exhausted by him. 18. In case of Bhagwat Narayan Dwivedi v. Kasturi D/o. Ramdayal A.N.M., Civil Dispensary, Moren, reported in AIR 1974 MP 26 , in Para 27 it was observed as under: "27(1) Where a third person, who is not a judgment-debtor or is not otherwise bound by the decree, is in possession of the property, of which possession is to be delivered to a holder of the decree for possession or to an auction-purchaser, the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to remove him from possession and deliver possession to the decree-holder or auction purchaser, unless and until: (a) it holds that such a person is bound by the decree, or (b) it makes an order under Order 21, Rule 98, C.P.C., which presupposes the making of a complaint by the decree-holder under Order 21, Rule 97, of the Code. (2) As soon as the third person resists or obstructs delivery of possession, the Executing Court must stay its hands, until the decree-holder either satisfies it that such a person is bound by the decree, or makes an application under Order 21, Rule 97, complaining resistance or obstruction. (3) The third person can give intimation in writing to the Executing Court of his intention to resist or obstruct. It is not necessary that he should use force or there should be a show of force on his behalf at the spot. Such intimation may be given to the Court after or even before a warrant of possession is issued. It is not necessary that he should use force or there should be a show of force on his behalf at the spot. Such intimation may be given to the Court after or even before a warrant of possession is issued. (4) The enquiry must be summary and the proceeding must be disposed of expeditiously, being in mind its scope and the limited question to be decided. (5) If the Court finds that the resistance or obstruction was vexatious or frivolous, it may award heavy costs and also mesne profits." Here, the Executing Court has rightly decided the objections raised by the present appellant before the Executing Court, and thereafter, has come to the conclusion that the possession of the suit property for more than 34 years of the appellant cannot be accepted as the original defendants have submitted purshis vide Exh. 49 of vacating the possession of the suit property. This was the collusion of the defendant No. 1-father and the present appellant being the son not to comply with the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 115 of 1983. The resistance or obstruction from the appellant are frivolous and vexatious. This judgment would never be helpful to the present appellant. 19. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to accept the prayer made by the appellant and has found no error committed by the Courts below in not considering the objections raised by the present appellant under Order 21, Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. Accordingly, present appeal is hereby ordered to be dismissed. Order in Civil Application (For Stay) No. 1 of 2019 in Second Appeal No. 141 of 2019: In view of the order passed by this Court in Second Appeal, the Civil Application No. 1 of 2019 would not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.